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This dissertation presents the theory of ideas developed by Walter Benjamin in the 
“Epistemo-Critical Prologue” of his Trauerspiel book and thereby seeks to fill an existing 
gap in English-language Benjamin literature. On the one hand, it performs its task by closely 
reading this thinker’s early, epistemo-linguistic writings up to and including the “Prologue”: 
most prominently, “On Language as Such,” “The Program of the Coming Philosophy,” “The 
Concept of Criticism,” and the theoretically inclined sections of “Goethe’s Elective 
Affinities.” On the other, it does so by positioning Benjamin’s theory of language within 
existentialist philosophy and by applying his theory of ideas to post-war literary theory. It 
thus furnishes both a pre-history and a post-history of Benjamin’s theory of ideas. In the 
course of justifying its approach to Benjamin, the dissertation develops a methodology of 
“existential writing” and “second reading” whose emphasis falls on the ethical, political, 
epistemological, and metaphysical dimensions proper to the acts of writing and reading-
while-writing. Making use of the Platonic concepts of “bastard reasoning” and “khôra” 
alongside Kant’s transcendental ideas of Soul, Cosmos, and God, the dissertation reaches its 
end in defining Benjamin’s “idea” as a “non-synthesis” between concept and phenomenon, 
one accessible only to a linguistic operation of “virtual translation” which is itself a “non-
synthesis” between the methods of induction and deduction. Finally, the dissertation argues 
that art, philosophy, and critique can function as forms of “virtual translation” or “bastard 
reasoning” only insofar as they have a transcendental, ultimative, and revelatory character.  
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To my parents 
 
 
Sunt pueri pueri, 










On the other hand, take a man who thinks that a written 
discourse on any subject can only be a great amusement, that 
no discourse worth serious attention has ever been written in 
verse or prose, and that those that are recited in public without 
questioning and explanation, in the manner of the rhapsodes, 
are given only in order to produce conviction. He believes that 
at their very best these can only serve as reminders to those 
who already know. And he also thinks that only what is said 
for the sake of understanding and learning, what is truly 
written in the soul concerning what is just, noble, and good 
can be clear, perfect, and worth serious attention: Such 
discourses should be called his own legitimate children, first 
the discourse he may have discovered already within himself 
and then its sons and brothers who may have grown naturally 
in other souls insofar as these are worthy; to the rest, he turns 
his back. Such a man, Phaedrus, would be just what you and I 
both would pray to become. 
—Plato, Phaedrus 
 
When you are philosophizing you have to descend into 
primeval chaos and feel at home there. 
—Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value 
 
The act of authentic knowledge always ends in paradox and 
mystery. Only those who have the presumption of the known 
can imagine that, within the realm of authenticity, and thus 
of the spiritual, to know means to elucidate. For, to 
elucidate is the same as to destroy. 
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Hypocrite lecteur,—mon semblable—mon frère! 
—Charles Baudelaire, “Au lecteur” 
In this introduction I intend to make an inventory of my dissertation’s various elements, 
arguments, and limits. Its didactic form means to counterbalance the experimental and 
sometimes opaque nature of the dissertation itself, and thus make it accessible to the 
hurried reader’s use. I will start by delimiting its scope: loosely put, its subject matter 
(0.1). Next, I will place the dissertation within the academic context from which it arose, 
schematizing the secondary literature upon which it draws and with which it takes issue 
(0.2). Finally, I will provide an outline of each of the dissertation’s chapters, one to which 
I wish the reader will return whenever she feels lost in the thick of the text itself (0.3). 
It is a well-known fact that, just as there are several of “us” who write,1 so there are 
several of “us” who read. This dissertation has, as far as I can see, at least four ideal 
readers and may thus be understood as four books in one. Each can be “assigned” two 
sections of the work. To the academic reader—that is, the lover of knowledge—the 
“Introduction” (specifically, its third section) and “Conclusion” are sufficient for an 
understanding of what the dissertation grapples with, the ideas it puts forth, and the 
results that it obtains. The literary reader—which is to say, the literary theorist as much 
as the reader of literature—will find Chapters 1 (on writing) and 6 (on reading) most 
useful, seeing as they provide a methodology and stylistic guide that may serve as a way 
out of the impasse that her field has reached today. Chapters 2 and 5 are meant for the 
metaphysical or existential reader, for she who is concerned with that which may be most 
obscure and secretive because most fundamental: within them she will find a theory of 
language and ideas, but only, as is her nature, insofar as she can bracket that “blessed 
                                                 
1 “The two of us wrote Anti-Oedipus together. Since each of us was several, there was already 
quite a crowd.” Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 3. 
2 
 
rage for order” expressed sublimely by Wallace Stevens.2 Finally, the philological or 
hermeneutic reader, interested in the minute ciphers that every text contains, concerned 
with the empirical basis of the text’s interpretation, will find her satisfaction in the middle 
chapters of the dissertation, 3 and 4. It is my hope that just as these four readers meet 
within the writer of this dissertation, so they will meet within any one empirical reader.  
A final note is necessary. I am aware that the majority of this dissertation, with the 
exception of this “Introduction” and of the “Conclusion,” employs the noun “man” and 
the pronouns “he,” “his,” and “him.” Far from being a regressive statement of allegiance 
to the patriarchal history of philosophy, or the product of a naïve belief in philosophy as 
an apolitical domain, I’ve made this choice with the firm belief that an alteration of 
gender in the discourse of “first philosophy,” fashionable as it may be today,3 belongs to 
the most ineffective, opportunistic, and facile manner of “doing politics” while writing—
to what we might call “philosophical politicking.”4 There are greater stylistic risks to 
which one can expose philosophical writing so as to render it politically disruptive, risks 
that I haven’t shied away from taking. That this introduction, as much as the conclusion, 
nevertheless makes this gesture, speaks to the degree to which I regard it (or them) as 
extraneous to the dissertation proper.  
0.1 Subject Matter and Scope 
This dissertation’s focus is Walter Benjamin’s “ideas.” My primary, original intention 
was to explicate the “theory of ideas” that Benjamin puts forth in the “Epistemo-Critical 
                                                 
2 Wallace Stevens, “The Idea of Order at Key West,” in The Collected Poems (New York: Alfred 
K. Knopf, 1971), 130. 
3 This is typical of the speculative realist movement. For an example, see Quentin Meillassoux, 
After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, trans. Ray Brassier (London: 
Continuum, 2008). 
4 This is by no means to negate or undermine the authentic, fully-committed gendering of 
metaphysics put forth by feminist philosophy such as we can first find in Julia Kristeva’s 
Séméiôtiké (1969) and Luce Irigaray’s This Sex Which Is Not One (1977). It’s when this 
gendering is reduced to a mere gesture (especially made by male philosophers) that it loses its 
true political potential. 
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Prologue” of his 1925 Habilitationsschrift, the Origin of the German Trauerspiel.5 
Recognizing that this theory has a “pre-history,” however, I was compelled to start with 
Benjamin’s earliest writings in which “idea,” or an equivalent figuration of it, plays a 
central role. Since it makes its appearance at least as far back as his 1915 fragment, “Two 
Poems by Friedrich Hölderlin,” I relied on the following description that Benjamin gives 
of his own prologue: 
This introduction [to the Trauerspiel book] is an unmitigated chutzpah—that is to 
say, neither more nor less than the prolegomena to epistemology, a kind of second 
stage of my early work on language (I do not know whether it is any better), with 
which you [i.e., Gerhard Scholem] are familiar, dressed up as a theory of ideas.6 
My dissertation takes the “beginning” of Benjamin’s theory of ideas to be his 1916 “On 
the Language of Man and Language as Such,” devoting one full chapter to it (Chapter 2) 
and another to the “Prologue” itself (Chapter 5). I must note, however, that this is indeed 
a self-imposed limitation, a more or less arbitrary decision conveniently justified by 
Benjamin’s aforementioned remarks as well as by the words he writes above the 
Trauerspiel book’s dedication: “Conceived 1916 Written 1925.”7 I made this choice not 
                                                 
5 I borrow this rendering of Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels from Howard Eiland’s 
forthcoming translation. Additionally, as is evident from his letters, and as he himself claims on 
its first page, Benjamin finished the Trauerspiel book in 1925. 
6 Walter Benjamin, “To Gerhard Scholem (Frankfurt am Main, Februrary 19, 1925),” in The 
Correspondence of Walter Benjamin, 1910-1940, ed. Gershom Scholem and Theodore W. 
Adorno, trans. Manfred R. Jacobson and Evelyn M. Jacobson (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 1994), 261. To it can be added the following sentence from an earlier letter to Scholem: 
“You will again find something like an epistemological effort here [in the introduction to the 
Trauerspiel book], for the first time since my essay "On Language as Such and on the Language 
of Man." Walter Benjamin, “To Gerhard Scholem (Capri, June 13, 1924),” in The 
Correspondence of Walter Benjamin, 1910-1940, ed. Gershom Scholem and Theodore W. 
Adorno, trans. Manfred R. Jacobson and Evelyn M. Jacobson (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 1994), 242. This is no discovery on my part. Richard Wolin begins his chapter on 
Benjamin’s “Ideas and Theory of Knowledge” precisely with these two quotations. Richard 
Wolin, Walter Benjamin: An Aesthetics of Redemption (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1994), 80. 




due to a methodological conviction of the kind that holds the author’s thoughts about his 
own work to be paramount, but, at most, from considerations of economy. After all, 
every beginning is ultimately undecidable, and by this very virtue requires a pure 
decision.8 
Although I was also aware that Benjamin’s post-Trauerspiel writings could be seen as 
containing a “post-history” of his theory of ideas (most evidently the Arcades Project 
with its concept of “dialectical image”), my dissertation does not follow their course, 
coming to an end before the Trauerspiel prologue. It does this for three reasons. The first 
is “the turn” that I perceive to have occurred in Benjamin’s writing with the premature 
end of his academic career in 1925 and his 1926 visit to Moscow. Benjamin’s turn, in 
other words, away from the Neo-Kantian and phenomenological traditions to which his 
interest in a theory of ideas belonged,9 and towards Marxist dialectical materialism, with 
its explicit aversion to “ideas”10—a dream from which he would be woken only by the 
                                                 
8 For more on the beginning or beginnings, see Chapter 6, “On Second Reading.” 
9 Constructing a theory of ideas was of particular interest to a number German(-language) 
philosophers during the first half of the 1920s. The following is a list of such philosophers 
alongside the particular writings wherein they at least partially developed a theory of ideas. Neo-
Kantians: Ernst Cassirer—Idee und Gestalt (1921), “Eidos and Eidolon” (1924); Richard 
Hönigswald—“Vom Problem der Idee” (1926); Bruno Bauch—Die Idee (1926). (Realist) 
Phenomenologists: Jean Hering—“Bemerkungen über das Wesen, die Wesenheit, und die Idee” 
(1921); Hedwig Conrad-Martius—Realontologie (1923); Roman Ingarden—Essentiale Fragen 
(1925). Others: Franz Rosenzweig—The Star of Redemption (1921); Edwin Panofsky—Idea 
(1924). In addition, see Peter Fenves, The Messianic Reduction: Walter Benjamin and the Shape 
of Time (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011) for more on Benjamin’s relationship with 
Neo-Kantianism and phenomenology.  
10 See Abraham Socher’s “Revelation in the Rock: Gershom Scholem, Walter Benjamin and the 
Stones of Sinai,” The Times Literary Supplement, March 21, 2008. Herein, Socher recounts 
Scholem’s perception of Benjamin’s about-face. An insight into Benjamin’s new mindset (albeit 
at that point in time already quite old) is attainable from that fact that, in 1938 (when he met 
Scholem in Paris), he refused to condemn the Moscow show-trials. Additionally, Benjamin 
himself attests to a “turn” of sorts when, in a 1928 letter to Scholem, he distinguishes between 
two different cycles of writing, one German and one that starts with One-Way Street and would 
become the Arcades Project: “Once I have, one way or another, completed the project on which I 
am currently working, carefully and provisionally—the highly remarkable and extremely 
precarious essay ‘Paris Arcades: A Dialectical Fairy Play’ [‘Pariser Passagen: Eine dialektische 
Feerie’]—one cycle of production, that of One-Way Street, will have come to a close for me in 
much the same way in which the Trauerspiel book concluded the German cycle.” Walter 
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August 1939 signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.11 The extensive amount of 
already-existing secondary literature on Benjamin’s post-1925 writings, especially in the 
English-speaking world, constitutes my second reason. Finally, the third and final reason 
has to do with the fact that a given text is continued by its own author—in her later 
texts—only finitely, that a text always retains further possible continuations. Technically 
speaking, however, I consider only this last reason to be methodologically justifiable.12 
In sum, my dissertation deals with Benjamin’s 1916 to 1925 writings. Given that its focus 
is Benjamin’s theory of ideas, however, I consider only those writings that fit in two of 
the five categories by which the seventh volume of the Gesammelte Schriften organizes 
Benjamin’s fragments of that period. Namely, the writings “Zur Sprachphilosophie und 
Erkenntniskritik” and “Zur Ästhetik,” and not those “Zur Moral und Anthropologie,” 
“Zur Geschichtsphilosophie, Historik, und Politik,” or contained within “Charakteristiken 
und Kritiken.”13 The reader will therefore note the absence of some of Benjamin’s most 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
Benjamin, “To Gerhard Scholem (Berlin, January 30, 1928),” in The Correspondence of Walter 
Benjamin, 1910-1940, ed. Gershom Scholem and Theodore W. Adorno, trans. Manfred R. 
Jacobson and Evelyn M. Jacobson (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1994), 322. I should note 
that this is the quotation with which Howard Caygill begins his Benjamin book. Howard Caygill, 
Walter Benjamin: The Color of Experience (London: Routledge, 1998), x. Finally, my decision 
could be seen as an echo of the one Benjamin makes vis-à-vis his dissertation: just as he turns 
away from Friedrich Schlegel’s ideas and the Romantic tradition at the point where they become 
politically compromised (beginning around 1802/04), so I turn away from Benjamin circa 1925. 
11 Perhaps the most accurate assessment of Benjamin’s Trauerspiel book (or, better yet, its 
“Prologue”) would situate it between his first, Neo-Kantian/phenomenological period and his 
second, Marxist period. In this sense, we may speak of an “early” Benjamin (1910-1925) and a 
“late” Benjamin (1925-1940). The Trauerspiel book could be said to be Benjamin’s Krisis-book. 
It is, then, precisely his attempt to adapt the theory of ideas to dialectical materialism that grants it 
its originality. Significantly, Beatrice Hanssen’s book on Benjamin makes a similar point about 
the “Prologue.” See Beatrice Hanssen, Walter Benjamin’s Other History: Of Stones, Animals, 
Human Beings, and Angels (Berkeley: University of California Press), 38. 
12 I explicate this methodological principle further in Chapter 6, “On Second Reading.” 
13 See Walter Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften VI, ed. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann 
Schweppenhäuser (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991). I’m aware that this volume contains 
two further sections of fragments, “Zur Literaturkritik” and “Betrachtungen und Notizen.” 
Benjamin wrote the fragments contained within them after 1925, however. 
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important, and commented upon works from those years: “Fate and Character,” “Critique 
of Violence,” “Capitalism as Religion,” the majority of “Goethe’s Elective Affinities”—
excepting its few, purely theoretical parts, along with the fragments wherein they were 
drafted—and, finally, the “exegetical” part of the Trauerspiel book (that is, the parts 
entitled “Trauerspiel and Tragedy” and “Allegory and Trauerspiel”). Such exclusion is 
characteristic of his theory of ideas, especially in its initial stages, lying as it does at the 
intersection of epistemology, metaphysics, the philosophy of language, aesthetics, and 
literary theory. In following such a theory, my dissertation can be said to lie at the same 
disciplinary intersection. 
Finally, the reader may wonder at the presence of the word “preposterous” in the title of 
this dissertation, a word that evinces a play on Benjamin’s concepts of “pre-“ and “post-
history.” She may expect, as is typical of a “traditional” philosophy dissertation, to read a 
history of the concept of “idea.” Such a dissertation would contain a first part (“pre-
history”) covering the “life” of the idea from Plato to Husserl (passing at least through 
the philosophers explicitly mentioned by Benjamin in the “Prologue”: Leibniz and 
Hegel), a second part in which Benjamin’s theory is explained with regard to those 
presented in the first part, and a third part (“post-history”) which would trace the 
influence of Benjamin’s theory on subsequent theories of the idea (in, for instance, 
Heidegger, Adorno, “French Theory,” the German Poetik und Hermeneutik group, and 
“Italian Theory”).14 And, indeed, my initial rendering of the dissertation’s title placed 
“history” after “preposterous” so as to signal the intention of precisely such an ambitious 
project. But that, in reading Benjamin’s writings with the purpose of conceptualizing 
such a theory, and trying to articulate this theory in writing, I came across difficulties 
which significantly altered my methodological principles—which, that is, imposed upon 
                                                 
14 The “pre-history” of such a project would be more or less synonymous with the history of 
philosophy (writ large) up to 1925, to which would have to be added the already mentioned 
works by Cassirer, Hering, Conrad-Martius, and Panofsky, as well as Hermann Cohen’s 
“Mathematics and Plato’s Doctrine of Ideas” (1878), Paul Natorp’s Plato’s Doctrine of Ideas 
(1903), and Nicolai Hartmann’s Plato’s Logic of Being (1909). On the other hand, the “post-
history” would include, without being limited to: Martin Heidegger (specifically his 1931/2 
lectures on “The Essence of Truth”), Theodor Adorno, Hans Blumenberg, Péter Szondi, Gilles 
Deleuze, Alain Badiou, Jean-Luc Nancy, Giorgio Agamben, and Massimo Cacciari. 
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me a type of infinite close reading (and “close writing”) that drastically reduced the 
amount of philosophers wherewith my dissertation could consistently engage.15 In short, 
I realized that, to commit to a close reading of the theory of ideas across the history of 
philosophy as a whole (even if only seen from the perspective of Benjamin’s own theory) 
would be to undertake a work dozens of volumes in length, a work perhaps only 
accomplishable in several lifetimes.16 
This is not to say, however, that my dissertation is absent of a “pre-“ and “post-“ history 
of Benjamin’s theory. Instead, the reader should understand the two terms as each having 
a primary reference ulterior to the one that she might presuppose: the first referring to 
Benjamin’s pre-“Prologue” writings (analyzed in Chapters 2, 3, and 4), the second to the 
methodology that I derive from post-war philosophy and literary theory (put forth in 
Chapters 1 and 6). It’s only secondarily that each term is involved in the more “common” 
reference: “pre-history” to the few places where I invoke Plato, Kant, or Hegel; “post-
history” to those wherein I bring Deleuze, Derrida, Nancy, or Agamben into play. What I 
will kindly ask the reader is to keep in mind, however, that this secondary reference—
which is to say, the use of the above-named philosophers—is schematic at best; that, 
having limited my close reading to Benjamin’s writings, I can’t claim the quality of 
interpretation regarding these philosophers that I can regarding Benjamin. 
0.2 Scholarly Context 
Part of my impetus for writing this dissertation was an evident gap in English-language 
“Benjamin criticism”: namely, that which hangs over Benjamin’s “Prologue.” This text 
has received substantially less treatment than have his other essays and works, even those 
from the same period, whether it be a matter of “On Language,” “The Coming 
                                                 
15 Chapters 1 and 6 are accounts of the methodology that I found myself developing in engaging 
with Benjamin’s writings. 
16 That I thereafter (after I had written most of the dissertation) discovered such a “classical” 
interpretation (of the kind I initially wanted to undertake) to more or less already exist in the 




Philosophy,” “The Concept of Criticism,” “Critique of Violence,” “The Task of the 
Translator,” “Goethe’s Elective Affinities,” or the main body of the Trauerspiel book 
itself.17 A likely explanation may be the highly philosophical nature of the “Prologue” in 
contrast to the contexts wherein Benjamin’s work is usually studied and engaged with: 
Departments of English, German, Political Science, Art History, and Media Studies.18 
Yet this still doesn’t account for why “The Coming Philosophy” has received attention 
where the “Prologue” has not. A significant example is Peter Fenves’ The Messianic 
Reduction, a study that approaches Benjamin’s early writings in a rigorous philosophical 
key, and even announces itself as an attempt at contributing to an understanding of the 
“Prologue,”19 but stops short of actually engaging with the latter among other of 
Benjamin’s early philosophical writings (doing so without any explicit justification on 
Fenves’ behalf). I would wager, then, that it’s less the philosophical character of the 
“Prologue” and more the Platonism it apparently embraces by putting forth a theory of 
ideas—“Platonism” being something with which post-war continental philosophy 
(wherein Benjamin’s writings were and still are received) has been most explicitly 
                                                 
17 For example, the “Critique of Violence” and the “Concept of Romanticism” have entire 
collections of essays assigned to them—see Towards the Critique of Violence, ed. Brendan 
Moran and Carlo Salzani (London: Bloomsbury, 2015) and Walter Benjamin and Romanticism, 
ed. Beatrice Hanssen and Andrew Benjamin (London: Continuum, 2002), respectively—while 
not a single essay is devoted to the “Prologue” in the collection Walter Benjamin’s Philosophy: 
Destruction and Experience, ed. Peter Osborne and Andrew Benjamin (London: Routledge, 
1994). 
18 This is no less true of the German academic context. See David S. Ferris, “Critical Reception,” 
in The Cambridge Introduction to Walter Benjamin (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), 136-45, and Uwe Steiner, “Reception,” in Walter Benjamin: An Introduction to His 
Work and Thought, trans. Michael Winkler (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 180-4. 
19 “The study undertaken here seeks to make up for this lacuna by determining the point where 
Benjamin’s philosophical investigations, which culminate in the ‘Epistemo-Critical Preface’ to 
the Origin of the German Mourning Play, part ways with ‘Husserl’s philosophy.’” Peter Fenves, 
The Messianic Reduction (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 2. 
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uncomfortable20—that has allocated the “Prologue” to the margins of Benjamin 
criticism.21 
There are, nevertheless, several works of secondary literature that do undertake an 
exegesis of, or at least attempt to conceptualize, the “Prologue.” They tend to fall into 
several categories, without necessarily being exclusive to any particular one. First of all, 
there are those works which, in order to decipher the “Prologue,” rely on biography and 
intellectual history. In other words, they make proficient use of “Benjamin’s intention,” 
as stated in his letters and conversations and as shaped by his readings and the events in 
his life, in order to give the “Prologue” a central, unifying theme and argument. The 
relevant sections in Richard Wolin’s An Aesthetic of Redemption, Rainer Rochlitz’s The 
Disenchantment of Art, John McCole’s Walter Benjamin and the Antinomies of Tradition, 
and Beatrice Hanssen’s Walter Benjamin’s Other History all follow this general 
schema.22 Second are those works that read the “Prologue” through (i) contemporary 
philosophers, (ii) philosophers that Benjamin makes reference to but which are 
interpreted, by the given scholar, in a contemporary fashion, or (iii) the terms of 
contemporary philosophy. Herein, Benjamin is ultimately subsumed to the concepts 
readily accessible to a later audience. This is the case, most explicitly, for Rodolphe 
                                                 
20 I’m thinking herein mostly of post-structuralism and Marxist critical theory, both of which rely 
precisely on doing away with the “eternity” that typifies Platonic ideas. Perhaps a good title for a 
book on post-war philosophy would read Ideas and their Discontents. 
21 And, with it, most of the works cited above (footnote 9) which aimed to present a theory of 
ideas, none (except the Panofsky and one of Cassierer’s essays) having as yet been translated into 
the English. 
22 The two intellectual contexts through which these works decipher the “Prologue” tend to be 
Neo-Kantianism and the early Frankfurt School. Wolin, for instance, invokes Bloch on utopia and 
Lukács and Adorno on the essay, more or less assimilating Benjamin’s argument to theirs. Wolin, 
Walter Benjamin, 85-105. Rochlitz invokes Heidegger and Lukács, while also claiming that 
Benjamin’s description of the “Prologue” as “dressed up in a theory of ideas” must be interpreted 
to evince an intended dissimulation on Benjamin’s behalf. Rainer Rochlitz, The Disenchantment 
of Art: The Philosophy of Walter Benjamin, trans. Jane Marie Todd (New York: The Guilford 
Press, 1996), 32-8. On the other hand, McCole contextualizes Benjamin within—and as 
opposing—the resurgent “idealist aesthetics” of the time. John McCole, Walter Benjamin and the 
Antinomies of Tradition (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 148-171. And Hanssen 
makes sure to invoke Cohen, Nietzsche, Windelband, Rickert, and Thorleif Boman in her study. 
Hanssen, Walter Benjamin’s Other History, 42-4. 
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Gasché’s “Saturnine Vision and the Question of Difference,” Samuel Weber’s 
Benjamin’s –abilities, and Dominik Finkelde’s “The Presence of the Baroque.”23 Third of 
all, there are those works interested in finding a place for Benjamin’s “Prologue” within 
the history of philosophy, and which, in order to do so, transpose his theory into another 
philosopher’s terms: Howard Caygill’s Walter Benjamin: The Color of Experience, 
Fenves’ “Of Philosophical Style—from Leibniz to Benjamin,” Ilit Ferber’s “Melancholy 
and Truth” chapter from his Philosophy and Melancholy, and Jan Urbich’s Benjamin and 
Hegel being the most evident examples.24 Three significant exceptions can be noted: 
David S. Ferris’ Cambridge Introduction to Walter Benjamin, Kristina Mendicino’s 
“Before Truth,” and Eli Friedlander’s Walter Benjamin. But that, Ferris achieves this 
primarily on account of compartmentalizing Benjamin into chapters reading “Life” 
(biography) “Contexts” (intellectual history) and “Works,” Mendicino only explores the 
first sentence of Benjamin’s “Prologue” (albeit she opens it up to a larger discussion of 
the text) and therefore fully thinks through only Benjamin’s concept of “presentation,” 
while Friedlander, using the Arcades Project as the organizing element of his study, often 
resorts to anachronism.25 
                                                 
23 To be precise, Gasché speaks of Benjamin in terms borrowed from the philosophical currents 
popular at the time of his essay’s publication (1986), referring to “pure (or: radical) difference” 
and “the Other.” Rodolphe Gasché, “Saturnine Vision and the Question of Difference: 
Reflections on Walter Benjamin’s Theory of Language,” Studies in 20th Century Literature 11, 
no.1 (January 1986): 82-7. Weber starts his discussion of the “Prologue” by invoking Derrida’s 
theses on iterability just as he prefaces his discussion of Benjamin’s “On Language” with an 
explanation of Deleuze’s concept of the virtual. Samuel Weber, Benjamin’s –abilities 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008). 4-34. And Finkelde makes use of Deleuze’s 
concept of the fold. Dominik Finkelde, “The Presence of the Baroque: Benjamin’s Ursprung des 
deutschen Trauerspiels in Contemporary Contexts,” in A Companion to the Works of Walter 
Benjamin, ed. Rolf J. Goebel (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2009), 52-62. 
24 While Caygill heavily relies on Kant (having published A Kant Dictionary three years prior to 
his study on Benjamin) and Urbich on Hegel, Fenves and Ferber read Benjamin through Leibniz. 
See (i) Jan Urbich, Benjamin and Hegel: A Constellation in Metaphysics (Girona: Catedra Walter 
Benjamin, 2014), (ii) Peter Fenves, “Of Philosophical Style—From Leibniz to Benjamin,” 
boundary 2 30, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 67-87, and (iii) Ilit Ferber, “Melancholy and Truth,” in 
Philosophy and Melancholy: Benjamin’s Early Reflections on Theatre and Language (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2013), 163-194. 
25 “This state of things has led me to adopt a peculiar method to address the problem—a method, I 
might add, commensurate with the difficulties the task presents. I chose The Arcades Project as a 
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In sum, what these limitations result in are commentaries on Benjamin’s “Prologue” 
which either engage with it only in a superficial manner, by summarizing or re-phrasing 
it, concerned as they are more with finding the right labels for Benjamin’s theory than 
with philosophical argument, or—where they attempt a deeper philosophical analysis—
present Benjamin’s theory of ideas from the viewpoint of Kant, Leibniz, Hegel, “late 
Benjamin,” or a term (in the “Prologue”) other than that of the “idea.”26 Put differently, 
the vast majority of Benjamin criticism on the “Prologue” consists of what I would call 
weaker or stronger versions of “meta-commentary”: a way of formulating arguments 
about a certain text that exchanges the assay to think through the said text for its 
simplification or familiarization.27 And this is no less true of Benjamin criticism in 
general (and perhaps “criticism” in toto). After all, the two major philosophical works on 
Benjamin published this decade, Fenves’ already-mentioned The Messianic Reduction 
and Gerhard Richter’s Inheriting Walter Benjamin, fit either into the first or the second 
category of Benjamin studies while altogether skirting the “Prologue”: Fenves discusses 
“The Coming Philosophy” by contextualizing it within the three currents of philosophy 
popular at the time of its writing (Neo-Kantianism, phenomenology, and logicism), while 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
focal point to bring out Benjamin’s thinking as a totality. […] That is to say, I construe The 
Arcades Project as the most extreme attempt to realize the task Benjamin set himself in 
philosophy.” Eli Friedlander, Walter Benjamin: A Philosophical Portrait (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2012), 2. For the Mendicino, see Kristina Mendicino, “Before Truth: 
Walter Benjamin’s Epistemo-Critical Prologue,” Qui Parle 26, no.1 (June 2017): 19-60. 
26 I should add that Mendicino’s focus on “presentation” over “idea” is not the only case in which 
one term is privileged over the “idea” in Benjamin criticism of the “Prologue.” See Hans-Jost 
Frey, “On Presentation in Benjamin, in Walter Benjamin: Theoretical Questions, ed. David S. 
Ferris (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1996), 139-64 and the already-mentioned works by Hanssen and 
Fenves (specifically, “Of Philosophical Style”), all of which engage with the idea only through 
another term: “presentation,” “origin,” and “monad,” respectively. We can likely attribute this 
fact to the general anti-Platonism of post-war continental philosophy. Furthermore, these works 
may be said to make up a fourth category of Benjamin studies on the “Prologue.” 
27 I must refer the reader to “On Second Reading” for more. Therein I call such meta-
commentaries examples of “writing-on.” 
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Richter can’t keep from making use of Žižek, Derrida, Badiou, and Heidegger, among 
others, as points of contrast or clarifying figures.28 
I can’t, then, but agree, at least in spirit, as much with Alison Ross’ assessment that 
Benjamin criticism is made up of “various impressionistic theses” which ultimately 
render Benjamin’s writings seemingly resistant to “theory formation”29 as with Kristina 
Mendicino’s assertion that Bernd Witte’s insistence “on careful readings of the complex 
structure of Benjamin’s texts” should also be oriented towards the “Prologue.”30 Except 
that, herein, I’m interested neither in facilitating the entrance of the “Prologue” into “the 
field of scientific debate,” as Ross implicitly suggests should be done with Benjamin’s 
writings in general,31 nor in further determining the intellectual-philosophical-historical 
nexus wherein the “Prologue” sits by “turn[ing] […] to Hermann Güntert’s Von der 
Sprache der Götter und Geister and Hermann Usener’s Götternamen, which form 
important threads throughout Benjamin’s text” or by “elaborat[ing] carefully the relation 
between Benjamin’s discussion of the idea and that of Florens Christian Rang.”32 For 
both of these are only further instances of meta-commentary. Instead, while being quite 
aware of the extent to which any one of Benjamin’s writings, in this case the “Prologue,” 
functions much as does a roly-poly (insistently returning to its esoteric post after every 
conceptualizing poke), my dissertation will attempt to construct a theory of Benjamin’s 
                                                 
28 “Whatever else may be said of the concept of experience that Benjamin proposes, its 
corresponding concept of knowledge is of a piece with at least three philosophical movements of 
the period that seek to secure their scientific character, each in its own way: the Marburg school, 
to which Benjamin explicitly refers; phenomenology, which he briefly mentions; and the 
‘logistical’ programs advanced by Russell and Frege, to which he alludes in its final pages.” 
Fenves, The Messianic Reduction, 157. For Richter, see Gerhard Richter, Inheriting Walter 
Benjamin (London: Bloomsbury, 2016). 
29 Alison Ross, Walter Benjamin’s Concept of the Image (London: Routledge, 2015), 14. In this 
cited footnote, Ross takes up, and cites, Axel Honneth’s assessment of Benjamin criticism while 
rejecting his notion that this is due to Benjamin’s writings themselves. Their “resistance to theory 
formation” are Honneth’s words, rather than Ross’. 
30 Mendicino. “Before Truth,” 47. 
31 Ross, ibid. Again, the words I cite are in fact from Honneth. By citing and rejecting Honneth’s 
entire thesis, Ross implicitly affirms what he negates. 
32 Mendicino, “Before Truth,” 56. 
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ideas from a careful, close, even philological reading of his texts in their full complexity. 
It will do this without making recourse to meta-commentary, that is, without “clearly and 
distinctly” presenting this theory either by simplifying it into one thesis (and thus: 
transposing it into an alternative set of terms) or by capturing it in a philosophico-
historical nexus33—and will, therefore, continue it. In this way, I aim to fill in not only a 
critical gap around Benjamin’s “Prologue,” specifically the meaning it attributes to the 
term “idea,” but also a “methodological” gap: the lack of any readings of Benjamin’s 
writings that are able both to be sustained close readings and to “develop” his texts in a 
philosophical key. 
0.3 Dissertation Outline 
The dissertation’s chapters are arranged in the order of their composition, with the 
exception of this “Introduction” and the “Conclusion” (which were written last).34 It is 
made of six chapters: two “outer” methodological chapters, treating “writing” (Chapter 1) 
and “reading” (Chapter 6), and four “inner” exegetical chapters, attending, in turn, to 
Benjamin’s “On Language” essay (Chapter 2), the manuscriptal theoretical-aesthetic 
fragments and letters that he wrote between 1916 and 1917 (Chapter 3), a selection of the 
theoretical-aesthetic writings (both contemporaneously published and manuscriptal) that 
he wrote between 1918 and 1922 (Chapter 4), and, finally, his “Prologue” to the 
Trauerspiel book (Chapter 5). While the first two exegetical chapters employ the method 
or form announced by their title—Chapter 2 “deduction” and Chapter 3 “induction”—the 
last two exegetical chapters constitute, from this same formal-methodological viewpoint, 
two different attempts at reconciling the first two—Chapter 4 by means of “synthesis,” 
                                                 
33 That I nevertheless do this in the “Introduction” and “Conclusion” should be interpreted by the 
reader to mean that several different introductions and conclusions to this dissertation are 
ultimately possible. 
34 That Chapter 1, “What is an Existential Writing?” has, as part of its title, the parenthetical 
“Methodology II,” while Chapter 6, “On Second Reading,” is similarly marked with 
“Methodology I” is due not to an intent, on my behalf, to confuse the reader but, rather, to the fact 
that the first section that I finished writing was a version of what is now “On Second Reading”—
a version, entitled “Of Primary and Secondary,” ultimately proving so inadequate and therefore 
having to be re-written to such a degree that it became unthinkable for me to place (or replace) 
“On Second Reading” first (that is, to make it “Chapter 1”). 
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Chapter 5 by “non-synthesis.” I leave a further explanation of what these terms mean to 
the relevant sections below. 
0.3.1 What is an Existential Writing? 
In this first chapter, my main objective was to provide a preliminary “methodology of 
writing,” more commonly known as a stylistic guide, for the dissertation as a whole. I 
meant, namely, to outline the elements and philosophically justify the use of what I call 
“existential writing.” The chapter presents two complexly interrelated layers of argument 
corresponding to the two levels of the text: the main text and the citations-footnotes. 
While the first can be said to constitute an exercise in “pure” philosophy, the second 
means to function as an “entry” in the history of philosophy. Henceforth, I am to outline 
the two in separate sections, (0.3.1.1) and (0.3.1.2), reserving a final section for a 
discussion of this chapter’s form, (0.3.1.3). It is in section 0.3.1.2 that I will account for 
the sources or texts with which the chapter engages. 
0.3.1.1 Main Text 
The chapter begins with a critique of what we might usually associate with the term 
“existential writing”—namely, the writing that was practiced and theorized by the 
philosophers who stood under the banner of “existentialism.” I argue that the writing 
“done” by the existentialists is marked by a separation of content from form, that the 
existentialist philosophy they describe in their writings—which places the greatest value 
on risk, freedom, responsibility, angst, nausea, and engagement—is not practiced by their 
writings. That, interested in the worldly, inter-subjective sphere of action over and above 
the solitary realm of “creation,” the existentialists adopted an instrumental theory of 
language and writing, associating the writing proper to existentialism with prose (which 
they qualify as being inherently social-utilitarian and detached from language) rather than 
poetry (which they regard as solipsistic-religious and attached to language). What this 
means, however—and herein lies my critique—is that, while the writing practiced by the 
existentialists may intend to orient itself towards “existence,” its prosaic form in fact 
contributes to the further reification of the latter (that is, to the further annihilation of 
being’s singularity, to the reduction of the risk-freedom-angst-nausea that it manifests). 
15 
 
With this in mind, I provisionally argue, against the existentialists, that the only type of 
writing that can properly be called existential must, within their terms, be poetic 
writing—a writing that, by supplementing the prose-poetry dichotomy with the classical-
modern one, I show not to be limited to the literary genre called “poetry,” but to be 
extendable to any genre of writing (including prose). 
In a subsequent step, I posit this notion of poetic writing as itself in need of being 
overcome insofar as it can easily lead to an idolatry of words and of formulae that 
ultimately reifies being no less than does prose (insofar as poetry sees its verses as having 
“captured” being, as having brought it to a halt inside them). Such overcoming, I argue, 
can only be realized by eliminating the unsayable from language, which is to say, by no 
longer believing either that writing can be the expression of the Muses or that it can 
represent the elements—and thus facilitate the advent—of some utopian Cause. For it is 
precisely the notion that the unsayable can be present within language that the 
existentialists presuppose when they distinguish between prose and poetry—the 
distinction being merely one over which unsayable it is that each expresses (Justice, 
Freedom, Community or the Created, the Real, the Divine, respectively)—and that 
ultimately grounds the reifying function that they (these two forms) share: the reification 
of language either as a mere tool or as a definitive, exemplary result—in both cases 
ultimately spilling over into a reification of being, which by its nature fits no tool or 
formula. Vis-à-vis the categories of poetry, prose, and existential writing, then, such an 
elimination of the unsayable entails a prosification of poetry, a “detached attachment” to 
language on the writer’s behalf. It therefore remains accurate to claim that existential 
writing is poetic (it having to start from attachment), but only as long as we add the 
qualification, “in a prosaic way” (it being necessary that a certain degree of detachment 
intervene). This prosification or detachment, I argue, is instantiated by an exercise of (not 
radical but only ever specific) doubt in regard to the validity or accuracy of particular 
formulae (and therefore also: to the presence of the unsayable within them), an exercise 
that I call “inner dialogue” and that consequently serves as the essential core of 
existential writing. Only such an existential writing, excising the unsayable from words 
and thus “transforming” them from tools-mirrors-cages “for” being (back) into “mere 
words,” themselves beings, allows them to intimate that unsayable being. Thus, in 
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attitude and effect more than appearance and technique, existential writing can be 
considered apophatic. 
Given that the existentialists saw writing as a means for ultimately political ends (as, in 
other words, a form of engagement)—this being at the very heart of their rejection of the 
poetic in favor of the prosaic—my conceptualization of existential writing also functions 
as a critique of political writing. It is for this reason that I introduce a distinction between 
the realm of the had (loosely: the past) and the realm of being (similarly: the present), 
where the former is precisely than that to which both words and being are delivered as a 
result of their reification at the hands of “pure detachment” or “pure attachment.” For, 
when each is taken alone, prose relies on having (and keeping) the signified (regardless 
of the signifier, and thus tending to invent for it a new one) while poetry intends to have 
(and repeat) the signifier (no matter its “ordinary” signified). This while they both 
imagine themselves to in fact be rejecting the realm of the had (a realm that, after all, is 
co-extensive with those of economy-capital and profanity-humanity) altogether, by doing 
away either with the signifier (prose) or with the signified (poetry). In this context, 
bearing the name “fabrication,” existential writing’s “detached attachment,” being an 
exercise in doubting the signifier(s) to which poetry holds, reactivates the word, shows 
the signifier, as much as its complementary signified, to be an act, returns what appears 
as a final product to the process whence it emerged, and, instead of professing 
independence from the had, acknowledges the latter by stitching it back together with 
being. Seeing that the political is always only present within a certain layer of the had, 
namely, the had-together-past we know as our institutions or the state, the result of 
multiple had-pasts being merged together, existential writing, although lacking the power 
to immediately submit the entirety of the had-together-past to being, can nevertheless do 
so indirectly: for, in returning even one had-past to being, it breaks up the unity of the 
had-together-past, and therefore forces it to reassemble under a new flag. This function, I 
argue, is what renders existential writing more politically effective than the writing of the 
existentialists, for they, albeit always under the guise of rejecting the had altogether, 
ultimately just try to impose one had-together-past (even that of the immediate past) over 
another, not realizing that there’s only ever one had-together-past, and that their act 
therefore only serves as its confirmation. Ironically, it’s precisely by not engaging in the 
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battle between “different” had-together-pasts that the existential writer is the one who’s 
most politically engaged. 
Finally, I argue that, despite existential writing theoretically being able to restitute any 
had to being, a few exceptions do exist, exceptions that constitute the stylistic contour of 
existential writing. These are, namely, the preterite tense and what I show to be its 
spiritual kin: the use, within academic writing, of first- and second-person pronouns 
(singular and plural), proper names, jargon, and authoritative citations. Finally, the rest of 
the chapter: (i) outlines the manner in which each said exception safeguards academic 
writing from criticism, risk, responsibility, and the appearance of inconsistency or 
contradiction; (ii) suggests that the middle voice is the one most suitable to existential 
writing and that this voice is most at home in the English on account of this language’s 
unique use of the progressive tense; (iii) divorces existential writing from mystical 
writing by, on the one hand, constructing a theory of silence and, on the other, 
differentiating it (existential writing) from the journal, the fragment, and automatic 
writing; and (iv) claims existential writing to be as hypocritical and dishonest as any 
other form of writing, but the only one among them which is so lucidly. 
I should say, in addition, that the reader should understand the chapter in question to also 
function as a rough introduction to the dissertation. This first and foremost (i) insofar as it 
puts forth a set of false disjunctions—namely, prose or poetry and attachment or 
detachment—which, as the reader will later note, broadly resemble those of “bourgeois 
language” or “mystical language,” “deduction” or “induction,” and “the Romantics” or 
“Goethe,” and (ii) inasmuch as it attempts to find a middle term between them—namely, 
fabrication. Furthermore, by discussing muteness and silence (in its last paragraphs), 
especially in the context of “creation,” this chapter prepares the way for the next 
chapter’s thematization of these same themes as they occur in Benjamin’s “On 
Language” essay. 
0.3.1.2 Citational Footnotes 
What this chapter ultimately turns on, what it attempts to elucidate and further develop, is 
Benjamin’s 1916 letter to Martin Buber wherein he argues that, for writing to truly be 
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politically effective, it must engage in a crystal-pure elimination of the unsayable in 
language. Benjamin’s letter constitutes at once a response to Buber’s request for a 
contribution (from Benjamin) to his new journal, Der Jude, and a concerted effort to 
overturn the Austrian philosopher’s conception of language and writing. Benjamin finds 
this conception to be present, on the one hand, within Buber’s introductory article to the 
inaugural, April 1916 issue of Der Jude, “Die Losung”35—to which Benjamin explicitly 
alludes in speaking of “the contributions to the first volume […] especially their position 
on the European war”36—and, on the other hand, within Buber’s introduction to his 1909 
Ecstatic Confessions, “Ecstasy and Confession”37—to which Benjamin implicitly alludes 
by focusing on one of its central terms, the “unsayable.” 
In sum, the 1909 introduction posits that ecstasy, or ecstatic experience (as Buber claims 
has been suffered by various mystics throughout history), is the soul’s or the I’s 
experience of itself and therefore the individual’s unification with herself and with the 
world, an experience lying beyond language insofar as language is equivalent, for Buber, 
to knowledge, rationality, multiplicity, the I’s self-differentiation, and the community of 
things held in common. Once the individual has this unsayable experience, however, she 
is compelled to capture it in language, in writing, even while realizing her inability to do 
so. Buber argues that the mystic’s struggle with language ultimately results either in 
confessions—which the rest of the volume, being a collection of such confessions, 
offers—or in myths (the products of the prophet-poet’s imposition of the ecstatic unity 
experienced upon the world’s multiplicity). The 1916 Der Jude article adds a political 
component to this theory. For here, Buber claims that the still ongoing war is itself an 
experience of ecstasy for the individual in that it wrests her (at the time: exclusively him) 
from her bourgeois, alienated existence and impels her to lose herself in a cause, or: in a 
                                                 
35 See Martin Buber, “Die Losung,” in Der Jude: eine Monatsschrift 1, no. 1 (April 1916): 1-3. 
36 Walter Benjamin, “To Martin Buber (Munich, July 1916),” in The Correspondence of Walter 
Benjamin, 1910-1940, ed. Gershom Scholem and Theodore W. Adorno, trans. Manfred R. 
Jacobson and Evelyn M. Jacobson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 79.  
37 See Martin Buber, “Introduction: Ecstasy and Confession,” in Ecstatic Confessions: The Heart 
of Mysticism, ed. Paul Mendes-Flohr, trans. Esther Cameron (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University 
Press, 1996), 1-11. 
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united community. Consequently, maintains Buber, the war can only be of benefit to 
Judaism and facilitate the advent of the Jewish nation (of Palestine), because it acquaints 
the Jew with an ecstatic experience of unity-in-nationhood that she’ll want to repeat, and 
thus makes her both more receptive to the notion of Judaism and more active in 
formulating, as much as rediscovering, the myths necessary to its realization. Thus, if the 
style of this particular article exemplifies the formulation of myth, then a supplicating 
study of Jewish tales, the Hebrew Bible, and the Hebrew language more generally (all of 
which Buber carried out) epitomizes its (that is, myth’s) rediscovery.38  
It should be obvious, given the schema I presented in (0.3.1.1), that Buber vacillates 
between (i) seeing language as an instrument—namely, for communication between 
people (in a community) as well as for the realization (by means of inspiration to 
“political” action) of the Jewish cause—and (ii) revering it as a remnant of divinity—
namely, where it is an ecstatic(‘s) confession, a poetic-prophetic myth, a Jewish legend-
tale, or the Hebrew language (of the Bible). In him, the co-implication of “prose” and 
“poetry” attains its highest degree of visibility, for Buber unwittingly claims “poetic 
writing” to itself be an instrumental use of language, a type of “prosaic writing,” but one 
which outstrips every other type insofar as it can create “nation-founding” myths, so that 
only in its finished form can it be revered as “poetry,” as a myth containing the divine. 
Put differently, the difference, for Buber, between “prose” and “poetry” as I defined them 
above (paraphrasing Sartre)39 is naught but one between a process of fabrication and its 
fabricated product: they are both secondary, whether in regard to their ends (“political” 
action, the advent of “the world to come”40) or to their contents (ecstasy, the “divine”). 
As slight as it might seem, this difference rules out a priori any mixture of the two 
                                                 
38 See Martin Buber, “The Hebrew Language,” in The First Buber: Youthful Zionist Writings of 
Martin Buber, ed. and trans. Gyla G. Schmidt (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1999), 
198-205, and Martin Buber, “Myth in Judaism,” in On Judaism, ed. Nahum N. Glatzer, trans. Eva 
Jospe (New York: Schocken Books, 1996), 95-107. 
39 To be clear, “prose” herein includes the poetic, myth-making writing to which Buber refers. 




insofar as it places them on different levels: “poetry” on that of study (always an object) 
and “prose” on that of creation or assistance (always part of an ensuing project). 
And this is precisely where Benjamin intervenes with his letter: opposed to the 
instrumental use of language (that is, of certain words and languages) but aware that this 
use is inextricable from a countervailing reverence toward it (namely, toward a certain 
language, toward certain forms of it, other than those used instrumentally), he concludes 
that no overcoming of “instrumental-language” can be realized without a simultaneous 
overcoming of “sacred-language.” Thus, to request that the unsayable be eliminated in 
language and an objective-dispassionate writing be practiced—which is to say, that 
sacredness and ecstasy be barred from partaking in any language-constructs, including 
the Hebrew language and any Jewish (or non-Jewish) myths—is to demand that the 
instrumental use of language be stripped of its ends, that its impotence vis-à-vis the 
attainment of its goal be demonstrated, this goal being the apprehension of the sacred in 
linguistic form (as a myth) which would cause “real” (worldly) action to take place in its 
name. Lacking both a sacred content and a sacred end, language would stop being a 
container or a means; both the “sacred” text (or myth) and writing would be seen as 
wholly profane actions, which, precisely as profane (as unable to say the unsayable), 
would simultaneously be political—having a bearing upon the sayable world—and 
disclose the unsayable (in its purity). Only such writing, in other words, would do justice 
to the divine and be politically effective (in safeguarding the “absolute” of the Jewish 
state). 
Although my chapter makes use of its central terms and cites Benjamin’s “side,” the 
disagreement between Buber and Benjamin (as presented in this introduction) only 
operates in its (this chapter’s) unwritten background, the texts that I cite and engage with 
most copiously being, rather, those of Jean-Paul Sartre (specifically the 1947 What is 
Literature?), Benjamin Fondane (mostly the written-in-1944 but published-in-1945 
“Existential Monday and the Sunday of History”), Mihai Șora (mostly Du Dialogue 
intérieur from 1947), Roland Barthes (mostly Writing Degree Zero, published in bits 
from 1947 to 1953, the year it came out as a volume) and Maurice Blanchot (1952’s 
“Death as Possibility” and 1953’s “The Essential Solitude” from 1955’s The Space of 
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Literature). The first (Sartre) is part of the official existentialist “movement” while the 
rest belong rather to an (or: the) undercurrent of existentialism, such that they are either 
not recognized as existentialists proper (Barthes and Blanchot) or are simply ignored 
altogether (Fondane and Șora).41 With this in mind, my intent was to explicate 
Benjamin’s response to Buber, who is considered an early, German existentialist or 
Lebensphilosoph,42 by using the (combined) arguments against Sartre (the French 
existentialist) carried out by a loose (to the point of being strangers) group of “fellow-
travelers.”43  
The chapter was thus to accomplish (at the level of the footnotes and thus the history of 
philosophy) a triple performance: 1) to present a hidden tradition of existential 
philosophers along with its (or “their”) main principles, all of which center around the 
                                                 
41 Neither of these last two is given an entry in the ten-volume Encyclopedia of Philosophy edited 
by Donald M. Borchert, none of the four feature in the section entitled “Cast of Characters” 
which ends Sarah Bakewell’s At the Existentialist Café (2016), and only Blanchot is given an 
entry—wherein he is described precisely as an opponent of Sartre’s view of writing—in Stephen 
Michelman’s Historical Dictionary of Existentialism (2008). 
42 Early German existentialism is usually given the moniker Lebensphilosophie, a term meaning 
to evoke a philosophy that places the highest stakes on Erleibnis. Its members can be said to 
loosely include: Wilhelm Dilthey (publishing Das Erleibnis und die Dichtung in 1906), Ludwig 
Klages (publishing Mensch und Erde and Ausdrucksbewegung und Gestaltungskraft in 1913), 
Martin Buber (as already shown), Georg Simmel (especially his 1903 “The Metropolis and 
Mental Life”), the German Youth Movement, and the Georg-Kreis. Moreover, it is approximately 
synchronous with Spanish existentialism—Miguel de Unamuno’s Our Lord Don Quixote and 
Ortega y Gasset’s Meditations on Quixote were both published in 1914—and Russian 
existentialism—Lev Shestov published All Things are Possible in 1905 while Nikolai Berdyaev 
The Meaning of the Creative Act in 1916. Benjamin’s “Experience” fragment, written in 1913 and 
elevating Erleibnis over Erfahrung, can be said to evidence not only an interest in but also an 
allegiance to Lebensphilosophie on his part, an allegiance that he turns away from after the 
suicide of his friend Fritz Heinle (as a protest against the war) in 1914. This is why he references 
1915’s “The Life of Students” in his letter to Buber, it being his first published piece that’s 
critical of Lebensphilosophie.—See the first chapter of McCole’s Walter Benjamin and the 
Antinomies of Tradition for a more in depth discussion of Benjamin’s adherence to and break 
from the youth movement. 
43 While Fondane was of sufficient fame to be known to all the other three, Barthes and Blanchot 
were both contributors to the journal Combat, and Șora and Barthes could easily have crossed 
paths either in 1948, on the way from Paris to Romania, or in Bucharest, during Barthes’ year-
long appointment as a librarian at the Bucharest French Institute—especially given that Șora had 
just returned (unwillingly) from 10 years of living in France and was at that point more a French 
than a Romanian writer (and therefore reader). 
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concept of (proper) “existential writing”; 2) to show that (early) Benjamin, on account of 
his letter to Buber, can be seen as belonging to this hidden existential undercurrent;44 and 
3) to assert the adherence of my own project to this tradition (of, namely, existential 
writing). If the first (a) of these wants to function as (i) a foundation for my concept of 
existential writing, (ii) an analysis of the concept of “writing” in French philosophy from 
about 1945 to 1953, and (iii) argument that post-structuralist écriture be seen as 
existentialist, while the second (b) attempts to outline an initial, French post-history of 
Benjamin’s work, then the third (c) means to claim for the present the issues (and 
solutions) of the past. For—lest we each wish to become rhinoceros45—what we must 
once more resist today is both using language in an instrumental, “political,” myth-
making manner and granting sanctimony to every (mystical) confession of (personal-
collective-ecstatic) experience. As I try to show, this resistance, wherein writing (or: 
literature) would once more be given its own room, is not the least, as we might expect, 
but, rather, the most politically engaged. 
0.3.1.3 General Style 
The two aspects of this chapter that the reader will immediately notice are the fact that it 
is unbroken into titled subsections and that it makes abundant use of citations. Given that 
                                                 
44 It’s more than likely that Benjamin and Fondane knew of each other and even met. They were 
both contributors to Cahiers du Sud and part of the group around it, publishing in the same 
August 1937 issue (Benjamin a section of the “Goethe” essay in French translation, Fondane a 
review of Armand Petitjean’s Imagination et réalisation), and attending the same banquet for 
contributors in November of 1938. Given that Benjamin was at the time in the midst of writing 
his book on Baudelaire, and would have answered any social question of “What are you working 
on?” to that effect, we might speculate that it was precisely such a meeting that pushed Fondane 
to start writing his own study of the French poet (from 1941 to 1944).—Mention of Benjamin’s 
presence at this banquet-dinner can be found in Walter Benjamin, Selected Writings, Volume 4, 
1938-1940, ed. Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 
2003), 431. While of Fondane presence at this same banquet in Michael Finkenthal, Benjamin 
Fondane: A Poet-Philosopher Caught between the Sunday of History and the Existential Monday 
(New York: Peter Lang, 2013), 87. 
45 Eugene Ionesco’s Rhinoceros, to which I’m here alluding, is a play based on two separate 
historical moments that the playwright underwent: the turn towards facism of the Romanian 
intellectuals of his generation in the late 1930s (most famously, Eliade, Cioran, and Noica), and 
the turn towards communism of the French intellectuals of his generation in the late 1940s (most 
famously, Sartre, Camus, and Merleu-Ponty). 
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the continuous essay is one of existential writing’s most typical forms,46 the first aspect 
foreshadows the various other formal-stylistic features of the chapter insofar as it 
partakes, along with them, in my attempt to practice “existential writing” within the very 
act of describing it. The reader can, at least at first attempt, expect to start the chapter in 
medias res and lose her place at every turn, to be ever unprepared for what comes next 
and get from one sentence to another only by leaps of faith (and sometimes: logic), to be 
unable to entirely conceptualize the content and to form doubts regarding both the author 
and herself. In short, this chapter should constitute an existential adventure, a 
peripeteia.47 
The second, “citational” aspect, on the other hand, seems to undermine this very assay, 
for it appears to contradict the chapter’s characterization of citation as antithetical to 
existential writing. Instead, aware that the ultimate genre of my writing was to be the 
dissertation and that one of its essential features is the use of secondary sources and 
citations, I chose to enlist this very feature in my exercise.48 Whence my ample use of 
citation—and use of ample citations—in front of which the reader can’t but feel betrayed 
and disrespected by the author, and thus begin doubting her reliability; but, more 
                                                 
46 Benjamin’s “On Language as Such” and Fondane’s “Existential Monday” are both continuous 
essays, for example. Furthermore, Benjamin’s Trauerspiel book only lists the titles of each of its 
three parts’ subsections in the table of contents—this also being true for Șora’s Du Dialogue 
intérieur. 
47 I would say, in Romanian, întâmplare—a word whose second morpheme, “tâmplare,” derives 
either from (i) tempus in the sense of “time,” whence the common meaning of the whole, 
“happening” (that which is “in time”), or (ii) tempus in the sense of “temple” or “head,” which 
would make the whole mean “in (the) temples,” or “that which happens in one’s head” (this 
double meaning of tempus probably being the basis for Kant’s concept of time)—and thus allude 
to Max Blecher’s 1936 novel, Întâmplări în irealitatea imediată (translated as “Adventures in 
Immediate Irreality”). As I can’t, I’ve chosen peripeteia—which in Latin means “a crisis” or 
“reversal of fortune” and in Ancient Greek means “reversal,” “adventure,” or “escapade”—and 
added “existential adventure” as its equivalent. 
48 Given the context, I would say, “exercise in style,” and thereby allude to Raymond Queneau’s 
homonymous 1947 “novel,” famous for recounting the “same” story in 99 different ways (or 
“styles”). I would thus align myself to both his attempt (in the said novel) to show the 
inextricability of form from content (it hardly ever being the same story) and to Oulipo’s 
proclivity for “constrained writing”—which the entirety of my dissertation (excepting the 
introduction and conclusion) employs on the basis of the arguments made in this first chapter. 
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importantly, overwhelmed and distracted by the constant shift she undertakes between the 
main text and the footnotes, always in danger of losing the argument’s thread (and her 
train of thought), and ultimately forced to decide (the amount of times depending on the 
reader) whether or not to follow the superscripted signal. And whence also the relative 
lack of commentary and explanation to the citations. For it thus appears unclear how the 
author’s main text relates to her citations, how it is that she interprets the sentences she 
cites, such that the reader can’t distinguish ‘twixt the author’s voice and those of his 
sources. 
Ultimately, this loose juxtaposition of citations—and with it, albeit to a lesser degree, 
their ampleness—means to lead the reader into the “experience” of the author, not just in 
the sense made famous by Barthes,49 that the work of reading becomes so difficult it 
might as well go by the name “writing,” but, more importantly, in that the reader is 
transposed into the “textual” situation that the author faced while writing: her constant 
shift from the text she quotes to the text she writes, her confrontation with a myriad of 
sources, as yet held together more by a nebulous “idea” than by clear and distinct 
concepts. As such, citation—and existential writing in general—ends up operating as a 
transformed version of ecstatic confession. By it, the author exposes herself, she reveals 
her ecstatic experience—ecstatic because ego-less, mad-with-language, immersed in 
texts—but the “herself” that she exposes is more a “literary situation” than a “self,” and 
the “experience” that she reveals is less of the unsayable (at the limit, the divine), of her 
self-identity, than of the sayable par excellence (that is, language), of her self-dispersal. A 
transformation, which is to say: a crystal clear elimination of the unsayable (herein, from 
confession). 
0.3.2 Logological Deductions 
This second chapter is my attempt to provide an exhaustive interpretation of Benjamin’s 
“On Language” essay, an interpretation that I baptize as both “deduction” and 
                                                 
49 Most elaborately in his introduction to S/Z. See Chapter 6, “On Second Reading,” for a more 
specific engagement with this text vis-à-vis the question of reading and writing. 
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“adaptation.” In the remainder of this section, I wish to speak, in separate sections, to this 
interpretation and to the reasons for its peculiar name. Or, more clearly said, I intend, on 
the one hand, to outline this chapter’s structure and general arguments and, on the other, 
to answer the “how” and “why” of the way in which it functions. The sources that I 
employed within it are limited to: (i) the Benjamin fragments entitled “On Language as 
Such and the Language of Man,” “Trauerspiel and Tragedy,” “The Role of Language in 
Trauerspiel and Tragedy,” and “Imagination”; (ii) Genesis, specifically 1-3; and (iii) the 
plot of Sophocles’ “Oedipus the King.” 
0.3.2.1 Structure, Matter 
A fact nakedly accessible to the reader only once she reaches its very last “proposition” is 
that this chapter is divided into six numbered sections. The first of these sections (1.) is 
also the shortest. Therein, I (i) explicate the “language of things” as inherently split 
between an “impartable,” communicating, appearing side and an “unimpartable,” non-
communicating, mindly side, and (ii) outline some of the consequences of this inner-
division. In section two (2.), I deal with the “language of man,” (i) positing it as devoid of 
an impartable-unimpartable split, (ii) showing that and how it has, by way of naming, a 
rectifying effect on thingly language, and (iii) exposing it as containing its own division, 
namely, between being receptive (of a thing’s division) and being creative (of a thing’s 
rectifying name). If these first two sections keep to the arguments present in “On 
Language,” the third section (3.)—which is about “the language of God” or the “divine 
Word”—substantially deviates, in an extrapolating manner, from Benjamin’s essay, by 
re-fashioning its interpretation of Genesis. In this section, I argue that the two already 
mentioned divisions (of the thingly and of the human) have their source in God’s self-
divided act of creation and, further, that this act, due to its imperfection, bestows upon 
man’s language both the ability to rectify the divine Word, described in section two (2.), 
and the ability to deepen its fault. 
It is from its very origin, then, that man’s language is, partly—or, has the ability to be—
fallen, and the next section of this chapter (4.) is precisely an outline of the path from 
“paradisiacal (human) language” to “fallen (human) language.” Therein, I describe the 
emergence and effect of lying, purification, abstraction, the multiplication of languages, 
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the final domination of the sign, and the reorientation of naming from things to human 
language itself, doing so in a way that simultaneously befits and expands Benjamin’s own 
account. In section five (5.), which is also the longest, I endeavor to re-explain paradisical 
language, fallen language, and the interval between them, in the more technical terms of 
“name,” “symbol,” “impartability,” and “unimpartability.” On the basis of this 
formalization, I show, on the one hand, that the Fall is reversible and how it is reversible 
through translation, and, on the other, that Benjamin’s description of tragedy accords to 
beginning of the Fall, while his description of Trauerspiel accords to the beginning of a 
possible “re-ascent.” Finally, section six (6.) constitutes a final re-telling of the Fall, this 
time through the dichotomy of mathematics and art, where man’s practice of 
mathematics leads to the Fall while art (which is always a practice) leads out of it. In and 
through this section, I wanted to (i) complete Benjamin’s essay in keeping with his 
original intentions vis-à-vis mathematics,50 (ii) show formalization, or the deductive 
method, as being one with fallen language, and (iii) argue that the same mechanism 
which reverses the Fall is also the one wherein ideas are presented and re-purified. It 
would not be an exaggeration to say that the majority of what follows, namely, the rest of 
my dissertation, is an attempt at giving the proper formulation to this last section of the 
“deductions”—to, in other words, at once posit a theory of ideas and schematize its 
relationship to art by means of a complementary theory of language. Also notable is the 
“ethical deduction” that I present in the first half of this chapter (and that I mark with the 
symbol for infinity): namely, that Benjamin’s essay posits man’s state as being naturally 
posterior, and that it is man’s very attempt to escape his posterity that leads to his Fall. 
                                                 
50 As Benjamin says, in his November 11, 1916 letter to Scholem: “In this essay [“On 
Language”], it was not possible for me to go into mathematics and language, i.e. mathematics and 
thought, mathematics and Zion, because my thoughts on this infinitely difficult topic are still 
quite far from having taken final shape. […] I am still unable to touch on many points. In 
particular, the consideration of mathematics from the point of view of a theory of language, 
which is ultimately, of course, most important to me, is of a completely fundamental significance 
for the theory of language as such, even though I am not yet in a position to attempt such a 
consideration.” Walter Benjamin, “To Gerhard Scholem (Munich, November 11, 1916),” in The 
Correspondence of Walter Benjamin, 1910-1940, ed. Gershom Scholem and Theodore W. 
Adorno, trans. Manfred R. Jacobson and Evelyn M. Jacobson (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1994), 81-2. 
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0.3.2.2 Operation, Method 
There are three formal aspects of this chapter that contribute to its argument as well as to 
its title: (i) the choice of subject-matter for each general section and their order of 
arrangement; (ii) the fact that its form is borrowed from Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus; and (iii) the manner whereby my text alters Benjamin’s own 
(which is presented in the footnotes). In short, the first (i) is no more than my chapter’s 
adherence to, and therefore exposition of, the structure and order—better said: the plot—
of Benjamin’s “On Language.”51 This is the first sense in which it can be called an 
adaptation of Benjamin’s essay. And, just as any adaptation requires a different medium 
or form (in)to which the original is to be adapted, so my chapter adapts the “content” of 
Benjamin’s text to the “form” of Wittgenstein’s roughly contemporaneous text. Through 
this particular choice of form (ii), one that follows and thus immediately contrasts to the 
one used by Chapter 1, I intended to at once “experiment” with the deductive method in 
order to observe and present its limitations (especially vis-à-vis Benjamin’s writings) and 
(thereby implicitly) suggest that early Wittgenstein belongs within the club of deviant 
existentialists (outlined in section 1.b. of this introduction), even if his writing is more 
apophatically than cataphatically existential.52 In other words, I meant for this form’s 
inevitable failure—evident in the linguistic and terminological difficulty that increasingly 
weighs down the reader the further along she (pilgrimatically) progresses and that results 
from my attempt to bridge the logical lacunae between Benjamin’s own propositions—to 
itself function as both a search for a method and (therefore) a type of existential writing. 
Finally, on the whole, (iii) an adaptation—mine being one that both expands and 
                                                 
51 “On Language” starts with the “language of things” (63-4), moves through “the language of 
man” (64-6) as well as “the language of God” (67-8), touches upon the paradisiacal 
language/fallen language dichotomy (68-71) no less than the name/judgment dichotomy (71-3), 
and ends with the mathematics/art dichotomy (73-4). Although Benjamin doesn’t explicitly 
mention “mathematics” in the essay, he does so in its drafts (as well as in the correspondence 
around it). 
52 It’s important to note that, while Benjamin interprets Genesis 1 directly, Wittgenstein intimates 
its presence in his text through the fact that the Tractatus has as many sections as the days of 
creation, the seventh and last being no longer than “What we cannot speak about we must pass 
over in silence” and thus mirroring the day of rest. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus, trans. D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuiness (London: Routledge, 2001), 89. 
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contracts the original—is, liminally, a translation, and can, following Benjamin’s own 
argument, lead out of the Fall. This is, in part, why I place almost the whole of 
Benjamin’s essay in my footnotes—so that, in “translating” between them, the reader 
might find herself re-ascending. 
0.3.3 Metaphrastic Inductions 
Longest among all the others, the third chapter of my dissertation is a chronological close 
reading of the manuscriptal theoretical-aesthetic fragments and letters (some of which 
have yet to be translated into the English) that Benjamin wrote between 1916 and 1917. 
By “chronological close reading” I mean an exegesis of these texts that attends (i) to 
them in the order in which they were written and (ii) to each line by line, such that, 
despite my in-text citations, the reader is assumed to have the original Benjamin text in 
front of her. The chapter is divided by year and marked with the title of the major text 
that the respective set of paragraphs addresses, these “major” texts being, in order of 
appearance: “Eidos und Begriff,” “Theses on the Problem of Identity,” “Das Urteil der 
Bezeichnung,” “Das Wort,” “The Ground of Intentional Immediacy,” “Notizen zur 
Wahrnehmungsfrage,” “On Perception,” and “On the Program of the Coming 
Philosophy.”53 In what follows, I intend, as in the previous section, to give a general 
overview of this chapter’s arguments and insights and to justify the methodology—of 
“chronological close reading” or “induction”—that it puts to use, but, unlike before, I 
reverse their order, such that I begin by talking about the methodology. 
0.3.3.1 Form 
Having experimented with the deductive method in the previous chapter—most evidently 
by interpreting (for the most part) a single text and stretching it as far as it could go 
without breaking (even: to the point of breaking)—in this third chapter I assayed the 
inductive method. What this means is not only that I dealt with multiple texts but also 
                                                 
53 Where this “order of writing” was vague (as can be seen in the “Anmerkungen der 
Herausgeber” section of GS VI), I surmised it in a preliminary stage of analysis, such that the 
order in which I ultimately placed the fragments should be seen as my philological attempt at 
contributing to their datation. 
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that I interpreted them as I went, seeking as much as possible not to submit them to any 
preconceived schemas, that is, to any concepts attained before the act of close reading. 
The effort was by and large one of trying (i) to fit together the disparate sets of terms that 
Benjamin uses throughout these texts and (ii) to establish continuity in argument and 
subject matter from one fragment to the next. Ultimately this method lead to a dead end 
no less than did the previous, for in attempting to establish a cohesive net between these 
texts, my explanations became increasingly more complicated, such that, where there 
emerged a knot, undoing it only lead to the emergence of another, larger knot elsewhere. 
It is for this reason that the chapter ends with the “Coming Philosophy” essay, cut short, 
as it was, by my confrontation with a knot so large that I found myself unable to achieve 
its disentanglement without falling into writing pure non-sense. For, my initial plan was 
that my chapter not only reach (in terms of Benjamin’s fragments) the end of 1917 but 
also that it cover the whole of 1918.54 Ultimately (as was also true of deduction), only 
where induction is pushed to its extreme, to where it can no longer function without 
cheating, can we say that there is existential writing. 
Structurally, “Metaphrastic Inductions” proceeds from text to text by way of first 
establishing a conceptual link to the previous text, then presenting an exposé of the text in 
question, and finally attempting to conceptually and terminologically integrate it within 
those that precede it. I apply this procedure up to the “On Perception” essay (but not 
including it), after which, on the assumption that the reader has by then become 
acquainted with my general interpretative intentions (and limitations), I perform all three 
operations simultaneously as I go through the text at hand. It is this attempt at carrying 
over the terminology, as much as the particular syntax in which it occurs, from text to 
text that lends my chapter its name, “metaphrasis” meaning “a word-for-word 
translation.” Formally, this chapter can be said to be composed of commentaries on the 
                                                 
54 Consequently, I had to leave out my interpretations of the following fragments, which exist 
either in note- or essay-form: “Die unendliche Aufgabe,” “Letter to Gerhard Scholem (ca. 
December 23, 1917),” (shortened title:) “Über die Symbolik,” “Nachträge zu: Über die 
Symbolik,” “Die Form und der Gehalt…,” the “Addendum” to “Coming Philosophy,” “Begriffe 
lassen sich…,” “Über die transzendentale Methode,” and (shortened title:) “Zweideutigkeit der 
Begriffs der ‘unendlichen Aufgabe.’” 
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already listed texts. As commentaries they should be viewed by the reader as lying under 
the sign of prelimination, as “inductions” which form a preparatory stage for the final 
theory of ideas (most successfully advanced in Chapter 5). 
0.3.3.2 Content 
This chapter begins by following “Eidos und Begriff” in distinguishing between (i) 
“concept” (which I later call: “concrete concept”), (ii) “concept-of-concept” (later: 
“abstract concept” and equivalent to “linguistic essence”), (iii) “essence” (equivalent to 
“spiritual essence”), and (iv) “object”—a distinction that, I argue, “Theses on Identity” is 
devoted to reinforcing. At this point, my principal thesis is that, where these terms are 
confused, fallen language is at work—and criticism’s task, as described in the “Belmore” 
letter, is precisely to dispel all such confusion. Moving to “Das Urteil” and “Das Wort,” I 
detect in Benjamin’s opposition of “judgment of designation” to “judgment of meaning” 
a version of the “On Language” opposition between the use of language that leads to the 
Fall and that which might lead out of it. I thereafter follow these fragments, along with 
the two around “intentional immediacy,” in explaining an additional set of terms, namely, 
(iv) the “signified” (or: “object”), (v) the “sign,” (vi) the “word” (equivalent to “signifier” 
and solidary with “intention”), (vii) the “name,” and, my own invention, (viii) the 
“general concept.” With all eight terms in tow, I present the theory of language implicit 
to these fragments. My argument is, roughly, that: (α) due to the word’s harboring of the 
name, its (the word’s) proper use, tied to an intention in a predicative judgment, elicits a 
concrete concept from the object; and (β) that the totality of such uses would expose the 
object’s abstract concept, its impartability, which would, in turn, bespeak its essence, its 
unimpartability, and thus reveal its name (the relation between these two “–
partabilities”). Additionally, I claim (γ) that while its “proper use” would, in its totality, 
lead back to paradisiacal language, the word’s “improper use,” one wherein it is reduced 
to a sign whose correlate is the general concept, is precisely what caused fallen language 
to emerge in the first place. 
In a subsequent step, I grapple with “Notizen,” showing its theory of perception to be a 
translation or metaphrasis of the theory of language elaborated thus far. I argue, by means 
of its terms and arguments, that this fragment yields an “additional” term, one that, called 
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“perception” by Benjamin, I re-baptize as the “true” or “symbolic” concept and 
understand along the lines of the “name” or “naming language” in the previous, claiming 
that it is what allows for the passage—and identity—between the impartability of the 
word which emerges from interpretation and the (hidden) impartability of the object. 
Further, I posit that, if “knowledge” emerges at once with the impartability of the word, 
then “perception” is to be found at the limits of “sense,” where it’s rather “insensateness” 
that comes to the fore. I thereafter, in attending to “On Perception,” configure, as if a 
Rubik’s cube, the relation between “perception,” “experience,” and “knowledge” 
variously, turning it every which way, only to arrive at its full determination with my 
conceptualization of the term “non-synthesis” from “Coming Philosophy,” the text to 
which I devote the most time and that functions as the culminating and final point of my 
“inductions.” It is herein that I manage to: (α) present the relation between the three 
abovementioned terms (perception, experience, and knowledge) as one similar to that 
between the three languages described in “On Language” (of things, of man, and of God), 
namely as a relation of non-synthesis; (β) show this “relation” to be of a purifying nature 
for the terms (and language) involved (purifying, namely, of general concepts, myths, 
representations, or “fallness”); and (γ) provisionally identify “non-synthesis,” which I 
also call “diathesis” (and therefore implicitly, “critique”), with the “idea.” Additionally, 
this section retrieves from Benjamin’s text—and begins putting into practice—a “new” 
transcendental logic, one that revolves around the study of words and that I will later (in 
Chapter 5) call “virtual translation.” 
0.3.4 Dictionary of Pre-Words 
The fourth chapter of my dissertation is, generally speaking, an attempt to extract some of 
the main terms, relations (between these terms), and arguments from Benjamin’s 1918 to 
1922 theoretico-aesthetic writings—above all from his “Concept of Criticism” 
dissertation, his epilogue to said dissertation, and his “Goethe’s Elective Affinities” essay. 
The exegesis that this chapter performs is organized not so much chronologically, this 
being characteristic of the immediately foregoing, as terminologically. The sub-sectional 
terms into which it is divided are the following, in order of appearance: “system,” 
“critique,” “form,” “content,” “kinship,” “material content,” “truth content,” and 
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“expressionless.” Consistent with my antecedent “summaries,” I herein intend to (0.3.4.1) 
trace the thematic and argumentative skeleton of the “Dictionary,” and (0.3.4.2) give 
grounds for its terminological structure and its methodology, explicating the particular 
way in which it relates to “deduction” and “induction,” an explication that ultimately 
necessitates a comparison with, and thus an anticipation of, the form particular to Chapter 
5. The reader will therefore find the justification of the succeeding chapter’s form in this, 
rather than the next, “summary.” 
0.3.4.1 Themes 
I begin the chapter by arguing that, as early as his dissertation, Benjamin conceptualizes 
the term “system” in a manner resembling the concept of “non-synthesis” put forth in 
“Coming Philosophy,” that, in other words, “system” should be read as a further 
expansion of Benjamin’s “non-synthesis” concept. Further, I situate “system” within 
Kantian philosophy more generally and thereby show “non-synthesis” to both (i) relate to 
“Kant’s God” and (ii) hold not just between two different “realms” or “languages” (for 
instance, “experience” and “knowledge”) but also between two members of the same 
set—insights which are both essential to the chapter that follows. 
Next, in line with my linguistic understanding of “On Perception” and “Coming 
Philosophy” in the preceding chapter, I approach “The Concept of Criticism” in linguistic 
terms so as to define what Benjamin means by “critique.” Herein, I argue that Benjamin 
detects in the Romantics the mistake of identifying the idea with the noun—and, more 
specifically, the morpheme—thus confusing the pure and empirical realms and, 
ultimately synthesis with non-synthesis. I follow this, in my discussion of the terms 
“form” and “content,” by showing Benjamin as detecting, in the last section of his 
dissertation, a symmetrical mistake made by Goethe, namely, that of identifying the idea 
with the phoneme, one that equally conflates as much the two realms as the two 
“syntheses.” I conclude this section by suggesting, by way of a meticulous differentiation 
between three types of form and three types of content (presentational, symbolic, and 
pure), that Benjamin saw the way out of these two errors, which roughly correspond to 
the bourgeois and mystical theories of language, as standing precisely in an attempt at 
holding them apart, at placing them in “non-synthesis”—“them” referring to both (i) the 
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Romantics and Goethe and (ii) the concepts that they focus on, form and content, 
respectively. Ultimately, I claim, Benjamin’s task is finding a Goethean concept of 
criticism, a concept that I posit (but only adequately develop in Chapter 5) to entail a 
non-synthetic understanding of artistic creation as critique and vice versa. 
I specify this (non-)relation of “being-together-but-apart” in the next section as precisely 
the one to which the Benjaminian-Goethean term “kinship”—and, more specifically, 
“elective kinship”—alludes, such that the beginning of the “Goethe” essay must be seen 
in tandem with the end of the “Criticism” dissertation: as an attempt at describing, under 
the names of Sachgehalt and Wahrheitsgehalt, the (non-)relation of the Romantics to 
Goethe, of form to content, and vice versa. What I add to the concept of “non-synthesis” 
by means of figuring it as “kinship” thusly is the temporal dimension that first appeared 
in the “Theses on Identity”: it (non-synthesis) must also be seen as holding between (any) 
two terms only as long as they are still undergoing a process of separation (and, no less: 
as long as they threaten to fall into mythical confusion). In the final section, I define the 
“expressionless” in such a way that it becomes evident as the term wherein non-synthesis 
most fully comes to fruition: namely as meaning both the prosaic—and therefore what 
Benjamin calls “pure form”—and the ur-phenomenon—and therefore what Benjamin 
calls “pure content.” In this way I anticipate and prefigure both the theory of 
presentation—wherein presentation should be soberly expressionless—and the theory of 
ideas—wherein the idea should be regarded as an inexpressible ur-phenomenon and only 
be evident at the margins of expression—put forward in the “Epistemo-Critical 
Prologue.” I end by arguing that “existential writing” as defined in Chapter 1 should be 
understood as precisely an expressionless type of writing capable of presenting the 
inexpressible.   
0.3.4.2 Motifs 
As its title states, and as the reader will immediately notice, this chapter is a “dictionary.” 
Having experimented with both deduction and induction, I sought to find a form wherein 
they could be mixed—and the “dictionary” form or genre is a melting pot par excellence. 
For, this form, especially as I used it, is one that at once (i) attends to a plurality of texts, 
trying to find their points of commonality and (ii) starts from an already-established set of 
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concepts or terms, and therefore: set of differences, and attempts to submit to them the 
texts at hand (or: a dictionary of this kind takes upon itself both the task of looking at 
different instances of the same word and that of looking at different instances of the same 
word). In short, my fourth chapter is, formally speaking, a “synthesis” of the two chapters 
that immediately precede it. This is also reflected in the fact that the “Dictionary” is 
organized at once conceptually (thus: deductively) and chronologically (thus: 
inductively). Finally, it would not be superficial to say that the “Dictionary” repeats the 
very mistake it claims Benjamin to detect in the Romantics (and, to some extent, in 
Goethe): namely, precisely by virtue of being a dictionary, it identifies ideas (which I 
name, in the wake of my “Coming Philosophy” exegesis, pre-words) too strongly with 
particular German or English nouns or signifiers. I would claim that even Benjamin’s too 
strict understanding of “pure contents” as the muses in the epilogue to “The Concept of 
Criticism”—upon which I based the number of terms that my dictionary “defines”55—is 
guilty of this mistake insofar as it entails a “mythification” of ideas (or, as he calls them 
therein: ideals). 
Most helpful to the reader would be to contrast the “dictionary” form used in the chapter 
at hand with the “breviary” form used in the one that follows, Chapter 5. For, therein, 
what I attempt is to keep induction and deduction together but at a distance, in non-
synthesis rather than synthesis. It’s for this reason that the “Breviary” is divided into two 
“streams” of discourse: a main one, in line with Western (more precisely: Arabic) 
numerals, and an auxiliary one, in line with Hebrew numerals—these encapsulating, or 
being a cipher for, no less than the two traditions between which Benjamin’s intellect 
attempts to mediate at this point in his life, namely, the German and the Jewish. It’s 
important to note, however, that the reader should not expect to find a strict allegiance of 
deduction with one stream and induction with the other. Instead, she will find each 
(namely, deduction or induction) sometimes in one stream, sometimes in the other. 
Finally, instead of attempting to proceed, as does the “Dictionary,” conceptually and 
                                                 
55 The reader should understand the “pre-word” in the title as bringing the number to nine. It thus 
accords to the missing muse: Urania. 
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chronologically at once, the “Breviary” undermines both these procedures: the first 
insofar as the auxiliary stream continually breaks off the smooth conceptual flow of the 
main stream, the second by interpreting the “Prologue” out of order, such that its 
beginning is attended to last. 
Finally, it may be pertinent, at this point, to re-conceptualize the function of each chapter 
presented thus far with the aid of an architectural metaphor: Chapter 1 is to the blueprint, 
as Chapter 2 is to the foundation, Chapter 3 to the floor and walls, and Chapter 4 to the 
stairs and windows of my dissertation. Finally, in this nexus, Chapter 5 must be seen as 
the roof and towers (from inside: the ceiling and cupola) and Chapter 6 as a photograph 
of the finished building (or: the façade). With this in mind, the chapter at hand, the 
“Dictionary,” sits alongside the one immediately preceding it as part of the dissertation’s 
“interior work,” foreign to the walker-by—yet, on account of “its” windows, slightly 
more accessible than its compatriot. It is for this reason that I have subtitled both these 
chapters “stopes,” a word that means (in the singular) “a mining excavation in the form of 
a terrace of steps.”56 Which is to say that the “Dictionary” lies under the sign of 
prelimination no less than the “Inductions,” it too being an “experiment” that ultimately 
fails. For, I must confess that, like the “Inductions,” the “Dictionary” was initially much 
larger, containing pages upon pages wherein its concepts were turned and twisted to such 
an extent that they began speaking in tongues.57 The fact of being a failure and thus 
                                                 
56 “Stope” additionally intends to translate the Romanian “șantier,” which, meaning “building 
site,” is an even more suitable term for the manner in which this chapter, as much as the 
antecedent one, operates. It may be that these chapters are “stopes” on the first reading, but 
“șantiere” on the second, once the reader has gone through the dissertation as a whole. That 
“șantier” is also the title of one of Mircea Eliade’s early existentialist novels (from 1935) means 
at once to further align my project with existentialism and add Eliade to the list of “underground” 
existentialists. 
57 The pages that I removed or were left incomplete contain interpretations of the following works 
and fragments: “On Semblance,” “Schönheit,” “Die Idee der Schönheit,” “Reinheit und 
Strenge…,” “Outline for a Habilitation Thesis,” “The Task of the Translator,” and “Individual 
Disciplines and Philosophy.” I must especially emphasize the absence of “The Task of the 
Translator,” for although I don’t explicitly engage with it in this dissertation (for the reasons 
already stated), it was of foremost importance to the development of Chapter 5. Put differently, 
Chapter 5 should also be seen as an interpretation of “The Task of the Translator.” 
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lacking a true conclusion, doesn’t, however, diminish its value in containing elements 
that contribute essentially to the final theory of ideas put forth in Chapter 5. 
0.3.5 Breviary of Ideas 
With this, my fifth chapter, I intended no less than to give a reduct of the theory of ideas 
that Benjamin presents in the “Prologue.” I therefore meant it to function as the summa 
of, result of, rectification of, and supplement to all the preceding chapters of my 
dissertation (especially Chapters 3 and 4). Accordingly, in the following outline, I will 
indicate some of the places wherein the “Breviary” draws on the other chapters. 
Furthermore, in this chapter the reader should also expect to find, not only an analysis of 
the “Prologue,” but also its philosophical contextualization—namely, within the theories 
of ideas put forth by Plato, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, and Deleuze, most of my focus and 
exegesis bearing on the first, specifically as it appears in the Timaeus, it being the text 
from which I draw one of my central theses.58  
The “Breviary” is nominally divided into six sections. In the first, I suggest that 
Benjamin’s theory of ideas must, on the basis of German baroque capitalization, first and 
foremost be seen as a theory of language, of—to be more specific—the German 
language, especially as it manifests in translation. Put differently, I show Benjamin’s 
theory of ideas to be a theory of translation into and out of German.59 Furthermore, I 
argue more generally that translation is the process wherein the word is stripped of both 
its signifier (as presented in the “Dictionary”) and its signified (as shown in the 
“Inductions”), and that this divestment, and with it translation, coincides with the 
                                                 
58 I would like to note here, as I did not in the “Breviary,” where I took it as self-evident, that I 
overlooked the theories of ideas put forth by Descartes, Locke, Spinoza, Berkeley, and Hume 
inasmuch as I considered them to be, in truth, theories of the concept. That I did not show this to 
be the case—and, in addition, did not include Schopenhauer’s and Husserl’s genuine theories of 
ideas—is, admittedly, one the limitations of this dissertation, a limitation that I hope to rectify in 
a future project. 
59 Better yet: I situate Benjamin’s theory within a particular linguistic context. This insight, the 
notion that any metaphysics is linguistically situated, is one that I borrow from Vilém Flusser, 
who applies it most rigorously to the philosophies of Aristotle, Heidegger, and Kant. See Vilém 
Flusser, Language and Reality, trans. Rodrigo Maltez Novaes (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2018). 
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presentation of an idea. The second section is one wherein I differentiate the concept 
from the idea, arguing (in a manner consistent with my reflections on insensateness in the 
“Inductions”) that the idea always appears at the limit of the concept and that it does so 
twice, both as the disordinate preceding and the superordinate exceeding it60 (an insight 
solidary with the one I presented in the “Inductions” vis-à-vis the operation of the 
designation judgment on the word). Additionally, I argue that such a liminally-pushed 
conceptualization is itself one that necessarily occurs in simultaneity with translation. Or, 
in other words, that an operation on phenomena is always also an operation on words.61 
Next, in the third section, which bears the title of the dissertation as a whole, I call this 
correspondence between conceptualization and translation “bastard reasoning,” a term 
that I borrow from Plato’s Timaeus and that I show to be central to understanding 
Benjamin’s theory insofar as it also entails (i) a mediation between induction and 
deduction (presented in this introduction and related, in the “Breviary,” to Goethe and the 
Romantics, and therefore to the “Dictionary”) and (ii) an understanding of the idea as a 
khôra, and thus as a non-synthesis between phenomenon and concept (at the limit: 
between world and self). 
It is in the subsequent two sections that I offer my most original contribution to 
understanding Benjamin’s theory. For, in the fourth section, I claim, by way of a 
translation between idea, khôra, origin, and monad, as well as through a particular 
understanding of Benjamin’s notion of history, that the idea must be defined as a 
viewpoint on the end of the world, such that, if its presentation is to happen through art, 
then the respective artwork should be apocalyptic by necessity. This while, in the fifth 
section, I explicate the difference (that Benjamin leaves implicit) between the truth and a 
                                                 
60 I realized, after writing this particular section, that my thesis as to the double appearance or 
presence of the idea is quite similar to Badiou’s theory of presentation. See, in particular, Alain 
Badiou, “The One and the Multiple: a priori conditions of any possible ontology,” in Being and 
Event, trans. Oliver Feltham (London: Continuum, 2005), 23-30. It’s for this reason that, later on 
in this chapter, I introduced a section (14. ב.) in which I hoped to differentiate my theory from 
Badiou’s by claiming ubiquity for the event as well as by granting it an ethical rather than a 
political status. 
61 I thus prove true a methodological thesis that I had already exercised both in the “Dictionary” 
and in the “Inductions.” 
38 
 
truth, or the non-synthesis and a non-synthesis, arguing that the truth is the non-synthesis 
between ideas themselves (between non-syntheses), that it is the end of the world as a 
whole, and the ultimate “difference” between the phenomenal and the conceptual realms: 
God. Additionally, I account for Benjamin’s characterization of the ideas as limited in 
number by positing their set to consist only of Adamite names, of the names used in 
Paradise—this being a world that did indeed reach its end—and thus to exclude all those 
produced historically, that is, after the Fall. Finally, in translating “concept” into 
“intention” and “synthesis,” and thus positing it as that at the limit of which the idea, or 
non-synthesis, operates, I transform—or: I show Benjamin’s theory to transform—Plato’s 
theory of ideas into a sort of negative theory of knowledge and (to) thus make it useable 
for existential philosophy (the one that I expound in Chapter 1). My last, sixth section, 
concerns the particular manner in which Benjamin conceives of ideas’ presentation. 
Therein, I show translation, critique, artistic creation, and philosophical writing to be 
different—necessarily apocalyptic—forms through which the idea may be presented,62 
reserving a special place for the philosophical treatise insofar as, by being capable of 
presenting several ideas at once, it is the only that can present the truth as such. I finish 
by (i) relating the presentation of ideas to the now of knowability, positing the moment of 
presentation to be an ethical moment wherein the subject undergoes a crisis, and (ii) 
distinguishing between “mathematics-science” and “art-philosophy” through the fact that 
what I call secondariness applies to, or is held up by, the latter alone (drawing from and 
continuing, in both instances, the arguments on freedom and posterity that I already 
presented in the infinity sections of the “Deductions”). 
0.3.6 On Second Reading 
The sixth and final chapter of my dissertation means to function as a methodology of the 
type of reading that I employ(ed) in the dissertation. It is thus to be understood, by the 
reader, as the counterpart to or continuation of Chapter 1. If, in that first chapter, I 
                                                 
62 I should note that, insofar as I place artistic creation next to critique and translation in this 
section, I’m following the thread of the equation between critique and artistic creation that I first 
suggested in the “Dictionary.” 
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advanced a theory of existential writing, I herein could be said to advance one of 
existential reading—more precisely: of the existential reading particular to the writer—
exploring the risks and freedom to which interpretation exposes the writer within the act 
of writing in a way not true of the reader within the act of reading. To this end, I survey a 
variety of literary theorists who wrote in the wake of the existentialist movement and 
who, on account of having dealt with the problem of “reading,” I consider to participate 
in the aforementioned (0.1.1) existentialist undercurrent, and therefore in Benjamin’s 
post-history—more specifically, in order of appearance (and without repeating the 
above): Wolfgang Iser, Matei Călinescu, Mikhail Bakhtin, Paul de Man, Stanley Fish, 
Péter Szondi, Massimo Cacciari, and Michel Foucault. Unlike in Chapter 1, however, I 
herein explicitly differentiate my view of this “existential reading” from that which I 
perceive as operating in the writings of the named theorists such that “On Second 
Reading” also partially functions as a critique (in the negative sense of the word). Put 
differently, this chapter, as indicated by its title, is a “writing-on” and therefore lies much 
more within the strictures of the academic paper than those previous. Consequently, in 
what follows, I don’t deem necessary an introduction to its form. 
In what can be called “Part One” of the chapter,63 I begin by arguing that both Barthes 
and Iser confuse the realm of writing with that of reading and therefore cover over (i) 
what I call “second reading,” namely, the reading done by the writer in the act of writing, 
and (ii) the kind of reading particular to the realm of the reader. In short, these two 
theorists project the reading done by the writer onto the reading done by the reader and 
thereby conflate them. Next, I posit two components to be present in this “second 
reading”: lectorial reading (the reading of another text while writing “this” one) and 
scriptorial reading (the reading of “this” text while writing it). Attempting to extract the 
features of lectorial reading, I show Călinescu’s distinction between reading and 
rereading to (i) be flawed insofar as it maintains the confusion between the two said 
realms and (ii) be itself yet another projection, or copy, of the distinctions that pertain to 
                                                 
63 This subdivision of the chapter is not signaled in the chapter itself. I’m introducing it herein 
solely for the reader’s aid. 
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the realm of the writer. I therefore decide to define lectorial reading—which at this stage 
is a cipher for “interpretation”—by way not of its copies but of its archetype, showing 
scriptorial reading to have this status due to these two (second) readings’ coincidence in 
citation. Thereafter, I characterize scriptorial reading as one that forces the writer into 
neuroticism and paranoia: it pushes her to both (i) lose her thread and perform an about-
face (which I relate to the wealth of associations that the writer starts seeing in her 
writing) and (ii) enter into a reactive inner dialogue vis-à-vis an imagined audience (an 
operation that I derive from Bakhtin’s commentary on Dostoevsky). These two 
characteristics threaten to turn the writer silent, such that her escape in writing can’t but 
be marked by (i) discontinuity and stutter, and (ii) apodicticity and a groundlessness 
precluding any meta-commentary. Insofar as it is joined to scriptorial reading (most 
visibly: in citation), lectorial reading, I argue, bears similar features. Namely, I define 
this reading as being at once close (insofar as it too sees a wealth of meaning in the 
source-text) and extensive, as continuing the source-text (in that the escape that the writer 
must perform is one from repetition rather than from silence). Or, in other words: 
fetishistic and hysterical, respectively. This last feature of lectorial reading leads me to 
conclude that second reading is, further, ruled by the source-text that sets the writer’s 
agenda, and that the operation of this second reading on the source-text is one of 
simultaneous articulation and disarticulation. 
With this in mind, I move, in what might be called “Part Two” of the chapter, to 
contrasting the writing that emerges from fidelity to second reading, the “disclusive text,” 
and that which emerges from the betrayal of second reading, the “occlusive text.” I 
argue, to be clear, that the writer often hides her second reading by way of ignoring her 
act of writing in favor of the intention she held previous to it, and achieves this by means 
of meta-commentary. Further, I show this manner of “writing occlusively” to be a 
projection of the reader’s view of writing into the writer’s realm. I then posit that 
deconstructive criticism (in the figure of de Man) is right to test the fissure between meta-
commentary and commentary present in particular source-texts but that it ultimately fails 
to stay true to the second reading within the texts that it writes about these source-texts. 
In short, what I argue herein is that deconstructive criticism still yields occlusive texts. 
Ultimately, I identify the source of this mistake to lie within both (i) deconstructive 
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criticism’s tendency toward object-adequacy, and (ii) its attempt to represent determinate 
second readings. I therefore reject the deconstructive procedure of analyzing the above-
named fissure “for the sake of the object” in favor of one wherein the object is 
“extended.” 
Next, in, let’s call it, “Part Three” of the chapter, I explore what may lie beyond “object-
adequacy,” deriving from Szondi’s “On Textual Understanding” the argument that a 
disclusive text should be said to rely, instead, on adequacy to a praxis (here: that of 
writing). I thus introduce an ethical dimension into my argument: the subject doesn’t 
choose which praxis she participates in vis-à-vis an object but only whether to be true to 
the praxis wherein she already finds herself—this test being synonymous with her 
“crisis.” I then further clarify, by means of Szondi, the distinction between the occlusive 
and the disclusive text along the lines of a logic replacement and a logic of extension, 
respectively, and claim that one of the main features of the disclusive text is that it not 
only derives from its source-text but—through its articulating-disarticulating procedure 
on the said source-text—also reveals its secondariness (both its own and that of the 
source-text). 
In the last, “Fourth” part of the section, I follow the thread of the “secondariness” in 
question, a thread that forces me to revise my definition of the “source-text” from 
meaning the text that the writer writes “about,” to the entire set of circumstances wherein 
she writes, circumstances which precede and result in her text. Put differently: the je-ne-
sais-quoi or the “content” of her writing, kin to no less than second reading itself. I argue 
that, just like second reading, this source-text is inaccessible and can, at best, be 
intimated—in the case where the source-text of another text is at stake—by way of 
interpreting the author-in-question’s previous, related writings, and doing so specifically 
by “extending” them separate of one another. Finally, I re-inscribe or re-contextualize my 
reflections on second reading within the sphere of epistemology, showing, by way of 
Cacciari and Foucault, that, if the reader’s realm is fundamentally split between figuring 
the source-text as a thing-in-itself and figuring it as the transcendental subject—positing, 
as it does, a disjunctive relation (a synthesis) between these two noumena—then the 
writer’s (authentic) realm can be conceived of as the reader’s crisis, as, namely, being 
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present where the two noumena in question momentarily coincide, or where the source-
text is both—in, namely, a conjunctive relation (or non-synthesis): the realm of action 
and fabrication. Second reading is thus defined as no less than the action par excellence 
capable of effectuating this coincidence, and, implicitly, as a presentation of the idea. 
As should be evident from this summary, if Chapter 1 can be understood as being an 
introduction of sorts to my dissertation, then this last chapter must be seen as its 
conclusion. For, not only does “On Second Reading” further apply the notion of non-
synthesis, nor does it just constitute a more developed exposition on secondariness and 
posterity, but it also (i) further reflects on artistic creation as critique, (ii) employs 
Benjamin’s notion of the “death of intention” in the context of writing, (iii) traces the 
origin of discontinuity and its manner of operation in writing, and, most importantly, (iv) 
expands Benjamin’s theory of ideas to the sphere of praxis, showing the relationship 
between praxes to be of the same kind as that between ideas (namely, of non-synthesis). 
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Chapter 1  
1 What is an Existential Writing? 
(Methodology II) 
From the outset, this question sounds of a translation, and may thus, needless of further 
explication, provide, embedded in its form, the fitting answer: “writing in the style of the 
existentialists.” The work would subsequently be cut out along the contour of a common 
style, the average extracted from a set of existential writings. And yet, if the 
Daseinsprinzip of writing is form,64 then this Dasein-writing can be seen as one that puts 
its own existence into question in its very existence.65 The answer would then fall outside 
the purview of the literary critic, and more within that of the historian of ideas—looking, 
to be specific, at those particular existentialist texts that pose the question of their writing 
from the outset. But isn’t this somewhat of a contradiction—not only that an existentialist 
would have time to write, but also that, out of anything, it is writing that he would 
address? Dostoevsky’s The Gambler would be a prime example of a text written “out of” 
existence and “on” the conditions of its writing—except that these conditions are 
conditions, and, even if considered, they are not particular to writing. In fact, only the 
poet is the sort of writer whose writing, arriving on the shores of (his) existence, eludes 
the interruption of the latter. “C’est rien! j’y suis! j’y suis toujours.”66 
                                                 
64 “[Form] grounds the work a priori […] as a principle of existence (Daseinsprinzip).” Walter 
Benjamin, “The Concept of Criticism in German Romanticism,” trans. David Lachterman, 
Howard Eiland, and Ian Balfour, in Selected Writings, Volume 1, 1913-1926, ed. Marcus Bullock 
and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1996), 156. 
65 “[Dasein] is ontically distinguished by the fact that in its being this being is concerned about its 
very being.” Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany, NY: SUNY 
Press, 1996), 10. 
66 Arthur Rimbaud, “Qu’est que ce pour nous, mon coeur,” in Complete Works, Selected Letters: 
A Bilingual Edition, trans. Wallace Fowlie (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 214.  
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What this contradiction designates is the extent to which existentialism falls short of its 
name: the fact that when it gambles, it always flips a two-headed coin,67 that what it lives 
and what it writes belong to orders as distinct from one another as quantum physics from 
general relativity. So far as existentialism is a philosophy about or dealing with existence, 
it puts itself in the position of the positive, of knowledge, prepared to neutralize and to 
subsume each negative or existent,68 to generalize them all into “existence” and thereby 
turn them over to the ends of universal reason,69 as if to that Bureau of Existences from 
Manganelli’s sixtieth ouroboric novel, where “[a] meticulous but slightly absent-minded 
gentleman” waits to come into existence only to desist from both pre- and non-existing 
when he notes “a slight inaccuracy in the way his name was written” on an envelope from 
                                                 
67 “To live in one category and to think in another: this is the critique aimed at speculative 
philosophy by which one recognizes the distinctive mark of authentic existential thought!” 
Benjamin Fondane, “Existential Monday and the Sunday of History,” in Existential Monday: 
Philosophical Essays, trans. Bruce Baugh (New York: New York Review of Books, 2016), 17. 
“But ‘existential’ philosophy could in no way escape the damnation that strikes every 
‘philosophy’: it seems that wherever there is ‘philosophy’ there is also, necessarily, impotence; 
any step towards truth is punished by a sad turn back; the more courageous the advance, the more 
dangerous the fall. This is why the ‘immediate given’ quickly became a concept referring to the 
general, an empty concept; the will to believe quickly became the will to believe only what’s 
demonstrable; the will to power became a negation of power: Amor Fati; Heidegger’s Existence 
moved to a point that transcends the real, and singular being is no longer anything but an 
illustration of the Existence that precedes it.” Benjamin Fondane, Conștiința nefericită, trans. 
Andreea Vladescu (Bucharest: Humanitas, 1992), 60. (My translation). 
68 “In fact, minds as acute as those of Berdyaev on the one hand and Bespaloff on the other have 
noted the following: Berdyaev that, in opposition to Kierkegaardian philosophy, the philosophies 
of Heidegger and Jaspers, for example, are philosophies of existence, about existence; and 
Bespaloff that ‘existential phenomenology, under the auspices of Gabriel Marcel, Heidegger, or 
Jaspers, has been carrying out an insidious maneuver to regain firm ground; the existent has been 
eliminated and replaced by Existence.’” Fondane, “Existential Monday,” 6. ”Philosophy was 
therefore never disinterested in existence; it has always given itself the task of transforming this 
nothingness into being. Philosophy has always taken itself to be the Positive, just as it has always 
taken the existent for the Negative. If existential philosophy gives itself the same task, in what 
way does it differ from the philosophy that preceded it?” Ibid., 10. 
69 “In fact, one should ask (before deciding whether this is indeed a victory over Hegel) whether 
the existential philosophy of our time at least prolongs the guiding thought of its initiators, or 
whether it has merely retained the name ‘existential’ for a form of thought that—no matter what 
name one gives it—in essence intends to submit its teachings to universal reason.” Ibid., 6-7. 
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the Bureau.70 The “existence” of existentialism thus succeeds merely in adding to the law 
another brick, one that the latter can hurl back whenever man, by right of the existent, 
wants to claim that it, even if sacred, for him was made, not he for it.71 
Perhaps the most evident instance of existentialism’s self-betrayal is its categorical 
dichotomy ‘twixt poetry and prose, where the first is, in both attitude and practice, 
disclaimed in favor of the second, which is deemed exemplary of “existential” writing.72 
Existence neutralizing the existent finds its double in prose-writing’s use of words, their 
reduction, under its regime, to mere object-designations, judged according to their 
denotative rectitude.73 By function, then, prose is equivalent to speech, the words of both 
being mere useful conventions, tools, penetrable like a pane of glass.74 The speaker acts 
                                                 
70 Giorgio Manganelli, “Sixty,” in Centuria: Ouroboric Novels, trans. Henry Martin (Kingston, 
NY: McPherson & Company, 2005), 129-30. 
71 “The Law is sacred, but it was made for man; it can, consequently, be suspended if the greater 
interests of man are endangered rather than safeguarded by it.” Fondane, “Existential Monday,” 
2-3. “Consciousness can’t decide to admit that everything that isn’t ‘knowledge’ can nonetheless 
be ‘power’ and sets itself the absurd, ingrate, and dangerous task of destroying within the existent 
any manifestation of power that proves itself to be irreducible to the operations of knowledge.” 
Fondane, Conștiința nefericită. 56. (My translation.) 
72 “It is true that the prosewriter and the poet both write. But there is nothing in common between 
these two acts of writing except the movement of the hand that traces the letters. Otherwise, their 
universes are incommunicable, and what is good for one is not good for the other.” Jean-Paul 
Sartre, What is Literature?, trans. Bernard Frechtman (New York: Philosophical Library, 1949), 
19. Following Sartre’s arguments on prose’s ability to disclose freedom in the second and third 
chapters of the book, as well as the importance of freedom to the existential project, the thesis 
that Sartre sees prose as the exemplary mode of existential writing follows. The same emphasis 
on prose—particularly, fiction—but completely without mention of poetry, can be found in 
Albert Camus, “Absurd Creation,” in The Myth of Sisyphus, trans. Justin O’Brien (New York: 
Penguin Books, 1979), 86-106. 
73 “Prose is, in essence, utilitarian. I would readily define the prose-writer as a man who makes 
use of words. […] The art of prose is employed in discourse; its substance is by nature 
significative; that is, the words are first of all not objects but designations for objects; it is not first 
of all a matter of knowing whether they please or displease in themselves, but whether they 
correctly indicate a certain thing or a certain notion.” Sartre, What is Literature?, 20. 
74 “[O]ne can penetrate [the sign] at will like a pane of glass and pursue the thing signified […] 
For [the man who talks] [words] are useful conventions, tools which gradually wear out and 
which one throws away when they are no longer serviceable.” Ibid., 12-3. Their identity (that of 
prose and speech) is most obvious in the fact that both the words used by the speaker and prose 
are described in terms of “eyeglasses” and “antennae.” Ibid., 12, 20. 
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upon the world through them; they serve as his prostheses,75 at once shielding him from 
it and throwing him upon it without residue.76 The actions they facilitate, by naming 
objects, are actions-of-disclosure that transform the world77 in stripping off its veil of 
innocence.78 Evidently, “existential” writing is synonymous herein to writing while 
“engaged”—writing for a cause, to a particular audience, in, whenever possible, key-
words,79 as a sign of “my” engagement80—and thus completely consonant with 
                                                 
75 “[H]e is surrendered by a verbal body which he is hardly aware of and which extends his action 
upon the world.” Ibid., 12.  
76 “[T]he word […] tears the writer of prose away from himself and throws him into the midst of 
the world.” Ibid., 15. 
77 “The opinion is widespread, and prevails almost everywhere as axiomatic, that writing can 
influence the moral world and human behavior, in that it places the motives behind actions at our 
disposal. In this sense, therefore, language is only a means of more or less suggestively laying the 
groundwork for the motives that determine the person’s actions in his heart of hearts.” Walter 
Benjamin, “To Martin Buber (Munich, July 1916),” in The Correspondence of Walter Benjamin, 
1910-1940, ed. Gershom Scholem and Theodore W. Adorno, trans. Manfred R. Jacobson and 
Evelyn M. Jacobson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 79-80. 
78 “Thus, the prose-writer is a man who has chosen a certain method of secondary action which 
we may call action by disclosure. […] words are action […] to reveal is to change and […] one 
can reveal only by planning to change.” Sartre, What is Literature?, 23. “To speak is to act; 
anything which one names is no longer quite the same; it has lost its innocence.” Ibid., 22.  
79 The prose-writer can and must be asked “What is your aim in writing? What undertakings are 
you engaged in, and why does it require you to have recourse to writing?” as well as “What 
aspect of the world do you want to disclose? What change do you want to bring into the world by 
this disclosure?” Ibid., 21-23. “Whether he wants to or not, and even if he has his eyes on eternal 
laurels, the writer is speaking to his contemporaries and brothers in class and race. […] people of 
the same period and collectivity, who have lived through the same events, who have raised or 
avoided the same questions, have the same taste in their mouth; they have the same complicity, 
and there are the same corpses among them. That is why it is not necessary to write so much; 
there are key-words.” Ibid., 68. 
80 “What these intellectual modes of writing [found in Esprit or Les Tempes Modernes] have in 
common, is that in them language, instead of being a privileged area, tends to become the 
sufficient sign of engagement (l’engagement). […] Writing here resembles the signature one 
affixes at the foot of a collective proclamation one has not written oneself. […] Whereas an 
ideally free language would never function as a sign of my own person and would give no 
information whatsoever about my history and my freedom, the writing to which I entrust myself 
already exists entirely as an institution; it reveals my past and my choice, it gives me a history, it 
blazons forth my situation, it commits me without my having to declare the fact.” Roland Barthes, 




“existentialist” philosophy, its writing similarly: for reason, to philosophers, in concepts, 
as a sign of knowledge. Nor is it alien to Marxist writing, when considering the latter’s 
use of a vocabulary generally technical, one by which it claims to be the language of 
knowledge—the result of language’s transfiguration into a device exclusively 
communicant of value-judgements.81 En masse, these “modern” modes of writing are 
nothing but protrusions, as if from the ancien past, of that language of propriety called 
“classical.” Their most essential features are determined, from the center, by classicism’s 
understanding of the word as sans a density that it might call its own, as being the mere 
algebra of its relations,82 as an entity which, by strict recourse to a desiccate tradition, is 
neutralized and absented and thus divested of the being83 which could keep it in the 
entitative realm. Said differently, the word is here a social-word consumed collectively 
and “in” a language operating most of all as speech.84 
                                                 
81 “[With Marxist writing] the closed character of the form […] derive[s] […] from a lexicon as 
specialized and as functional as a technical vocabulary; even metaphors are here severely 
codified. […] [F]rom the very start Marxist writing is presented as the language of knowledge. 
[…] Being linked to action, Marxist writing has rapidly become, in fact, a language expressing 
value-judgements. […] In the Stalinist world, in which definition, that is to say the separation 
between Good and Evil, becomes the sole content of all language, there are no more words 
without values attached to them.” Ibid., 23-4. 
82 “Overworked in a restricted number of ever-similar relations, classical words are on the way to 
becoming an algebra where rhetorical figures of speech, clichés, function as virtual linking 
devices; they have lost their density and gained a more interrelated state of speech; they operate 
in the manner of chemical valences, outlining a verbal area full of symmetrical connections, 
junctions and networks from which arise, without the respite afforded by wonder, fresh intentions 
towards signification.” Ibid., 46. 
83 “The economy of classical language (Prose and Poetry) is relational, which means that in it 
words are abstracted as much as possible in the interest of relationships. In it, no word has a 
density by itself, it is hardly the sign of a thing, but rather the means of conveying a connection.” 
Ibid., 44. 
84 “Classical language is a bringer of euphoria because it is immediately social. There is no genre, 
no written work of classicism which does not suppose a collective consumption, akin to speech; 
classical literary art is an object which circulates among several persons brought together on a 
class basis; it is a product conceived for oral transmission, for a consumption regulated by the 




Where “existentialist” philosophy sees poetry alone as being radically asocial and un- or 
disengaged,85 forcing a division between it and prose in order to maintain the latter’s 
classicism, the real distinction lies between the modern and the classical: modern prose is 
just as capable as modern poetry of overturning its classical counterpart, whether as novel 
or as essay. Nonetheless, “existentialist” philosophy is not erroneous in its description of 
poetic writing. Herein, the bard is said to serve words rather than to utilize them—to view 
them as if viewing things86 whose significance is no longer an “aimed after” transcendent 
goal but, instead, a property of each.87 Words are not internal to him, an extension of his 
body, but exterior, a barrier in his approach toward other men. He thereby looks at them 
as from God’s vantage point.88 In the poetic word there lies a play of mirrors ‘twixt its 
signification and its verbal body, such that the word becomes an image of the thing, and 
                                                 
85 “Thus under each Word in modern poetry there lies a sort of existential geology, in which is 
gathered the total content of the Name, instead of a chosen content as in classical prose and 
poetry. The Word is no longer guided in advance by the general intention of a socialized 
discourse; the consumer of poetry, deprived of the guide of selective connections, encounters the 
Word frontally, and receives it as an absolute quantity, accompanied by all its possible 
associations.” Ibid., 48. “If this is the case, one easily understands how foolish it would be to 
require a poetic engagement. Doubtless, emotion, even passion and why not anger, social 
indignation, and political hatred? are at the origin of the poem. But they are not expressed there, 
as in a pamphlet or in a confession. Insofar as the writer of prose exhibits feelings, he illustrates 
them; whereas, if the poet injects his feelings into his poem, he ceases to recognize them; the 
words take hold of them, penetrate them, and metamorphose them; they do not signify them, even 
in his eyes. […] The word, the phrase-thing, inexhaustible as things, everywhere overflows the 
feeling which has produced them. How can one hope to provoke the indignation or the political 
enthusiasm of the reader when the very thing one does is to withdraw him from the human 
condition and invite him to consider with the eyes of God a language that has been turned inside 
out?” Sartre, What is Literature?, 18-9. 
86 “[Poetry] does not use words in the same way [as prose], and it does not even use them at all. I 
should rather say it serves them. […] [T]he poetic attitude […] considers words as things […] for 
[the poet], [words] are natural things which sprout naturally upon the earth like grass and trees. 
[…] [The poet] discovers in [words] a slight luminosity of their own and particular affinities with 
the earth, the sky, the water, and all created things.” Ibid., 12-3. 
87 “[Signification] is no longer the goal which is always out of reach and which human 
transcendence is always aiming at, but a property of each term, analogous to the expression of a 
face.” Ibid., 13. 
88 “The poet is outside of language. He sees words inside out as if he did not share the human 
condition, and as if he were first meeting the word as a barrier as he comes towards men.” Ibid., 
13-4. “[T]o consider with the eyes of God a language that has been turned inside out.” Ibid., 19. 
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the thing an image of the word.89 The poet’s first approach is not by knowing name, but 
by a silent contact.90 His word stands like a mast, placing the work upon a feverish sea, 
“a totality of meanings, reflexes and recollections.”91 Under it, in an inferno of its own, 
lies not a content chosen by tradition—the word is no longer defined by an assemblage of 
relations—but “the total content of the Name.”92 An encyclopedia of all determinations 
past and future, the word, standing frozen without article, drills holes in poetic speech, 
turning it inhuman, facilitating its descent, and thereby opening the door on nature’s other 
bank.93 Modern poetry reveals itself herein to be objective.94 
* 
                                                 
89 “[A]ll language is for [the poet] the mirror of the world. Its sonority, its length, its masculine or 
feminine endings, its visual aspect, composed for him a face of flesh which represents rather than 
expresses signification. Inversely, as the signification is realized, the physical aspect of the word 
is reflected within it, and it, in its turn functions as an image of the verbal body.” Ibid., 14. 
90 “Instead of first knowing things by their name, it seems that [the poet] first has a silent contact 
with them,” Ibid. 
91 “Fixed connections being abolished, the word is left only with a vertical project, it is like a 
monolith, or a pillar which plunges into a totality of meanings, reflexes and recollections: it is a 
sign which stands.” Barthes, Writing Degree Zero, 47. 
92 “The poetic word is here an act without immediate past, without environment, and which holds 
forth only the dense shadow of reflexes from all sources which are associated with it. Thus under 
each Word in modern poetry there lies a sort of existential geology, in which is gathered the total 
content of the Name, instead of a chosen content as in classical prose and poetry.” Ibid., 47-8. 
93 “The Word, here, is encyclopedic. […] It therefore achieves a state from which is possible only 
in the dictionary or in poetry—places where the noun can live without its article—and is reduced 
to a sort of zero degree, pregnant with all past and future specifications. […] This Hunger of the 
Word, common to the whole of modern poetry, makes poetic speech terrible and inhuman. It 
initiates a discourse full of gaps and full of lights […] so opposed to the social function of 
language that merely to have recourse to a discontinuous speech is to open the door to all that 
stands above Nature.” Ibid., 48-9. 
94 “At the very moment when the withdrawal of functions obscures the relations existing in the 
world, the object in discourse assumes an exalted place: modern poetry is a poetry of the object 
[…] [which is to say] of verticalities […] suddenly standing erect, and filled with all their 
possibilities.” Ibid., 50. 
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Wherefore it is poetic writing, rather than the existentialists’ necessarily classical prose, 
that most resembles existential writing.95 The latter is no more than an ideal, however. 
Better put: only the question’s ideal has thus far been provided, so that the pen has been 
displaced less than replaced. On the other hand, such a mediation through 
displacements—rather than an instantaneous attainment of some immediate solution, or a 
clear-distinct deduction—divulges an essential aspect of this writing that “places its own 
existence into question in its very existence”: its character as inner dialogue. The ground 
of this dialogue can be understood as a labyrinth and therefore as a path marked by wrong 
turns and fallacious outlines.96 So that existential writing must from the start allow for 
errors or mistakes, false questions or partial answers, and make resonate its drama of 
ideas even if they take the course of Manganelli’s fourth ouroboric novel, where “a man 
of sound education and moderately melancholy spirits” yields conclusive proof of God’s 
existence only to go out “for no particular reason, or, in short, to live” and disremember 
it—his notes useless because incomplete.97 From another angle, however, inner dialogue 
determines writing to withhold a grain of indetermination. Bearing a centrifugal force, it 
forbids bringing the process to an end, settling on a solution, and does so by putting into 
                                                 
95 “Sprung from poetic experience, existential thought acts as a restorative thought, in contrast to 
philosophical thought, which is a consumptive thought. In this, it is completely similar to that of 
the poet, a thought of passion, of dilation.” Fondane, Conștiința nefericită, 54. (My translation.) 
96 “If, then, man is the bearer of somesuch flower (invisible, but determined in its smallest details) 
and not of a power to create ad libitum (somesuch flower: the immaterial promise of somesuch 
fruit), it mustn’t be forgotten, so as not to confuse man with a plum tree, that we don’t have a 
royal road available that would lead, without any detours, this fragile promise of plenitude which 
shyly palpitates within man, to its natural goal, that is, the state of being a fruit. The only itinerary 
that offers itself to his naive and gullible flower’s steps is one that merits its name with difficulty, 
for it bifurcates cunningly with each of them, thus adding to the load of walking, hesitation 
regarding the path which should be taken. Such that this quite vague thing to whose will we’ve 
yielded in good will, according it the trust we would accord an honest itinerary—liable, that is, to 
allow the traversal of unknown realms without the risk of getting lost—leaves behind its deceitful 
appearances of a wolf in sheep’s clothing and pronounces, into an ear horrified by the discovery, 
its veritable name, which is that of ‘labyrinth.’” Mihai Șora, Despre dialogul interior: Fragment 
dintr-o Antropologie Metafizică, trans. Mona Antohi and Sorin Antohi (Bucharest: Humanitas, 
2006), 23. (My translation.) 
97 Giorgio Manganelli, “Four,” in Centuria: Ouroboric Novels, trans. Henry Martin (Kingston, 
NY: McPherson & Company, 2005), 17-8. 
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question even the most veritable answers.98 Without it, writing would end in the 
immediate signified of its word, failing to push through to its trans-signified—that is, to 
infinite Being, the divine, what lies on the other side of Nature—and, sure of it, would 
idolize the path it takes.99 Inner dialogue, then, is that which rectifies writing’s original 
attachment to the hic et nunc, its initial engagement in the concrete-immediate given, 
generating alongside it a manner of detachment that prevents its words and subject matter 
from rigidifying into self-sufficient things, and orients them towards what is.100 Bearing 
directly on philosophical writing, this intensive centrifugal force is meant to counteract 
the centripetal force that extends a method discovered at a certain time and for the limited 
use of a certain well-determined investigation, to a method applicable ubiquitously and 
no matter the conditions present—an itinerary best illustrated by that belonging to 
Descartes.101 
                                                 
98 “And here’s a second function of the inner dialogue, this time one which is, so to say, 
‘redressing,’ rather than expiatory. Indeed, it is that which allows in-tention to maintain its 
direction to the end without detours—rectitudo, όρθότης—and this while placing into question 
every answer attained (I mean: even those that are veritable).” Șora, Dialogul interior, 110. (My 
translation.) 
99 “For, were the road open and straight, our engagement would no longer be the same: we would 
always be sure that we’re on the right road, but at the same time, the certainty regarding the place 
where we find ourselves, the idea that this road that we’re traversing at this very moment is the 
right one would be so powerful that we would stop traversing it and stop there where we find 
ourselves. We would thus easily start idolizing precisely this admirable road, considering its 
every turn a final point and consequently attach ourselves to it, while the road as a whole only has 
sense insofar as it leads towards what’s found at the end, and which is the only veritable end of 
the journey. It would mean to close upon itself every reached act, to opacify its transparence and 
thus deprive ourselves of any possibility of going beyond its immediate signified, to that, more 
profound layer of being that it co-signifies and, even further, to the Ens in-creatum that it trans-
signifies.” Ibid., 110-1. (My translation.) 
100 “[W]e must attach ourselves to the act given hic et nunc because it is con-substantial with that 
which is aimed for; but we must also detach ourselves from it, because that which, through it, is 
aimed for, exceeds it infinitely.” Ibid., 116. (My translation.) “Engaging himself courageously in 
himself and exploring the real (given in a concrete mode) that he finds therein, man must at the 
same time somewhat doubt what he thereby comes to possess. This lived world will then cease 
from being opaque, will become transparent, and man will no longer attach himself to it as to a 
‘thing’ that would be self-sufficient, but as to a sign of He Who Is.” Ibid., 118. (My translation.) 
101 “The history of the transformation of any new road into a general method of research is fully 
captured by these few lines; it is the itinerary that yesteryear tied Descartes’ dream to the 
Cartesian method (initially restricted to Descartes’ personal use): a method applicable everywhere 
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Contrary to expectations, the detachment required of existential writing owing to the 
inner dialogue within it is, as detachment, antithetical neither to poetry nor to political 
engagement. Indeed, the most political writing is precisely one that, instead of seeing in 
words only an instrument of action, sees words as such, as capable of saying something 
of themselves.102 Yet this epiphany of words is herein not the object of a “coming,” 
complementary detachment; it does not occasion grasping words as naturable things, as 
each the mirror of a corresponding thing—said above by way of transition; it stops short 
of tolerating tout court any pure attachment.103 “Words are entirely sayable”—this means 
that nothing unsayable should come-to-halt within them, forcing them thereafter to speak 
in its name.104 But also: that they themselves are not unsayable, are neither inert things, 
stones to be uplifted and thrown out for a skip,105 nor the divine word, infinite being 
itself. If the prosaic word is, within a given signification, transparent in regards to both 
the opaque that through it signifies and the opaque that it signifies, but turns opaque at 
signal’s end, like a lake that, with the trout-tickler’s departure, becomes turbid once 
again—then the poetic word, like flame from hearth and spindle on some crystalline and 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
and in any conditions, after it was discovered at somesuch date, for the use limited to somesuch 
well-determined research (a geometry problem, for instance) where it gave its full measure—the 
only time, moreover (imagine Descartes as a biologist!)—precisely because it was derived from 
the very problem it was trying to resolve.” Ibid., 160. (My translation.) 
102 “[I]t repeatedly seems to me that the crystal-pure elimination of the unsayable in language is 
the most obvious form given to us to be effective within language and, to that extent, through it.” 
Benjamin, “To Martin Buber,” 80. (Translation modified.) 
103 “This elimination of the unsayable seems to me to coincide precisely with what is actually the 
objective and sober manner of writing […] objective and, at the same time, highly political 
writing.” Ibid. (Translation modified.)  
104 “[L]anguage [as] only a means of more or less suggestively laying the groundwork for the 
motives that determine the person’s actions in his heart of hearts. […] [Language as] the 
transmission of contents (Inhalten)” Ibid. Herein Inhalten etymologically confesses itself as a 
“halting-in,” or that which is “halted-in.” See also Sartre’s initial description of the poet: “As [the 
poet] is already on the outside, he considers words as traps to catch a fleeting reality.” Sartre, 
What is Literature?, 14. 
105 “[A] relationship between language and action in which the former would not be the means of 
the latter.” Benjamin, “To Martin Buber,” 80. (Translation modified.)  
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stifling night, is the medium in which knowledge and action grow indiscernible from one 
another106 and from the word itself,107 immediately.108 To be properly political, an action 
must be receptive-creative, a detached-attachment,109 and this condition is achievable 
only in a word bereft of the unsayable—that obstruction which, like a line drawn in the 
sand, suspends over the prose-word the law of the excluded middle: either purely 
receptive or purely creative. It follows that, wordless and silent, the unsayable sits 
henceforth beyond language, but as an effect not of exclusion as of detachment,110 such 
that the word can from its grasp release itself only by aiming toward it, trans-signifying 
it, and prompting its self-presentation, the way the flame outlines night’s all-pervasive 
plenum.111  
                                                 
106 “[The elimination of the unsayable] implies the relationship between knowledge and action 
precisely within linguistic magic.” Ibid. (Translation modified.) 
107 “[O]nly where this sphere of the wordless reveals itself in unsayably pure [night] can the 
magic spark leap between the word and the motivating act, where the unity of both of these is 
equally real.” Ibid. (Translation modified.) The original “Macht” has been read here as “Nacht,” 
following Howard Eiland’s correction. Ibid., 86.  
108 “I can understand writing as such as poetic, prophetic, objective in terms of its effect, but in 
any case only as magical, that is as un-mediated.” Ibid., 80. 
109 “My hero loves this woman (in her entirety), although he loves her in and through her qualities 
(in the categorial sense of the word). She is for him, in each instant and in each of the acts that he 
carries out for her, something and someone totally different from himself; she is YOU. Far from 
being satisfied with enjoying her, he loves her; it’s not enough for him that she is ‘the immanent 
sense’ of a particular concrete situation through which he is passing; instead, he searches in all 
her appearances within his existential sphere for a sense that at once transcends and is con-
substantial to them, and which is: Her, as she is in her most secret forum, as she can never be 
given to him, as he can never have her. And there, in herself (as a ‘dynamic centre’), there lie a 
multitude of things: there lies especially this A which is given to him now; there lies this B and 
this C that can be given to him; there also certainly lie this D, this E, this F… to which he will 
never come close, but which make a common indissoluble body with this Totality that his 
actioning in-tention aims towards and which outstrips that which can be given to it. This is why 
he must disclose the given onto the totality of transcendence that it (this given) realizes and act 
accordingly. His attachment to the given will therefore be a ‘detached attachment.’ It’s the only 
manner in which he can maintain the rectitude of his acting in-tention, this primordial condition 
of any orthopraxis.” Șora, Dialogul interior, 122-3. (My translation.) 
110 More specifically, of an “elimination” where the word must be given its logical overtones: not 
as outright expulsion as much as “identification” or “determination,” and therefore also: 
“differentiation.” 
111 “My concept of objective […] writing is this: to lead to what was denied to the word […] [to] 
where this sphere of the wordless reveals itself […] [words] intensive[ly] aiming […] into the 
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Attachment, when lacking a counterbalance, predominantly designates idolatry of words, 
writing’s satisfaction with the methods and solutions that it has received. In turn alone, 
detachment indicates that aim which wipes the dirt from every “pane-word,” the author’s 
self-aggrandizing exhibition that he can arrive at being, a faculty that expands endlessly, 
that stretches gradually across the world, and ultimately culminates with the author’s 
usurping of being and his insertion in its place of his own, handmade abstraction: 
“Existence.” While the two fail to converge in a detached-attachment, they nonetheless 
concur in their excess. At the limit, the repetition of results and methods is only a few 
shades removed from the exchange of any and all method for rampant subjectivity, since 
both result in a modality of writing that turns away, abstracts, from the existent, either as 
becoming or as actual, respectively.112 Which is to say that both detachment and 
attachment fall into mere habit, into the domain of the had, the past—whether it be 
ontological, personal, or institutional. The attached writer orients himself towards his past 
self as if towards a mask, per-forming his pre-formed position, adamantly keeping to dry 
land, while the detached adds yet another acquisition to his treasure, and now one more 
atop the former, like so to rival God’s creation, not breaking off until he “has” being 
itself—unawares that, with regards to being, one can only be—until, a prophet incarnate, 
to section out the waves he’s able, ab-stracting all terrain from desiccation, subsuming all 
to his pelagic being: après moi, le déluge. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
core of intrinsic becoming-silent […], [the word] leading into the divine […] through itself and its 
own purity.” Benjamin, “To Martin Buber,” 80. (Translation modified.) 
112 “Opposite this appearance of false enrootment or of deliberate and artificial limitation, there 
exists the appearance of unbridled derootment or of unfettering at any price. Being is an ‘open 
system’ on the level of existential actuality (this “opening” being accompanied by the strictest 
essential determination). System? Yes, but: open. This is the proper reply to the obstinately 
enrooted man who wants to avail himself of this evident systematicity so as not to be troubled in 
his commodities. Open? Indeed, but: system, nevertheless, is the proper reply to the passionate 
derooted man who would seize, in order to abuse it, the reply given to the first. The rigid straight 
line of the first departs from the supple curve of being (analogically identical to itself) to the same 





And yet the existential writer is not one who, vehemently opposed to his confrères, 
entirely avoids the had and wants to keep exclusively within the realm of being, for this 
is the endeavor of detached pretension—of balking at the labyrinth in toto, whether by 
converting into yogic meditation the latter’s convoluted course, or surpassing it in some 
Icarian feat.113 Only what is had can be communicated, never being, so that an existential 
writing to the latter bound would place itself beyond communication, or: would “have” 
for its content the unsayable, and therefore share its empty net with its compatriots. 
Instead, such writing must embrace the fact of its communicability, that it can’t remove 
its portion from the had. This while, in contrast to the de- and the attached, it needs not 
quietistically give way, or committedly contribute, to had’s paralyzing homogenization of 
the world. In fact, its mark is that of keeping had in check: of fashioning the 
correspondence, stitch by stitch, of to have vis-à-vis to be, the rights to this coordination 
being given by fabrication, which is no less than their middle term.114 The latter can 
accord (to) have and (to) be because within it lie both orders: on the one hand, it is act, 
“they are in the midst of fabrication”—a pure quality and therefore part of being’s 
                                                 
113 “The common source of these two species of appearance, that of enrootment and that of 
derootment, is cupidity. A cupidity that is sometimes petty, consisting in attachment to a thing 
whose price we know and from which we don’t, consequently, want to part, sometimes 
adventurous, consisting of the indistinct appropriation of foreign non-values; sometimes lazy, 
sometimes thieving.” Ibid., 163-4. (My translation.) 
114 “[W]hat is absolutely certain is that our life here consists of two things: to be and to have. The 
true problem is not that of suppressing the latter, but of making it correspond, point by point, to 
the former: to have according to what you are. Of throwing a footbridge over the abyss, which is 
to say: of finding a system of equivalences between to be and to have, between quality and 
quantity—here’s the real problem. For it must be found a medial term that would hold to both and 
thus make possible the sought after solution. But, this medial term has already been found for 
quite some time: at stake, namely, is the long infinitive of the verb to fabricate (substantivized, 
yes, but still imbued with its entire verbal energy): fabrication.” Ibid., 145-6. (My translation.) 
“Fashioning,” “to fashion,” is perhaps the best translation, by etymological root, of the French 
faire, both being born from the Latin factio. However, since in English “fashioning” refers to the 
act but not the product, the alternatives were “creation,” “conception,” and “fabrication” (all of 
which contain the double sense Șora is aiming for). “Creation” being the domain of God, and 
“conception” being, as a product or result, too restricted to the immaterial realm, “fabrication” 
was the only word remaining. It should be noted that “conception” accords quite well to 
Benjamin’s use of Emfängnis in the Language essay. 
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order—on the other, it is product, “it has been fabricated”—quantifiable and therefore 
have-able.115 Act(ion), namely, no longer as the “handling” of handy-work,116 no longer 
as “creative” or “inventive,”117 but as the common fruit of an encounter hic et nunc, a 
reciprocal disclosure of being118 which results in the assimilation of one term within the 
other. Product, that is, this relation limited to this encounter and thus ossified into a thing 
completed, the fragment of a past (“has”) now alien to being (“been”), marking out both 
of its terms as objects, disposed to repetition (not in a new encounter, but in a 
reconstruction of the first) or disposal (of one term or both). This act, this work, this 
writing, when it folds onto its product, is a falsehood: an object from the start, not once 
intimate with, and therefore intimating, its author—himself, in turn, another object in its 
fabrication, either of a third or of his own regard.119 When instead the product folds back 
                                                 
115 “[Fabrication’s] two constant poles are: action (or the existential act, this pure quality) and its 
hardened result (or the—quantifiable—‘product’ of work, objectified existence, being 
transformed into thing).” Ibid., 146. (My translation.) 
116 In the letter to Buber, Benjamin uses Handeln (cognate of “handle”) for language-ignoring 
“action,” and Tat (cognate of “deed,” deriving from dehtis, “placing”) for action from the word. 
117 “Any veritable answer is the result not of a work of invention or ‘creation,’ but the final term 
of an operation of decantation, the residue of a work that explicates these interrogations, the pre-
givens of our spiritual lives.” Ibid., 31. (My translation.) 
118 “Fabrication is distinct from pure action in that it is an objectification of being and it, 
consequently, translates into a result that detaches itself from being and can be ‘had’—while 
action (or the existential act pure and simple) is the simple (evanescent) epiphany of being.” Ibid., 
146. (My translation.) 
119 “[T]he work that is modestly satisfied to fulfill its mission—that of bringing to light that 
which, already being there, until then lay in this obscure reservoir of larval forms which is 
potentiality. For between the work and he whose work it is, there is no difference in nature, but 
only a difference in the mode of being. And, as the contour of productive nature is forever fixed 
on the level of the possible, so is the contour of the work that needs to be produced. It’s not a 
matter of modifying this work at will, of determining it quidditatively: it is already determined; it 
only needs to be discovered and shown; or, better yet, everything needs be done for it to blossom, 
arriving through its fruit to its existential act. In contrast to the veritable creative intention, which 
gives itself the task of bringing to light ‘something’ already given at a certain, darker, level of 
being, the false creative intention starts by unsuitably ‘theomorphizing’ the human agent (who, 
properly speaking, is naught but an (active) mediator between his potentiality and his act of 
being), giving itself completely that ‘something’ which it will thereafter strive to push into the 
light. Except that it will make this man pay dearly for the illusion of liberty that it thus procures 
him: this ‘something’ at which it will arrive will in truth be that which we earlier named a ‘false 
work,’ because it will not lie in the extension of the proper nature of he who elaborated it: added 
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on the act, when the relation is multiplied and gathered up continuously, shaken into 
being so as not to freeze and shatter, then, as both convergent and translucent, the other is 
related to as other, the author sees the act to be its act (but by this virtue no less his), and 
writing turns into an arrow towards the Other.120 Fabrication, therefore, is a neutral term 
that can lead being and had, pure act and completed product, to correlation only if the act 
and not the product serves as goal, only where the product predicates the action, and 
never the reverse.121—Detached attachment that by slant prevents its imminent collapse; 
creative receptivity which, piercing, keeps it vigilant; communicative communing that, by 
extra “-cat-” (from -icō), thwarts its fetishistic self-seclusion.—Conceived as fabrication 
that revolves around restoring, existential writing is inherently poetic—this in contrast to 
that fabrication branded by consumption, at bottom technological, which, through self-
purification of the other, creates the very void it seeks to fill. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
from the outside, instead of grown from the inside, it can’t be anything except a factical reality.” 
Ibid., 27-8. (My translation.) 
120 “[In-tention] does nothing except aim at […] the known prout est extra animam, in other 
words as true objectively […] and, willy-nilly, hoodwink us, so to say, precisely as regards the 
fundamental impotence wherein we find ourselves, our impotence of jumping over our own 
shadow. […] [In-tention] ‘open[s]’ the respective being [and] thus arrives at the value that this 
latter carried.” Ibid., 52-3. (My translation.) “In order for intention to end up apprehending this 
transcendence in this immanence, it will be enough for it to keep from stopping at the given act, 
to tend towards the underside (which is not given) that this act implies for the in-tentioned form, 
that is, to consider this act not as its act (althought it is this too, effectively), but in its quality 
(equally real) of being the other’s act—where ‘the other’s act’ is to be understood, more 
precisely, as ‘the other in the act.’” Ibid., 56-7. (My translation.) “The [ontological] relation […] 
ends in a ‘entitative unity’ with the other as I-myself; for quidquid recipitur, ad modum 
recipientis recipitur and, in every act of knowledge, it’s precisely the knowing subject that serves 
in whatever measure as the receptacle for the known object, and not the reverse. […] [A]ny 
ontological relation is a relation of assimilation.” Ibid., 52. “As such, that is, as an ontological 
unity, man has a very powerful inclination to give in to his nature, to order everything around 
himself as around a center, and to stop at the ‘common act’ [the immediate signified of this 
‘formal sign’] without tending towards another.” Ibid., 109. (My translation.) 
121 “[F]rom this slavery then, man can escape by ‘instrumentalizing’ his rules, making them no 
longer function like a machine in vain, but only with a view to…” Mihai Șora, A fi, a face, a avea 
(Bucharest: Humanitas, 2006), 133. (My translation.) 
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And it is precisely by this quality that existential writing is political. The latter, the 
political, operates within the realm of had as its institutional determination: the had-past 
common to a set of beings that only through it forms a set; a society, manifest in 
institutions, laws, and schemas-of-identity.122 If generally the poetic aims to keep being 
and had open to one another, its gesture extends to this restricted, and restricting, sphere 
as well. In short, existential writing is political because its aim is always to enliven the 
forms through which society con-forms, and thereby hold them true to being. As a car 
that, inorganic, needs drivers to be placed in motion, so a public form needs actors to 
disclose it as activity123—but actors who are, at the limit, poets: both because the role 
they play is also an investment of their being, an existential risk, and thereby not 
restricted to one instance, and by virtue of the forms they yield, which are above all 
words as such. But there’s the rub, for skin-thin is the space between submitting present-
being to had-past and merging multiple had-pasts into a had-together-past in order to 
                                                 
122 “I will name this third had institutional had: it is composed of the common past, crystallized 
(if not sclerotized) in common institutions, belonging to the members of a society. But if there 
exists a ‘community’ of all beings which are internally (and analogically) governed by the formal 
law of the universal whose specifications they are, there doesn’t exist any ’society’ except to the 
extent that its members possess an ontological had together (for instance, a pseudo-ontological 
had or: a capital of habitudes): indeed, only through the connection of ‘their common past’ 
(especially to the extent that it is intertwined with the present) do individuals aggregate in the 
present in society. […] This is what a society is: the common past of different beings. Common 
not at the level of being (there is no community in being other than analogical community, while 
here it’s a question of a ‘community’ in pure univocity), but at the level of the schemas of 
(approximate) identification which, in turn, are not common to them except by virtue of having 
been emptied out, and only to the extent that they have been emptied out, of any living content.” 
Șora, Dialogul interior, 139-40. (My translation.) 
123 “Possible dangers into which the institutional had can drive being: traditionalism (being placed 
in a can, conserved; becoming conceived as pure stereotypical repetition), routine, academicism, 
sclerosis, conservatism—and I’m speaking only of the valid institutions, which emerge from the 
very breast of being. The remedy to all of these consists of keeping yourself supple and alive 
under the institutional carcass, animating the institution itself, keeping yourself in a state of 
continuous revolution in relation to it (without which it will rapidly dry up, like a mummy). This 
continuous revolution is of an exclusively ontological order (therefore it doesn’t end in 
suppressing the institution, for the institution is of the order of having) and it consists solely in 
this: to accept the institution beyond all doubt, but simultaneously to consider it open and 
therefore liable to develop (or, better yet, to be developed, since by itself the institution is inertia 
itself) in its own manner—and to contribute to this, always blowing life into it, by virtue of 
precisely this work of unceasingly adjusting it to being.” Ibid., 149-50. (My translation.) 
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present a common present, which consequently is a having rather than a being. Thin, 
namely, as snake’s skin, which in shedding opens up the space for direct contact: between 
erecting the word skyward, turning it from empty sign-product, clotted in determinate 
relations of exchange, to vibrant act that, holding hands with both poet and object, in turn 
mutates them into vibrating acts—between, that is, poesis dancing its hat off and the 
actor’s dissolution of the had-together-past into a multiplicity of had-pasts, a dissolution 
followed by his reassembly of the one into the other, in which the only had unwelcome to 
the present is that of previous unification. 
Instead of compromised by the political, this writing gains from it the strength to put off 
any past-rejecting purism. Its political existentiality precludes only a particular modality 
of past, only certain species of the had: that emblematic of the classical, the French 
preterite, wherein to have becomes a suffix. Indicating actions and events brought to 
completion, removed wholly from the present, the passé of narration presents the past as 
if in figures on a Grecian urn, which sit unable to effect either the viewer or, outside of 
their fixed mold, each other.124 By chiseling their background, this tense effectuates the 
standing of its figures in relief, where they take part in logic’s time—a temporality 
immediately entailing a causality—so that the vessel’s reading is continuous: the reader 
turns the urn or turns around it.125 Thus the preterite constructs a self-enclosed, ready-
made, and ordered world, a world bereft of the contingent and uncertain, of mystery and 
nonsense, which, presented as the past, makes the latter at once readily available and 
                                                 
124 “The part [the preterite] plays is to reduce reality to a point in time, and to abstract, from the 
depth of a multiplicity of experiences, a pure verbal act, freed from the existential roots of 
knowledge, and directed towards a logical link with other acts, other processes, a general 
movement of the world: it aims at maintaining a hierarchy in the realm of facts.” Barthes, Writing 
Degree Zero, 31. 
125 “Through the preterite the verb implicitly belongs with a causal chain, it partakes of a set of 
related and oriented actions, it functions as the algebraic sign of an intention. Allowing as it does 
an ambiguity between temporality and causality, it calls for a sequence of events, that is, for an 
intelligible Narrative. This is why it is the ideal instrument for every construction of a world; it is 
the unreal time of cosmogonies, myths, History and Novels.” Ibid. 
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empty (of all threat)126: “Ah, happy happy boughs, that cannot shed/ Your leaves, nor 
ever bid the Spring adieu.”127 The past as the content reflection of the present, the present 
content with(/)in its reflection—this tense is but a mirror that intends, in turn and at each 
turn, only itself, and thereby stops reality from overstepping language.128 Or, a 
boomerang of sorts, the preterite at once creates a world and points to its creation: “there 
never was a world for her/ Except the one she sang, and singing, made.”129 It follows that 
its every figure is as much that of a lover as of the urn itself or of the very art of 
pottery.130 The passé simple: the tool and product of intention.131 
Far from concurring with poetic writing by exposing its own artifacts as acts, this tense 
does not begin with one foot in to be, but both from birth has-it-had-planted firmly in the 
had. Its fictive operation joins hads into a sequence that it seals by binding to last had the 
first, making its own repetition handy as an instance of itself: an institution. It is the tense 
                                                 
126 “[The preterite] presupposes a world which is constructed, elaborated, self-sufficient, reduced 
to significant lines, and not one which has been sent sprawling before us, for us to take or leave. 
Behind the preterite there always lurks a demiurge, a God or a reciter. The world is not 
unexplained since it is told like a story; each one of its accidents is but a circumstance, and the 
preterite is precisely this operative sign whereby the narrator reduces the exploded reality to a 
slim and pure logos, without density, without volume, without spread, and whose sole function is 
to unite as rapidly as possible a cause and an end.” Ibid., 31-2. 
127 John Keats, “Ode on a Grecian Urn,” in Complete Poetry and Selected Prose, ed. Harold 
Edgar Briggs (New York: The Modern Library, 1967), 295. The “Grecian urn” in question is the 
Sisibios Vase. 
128 “The preterite signifies a creation: that is, it proclaims and imposes it. Even from the depth of 
the most somber realism, it has a reassuring effect because, thanks to it, the verb expresses a 
closed, well-defined, substantival act, the Novel has a name, it escapes the terror of an expression 
without laws: reality becomes slighter and more familiar, it fits within a style, it does not outrun 
language.” Barthes, Writing Degree Zero, 32. 
129 Wallace Stevens, “The Idea of Order at Key West,” in The Collected Poems (New York: 
Alfred K. Knopf, 1971), 130. 
130 “[T]his wooden walnut must not impart to me, along with the image of the walnut, the 
intention of conveying to me the art which gave birth to it. Whereas on the contrary this is what 
writing does in the novel. Its task is to put the mask in place and at the same time to point it out.” 
Barthes, Writing Degree Zero, 34. 
131 “Thanks to [the preterite], reality is neither mysterious nor absurd; it is clear, almost familiar, 
repeatedly gathered up and contained in the hand of a creator; it is subjected to the ingenious 
pressure of his freedom.” Ibid., 31. 
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through which all unity-into-society is realized. And at the center of this complex sits the 
narrator—the one to whom this mechanism points, as to the glass-blower the glass, in 
pointing to itself at every turn. The tangle of its self-incrimination thus unravels. Given 
that its aim of bringing hads to presence is tied to instituting common values, these values 
must inevitably be expressed in every had that’s brought to order—where those of 
artifice, utility, and sovereign creative freedom are impressed most forcefully. Howbeit, 
the passé simple does not breathe life into the institutions that it serves; on the contrary, it 
adamantly thins the space permitting such in-spiring by binding any lurking poet-actor to 
an either/or: he must either understand its figures, the hads that it makes present, as 
expressions of idea(l)s or perceive them as (representations of) concrete realities; must 
either wave the white flag of idealism or beat the snaring drums of realism. Thus, the 
only weak spots he can strike, in his fight against had’s homogenization of the world, are 
those his foe exposes by design: either he unmasks ideas each and values all as mere 
(representations of) concrete realities, whether these realities be objects, acts, relations, 
events, affects, situations—and then posits a world without idea(l)s as telos, where the 
exercise of thought and culture would bear the cost of time served in a labor camp; or he 
shows every “reality” to be no more than an idea(l) that, through urine, feces, blood, 
sweat, sperm, and rot, as much as through the puss and mucous of the masses, has been 
perverted or replaced—and ends in putting forth a set of rules by which any iconoclast or 
deviant will be delivered to the nearest guillotine. 
This false alternative, false even in its terms, is one through which the had makes of the 
poet-actor a lodger in its house, wherein, granted provisions, space, and liberty enough to 
last a lifetime, he in toto forgets the something other that beyond it lies, and consequently 
never leaves. For, in the second, the idea(l)s at stake are, because so easily reproached, 
mishandled, and perverted, no more than concept-hads, for which, impure by nature, such 
“blemishes” are mere superfluities; and where these idea(l)s-concept-hads are truly the 
usurpers of the pure idea(l)s, they are so solely owing to that advocate most loyal and 
devoted to those that they dethroned: he who earliest defaced the pure idea(l)s in 
endeavoring to designate the marks of their defacement. This while, in the first, those 
same realities intended for disclosure, for release from the cramped quarters of their 
concept-hads, are the very same that play at being, not grasping that, if the domain of 
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their existence really coincided with their role, then they wouldn’t have been have-able, 
and had, at all—that they stand, in truth, with one foot in each realm. This means that 
their unmasking only amplifies the had’s domain, for it impels both these realities and 
those idea(l)s to lose their footing in the realm of being and slip entirely within the had: 
realities through the intention of their immediate and full procurement, and idea(l)s in 
their deprival of transcendence, their transfiguration into mere signs of concrete realities. 
The house of had imprisoning the actor, albeit unknowingly, is thus a labyrinth without a 
center, where every path leads to a no-where.132 Or: where every path leads to the center, 
even those that look to be dead-ends. And it’s this very situation that forces the poetic to 
set unengagement as its golden rule, whither “to engage” denotes to sign this type of 
lease. Political is the poetic precisely through its unengagement. 
* 
While, in the early 20th century, the novel outright disinherited the passé simple, 
philosophy began spoiling it all the more, deeming this progeny, from all its litter, solely 
capable of spreading its most proper word. Although no longer yearning to devour a 
world in just one sitting, contemporary philosophical writing is nonetheless the most 
direct descendent of the classical, its teeth as sharp as ever. In other words, academic 
writing, the current name of this glutton or predator, is a writing determined, down to its 
smallest details, by the preterite—evidently, not as a linguistic verbal form but as a form 
tout court, bringing with it the effects of its linguistic manifestation. Whereas in the 
novel, this tense is found in the linguistic substantivizing of occurrences, in the academic 
book, or “paper,” it appears at the smallest level: in the use of proper names, jargon, and 
first- and second-person pronouns (singular and plural). 
                                                 
132 “The city ‘departs’ along the streets and axes that intersect with its structure. The exact 
opposite of Heidegger’s Holzwege, they lead to no place. It is as though the city were transformed 
into a chance of the road, a context of routes, a labyrinth without a center, an absurd labyrinth.” 
Massimo Cacciari, “Epilogue: On the Architecture of Nihilism,” in Architecture and Nihilism: On 
the Philosophy of Modern Architecture, trans. Stephen Sartarelli (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1993), 199-200. 
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“Let’s take these one by one,” the first-person plural pronoun, is an instance of 
unification between author and abstract reader(s), pointing to the text while writing it, yet 
not a fusion of the two insofar as tied to an imperative. The text is here a voyage 
throughout which the author serves the reader as a guide, a tour devoid of any dangers for 
the pair. “But we immediately realize that there” is a case in which the pair fuses, but 
still, like “we’ve already seen,” with the author as main actor. The author turns into the 
reader’s (self-)reflection (i.e., the voice in his head) and the text behaves as the 
transcription a priori of the latter’s consciousness. Thus does the author manage to save 
himself from criticism, the text from intruders, and the reader from becoming aware of 
his misunderstanding. Finally, “we know of a case that” is also a fusion between the two 
actors but, instead of à propos the text itself, beyond it, in “our body” and in “our 
possessions,” where the author plays, instead of the policeman or the witness, the 
barrister making his closing argument before a jury: he aims, by means of commonalities, 
to at once unite the jurists’ views and convert them to his own, reinforcing his arguments, 
where need be, by invoking that greatest commonality, the law. In this instance of the 
first-person plural pronoun, the text becomes precisely such a speech, a mere means 
containing naught but fictions and abstractions, a creation wherefrom the author subtracts 
himself—since it’s at once the product of its readers and a manifestation of “reason” 
itself—while its reader keeps safe by hiding either in its crowd or in “reality.”133  
                                                 
133 “[W]e-the-closed, not giving itself either to the world at large, for which it feels no kinship, 
nor to its neighbors, for which it feels no brotherhood, doesn’t develop with the entire 
inexhaustible wealth of unsuspected notes of its potentiality, but with the help of a few features 
that it deems characteristic, which it somehow extracts to the degree that it can from their 
compenetrative infinity, brutally schematizing them […] (the mania of univocizing) […] and thus 
transforming them into a ne varietur structure, it manufactures itself a poor model which it places 
in front of itself and it guides its obedient parade-steps by this model’s poverty of content (it no 
longer disposing—and this deliberately—of any of its former ‘willful steps’). […] [I]t is 
characterized by that set of fixed rules that would secure the continuous reproduction—with those 
minimal allowed modulations, resulting from the (supervised) (because known beforehand) 
explicitation of the more gross implications which are from the start hidden in the folds of the 
‘program’—the continuous reproduction precisely of the model, imagined as representing the 
invariant identity of this type of we.” Mihai Șora, eu & tu & el & ea... sau dialogul generalizat 
(Bucharest: Humanitas, 2007), 192-3. (My translation.) “We-the-closed […] is thoroughly 
installed on the level of to have. Its power is that of the mercilessly (internally distant, completely 
un-participating) seizure of everything that surrounds it (including its neighbours), mediated by 
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By contrast, within this purview “I” and “you” are, by their solitary nature, univocal. “My 
point here” is no different than “what I’ve argued” when it comes to the determinacy of 
the preterite at play. Both instances have for their object a differentiation (of author: from 
reader, from other authors, and from the text itself) which is simultaneously a 
unification—not of things external to the text and instituted “for eternity,” but of the text 
with itself in its duration for writer and reader—bringing the initial, most visible aspect of 
the intention full circle, to where it places the two actors in synchrony. “What I’m 
arguing is that the ‘I’” effects a presentification of the text by throwing over it a pre- or 
meta-text—like a table of “nutritional facts” stamping a can of soup, or a picnic blanket 
wrapping all the bitten bits into a bindle—but does so only after “first” dividing it from 
itself precisely in its duration, interrupting the very continuity it endeavors to impose. 
But, “I must add that the determination specific to its uses here” is also a continuous 
discontinuity; it puts enough holes in the text, though not all at once, to flood it with, and 
force its sinking into, the author’s Neptunian subjectivity. The text thereby becomes 
imbued with the author’s in-tension, and turns into the setting of the author’s struggle 
with himself, in one corner his creative act of writing, in the other his reflection on this 
act expressed by recourse to the “I.” Yet never, when used, does the first-person express 
the author’s proper self-reflection. It only points to self-reflection, expressing no more 
than the fact of its existence. In fact, the possibility of its expression is limited to this 
single case, so that only in tension with writing does self-reflection manifest, where—like 
an echo that engenders the very well and mountains where it rings—this manifestation is 
its only mode of being. The reader, meanwhile, is one these mountains. Within him 
echoes the same conflict, albeit in a quite different octave, between reading the text and 
reflecting on himself as reader. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
the sum of intra-worldly objects, entirely transformed into utensils (transformed, that is, into mere 
means, even if their own initial purposes were completely different). Its behavior [is] 
appropriating-organizing. […] [A] we of tautological identity that also transforms itself into a sort 
of monolithic super-ego, oppressing you with the entire mass of its institutionalized organization, 




As close as this situation may come to inner dialogue, it nonetheless does not evince the 
problem of filling a pre-given, but unknown, contour nor agree that this problem is to be 
solved cathartically.134 Instead, the author has, as the use of the first-person makes 
evident, determined his contour prior to any deliberation, and now is merely forcing 
himself into it, as if Procrustes into his own bed. Put differently, by this grammatical 
gesture, the author makes the text into an arrow pointing to his “self,” a mere means for 
his self-reflection. He thereby simulates an unapproachable subjectivity behind the text 
that means to serve it as its key but only renders it obscure in turn. Facing such a faceless 
text, the reader conjures for himself a similarily unapproachable subjectivity, which he 
thereafter propels into a past that antedates the reading he performs. Ultimately, the text 
disappears in its obscurity, its words replaced by either “its” theses or the author’s 
“who”—and, with it, its potential as a leap.135 But that, as long as it’s no longer whole, it 
isn’t wholly esoteric: for, if the instances of “I” are viewed as elevated, then they function 
at once to reveal the text, as a magician his tricks while he performs them, and to replace 
textual continuity with one that’s extra-textual and logical.136 
                                                 
134 “And man stepped out of this ‘full’ existence […] to fall into another existence […] one that’s 
degraded and hesitant vis-à-vis choosing the contour that belongs to it legitimately. Hesitant 
because it is no longer the full owner of this contour, it escaping through this existence’s fingers 
precisely in the moment when, spurningly, this existence turned away from it. [...] [M]an fell to 
the level of the inner dialogue. From now on, the coherence of this discourse […] instead of 
resulting naturally and clearly from the fact that man is ‘himself’ and manifests himself as such, 
must be acquired by him with difficulty, at the price of ever renewed efforts […] This man, split 
by his own hand and through no fault other than his own, will need, henceforth, to begin by 
making a void inside himself, banishing therefrom all exterior automatisms, all the factical 
realities of which his everyday being is usually full, in order to thus establish the propitious 
conditions for the efficient appearance of this ‘essential form,” buried somewhere within him, 
from which he’s arrogantly torn himself and which specifies him in being.” Șora, Dialogul 
interior, 98-9. (My translation.) 
135 In other words, the author makes the text depend on his life as its explanation, and thus turns it 
into an instrument of his fame—the text’s obscurity owing to his attempt to render it into an 
expression of one of his inexpressible and irreducible life experiences. This while the reader turns 
himself into a critic so as to create a wall between himself and the text’s play of mirrors, which 
he’s powerless to evaluate as such. 
136 For more on the function of the “I,” an alternate account, or a more formal explanation, see 
Émile Benveniste, Problems in General Linguistics, trans. Mary Elizabeth Meek (Coral Gables, 
FL: University of Miami Press, 1971), 217-30. 
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If to the text’s facticity, the “I” draws too much attention, then the “you” suspends its 
being from a cloud: a celestial necklace. Where academic writing is concerned, its use, 
unlike that of any other pronoun, is restricted to the positing of hypotheticals. It is thus 
the paradigm of all counterfactual pronouns. Similarly to the first-, the second-person 
also interrupts the text, like a pelican the water’s surface as it lands. The transcendent to 
which its disturbance testifies, however, is no longer the falconer who’s wildly calling for 
his falcon to return, but is, instead, the realm above: the seabird’s ripple generates etheric 
likeness in the text by breaking up the latter’s photograph into a mosaic, while the pelican 
itself, its wet webbed feet in tow, flies off towards the horizon. If the sky herein is the 
domain of potentiality or intelligibility, and the author’s “if-thens” are the folds by which 
the text partakes in this domain, then the text itself stands as opposed to any existential 
writing as imaginable. For the hypotheticals that it expresses are, precisely, naught, not 
only as “potentials,” hence innocuous, and hence irrelevant—where relevance and danger 
attract care, thus fidelity, and thus a wager—but withal as examples, adding the 
impersonal to their already discarnate constitution. Moreover, their very status as 
exemplary, as paradigms of the assertions that they ground, ordains them as self-
nullifying: they present and leave a class in the same motion, renouncing any antecedent 
density.137 On top of thus becoming as much a means as when inhabited by supplemental 
pre-texts, the text is herein a mere setting down of unapproachable paradigms, a medium 
converting “if-then” situations into laws of reason—the latter being non-existent anterior 
to or beyond the paradigm particular to each. 
But that, these situations are from the start transcendent to the text. Instead of by analysis, 
it is by synthesis that into paradigms they turn, but a synthesis already an analysis, 
transcendent to the text’s duration. If the situation were the experience of an object 
limited to object solely, then its juxtaposition to a universal, as example, would be mere 
synthesis—the operation of a common place. As relation (of two phenomena to a 
                                                 
137 “What the example shows is its belonging to a class, but for this very reason the example steps 
out of its class in the very moment in which it exhibits and delimits it.” Giorgio Agamben, Homo 
Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford 




subject), however, the situation placed in a text is already the result of a previous 
operation (of synthesis or analysis) which in its placing is synthesized once more—but, 
as result, obfuscates its status as a synthesis. In other words, within the “if-then,” the 
antecedent and the consequent are related as cause to effect, not by substance, but by 
habit—and the situation is thus expressed as a rule. On the other hand, its relation to a 
more general judgment is analogical and arbitrary—a synthesis, but not with an 
experience—resulting in a habit’s elevation to the realm of truth. The author thereby 
conflates his habit with a law of reason, making of an a posteriori an a priori, and thus 
posits himself as able to access the latter’s realm and yield from it examples. The text 
becomes the word of God made visible by the prophet. Au delà the Pyrenees, the reader is 
at once cajoled and coerced into the law presented, the latter itself being simultaneously 
impersonal and exterior. It neutralizes his responsibility and thus acts as his fate. In short, 
the ripples of the hypotheticals are also the virtual scare-quotes around the second-
person, and with it every other pronoun. 
* 
As the artisans of fate are idols, so the academic text is occupied by proper names. The 
persons thus invoked, no matter their status, are substantivized—no differently than in 
any other use of a proper name absent its “owner.” Names of writers, however, go 
further, turning text into a myth or a mythology. It thus no longer treats of nature, nor 
even of humans, but only of figures, so that the existent finds itself bracketed out. They 
now subsist in the atemporal realm of the canon, where they can sit beside their much 
older or much younger comrades, the gap between them present but, by means of enough 
context and deduction, traversable. The author acts here as a missionary, attempting to 
convert the readers to his god(s), and the readers become proselytes: they anticipate the 
next issue of the series, battle in a seminar with shiny trading cards, or attend the other 
church’s sermon in order to compose their own. The text, meanwhile, takes on the form, 
while dropping the tone, of a joke: “a priest, a rabbi, and a minister…” 
Related to the use of proper names, because similarly sharpening the text into a weapon, 
is that of jargon, which when invented by a proper name, reveals these disparate churches 
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to be cults. In its orientation toward initiates, jargon turns the text into a means, which, 
under the gaze of an outsider, becomes as indecipherable as a love letter whose writer and 
addressee he doesn’t know.138 And this constitutes the ideal situation, because, 
predominantly, even the initiate remains confused. Beneath the roof of the same church, 
the proselytes argue over which of them has truly understood the letter, their 
presupposition being that it was to he who understands it fully that it was addressed. In 
recognizing himself as such, this true proselyte would then have access to its conveyed 
love and would be capable of writing back. 
The reader that such a text presupposes is not merely an initiate, then, but must be either 
the author himself “right now,” as he writes, or an omniscient reader, God. Better yet—
rather than omniscient, all-remembering—a reader whose name would be “History,” 
materialized in the historian of ideas, who understands only by utmost reduction, or by 
way of dessicate tradition. Herein, one term can enter into logical relations with an 
altogether different term. Herein, no longer tied to any being—not even the author’s 
insofar as he has placed the text outside the reach of his own future self—the term 
becomes a corpse, able to refer to no more than the place wherein it’s found, wherefrom 
its only chance to move rests on a reader lifting it or striking it. But this is a task entirely 
Sisypehean and, to be fulfilled, requires a reader who’s entirely Sisyphean in turn.139 
And the same preteritic “forms” are present at more extensive levels of the academic text: 
whether in its syllogistic-deductive-systematic structure—its theses the stones in a 
                                                 
138 “The kiss, in spite of everything, is not speech. Of course, lovers speak. But their speech is 
ultimately impotent in that it is excessively poor, a speech in which love is already mired.” Jean-
Luc Nancy, “The Inoperative Community,” trans. Peter Connor, in The Inoperative Community, 
ed. Peter Connor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 36. 
139 “Camus writes in the last line of his work: ‘We must imagine Sisyphus happy.’ But that is the 
whole problem! And it is from this very problem that existential thought is born. That Sisyphus 
imagine himself happy is all that Platonic, Stoic, or Hegelian thought could ask for […] It is true 
that Camus does not go that far […] it is not Sisyphus whom [he] asks to image himself happy, it 
is we who are to imagine him so. That is much easier! And that preserves for us the possibility of 
a philosophy which goes ‘in search of peace’ in turning away from what Jaspers calls the 
‘incessant uneasiness’ of Sisyphuses—whether they be named Kierkegaard or Nietzsche. Camus 
finishes his book with a masterstroke, but it means neglecting to take into account the point of 
view of Sisyphus himself.” Fondane, “Existential Monday,” 16. 
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domino formation; its consistency of terms—the same eagle devouring the same 
Promethean liver; its preliminary statements of argument—explanations, to the members 
of the operating theatre, of the next incision to be made; or its use of historical or 
discipline-specific frames—meant to fix it like a tripod does a camera. But above all in 
citations is the simple passé found. In citations that act as authoritative appeals, proofs, or 
examples vis-à-vis the text’s theses, as the source language whose target language is the 
text: the flag justifying this pole’s fabrication, the seam by which this fabric is joined to 
that cloth, a joker pulled out of the deck and hidden in a sleeve before the game, the 
container pre-determining the shape of its possible contents. Citations always have a 
pierre-menardian character, so that within a text one and the same citation can be 
attributed to two separate authors and interpreted in a completely different manner, 
without the hurried reader, eager to skip indents and double apostrophes so as to read the 
“text itself,” knowing any better. Their essence is most evident in their ability to be 
completely fictional, along with their source, its author, and its publication.140 On the 
other hand, the patient reader will neurotically clamp down upon the cited phrase, 
weaving his own text from its authentication and its transport from one text to another, as 
though searching for a final ur-text in some all-grasping library.141 As recourse to 
authority, citation sits the text next to a dogma, canon, or tradition, where its meaning 
springs from the extent to which it diverges from or parallels the latter. Even if it 
unilaterally turns against the dogma that it conjures up, it nonetheless always obeys the 
general dogma of the printing press, of Protestant literacy—in short, of reading.—As a 
form of proof, citation is a testimony of the author’s knowledge and the text’s 
scientificity. Within it, the author’s existential responsibility is replaced at most with his 
literal responsibility, and the existents he addresses in the first with objects of knowledge: 
                                                 
140 See Jorge Luis Borges, “Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote,” in Collected Fictions, trans. 
Andrew Hurley (New York: Penguin Books, 1999), 88-95. 
141 “Someone proposed searching by regression: To locate book A, first consult book B, which 
tells where book A can be found; to locate book B, first consult book C, and so on, to infinity.” 
Jorge Luis Borges, “The Library of Babel,” in Collected Fictions, trans. Andrew Hurley (New 
York: Penguin Books, 1999), 117. 
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be it book, page, chapter, verse, author, term, concept, idea. Thus does he follow the rule 
by which he must distinguish from all others his own voice. 
But that citations, along with their respective proper names are complemented as little by 
the had as by any other passé. They are, instead, always translated by means of the 
présent and thus seem to continue the life of this philosopher or this text, to place them 
once again within duration. Indeed, this present presencing would qualify this writing as 
existential single-handedly if its present were the present hic et nunc, the brimming 
present that’s bereft of any equal. Quite the opposite proves to be true, however, since the 
present of the present tense is indeterminate, an empty abstract present, differentiated by 
the things whereof it is the present. Therefore, the transformation of existents into objects 
not only precedes this instance of the present tense but also acts as its immovable mover. 
It is, rather, change in voice that would effect the present in the text: from the active or 
the passive where action between subject and object is unilateral and binary, to middle 
voice’s two-way street, where author and object are both acted-on and acting 
simultaneously—where, in short, no object is at stake.142 As intransitive, this voice bars 
the preterite’s possessive suffix. It replaces, in the French, avoir with être. Folded on 
transitive verbs, starting with “to write,” this voice swallows actions into being: instead 
of writing at his own initiative, by interrupting action, the author is here “being 
written.”143 If the présent is subsequent to author and objects, the hic et nunc is herein 
                                                 
142 “[I]n the case of the active voice, the action is performed outside the subject […] in the case of 
the middle voice, on the contrary, by acting, the subject affects himself, he always remains inside 
the action, even if that action involves an object.” Roland Barthes, “To Write: An Intransitive 
Verb?,” The Rustle of Language, trans. Richard Howard (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 18. 
143 “Guillaume distinguishes between what he calls a diriment perfect (with the auxiliary avoir—
to have), which supposes an interruption of the action due to the speaker's initiative (je marche, je 
m'arrête de marcher, j'ai marché—I walk, I stop walking, I have walked), and an integrant 
perfect (with the auxiliary être—to be), peculiar to the verbs which designate a semantic whole, 
which cannot be delivered by the subject's simple initiative (je suis sorti, il est mort—I have left, 
he has died—do not refer to a diriment interruption of leaving or dying). […] [T]o write is 
becoming a middle verb with an integrant past, precisely insofar as to write is becoming an 
indivisible semantic whole; so that the true past, the ‘right’ past of this new verb is not j'ai écrit 
but je suis écrit—as one says je suis né, il est mort, etc., expressions in which, despite the verb 
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made precedent, the condition sine qua non of their appearance, and thus of the 
appearance of writer and existent (by contrast to author and object).144 And yet, what 
looks in French like aberration, in English has the status of a birthmark. The être that is 
ubiquitously introduced by middle voice is the to be present within every progressive 
English tense. Although to say, as in the passival verbs of yore, that “the text is writing,” 
is no longer a possibility, its replacement, “the text is being written,” only makes more 
evident this tense’s, and with it the text’s, participation in the sphere of being. Its present 
is no longer a bland, empty one, waiting for a sapid complement, but one present sui 
generis. Additionally, said also of a middle voice—the proper voice of existential 
writing—is the possessive existential clause, one that outright takes possession from the 
hands of had to place it in those of to be, turning Laodicean and hygienic having into 
excessive, humoral being.145 
* 
It is therefore by means of scratching off the upper layer that being’s pentimento surfaces. 
In hindsight, existential writing is this pentimento. And is so also in the painting 
process—if, instead of being, it’s the had that’s held as il pentito. The writing of 
existence is not “therefore” a scribing, as in ink, in guilt. The academic pen alone is 
onerous in carrying the burden of its hads, which, converging in the center of the page, 
weigh it down into a concave mirror. From mirror to mirror bound, the text intends herein 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
être, there is no notion of the passive, since without forcing matters we cannot transform je suis 
écrit—I am written—into on m'a écrit—someone has written me.” Ibid., 19. 
144 “[I]n the modern verb of middle voice to write, the subject is constituted as immediately 
contemporary with the writing, being effected and affected by it: this is the exemplary case of the 
Proustian narrator, who exists only by writing, despite the reference to a pseudo-memory.” Ibid. 
145 The difference being between, on the one hand, the French and German “J’ai faim” and “Ich 




to be the absolute reflection of the work, and thus attain atonement.146 To relate a writing 
to a work and therefore death147—this threatens, yet again, to make the difference of “the 
poetic” from “the academic” one merely of degree.148 For, death’s name is the poet’s 
great companion, what he holds tightest, tucked within his cheek. “Call’d him soft names 
in many a musèd rhyme/ To take into the air my quiet breath.”149 On the other hand, the 
death invoked by prose is that produced by suicide. There, the writer intends a good, 
familiar, organized death, which leads him only to an intensification of his self-
possession, the strengthening of his shield against the other, in a complete affirmation of 
the present, absolute, un-passing instant.150 His text thereby becomes a pyre upon which 
he throws himself, his reader, and his every theme in order to avoid that other death. He 
sacrifices these existents in exchange for their inert representations—a funeral in full 
propriety—a punctual had replacing singular beings continuously being. Precisely this 
continuous being is that other death, un-seize-able, un-seeable, and without size, bearing 
                                                 
146 “It seems that both the artist and the suicide succeed in doing something only by deceiving 
themselves about what they do. The latter takes one death for another, the former takes a book for 
the work.” Maurice Blanchot, “Death as Possibility,” in The Space of Literature, trans. Ann 
Smock (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), 106. 
147 “The writer, then, is one who writes in order to be able to die, and he is one whose power to 
write comes from an anticipated relation with death. […] Write to be able to die—Die to be able 
to write.” Ibid., 93-4. 
148 As in classical poetry, where, according to “M. Jourdain’s double equation: Poetry = Prose + a 
+b +c; Prose = Poetry – a – b –c; whence it clearly follows that Poetry is always different from 
Prose. But this difference is not one of essence, it is one of quantity. […] Any poetry is then only 
the decorative equation, whether allusive or forced, of a possible prose which is latent, virtually 
and potentially, in any conceivable manner of expression.” Barthes, Writing Degree Zero, 41-2. 
149 John Keats, “Ode to a Nightingale.” in Complete Poetry and Selected Prose, ed. Harold Edgar 
Briggs (New York: The Modern Library, 1967), 292. 
150 “To die well is to die in one’s own life, turned toward one’s life and away from death: and this 
good death shows more consideration for the world than regard for the depth of the abyss. […] a 
death which has not met with death […] The deliberateness in suicide […] whereby we strive to 
remain ourselves, serves essentially to protect us from what is at stake in this event. […] [We] 
see[k], in this familiar death that comes from us, not to meet anyone but ourselves, our own 
resolution and our own certitude. […] He who kills himself is the greatest affirmer of the present. 
I want to kill myself in an ‘absolute’ instant, the only one which will not pass and will not be 
surpassed. Death, if it arrived at the time we choose, would be an apotheosis of the instant; the 




no relation to any author’s immunitary self. It is the passing of the present not so much 
out of existence as out of subsistence, what places every had necessarily in the past, the 
margin ‘twixt no-longer and yet-to-come.151 “And each part of the whole falls off/ And 
cannot know it knew, except/ Here and there, in cold pockets/ Of remembrance, whispers 
out of time.”152 Not the poet-self but poetry itself directs itself towards this ulterior death, 
saying it, and it alone, alone153—and thus, like undomesticated fruit, standing, as 
potential bane, unreachable to urban intellection, the work obliges cultivation and 
engagement in its locus, the writer ever-risking lethal pricks, the reader ready to defend it 
from deracination.154 Here the actors are not separated, unequal, or identical, but hold the 
work precisely in the intimacy ‘twixt them.155 The poet hands himself to words no longer 
his own—which say nothing, yet aren’t merely silent—nor anymore the world’s, to a 
language without address and disclosure, that, instead of spoken, merely is.156  
                                                 
151 “[A]nd there is [the other death], which is ungraspable. It is what I cannot grasp, what is not 
linked to me by any relation of any sort. It is that which never comes and toward which I do not 
direct myself. […] There is in suicide a remarkable intention to abolish the future as the mystery 
of death: one wants in a sense to kill oneself so that the future might hold no secrets, but might 
become clear and readable, no longer the obscure reserve of indecipherable death. Suicide in this 
respect does not welcome death; rather, it wishes to eliminate death as future, to relieve death of 
that portion of the yet-to-come which is, so to speak, its essence, and to make it superficial, 
without substance and without danger.” Ibid.,104. 
152 John Ashbery, “Self-Portrait in a Convex Mirror,” in Selected Poems (New York: Viking 
Penguin, 1985), 204. 
153 “What it [the work—the work of art, the literary work] says is exclusively this: that it is—and 
nothing more. Beyond that is nothing. Whoever wants to make it express more finds nothing, 
finds that it expresses nothing. He whose life depends on the work, either because he is a writer or 
because he is a reader, belongs to the solitude of that which expresses nothing except the word 
being.” Maurice Blanchot, “The Essential Solitude,” in The Space of Literature, trans. Ann 
Smock (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), 22. 
154 “The solitude of the work has as its primary framework the absence of any defining criteria. 
This absence makes it impossible ever to declare the work finished or unfinished. […] The work 
is solitary: this does not mean that it remains uncommunicable, that it has no reader. But whoever 
reads it enters into the affirmation of the work’s solitude, just as he who writes it belongs to the 
risk of this solitude.” Ibid. 
155 “[T]he word being is pronounced through the work [thus making it be] […] when the work 
becomes the intimacy between someone who writes it and someone who reads it.” Ibid., 23. 
156 “What he is to write delivers the one who has to write to an affirmation over which he has no 
authority, which is itself without substance, which affirms nothing, and yet is not […] the dignity 
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Being-writing is therefore not mere silence, ascetically maintained before the purity of 
logic—with its exclusive self-scribing and circumscribing—but a continued speech 
beyond any content to be said or locutio of speaking,157 a speech (in)expressing the very 
being of this writing.158—“Mere” silence, or taceo, sits with two “other” silences as 
stages in the aition of language. First came the pre-linguistic sileo of divinity or nature, of 
the unknowable-and-tactless world, because absent of any knower-tactician. Interrupted 
by the Word, by the divine speech-act—itself turning by locutio into speech-sentence—
this sileo is changed into taceo, the tacitness of, posited against, speech, and against 
which speech is posited. And, as taceo is the post-lapsarian taciturnity of man, so muto 
comes to be the post-Adamic muteness of nature, a muteness expressing the change 
(muto) that nature undergoes in being (in the dative:) passive receiver—to or for which—
(in the ablative:) instrument—through which—place—from where—and material against 
which man’s speech differentiates itself159: the expression, namely, of lament. The tactics 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
of silence, for it is what still speaks when everything has been said. […] To write is to break the 
bond that unites the word with myself. […] To write is, moreover, to withdraw language from the 
world. […] The writer belongs to a language which no one speaks, which is addressed to no one, 
which has no center and which reveals nothing. He may believe that he affirms himself in this 
language, but what he affirms is altogether deprived of self. […] Where he is, only being 
speaks—which means that language doesn’t speak any more, but is.” Ibid., 26-7. 
157 “This affirmation doesn’t precede speech, because it prevents speech from beginning, just as it 
takes away from language the right and power to interrupt itself. To write […] is to destroy the 
relation which, determining that I speak toward ‘you,’ gives me room to speak within the 
understanding which my word received from you.” Ibid., 26. 
158 Important here are the following propositions from Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: “6.44 It is not 
how things are in the world that is the mystical, but that it exists. […] 6.522 There is indeed the 
inexpressible. It shows itself, it is the mystical. […] 6.53 The right method of philosophy would 
be this: To say nothing except what can be said, i.e. the propositions of natural science, i.e. 
something that has nothing to do with philosophy: and then always, when someone else wished to 
say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had given no meaning to certain signs 
in his propositions. […] 7 Wherefrom one cannot speak, over there one must keep silent.” 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness 
(London: Routledge, 1974), 88-9. (Translation modified.) 
159 “Indifference has two aspects: the undifferenciated abyss, the black nothingness, the 
indeterminate animal in which everything is dissolved—but also the white nothingness, the once 
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of taceo are therefore directed as much at speech as at sileo, constituting a dogmatic 
silence, a moral-skeptical-heroic reservation, itself a form of speech. And here an 
utterance is a revelation as much of silence as of utterance itself: a fully determined, even 
over-determined, speech, from which emerges the figure of a subjectivity who speaks. 
With the disappearance of sileo, any silence is still always speech and knowledge,160 so 
that the alternative is an indeterminate speech, incessant and without a locus,161 where 
the word-as-sound emerges, a speech vibrating with nature’s muto,162 and thereby with 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
more calm surface upon which float unconnected determinations like scattered members: a head 
without a neck, an arm without a shoulder, eyes without brows. The indeterminate is completely 
indifferent, but such floating determinations are no less indifferent to each other. Is difference 
intermediate between these two extremes? Or is it not rather the only extreme, the only moment 
of presence and precision? Difference is the state in which one can speak of determination as 
such. The difference 'between' two things is only empirical, and the corresponding determinations 
are only extrinsic. However, instead of something distinguished from something else, imagine 
something which distinguishes itself—and yet that from which it distinguishes itself does not 
distinguish itself from it. Lightning, for example, distinguishes itself from the black sky but must 
also trail it behind, as though it were distinguishing itself from that which does not distinguish 
itself from it. It is as if the ground rose to the surface, without ceasing to be ground. There is 
cruelty, even monstrosity, on both sides of this struggle against an elusive adversary, in which the 
distinguished opposes something which cannot distinguish itself from it but continues to espouse 
that which divorces it. Difference is this state in which determination takes the form of unilateral 
distinction.” Gilles Deleuze, “Difference in Itself,” in Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul 
Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 28. 
160 “The mystic’s ‘non-knowledge’ is not ignorance but a mode of knowledge; even ‘becoming 
stupid’ is an operation carried out by intelligence! Whatever one does, one cannot think outside of 
philosophy; keeping silent, turning one’s back on it, sidestepping it: this is still philosophizing. 
But one can reject this or that definition of philosophy. One can refuse to want to be a 
professional philosopher. One can refuse to submit to this or that technique, rule, or servitude that 
subjects it.” Fondane, “Existential Monday,” 24. 
161 “In the region we are trying to approach, here has collapsed into nowhere, but nowhere is 
nonetheless here.” Blanchot, “The Essential Solitude,” 31. 
162 “This integral silence is no longer simply the tacere but joins the silere: silence of all nature, 
scattering of the fact-of-man throughout nature: as if man were some kind of noise of nature (in 
the cybernetic sense), a caco-phony.” Roland Barthes, The Neutral: Lecture Course at the 
Collège de France (1977-1978), trans. Rosalind E. Krauss and Denis Hollier (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2005), 29. 
76 
 
being, by sliding into mutability.163 Incessant, namely, in never reaching an instant of 
fulfillment (or of suicide), in beginning again and again without end, a monotonous 
gymnopedie.164 “Your ear bend to the grave, abysmal way/ The pavement summons us to 
its entrails.”165 
Consequently, the writing of the journal—the confession of perversion, the document of 
life—is not synonymous with existential writing. Not only because it still places the 
writer too much before writing, instead of within it,166 or is precisely the writer’s reaction 
to losing his self in writing,167 but, rather, because a writing—for whom its existence as 
well as existence more generally is at stake—is one marked by the absence of days, is 
one that can’t be measured by time, subordinating time to itself, but one subordinate to 
time,168 one absent of time-as-timing.169 This doesn’t mean, however, that this writing is 
                                                 
163 “It is also possible that philosophy does not have to know a truth which is once and for all but 
can know a truth capable of changing, of being made and unmade, of becoming bored, perhaps.” 
Fondane, “Existential Monday,” 25. 
164 “But he [the writer] himself belongs to a time ruled by the indecisiveness inherent in 
beginning over again. The obsession which ties him to a privileged theme, which obliges him to 
say over again what he has already said—sometimes with the strength of an enriched talent, but 
sometimes with the prolixity of an extraordinarily impoverishing repetitiveness, with ever less 
force, more monotony—illustrates the necessity, which apparently determines his efforts, that he 
always come back to the same point, pass again over the same paths, persevere in starting over 
what for him never starts, and that he belong to the shadow of events, not their reality, to the 
image, not the object, to what allows words themselves to become images, appearances—not 
signs, values, the power of truth.” Blanchot, “The Essential Solitude,” 24. 
165 “Ascultă cum greu, din adâncuri/ Pământul la dânsul ne cheamă.” George Bacovia, 
“Melancolie,” in Plumb, ed. Anatol Vidrașcu and Dan Vidrașcu (Bucharest: Litera Internațional, 
2001), 44.  
166 “We could even say that it is the writings of subjectivity, such as romantic writing, which are 
active, for in them the agent is not interior but anterior to the process of writing: here the one who 
writes does not write for himself, but as if by proxy, for an exterior and antecedent person (even if 
both bear the same name).” Barthes, “To Write,” 19.  
167 “[T]he writer increasingly feels the need to maintain a relation to himself. His feeling is one of 
extreme repugnance at losing his grasp upon himself in the interests of that neutral force, formless 
and bereft of any destiny, which is behind everything that gets written. This repugnance, or 
apprehension, is revealed by the concern, characteristic of so many authors, to compose what they 
call their ‘journal.’” Blanchot “The Essential Solitude,” 28-9. 
168 “As long as time remains on its hinges, it is subordinate to movement: it is the measure of 
movement, interval or number. […] But time is out of joint signifies the reversal of the 
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one of journal entries from which dates have been effaced—that is, aphoristic writing, the 
fragmentary work—since this too is another way of evading the continuum of time, now 
by returning it to itself, and turning it into and in a circle.170 The unity against which the 
fragment-text “constructs” itself returns in the higher unity attained “above” it: that of the 
author, namely as the center of this fragmentation,171 or the reader as the final weaver of 
these disparate fragments into a one-fold, utilizable vestment.172 And writing once more 
stands not in existence, but beside it—which means: outside of it, and: as its reflection.173 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
movement-time relationship. It is now movement which is subordinate to time. Everything 
changes, including movement.” Gilles Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the 
Faculties, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (London: The Athlone Press, 1984), 
vii.  
169 “To write is to surrender to the fascination of time’s absence. […] In this time [of absence] 
what appears is the fact that nothing appears. What appears is the being deep within being’s 
absence, which is when there is nothing and which, as soon as there is something, is no longer. 
[…] [T]his empty, dead time is a real time in which death is present—in which death happens but 
doesn’t stop happening, as if, by happening, it rendered sterile the time in which it could happen.” 
Blanchot, “The Essential Solitude,” 30-1. 
170 “Joyce's words, accurately described as having ‘multiple roots,’ shatter the linear unity of the 
word, even of language, only to posit a cyclic unity of the sentence, text, or knowledge. 
Nietzsche's aphorisms shatter the linear unity of knowledge, only to invoke the cyclic unity of the 
eternal return, present as the nonknown in thought.” Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A 
Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press), 6. 
171 “[U]nity is consistently thwarted and obstructed in the object, while a new type of unity 
triumphs in the subject. The world has lost its pivot; the subject can no longer even dichotomize, 
but accedes to a higher unity, of ambivalence or overdetermination, in an always supplementary 
dimension to that of its object.” Ibid. “In the effacement toward which he is summoned, the ‘great 
writer’ still holds back; what speaks is no longer he himself, but neither is it the sheer slipping 
away of no one’s word. For he maintains the authoritative though silent affirmation of the effaced 
‘I.’ He keeps the cutting edge, the violent swiftness of active time, of the instant.” Blanchot “The 
Essential Solitude,” 27. 
172 “[T]he unity of a text is not in its origin but in its destination, but this destination can no longer 
be personal: the reader is a man without history, without biography, without psychology; he is 
only that someone who holds collected into one and the same field all of the traces from which 
writing is constituted.” Roland Barthes, “The Death of the Author,” in The Rustle of Language, 
trans. Richard Howard (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 54. 
173 “The world has become chaos, but the book remains the image of the world: radicle-chaosmos 
rather than root-cosmos. A strange mystification: a book all the more total for being fragmented.” 
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In contrast to this writing-as-post—whether as “coming after,” as ascetic fasting, as a 
locutio or station, as a construction column, as placing in a pre-determined place, as 
holistic-appearance, as a letter in the mail, as the mailman’s haste—reductive, if not 
destructive, of all unpredictability, and addressing only what-has-been, existential writing 
concerns the existent during, itself “during” to itself.174 It is thus never a writing “on,” 
“of,” or “about”—unless these terms apply to post-writing(s)175—and bears no program, 
guiding questions, or directions. Existential writing finds its concepts in the course of its 
unfolding, at risk of never finding them at all and turning to mere empty discourse and 
poetic metaphor.176 Moving not by gradual succession but by leaps alogical, because of 
faith, it makes truth inextricable from the lament of existence’s irrationality.177 Just as it 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 6. “The example is thus excluded from the normal 
case not because it does not belong to it but, on the contrary, because it exhibits its own belonging 
to it. The example is truly a paradigm in the etymological sense: it is what is ‘shown beside,’ and 
a class can contain every thing except its own paradigm.” Agamben, Homo Sacer, 22. 
174 “The after is the priviledged moment of speculative philosophy; it will think what has gone by, 
the ‘all done,’ where nothing is unpredictable any longer because even the contingent futures 
have ceased to be futures; speculative philosophy moves backwards, extracting the laws of what 
has been in order to draw up the ne varietur charter. But existential philosophy is concerned with 
the thought of the existent during, involved in a Real as yet without form or structure; it is itself 
involved in this ‘during,’ interested in its solutions.” Fondane, “Existential Monday,” 17.  
175 “A huge gulf then separates philosophies of, about, dealing with existence from philosophies 
which are about and deal with knowledge, seen specifically from the point of view of existence as 
unconditioned, historical, and thus not valid for everyone. […] One must decide which way to go: 
Do we really want to know what Knowledge thinks of the existent, or, for once, what the existent 
thinks of Knowledge? Is it existence, as always, or Knowledge, at last, that must be rendered 
problematic?” Ibid., 8. 
176 “Enigmatic philosophy! Without terminology, method, or technique! Which offers no rules for 
judging what is true; in which the ‘self’ is not revealed as Reason and whose legislation no longer 
depends on anything; which risks passing for empty discourse and poetic metaphor, and is even 
proud of the fact.” Ibid., 26. 
177 “It is no longer an autonomous thought but a thought in solidarity with existence, which 
‘participates’ in existence.” Benjamin Fondane, “Preface for the Present Moment,” in Existential 
Monday: Philosophical Essays, trans. Bruce Baugh (New York: New York Review of Books, 
2016), 43. “Must we be reminded that the irrational concrete also exists?” Ibid., 38. “[I]t is also 
possible that we have some effective influence on [truth’s] procedures; that loving, crying, 
praying, indeed revolting or resigning oneself are acts that shape [truth] to some extent. […] In 
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is not a “sincere” writing, claiming that it alone is pure of cheating by saying everything 
there is to say,178 but asserts that everyone cheats, itself included,179 that it cannot in any 
way respect itself and that life, the whole of existence, is a tale told by an idiot—so its 
“heroism” doesn’t lie in sacrifice to some idea compelling in its name the further sacrifice 
of readers, but in an exercise of true humility, an admission of spiritual defeat180: never in 
taceo but in muto. What’s given here is not the author’s body. The text is not one of his 
body parts, or the droppings thereof. It is not written in his blood. Instead, what emerges 
is no less than the unbridgeable contradiction upon which writing rests: that the author 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
other words, existential philosophy does not amount to an abandonment of knowledge or a 
sacrifizio del intelleto but is rather the search at long last for a genuine knowledge which will not 
turn its back on anything that is, whether it is a matter of ‘unhappiness’ or of the 
‘discontinuous.’” Fondane, “Existential Monday, 24-5. 
178 “Augustine and the obligation to say the whole truth, whatever the consequences. […] 
Jansenism, Protestantism: moral ‘rigor’ = expulsion of the implicit, of inner reservation. → 
Secularization of the rejection of the implicit, morality of frankness (Scouts, of Protestant origin). 
[…] Therefore one ceaselessly says that one says everything.” Barthes, The Neutral, 24. 
179 “[T]he formidable enemies of Plato and the nôus […] are Nietzsche, Dostoevsky, 
Shakespeare—those who dare to think outside the constraints of society, who dare to assert that 
everyone cheats, themselves included. For all intents and purposes, the philosopher, the 
politician, the leader, and the priest can only impose their truth by postulating that they are the 
only honest people in a world where everyone cheats.” Benjamin Fondane, “Man Before 
History,” in Existential Monday: Philosophical Essays, trans. Bruce Baugh (New York: New 
York Review of Books, 2016), 50. 
180 “Yes, even today, even empirically, the greatest heroism that we can ask of man is not to 
sacrifice himself to an Idea…With a few speeches and a well-run press, millions of men will 
agree to sacrifice themselves; that’s how much the need for self-sacrifice is built into the human 
frame. But what is not built into the human frame is true humility; not the kind that consists of 
training the will and self-mastery but the kind that consists in recognizing that one has no power, 
that one does not amount to much, that one amounts to so little that one can, without shame, be 
afraid, and tremble, and cry out, and call for help. […] It may be that the supreme heroism—I 
mean the most difficult thing for man—is not sacrificing one’s life but admitting spiritual defeat. 
It is harder for our spirit to confess ‘I can do nothing, nothing, there is nothing more to be done,’ 
that it is to give up one’s life. […] [T]he terrible and naked humility of Shakespeare admitting he 
has been defeated by the sound and the fury, or of Dostoevsky crying out that he cannot respect 
himself!” Fondane, “Man Before History,” 60. 
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writes with one foot in being and the other in the had.181 Existential writing is the 
presentation of his chaos-of-words, a chaos that emerges from his struggle with those 
portions of existence which he finds himself incapable of translating into the had—and, 
in turn, this struggle’s presentation. What such a struggle brings to light is that the text is 
never the poetic in itself, confident in its degree of poeticity,182 but the very split the had 
brings with it. 
                                                 
181 “But if I believe on the contrary that pleasure and bliss are parallel forces, that they cannot 
meet, and that between them there is more than a struggle: an incommunication, then I must 
certainly believe that history, our history, is not peaceable and perhaps not even intelligent, that 
the text of bliss always rises out of it like a scandal (an irregularity), that it is always the trace of a 
cut, of an assertion (and not of a flowering), and that the subject of this history (this historical 
subject that I am among others), far from being possibly pacified by combining my taste for 
works of the past with my advocacy of modern works in a fine dialectical movement of 
synthesis—this subject is never anything but a ‘living contradiction’: a split subject, who 
simultaneously enjoys, through the text, the consistency of his selfhood and its collapse, its fall.” 
Roland Barthes, The Pleasure of the Text, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1975), 20-1. 
182 “[Descartes] accepts doubt as indubitable. The last Cartesian certainty, incorruptible by doubt, 
is: ‘I think, therefore, I am.’ It may be reformulated: ‘I doubt, therefore, I am.’ The Cartesian 
certainty is therefore authentic, in the sense of being naïve and innocent. It is an authentic faith in 
doubt. This faith characterizes the entire Modern Age, whose final moments we are witnessing. 
This faith is responsible for the scientific and desparately optimistic character of the Modern Age, 
and for its unfinished skepticism, toward which we must now take the last step. In the Modern 
Age, this faith in doubt plays the role which, during the Middle Ages, was played by the faith in 
God.” Vilém Flusser, On Doubt, trans. Rodrigo Maltez Novaes (Minneapolis: Univocal 
Publishing, 2013), 4. 
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Chapter 2  
2 Logological Deductions: “On Language” 
(An Adaptation) 
0 Language is a trinity. It is and is spoken as: the word of God, the language of man, and 
the language of things—whether these be mythified as the Father, the Son, and the Holy 
Ghost; Brahma, Shiva, and Vishnu; the three Magi; Abraham’s three visitors; or the four-
footed, the two-footed, and the three-footed.—Language is tri-logous. It is 
quintessentially parted from itself. It is the very name for imparting and impartability.183 
Were it mono-logous, it would stay in one place, never de-parting. Were it dia-logous, its 
partitioning would be reversible. 
2.1 Of Things 
1 The language of things is set askew, like a tree split between the fore- and under- (by 
the heavens and the earth), this “between” serving as the border on which it “sits” or 
grows. Each thing’s spiritual essence is parted into an impartable and an unimpartable.184 
                                                 
183 Following Samuel Weber’s translation of “mitteilen” as “impart” (along with its variations): 
“This term is Mitteilbarkeit, usually translated in English as ‘communicability,’ but which might 
be more accurately rendered as ‘impart-ability.’ An even more literal translation would be the 
ability to part-with; but given the difficulty of actually using this phrase, I will limit myself to the 
first two translations.” Samuel Weber, Benjamin’s –abilities (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2008), 13. 
184 “Language […] imparts the […] spiritual essence [of things] only insofar as […] it is 
impartable.” Walter Benjamin, “On Language as Such and the Language of Man,” trans. Edmund 
Jephcott, in Selected Writings, Volume 1, 1913-1926, ed. Marcus Bullock and Michael W. 
Jennings (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1996), 63. (Translation modified.) “Allen Dingen 
haftet etwas Sprachloses an, das aber nur als solches erscheinen kann weil seine Sprache irgend 
etwas daseiendes Geistiges nicht auszudrücken vermag. Das meinen wir wenn wir die Dinge 
stumm nennen. Und so ist ihr geistiges Wesen nicht ihre Sprache; es ist nicht volkommen 
mitteilbar (‘Something speechless inheres in all things, something that can nevertheless appear as 
such only because its language (or: speech) fails to express something that is presently spiritual. 
This is what we mean when we name things mute. And so their spiritual essence is not their 
language; it is not perfectly impartable’).” Walter Benjamin, “II, 140-157 Über Sprache 
überhaupt und über die Sprache des Menschen,” in Gesammelte Schriften VII, ed. Rolf 
Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991), 786. 
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Coming across a thing, a traveller might take it for a mirror: on one side reflective, on the 
other opaque. 
1.1 It is the reflective side that sets out the language of the thing, being its speechly 
essence. Unlike a mirror, however, the thing reflects only itself (and not its self). The 
quality of its surface determines the scope of its reflection. More precisely, it determines 
the light that it can absorb and re-emit. This light is language (imparting itself).185  
1.2 The far side of the thing, its unimpartable part, renders the thing an in-dividual, as at 
the end of a Zenonian paradox.186 Inasmuch as it is an individual, the thing can’t impart 
its self. The self, where it exists, is unimpartable. Silence is the mark of things. It makes 
them imperfect vis-à-vis language itself.187 In its privacy, it is a privation of language. 
1.3 The language of things only allows language to penetrate things imperfectly—so that 
they impart themselves but never their selves, and do so, among themselves, only 
materially.188—Two things facing one another would create a mise en abyme wherein 
instead of parting, they would keep intact the light that they reflect. Namely, insofar as 
this reflection would not go on indefinitely but be absorbed, at its extremity, into each 
side—creating a static reflection(-set). In order to impart this radiation, the two mirrors 
must touch. The scope of a thing’s language is therefore also bound to the distance it 
must cover in order to touch other things. It therefore corresponds to the difference 
between the thing’s impartability and its unimpartability. 
                                                 
185 “What is impartable in a spiritual essence is its linguistic essence. Language therefore imparts 
the particular linguistic essence of things. […] the linguistic essence of things is their language 
[…] this impartable is language itself. Or: the language of a spiritual essence is directly that 
which is impartable in it. Whatever is impartable of a spiritual essence, in this it imparts itself. 
Which signifies that every language imparts itself. Or, more precisely, that each language imparts 
itself in itself.” Benjamin, “On Language,” 63-4. (Translation modified.) 
186 “[E]very language contains its own incommensurable, uniquely constituted infinity. Its 
linguistic essence […] defines its frontier.” Ibid., 64. (Translation modified.) 
187 “Language itself is not perfectly expressed in things themselves. […] [T]he languages of 
things are imperfect, and they are dumb.” Ibid., 67. (Translation modified.) 




1.4 Due to the presence of unimpartability in each thing, there is no “language of things.” 
While a thing may impart itself immediately, it must cover a certain distance and touch 
other things in order to impart its self. This extra step in no way revokes the immediacy 
of the thing’s imparting. What it does is spatialize or localize the language of a thing, the 
light that it reflects, deciding in favor of the photon. Since the language of things is thus 
lacerated by multiplicity, it is most proper to speak of the languages of things. 
1.5 A wholly unimpartable thing can’t enter into any touch. It lacks any and all relations 
and has no language, being entirely opaque. Its imparting is done by way of simulation: 
another thing is “put in its place,” is given the status of an as if, responsible for throwing 
light on it without being able to part it. Depending on the mode of this as if, the 
substitute-thing is in turn unimparted, kept whole and opaque in each instance that it acts 
as a discloser. The unimpartable thing is thus, after all, “imparted,” but without ever 
parting: it “imparts” its unimpartedness, like a contagion. This thing is called a sign or a 
means, respectively. A sign can only be signified by another sign. 
2.2 Of Man 
2 A wholly impartable thing is man, so that impartability without residue characterizes 
his language. Instead of reflective on one side and opaque on the other, man is 
translucent.189 In imparting, he immediately both imparts himself, out-speaking, and 
imparts his self, to-speaking.190 His act of imparting is called “naming,” and by it he 
perfectly imparts language itself, effectuating its impartability completely.191 He names 
                                                 
189 “[M]an’s spiritual essence [is], alone among all spiritual essences, alone among spiritual 
essences, impartable without residue. […] [T]hrough him pure language speaks.” Ibid., 65 
(Translation modified.) 
190 “Man […] imparts his own spiritual essence (insofar as it is impartable) by naming all other 
things.” Ibid., 64. (Translation modified.) “[I]n name appears the essential law of language, 
according to which to out-speak oneself and to to-speak to everything else amounts to the same 
thing.” Ibid., 65. (Translation modified.) 
191 “The name, in the realm of language, has as its sole purpose and its incomparably high 
meaning that it is the innermost nature of language itself. The name is that through which, and in 
which, language itself imparts itself absolutely. In the name, the spiritual essence that imparts 
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things, giving each a password to the gates of language. Things therefore impart 
themselves to man, and he names them in turn, stamping their unique impartability with 
the seal of impartability as such.192 The name is the language of language.193 
2.1 In the language of man, things lose their unimpartable side.194 Face to face with a 
thing, man can absorb its light and reflect it back in altered form, and thus to infinity. 
Being able to impart the thing into multiple reflections, he at once tests the scope of its 
reflection, determining its impartability, and allows the thing to immaterially impart its 
self. The traveller snatches up the mirror and flips it to its other side, determining the 
thickness of its coating. It is his contraction of the difference between its two sides—
whether through a scatter or a flip—that suspends the thing’s dark side, stripping it of the 
inaccessibility and in-dividuality of its self. In the language of man, this determination is 
called his knowledge of the thing. This also means: the knowledge of the thing’s inner 
difference, its self-contradiction; or, the knowledge of the thing’s impartability. It is on 
the basis of this knowledge that man names the thing.195 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
itself is language. Where spiritual essence in its imparting is language itself in its absolute 
wholeness, only there is the name, and only the name is there.” Ibid. (Translation modified.) 
192 “To whom does the lamp impart itself? The mountain? The fox?—But here the answer is: to 
man.” Ibid., 64. (Translation modified.) “All nature, insofar as it imparts itself, imparts itself in 
language, and so finally in man. Hence, he is the lord of nature and can give names to things.” 
Ibid., 65. (Translation modified.) 
193 “Man can call the name the language of language (if the genitive refers to the relationship not 
of a means but of a medium).” Ibid. 
194 “The incomparable feature of human language is that its magical community with things is 
immaterial and purely mental, and the symbol of this is sound.” Ibid., 67. “The translation of the 
language of things into that of man is […] a translation of the mute into the sonic.” Ibid., 70. 
195 “God’s creation is completed when things receive their names from man, from whom in name 
language alone speaks.” Ibid., 65. “Man names [things] according to knowledge.” Ibid., 68. “This 
knowledge of the thing, however, is not spontaneous creation; it does not emerge from language 
in the absolutely unlimited and infinite manner of creation. Rather, the name that man gives to 
language depends on how language is imparted to him.” Ibid., 69. (Translation modified.) 
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2.11 The name is in part receiving, in part conceiving.196 It is receiving of the thing’s 
difference, and conceiving of the thing’s name. This is due to the fact that, on the one 
hand, the thing doesn’t have both feet in language, and, on the other, it precedes its 
naming at the hands of man, and consequently man himself (as speaking-being).197 
Man’s language links knowledge and name, the products of these two processes, by way 
of correspondence. Just as the thing has to cover a certain distance and touch another 
thing in order to impart its self to it, so man has to cover a figurative distance between his 
knowledge of a thing and its name so as to zip them closed. Where the thing is partly 
unimpartable, there man is partly receptive.—If man were allowed an in-divisible self, 
the latter would be determined by the scope of his receptivity, particularly as it pertains to 
how he puts what he receives to use, to the degree that the name is cut to the measure of 
the thing. 
2.2 Devoid of the unimpartable in the language of man, things can impart their selves to 
one another, can address each other immediately and immaterially. The distance between 
them is bridged, or: sublated, by naming, so that the relation between two names is the 
relation between two thing-languages, transposed onto a third language, that of man, 
where the two meet immediately. But man doesn’t thereby erase the difference between 
the two languages: it is still a difference between media of singular densities. The relation 
between two names is not a given. It must be articulated; instead of lifting each to a 
different layer of man’s language, singling out determinations from each in order to claim 
identity or similarity, man must surf from the light waves of one to those of the other, 
riding the continuous breaks of various reflections.198 The relation is the trace left by his 
                                                 
196 “In name, the word of God has not remained creative; it has become in one part receptive, 
even if receptive to language.” Ibid. 
197 [B]ecause he speaks in names, man is the speaker of language, and for this very reason its only 
speaker.” Ibid., 65. 
198 “Translation attains its full meaning in the realization that every evolved language (with the 
exception of the word of God) can be considered a translation of all the others. By the fact that, as 
mentioned earlier, languages relate to one another as do media of varying densities, the 
translatability of languages into one another is established. Translation is removal from one 
language into another through a continuum of transformations. Translation passes through 
continua of transformation, not abstract areas of identity and similarity.” Ibid., 69-70. 
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surfboard. Only now can one invoke the language of things.199 “There’s no room for 
signs,/ for directions/ […] The all in all is stuck to all;/ the flank to flank,/ the breath to 
breath,/ the retina to retina.”200 
2.21 The name is the medium by which at once: man imparts his self, a thing loses its 
unimpartable side, and things address each other. A name is a medium through which a 
thing addresses itself to all other things. Each name has the thing it names at its center. 
Similarly, a thing’s mechanism of address is the reverse of man’s: its addressee is not 
found in its imparting of language, in using the addressee’s name, but in its imparting of 
itself, in its own name. 
2.22 Man’s act of naming is a game of hopscotch. It is an act of passing-over-settings, of 
jumping: namely from the language of a thing to the language of another, and from both 
to the language of man. And this is done all in one go: with one foot in square three, the 
stone is thrown into square six and followed by a double leap: both feet in squares four 
and five and one foot near the stone. Naming supra-sets the nameless and imperfect into 
the name-ful and perfect by striking on the former knowledge, the lapis 
philosophorum.201 Herein, the mirror-thing is back to itself reflected, opaque side and all. 
And it is this reflection that will become its self, and which it will reflect hereafter. 
∞.1 Man is the thing that submits all other things to their own languages, only so 
submitting himself to his own language. Seeing the power that he has to grant nature a 
higher community, his ego inflates. This raises the problem of the freedom he has of not 
                                                 
199 “Thus fertilized, [the name] aims to give birth to the language of things themselves.” Ibid., 69. 
200 “Nu e loc pentru semne,/ pentru direcții./ […] Totul e lipit de tot;/ pântecul de pântec,/ 
respirația de respirație,/ retina de retină.” Nichita Stănescu, “Omul-Fantă,” in Necuvintele 
(Bucharest: Jurnalul Național, 2009), 125. 
201 “For reception and spontaneity together, which are found in this unique union only in the 
linguistic realm, language has its own word, and this word applies also to that reception of the 
nameless in the name. It is the translation of the language of things into that of man.” Benjamin, 
“On Language,” 69. (Translation modified.) “The translation of the language of things into that of 
man is […] the translation of the nameless into name. It is therefore the translation of an 
imperfect language into a more perfect one, and cannot but add something to it, namely 
knowledge.” Ibid., 70. 
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submitting, and the various forms it may take: whether as muteness, as mis-naming, or as 
supra-naming. But that: without his submission, he is powerless to raise anything up. 
Only to overthrow everything, to lower everything (in)to the ground—only this stands in 
his power once he objects to his submission. 
2.3 Of God 
3 God’s word is the ur-ground on which lies the language of things, the language of man, 
and the latter’s supra-setting of the former. Both types of language are released from the 
word of God.202 Where the word is the light, language is the prism through which it is 
dispersed, each shade of color solidifying into one of God’s creations. The language 
wherein God creates is therefore the same as that wherein man names.203 Save for the 
fact that the language of God is devoid of the disunities that distinguish the language of 
man. It is in one and the same instance: creative and receptive, knowledge and name, act 
and product.204 God creates something with the word, then names it with the word, and 
finally knows it by the word. “He begins with himself and ends/ with himself./ Not 
announced by any aura, not/ followed by any cometary tail.”205 But man he does not 
create or name with the word, passing language down—re-leasing it—to him like an old 
cherished comb, to use freely, in whatever way he likes.206 As with things, so with 
language, man, or at least his language, is everywhere preceded. 
                                                 
202 “Through the word, man is bound to the language of things.” Ibid., 69. “The objectivity of this 
translation is, however, guaranteed by God. […] [T]he name-language of man and the nameless 
language of things [are] related in God and released from the same creative word.” Ibid., 70. 
203 “Man is the knower in the same language in which God is the creator.” Ibid., 68. 
204 “Language is therefore both creative and the finished creation; it is word and name. In God, 
name is creative because it is word, and God’s word is cognizant because it is name. […] The 
absolute relation of name to knowledge exists only in God; only there is name, because it is 
inwardly identical with the creative word, the pure medium of knowledge.” Ibid. 
205 “El începe cu sine și sfârșește/ cu sine./ Nu-l vestește nici o aură, nu-l/ urmează nici o coadă de 
cometă.” Nichita Stănescu, “Elegia Întâia,” in Necuvintele (Bucharest: Jurnalul Național, 2009), 
101. 
206 “[I]n man God set language, which had served him as medium of creation, free. God rested 
when he had left his creative power to itself in man.” Benjamin, “On Language,” 68. 
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3.1 It is precisely the space between “Let there be” and “He named” that allows for the 
appearance of the couple “unimpartability” and “receptivity,” as it applies to things and 
man, respectively.207 For, the fact that God needed to name them prior to man’s 
naming208 means that things had no language, no impartability, upon their creation, and 
that their unimpartability is their birthmark. Things can’t be imparted, namely, as to the 
fact of their existence, their coming into being since, unlike man, “formed” out of the 
already-created earth, they were created ex nihilo, out of language itself. Simultaneously, 
this divine naming predetermines man’s, making the name available to man a second 
name, removed not twice but fourfold from the thing: “the name of the knowledge of the 
name of the thing.” Man thereby names not a thing but a name. 
3.11 But that this space between “let” and “named” is not void: “He created,” alternating 
with “And it was so,” fills it from one end to the other.209 It is this median term that best 
reflects unimpartability at the level of things and receptivity at that of man—or, rather, 
that whereof the latter two are mere reflections. For if “He created” or “And it was so” 
must be separately said, then it’s not solely from God’s word that all creation sprung, and 
every creature is created both through language and through what this language does. The 
third term of God’s naming is an endeavor at bridging this gap, subsuming the created 
back into the word’s sole jurisdiction—except that this name differs from the word, and 
only goes to make the contradiction obvious. Creation results thereby in splitting the 
absolute relation between alpha and omega, word and name. It is what causes the fracture 
of God’s word in two, as in the breaking of a tablet or the folding of a page. In fact, the 
splitting of the word is what allows the coming-into-being of the world and things. A 
                                                 
207 In other words, the division within the language of man that Peter Fenves traces back to the 
proper human name can be traced back even further—to the act of creation, or the origin as such. 
See Peter Fenves, The Messianic Reduction: Walter Benjamin and the Shape of Time (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2011), 125-51. Admittedly, it is unclear from “On Language” to what 
extent Benjamin was himself aware of this possibility. 
208 “‘And he saw that it was good’—that is, he had cognized it through name.” Benjamin, “On 
Language,” 68. “Things have no proper names except in God. For in his creative word, God 
called them into being, calling them by their proper names.” Ibid., 73. 
209 Especially in Gen. 1:3-10.  
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thing is an instance of the word’s fissure. It is the embodiment of the difference internal 
to the genetic word. The resulting pieces are the two sides of the thing’s spiritual essence: 
the creation of the thing and its name, the unimpartable and the impartable. 
3.12 Thrice “created,” as he is,210 man lies apart from things ab origo: his creation is 
already mere word(s), so that the necessity of “He named” disappears. Man’s creation is 
the creation that does not cause the word to split. Moreover, “formed” from the already-
created, man is the word’s return to itself. Physically folded into itself, the earth has its 
inner contradiction, the residue of its creation, rectified by human form. Man’s creation is 
thus also an instance of restoring the word’s self-accord.211 And just as creation repeats 
its split with every creature, so his existence re-establishes accord wherever it may go. 
Man is a mosaicist. His role as namer is precisely that of gluing back together the word’s 
shards, of making things disclose their createdness and, matched with their name, let 
shine a bit of the divine212: “A god was placed in every hollow.// At the cracking of a 
stone, a god would/ instantly be fetched and therein placed. […] Please don’t nick your 
hand or foot,/ by mistake or by design.// For they’ll directly place a god inside the 
wound,/ as all about, as everywhere,/ they’ll place therein a god/ for us to worship, since 
he/ protects whatever from itself departs.”213 
                                                 
210 Gen. 1:27. This repetition of “created” is rather an incantation of sorts. 
211 This is why “God’s creation is completed when things receive their names from man.” 
212 “[T]he task that God expressly assigns to man himself: that of naming things. In receiving the 
unspoken nameless language of things and converting it by name into sounds, man performs this 
task.” Benjamin, “On Language,” 70. “Thus fertilized, [the name] aims to give birth to the 
language of things themselves, from which in turn, soundlessly, in the mute magic of nature, the 
word of God shines forth.” Ibid., 69. 
213 “În fiecare scorbură era aşezat un zeu.// Dacă se crăpa o piatră, repede era adus/ şi pus acolo 
un zeu. […] O, nu te tăia la mână sau la picior,/ din greşeală sau dinadins.// De îndată vor pune în 
rană un zeu,/ ca peste tot, ca pretutindeni,/ vor aşeza acolo un zeu/ ca să ne-nchinăm lui, pentru că 
el/ apără tot ceea ca se desparte de sine.” Nichita Stănescu, “Elegia a Doua, Getica,” in 
Necuvintele (Bucharest: Jurnalul Național, 2009), 104. 
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3.13 The name, in genesis prefigured as it is, is neither a conventional, agreed-upon mere 
sign, alien to what it names, nor immediately the essence of the thing.214 For, the latter 
would presuppose the thing to lack an unimpartable side in itself, to be an instance of the 
word as such, and not its splitting, and man to be without his rectifying function. Herein 
the world would be entirely enchanted, filled with uncreated things, overflowing with 
gods of every shape and size: a world from which man (as namer) is removed. This while 
the former would assert that man himself contains a split between the un- and the im-
partable, and, since this would disseminate to men, only by collective settlement could 
his imparting match what he imparts. Herein man would be “created” like a mere thing, 
ever split between his actions and his words, and any divine glimmer would, even as a 
possibility, be effaced. Men’s accord would serve the role of God and function as the 
measure of true language. And things, infected by signs designated, would turn to signs 
themselves and become unimpartable completely. They would come to be seen as 
standing alongside the ex nihilo of creation, and manifest to men as continual creations of 
forces hidden. The bourgeois and the mystical theories of language are thus entirely 
compatible. Both attempt to violate the tri-partite hierarchy of language. Insofar as they 
are successful, it’s no longer language as such that they have within their purview. 
3.2 Man’s language is the reflection of God’s word in name.215 The name is therefore 
translucent not only as regards the thing, but also as regards God’s word. In addition to 
placing things in relation to the word due to its rectifying function, one that makes the 
divine manifest in the thing, the name produces this relation in that the images of each are 
set next to each other in it, as the locutio of their encounter. If the two sides of the thing 
are the impartable and the unimpartable, then those of man are the divine (the accord 
                                                 
214 “Hence, it is no longer conceivable, as the bourgeois view of language maintains, that the 
word has an accidental relation to its object, that it is a sign for things (or knowledge of them) 
agreed by some convention. Language never gives mere signs. However, the rejection of 
bourgeois linguistic theory by mystical linguistic theory likewise rests on a misunderstanding. For 
according to mystical theory, the word is simply the essence of the thing. That is incorrect, 
because the thing in itself has no word, being created from God’s word and known in its name by 
a human word.” Benjamin, “On Language,” 69. 
215 “All human language is only the reflection of the word in name.” Ibid., 68. 
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between the word and itself) and the thingly (the discord between the word and itself). In 
the name, the latter is brought to accord, while the former to discord. The uncreated is 
discorded, namely, because it is made to manifest itself outside itself and do so alongside 
a version of itself with which it is in tension. And yet the discord that man’s name may 
cause, even if within itself, in no way matches the immediate creation of the world that 
God’s word can exert. Man’s language is perpetually limited by the created world, 
including man himself, and is, in the last instance, merely analytical, while the word, on 
account of its creativity, is entirely untold.216 While the divine is reversible, the human is 
on all sides bound by its posterity. 
∞.2 Wanting to evade his preordained position, the revolutionary is primarily interested 
in attaining primacy. But since his limits are not mere illusions, since he truly can’t create 
merely by speaking, how he goes about disposing of his post is a key question of any 
language-theory, even if merely apophatic in serving to elaborate the latter. For he must 
simulate the created world, re-producing it in such a way that only man’s—and no more 
God’s—word would have reversibility within its power. 
3.3 The feature by which man comes nearest God is the proper name he bears: the human 
name.217 And this because man is left unnamed by God218—itself owing to the fact that 
man’s emergence is the result of the re-constitution of God’s word. Wherefrom man’s 
freedom in the face of language, unsubjected to it as he is, to leave it or pervert it able, in 
accordance with his will. The proper name is un-preceded, whether by knowledge, or by 
the object of that knowledge. It is therefore no longer receptive, but wholly creative. 
                                                 
216 “The infinite of all human language always remains limited and analytic in nature, in 
comparison to the absolutely unlimited and creative infinity of the divine word.” Ibid. 
217 “The deepest images of this divine word and the point where human language participates 
most immediately in the divine infinity of the pure word […] are the human name.” Ibid., 69. 
218 “Of all beings, man is the only one who names his own kind, as he is the only one whom God 
did not name.” Ibid. 
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Oriented toward other men, it is creative of destinies,219 which is to say, of singularly 
bound impartabilities. Its path is paved by a freedom that renders the name arbitrary vis-
à-vis the person that it names.220 But, by the same token, the proper name is merely the 
divine word’s ugly stepsister. So that it still fits in God’s overall order like a brick: 
through it, men subject each other, from old to young, to language,221 guaranteeing to the 
named divine createdness.222 Posterity therefore remerges in the proper name as the state 
of coming in the wake of others, as a tradition that binds each man to a certain scope of 
impartability. 
3.31 The proper name is the in-forming of men by one another. In opening a gap between 
“saying” and “doing” with regard to each man’s being, it renders the named man 
eternally a match-maker. Consequently, a man’s destiny lies in the specific gap he’s 
dealt, determined by his proper name, where this destiny is equal to the set of actions, and 
of enunciations, that he undertakes in bridging it. By the same stroke does the proper 
name hand man over to an interiority, an inner space where he gains the repose to 
reconstitute himself without this action also slipping from his grip. In the creativity to 
produce interiorities, quasi-phenomenal things of their own, does the proper name come 
closest to divine creation of material things. And, like the godly, it sets fabrication free in 
man’s inwardness. For the latter is the ground of man’s every self-projection—where he 
is his own product—and every project—where the gap is re-configured and then crossed, 
although never completely, in the journey from the (inner) word to the external action, 
taking final shape as a technical-poetic product. The proper name, void of knowledge as 
                                                 
219 “By [the proper human name] […] each man […] is himself creative, as is expressed by 
mythological wisdom in the idea (which doubtless not infrequently comes true that a man’s name 
is his fate.” Ibid. 
220 “[T]he names [parents] give [to their children] do not correspond—in a metaphysical rather 
than etymological sense—to any knowledge, for they name newborn children. In a strict sense, no 
name ought (in its etymological meaning) to correspond to any person, for the proper name is the 
word of God in human sounds.” Ibid. 
221 “God did not create man from the word, and he did not name him. He did not wish to subject 
him to language.” Ibid., 68. 
222 “By [the proper human name] each man is guaranteed his creation by God.” Ibid., 69. 
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it is, pushes man to name himself a second time, and do so partly by producing secondary 
things. Evidently, it initiates the fall of man’s primordial interest in created things. 
3.32 Lying, or deception, is rooted in the gap that the proper name produces. This chasm 
releases at once he who seeks to adequate action and word, the hero, and he who 
proliferates their incongruity at every turn, the liar. By his very nature does the liar stand 
opposed to any project, except the one of keeping to this opposition. Which doesn’t mean 
he publicly condemns it, since this would still entail a minimum of adequation. It is, 
rather, in inwardness, the stage common to both he and the hero, that the deluder finds 
the wellspring of his lying. Nor does it mean that he repudiates his ego schizophrenically, 
since it is from his selfsame “I” that he derives his power of deception. Instead, the liar 
merely aims his words away both from himself and from created things, seeking to 
deliberately miss the target, thus continuously mis-naming. Closer to the gap cracked 
open by the proper name, not only does the liar come before the hero, he is the latter’s 
very raison d’être. Thus the scope of the liar’s creativity must always be sought in the 
reactions he provokes. Another takes shape, albeit at a later date, as a perversion of the 
hero—namely, the saint—emerging from that inner space which, separated from the 
outer, becomes also one of moralness. The saint marks the invention of “good” and 
“evil,” or “authentic” and “inauthentic,” initially allotted to the hero and the liar, 
respectively. 
3.33 As things are only able to address each other immaterially after being named by 
man, so men can only impart their selves to one another subsequent to naming one 
another. But while the first naming gives rise to a higher community of things, the second 
splits man from himself. Torn thus is both: this man, initially the incarnation of the 
word’s rectification—so needless of a name—from his self, which was but language, pure 
impartability, itself; and men from one another, as one by one they step out of their 
species. Where the thing joined to its name is placed back in the godly, the name joined 
to man removes him from his allocated place in the divine and hands him over to the 
judgment of his fellow men: to their courts and to their chatter. 
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2.4 Paradisiacal and Fallen 
4 The language of man is structurally twofold, ambivalent, bilateral, Jovian. Man is 
essentially a bi-glot: he walks, eats, thinks, and speaks on the frontier and has the interval 
as his abode—the interval between frontiers. His speech is parted by his pre- and post-
lapsarian conditions, into paradisiacal and fallen language. Were his language intact, he 
would lack the two-mindedness by which to both perceive the thing’s two sides and see a 
second manner of relating them. He would lack, too, the capability to “figure out” the 
word of God in things, inasmuch as he would have no reference by which to recognize 
that it, itself twofold, is (a) language. 
4.1 Man’s paradisiacal language is the language in which he fulfills his role as namer (of 
things). It is that by which creatures are safeguarded from turning fixed, stationary, or 
petrified, inasmuch as it continually rekindles the fire of the act off which, like sparks, 
they sprang. Thus does this language know them fully—in their origin. 
4.11 And yet the name is more than just the thread by which this or that piece of God’s 
word, the thing hither or thither, is sutured back together. Man’s ability to name depends 
on the divine provenance of his language, so that what he must “know,” moreover, before 
choosing a name, is the “shape,” or better: tone, borne by the word divine. In naming, 
then, man also sutures the self-contradiction and the self-identity of the word, leading 
things back not only to the act whence they emerged, but further, to the very point of 
their inexistence, de-creating them as a result. In this ethereal realm, the difference 
between impartable and unimpartable, expressible and inexpressible dissolves, since the 
action of imparting-expressing is suspended. This sphere is the origin of man’s ideas. 
Here, the thing has been by name refined into idea, and man’s divinely imparted freedom 
is at its apogee, weighing on him from above. He stands hither before a choice: either to 
discard language all together and remain within this airy realm, or to language re-descend 
along the curves of its partitions—either to reject imparting the thing by holding on to its 
idea, or to return to the thing its idea and thereby re-create it. The latter choice constitutes 
man’s paradisiacal language, wherein he can re-create. Everything relies on the meaning 
of this “re.“ 
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4.2 Where instead man chooses to discard language, to absolutely de-create creation, 
there he tends to the degenerate side of his language. But the freedom that releases this 
ability is only possible as long as man is wrapped in anonymity, a state true for Adam 
alone. Giving man a proper name is the same as stamping him with the seal of language, 
as forcing him to participate in the latter. Post-Adamite language is therefore man’s 
paradoxical invalidation of a language wherein he nonetheless continues to share. With 
every name he gives, man catches a glimpse of the uncreated, to which he is powerless to 
raise himself once and for all. Ipso facto, he devises a plan to de-create the world by 
making his own the uncreated, and fulfills it by intensifying the one operation he has at 
his disposal: naming. By naming a thing excessively, man simultaneously sketches a part 
of the uncreated with every glimpse he gains in his ascension, and exhausts the thing of 
its impartability, turns it wholly unimpartable, and therefore uncreated, prime material. 
4.21 The very determinations that come with acquiring a proper name, differentiating one 
man’s orientation toward the world of things from that of another, lead to the 
multiplication of languages. Language parts itself out in languages as each man names 
the same thing according to the dictates of his own-most inner space.223 Faced by this 
dispersion, which strips them of their freedom, men gather to reconstitute the paradisiacal 
language, agreeing on set words for set things, rendering themselves anonymous in the 
process. Thus a national language comes to be, which gives a determinate set of men the 
same proper name—a name that by its extent is more accurately a non-name—
anonymity, which, in turn, secures their freedom. But that this process is plural from the 
beginning, making for a variety of such languages. Their inter-relation weakens and 
undoes their hard-won freedom, it being merely a more extensive version of that between 
men naming one another. At both levels, of human actors and of nations, what’s turned 
                                                 
223 “The language of things can pass into the language of knowledge and name only through 
translation—so many translations, so many languages—once man has fallen from the paradisiacal 
state that knew only one language. […] The paradisiacal language of man must have been one of 
perfect knowledge, whereas later all knowledge is again infinitely differentiated in the 
multiplicity of language.” Ibid., 70-1. 
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away from absolutely, through a loss of interest in receptivity, are things.224 Man’s 
naming-function becomes exclusively concerned with, is exercised solely in regards to, 
man himself. Intentionally or not, this makes available more and more uncreated prime 
material. This material is, in fact, precisely the agent used to forge such covenants. The 
uncreated and unimpartable is the product of its own making. 
4.22 Fallen language is first and foremost marked by the abandonment of perfect 
knowledge for that of good and evil. That creation is good is a knowledge already given, 
announced by word of God on seventh day, so that the apples of the Tree of Knowledge 
are unnecessary to attain it.225 And that the knowledge of good and evil is itself the only 
evil because nameless, and thus incapable of shimmering the word of God—this 
knowledge too is plainly visible in the selfsame divine edict. While this knowledge (of 
good and evil) was from the start within man’s reach, the same can’t be said for the 
knowledge of good (itself) and evil (itself). Nor could man have attained the latter, as it is 
a non-knowledge, a knowledge of nothing, “good” and “evil” not being creations 
accordable by name, and thus impartable, but mere words instead.226 
4.221 At stake here is a different issue: namely that of lying, or deception. Adam’s 
naming of Eve is the first occurrence of the proper name, by which he simultaneously 
subjects her to language and opens the first gap between saying and doing, making lying 
possible. In addition, unlike Adam, Eve can be the subject of a conversation between God 
and her partner—that is, “Eve” can be imparted—in her absence. God’s edict is thus with 
                                                 
224 “Once men had injured the purity of name, the turning away from that contemplation of things 
in which their language passes into man […] [was] to be completed. […] The enslavement of 
language in prattle is joined by the enslavement of things in folly[,] […] [by a] turning away from 
things.” Ibid. 72. 
225 “Even the existence of the Tree of Knowledge cannot conceal the fact that the language of 
Paradise was fully cognizant. Its apples were supposed to impart knowledge of good and evil. But 
on the seventh day, God had already cognized with the words of creation. And God saw that it 
was good.” Ibid., 71. 
226 “The knowledge to which the snake seduces, that of good and evil, is nameless. It is vain in 
the deepest sense, and this very knowledge is itself the only evil known in the paradisiacal state. 
Knowledge of good and evil abandons name; it is a knowledge from the outside, the uncreated 
imitation of the creative word.” Ibid. 
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Eve on shaky ground, not only because it could be a lie, but because she seeks at once a 
way of parting truth from lie and an answer as to whether lying qualifies as good or evil, 
of which neither are within her reach. The talking snake she meets opines, and continues 
to do so, foremost because she fails to name it, weakened as her naming-power is in 
being named.227 Eve is from the start seduced away from an analysis of the snake’s 
specific impartability and towards the contents of its speech. Similarly she takes “good” 
and “evil” to have meaning, neglecting that naming has the thing, and not the name, for 
starting-point, that the name is not a springboard directed at the thing, or at its 
knowledge,228 but is the thing or its knowledge, immediately, in the sense of “you would 
not seek me if you had not found me.”229 But the snake also speaks to Eve because the 
lowered power of her naming has brought her closer to the realm of things, opening the 
possibility of creaturely exchange. In other words, the seduction is also that of at last 
having deceit within her reach, of making God, for once, in His absence, the subject of 
the conversation between herself and someone else. Only when deceit becomes possible 
do verbal contents accrue interest. 
4.222 God plants the tree and labels its consumption illegitimate in order to expose Adam 
to his freedom. Only then does God make Eve, as though to add to Adam’s challenge. 
For if Eve’s freedom is corrupted by her subjection to language, Adam’s is intact when 
he decides, in turn, to hear the content of her speech before its speechly quality. This 
decision is, from God’s perspective, one made absolutely in opposition to paradisiacal 
                                                 
227 It is not that naming would render the snake mute. But that it would make it speak in its own 
tongue. For what Eve hears is her own voice. This is why the snake can speak in man’s language 
in a way denied to things. She projects her language on the snake instead of listening to its own 
language. The possibility of this projection is opened up by the interiority that she’s acquired: the 
projection is an echo from the walls of her inner space. 
228 In the sense of “richtenden Wort,” “the judging word” emerging after the fall. Ibid., 71. The 
German adjective must be understood as “judging” as much as “directing,” “aiming,” 
“straightening,” or “rightening.” In Flusser’s philosophy of language, it would be called “the rite-
ning word.” In Deleuze and Guatarri’s, “the order-word.” But even within the essay at hand it has 
an English double: “the writing word.” 
229 Blaise Pascal, Pensées, ed. and trans. Roger Ariew (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 2004), 276. 
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language, and in favor of the language of the Fall. Henceforth, man’s freedom is as 
limited as Eve’s. Fallen language is already entirely prefigured in the Tree of Knowledge: 
from the fact of “good” and “evil” being empty words, mere signs, abstractions,230 to that 
of knowledge herein being reached by way of material community, to that of the fruit-
tree serving as a means to a desired end. It is a language imparting something other than 
itself, an expression become in part mere sign,231 that is, inexpressible, and thus a speech 
that shares its structure with the thing. In stepping out of name-language, and thus out of 
itself, it works as a supra- or meta-language, and it’s whence that the “knowledge” of 
“good” and “evil” applies. 
4.23 As the name purifies the language of things, supra-setting it into the language of 
man and thereby letting shine God’s word, so judgment purifies and elevates man’s post-
lapsarian small talk. But where, for the name “purification” means rectification of God’s 
word, for judgment it indicates the parting of sacred from profane. In other words, the 
name is that which keeps together Edenic language and fallen language, and the judgment 
that which counteracts this operation, aiming to distinguish the two languages 
completely. It’s by this principle that the judging word casts Adam and Eve from the 
garden, having profaned the latter’s perfect language, having enacted the sole evil living 
there precisely by its aim toward judgment. It is the judging word itself that profanes 
perfect language and that, waking as judgment to punish its very awakening, 
subsequently purifies it (of itself). A mania of purification, triggered by the rousing of 
this beast, “slouching toward Bethlehem,”232 engulfs the world endlessly, cutting across 
both internal and external, separating Supreme Being from demiurge, noumenon from 
phenomenon, soul (intelligible spirit) from body (sensible matter), God’s word from the 
                                                 
230 “[G]ood and evil, being unnameable and nameless, stand outside the language of names.” 
Benjamin, “On Language,” 72. 
231 “Name steps outside itself in this knowledge […] The word must impart something (other than 
itself). […] In stepping outside the purer language of name, man makes language a means (that is, 
a knowledge inappropriate to him), and therefore also, in one part at any rate, a mere sign.” Ibid., 
71. (Translation modified.) 
232 W.B. Yeats, “The Second Coming,” in The Collected Poems, ed. Richard J. Finneran (New 
York: Pallgrave MacMillan, 1989), 187. 
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language of things, man from things, signified from signifier, form from content, name 
from sign—always casting off the second term to its own-most realm of the unimpartable 
and inexpressible, of the petrified and frozen. And each such act, meant as “the last one,” 
only aggravates the confusion that it wishes to dispel, re-inscribing that same mark it 
means to nullify.233 Thus with the project of Babel, so often undertaken in the modern 
age: instead of purifying the plurality of languages into a single one, it only adds yet 
another (albeit: meta-language) to their scores, while projecting the shadow of its artifice 
over those very relationships between them, few as they may be, that really are 
“authentic.” 
4.24 Judgment serves as ground for the immediacy of abstraction’s impartability.234 It 
disseminates abstraction—and the will-to-abstract—in its every sanitation, substituting 
each virus with the mere idea of a virus, and placing it out of sight and out of mind, 
sanitizing even the virus itself from itself. It’s from things that judgment abstracts, thus 
bringing about nature’s other dumbness: its mute sorrow at being thoroughly known by 
an unknown,235 at no longer receiving the reflection of its knowledge in the name, locked 
up, as it has been, in the dark and damp cellar of the inexpressible. This is the result of 
being given all too many (wrong) names, or: countless signs, among which not a single 
                                                 
233 “The knowledge of things resides in the name, whereas that of good and evil is, in the 
profound sense in which Kierkegaard uses the word, ‘prattle,’ and knows only one purification 
and elevation, to which the prattling man, the sinner, was therefore submitted: judgment. 
Admittedly, the judging word has direct knowledge of good and evil. Its magic is different from 
that of name, but equally magical. This judging word expels the first human beings from 
Paradise; they themselves have aroused it in accordance with the immutable law by which this 
judging word punishes—and expects—its own awakening as the sole and deepest guilt. In the 
Fall, since the eternal purity of names was violated, the sterner purity of the judging word arose.” 
Benjamin, “On Language,” 71. “[F]rom the Fall, in exchange for the immediacy of name that was 
damaged by it, a new immediacy arises: the magic of judgment, which no longer rests blissfully 
in itself.” Ibid., 71-2. 
234 “[T]he abstract elements of language—we may perhaps surmise—are rooted in the word of 
judgment. The immediacy (which, however, is the linguistic root), of the impartability of 
abstraction resides in judgment.” Ibid., 72. (Translation modified.) 
235 “In all mourning there is the deepest inclination to speechlessness, which is infinitely more 
than the inability or disinclination to impart. That which mourns feels itself thoroughly known by 
the unknowable.” Ibid., 73. (Translation modified.) 
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(proper) name. Suffering repeatedly the upturned nose of every person she encounters, 
nature mourns.236 
4.241 “Never have I been upset with apples/ for being apples, with leaves for being 
leaves,/ with a shadow for being a shadow, with birds for being birds./ But apples, leaves, 
shadows, birds/ have all at once become upset with me./ And now I’m brought before the 
court of leaves,/ before the court of shadows, apples, birds,/ courts rounded, aerial 
courts,/ skinny, chilly courts./ And now condemned for my unknowing,/ for boredom, for 
disquiet,/ for being sedentary./ Sentences all scribed via the language peculiar to seeds./ 
Indictments sealed/ with offal from a bird,/ penances cinereal and chilly, determined in 
my stead./ I stand, head bare,/ and endeavor to decipher what befits (me/ for) my 
ignorance…/ but I can’t, I can’t decipher/ anything,/ wherefore this very state of mind/ 
becomes upset with me in turn/ and determines to condemn me, indecipherably,/ to a 
perpetual wait,/ to an in-tensioning of meanings that proceeds/ until they take the shape 
of apples, leaves,/ shadows,/ and birds.”237 
4.3 The fall of language makes way for the empire of signs. The dominion of external 
impartition entails the world grow cooler and more rigid, losing its former character as 
catacomb of sticky fluids, enclosed within a heavy, sweat-wrestingly humid climate. 
Traced in thick, determinate lines, the borders of its mundus novus leave swaths of space 
                                                 
236 “In the language of men […] [things] are overnamed. There is, in the relation of human 
languages to that of things, something that can be approximately described as ‘overnaming’—the 
deepest linguistic reason for all melancholy and (from the point of view of the thing) for all 
deliberate muteness.” Ibid. 
237 “N-am fost supărat niciodată pe mere/ că sunt mere, pe frunze că sunt frunze,/ pe umbră că e 
umbră, pe păsări că sunt păsări./ Dar merele, frunzele, umbrele, păsările/ s-au supărat deodată pe 
mine./ Iată-mă dus la tribunalul frunzelor,/ la tribunalul umbrelor, merelor, păsărilor,/ tribunale 
rotunde, tribunale aeriene,/ tribunale subțiri, răcoroase./ Iată-mă condamnat pentru neștiință,/ 
pentru plictiseală, pentru neliniște,/ pentru nemișcare./ Sentințe scrise în limba sâmburilor./ Acte 
de acuzare parafate/ cu măruntaie de pasăre,/ răcoroase penitențe gri, hotărâte mie./ Stau în 
picioare, cu capul descoperit,/ încerc să descifrez ceea ce mi se cuvine/ pentru ignoranță.../ și nu 
pot, nu pot să descifrez/ nimic,/ și-această stare de spirit, ea însăși,/ se supără pe mine/ și mă 
condamnă, indescifrabil,/ la o perpetuă așteptare,/ la o încordare a înțelesurilor în ele însele/ până 
iau forma merelor, frunzelor,/ umbrelor,/ păsărilor.” Nichita Stănescu, “A Cincea Elegie,” in 
Necuvintele (Bucharest: Jurnalul Național, 2009), 113. 
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free for the taking, making requisite whole hordes of go-betweens consigned solely to 
imparting across vacant flatlands. Put differently, imparting comes to be a message’s 
transference from source to destination by means of mediator(s)—and is thus only an 
imparting inasmuch as it parts from the source and becomes part of the destination, and 
no longer in the sense of its self-imparting: if anything, a broken seal is only evidence the 
postman floundered in his task. And this because, while in its pre-lapsarian existence 
communication is immune to all decay, even: immunized by its very communing, 
remaining self-same in and after its every parting out, its fall renders communication 
open to consumption, so that the more it is imparted the more its meaning dwindles. In 
this precise sense, man’s fallen word is unimpartable de jure but edible de facto (and thus 
participates in a material community not unlike that of things). As exemplarily 
unimpartable things, signs therefore become the prime instruments of language. A sign—
a thing exhausted of proper meaning, a dead thing, no longer capable of consuming—is 
what the postman is legally bound to be while on the job. Alternatively, it’s the message 
that must be a sign, inedible in its rigidity. 
4.31 The judging word therefore prefers to find things already dead, but will resort to 
killing them if necessary. The knowledge of good and evil is completely uninterested in 
(knowing) things as such—a judgment, after all, may be passed only when all becoming 
is complete. In its operation, judgment is the great language-inverter, where to invert 
means to square every linguistic duality, to make every cut eternal. That is, judgment 
forces impartable and unimpartable to trade places: if in Edenic language the 
unimpartable is the matter of things—a residue of their creation, or: of the uncreated that 
precedes it—then with the Fall it indicates their ideality, while their materiality falls 
under the name of the impartable; just the same, the initially impartable signified (the 
exemplarily impartable) falls into unimpartability, while the unimpartable signifier into 
an endless parting out among the many languages of fallen man. Judgment is thus a 
perpetual movement of confusion that turns every term into a senseless sign. And thus 
too is judgment the profaner of impartability by the same stroke that it attempts to make 
impossible its profanation. Thus do things become namers of men, men creators of 
god(s), god(s) the spirit of things. Thus does the most lifeless object exhibit the greatest 
semblance to the idea, and become supernaturally animate. And thus do men turn into 
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things, obscure to one another, parting themselves out only by matter, keeping silent even 
when they’re at their most verbose. 
4.32 The equivalence by way of judgment of dead thing and idea brings about the will to 
art—kin to abstraction’s will as Cain to Abel—where “art” is to be understood in its 
widest sense: Scientifism, representation, production, law. Where abstraction retreats 
from the world of things altogether, and into “thought” or “imagination,” art desires to 
reshape it. Finally man’s opportunity to usurp God’s place comes to fruition. And it’s by 
dint of his ability to mortify that he becomes creator, that he can artifice the world. He 
must first undo creation, must de-create the world, reducing its beings to uncreatedness, 
so that he can then create from nothing. Man possesses this power of de-creation through 
the reversibility made possible by judgment. He therefore had it all along, albeit in 
undeveloped form.—Which means that God’s Edenic prohibition is less a command than 
a question, as is probably the case with all commandments. If man will answer that divine 
creation is an evil, and thus doubt God’s pronouncement, then he is invited to try his own 
hand at it: either at creating or at correcting God’s creation with his “rightening words.” 
In this sense, God’s anger is nothing but a misperception on the part of man, nothing but 
man’s projection onto God of his self-judgment.238 It is because man takes God to be 
human that God punishes him, telling him precisely what he wants to hear, playing His 
man-allotted239 role. This God takes a seat beside the animate dead thing in that He, as 
much as it, are both products of man’s anthropomorphism. 
∞.3 At the height of his awareness, man realizes the fully paradoxical nature of his post. 
Namely, that even his rebellion against it is but derivation. The time between his creation 
and that of the first isn’t a measure, as he first thought, of his posterity, of his distance 
from God’s power. This distance, rather, is immeasurable, being that between time and 
the lack thereof. And since reversibility belongs to time, it is not the key to the divine. 
                                                 
238 God finds out about the offence neither by His omniscience, nor by confession, but by 
apprehending Adam and Eve as they attempt to hide from Him in shame—that is, as a result of 
their self-judgment. Gen. 3:8-10. 




Even if he ventures to very edge of creation, man is still bound to his post: he sits at the 
limit, but there confronts the infinite abyss between creation and Creator, the other side of 
which he cannot see. This abyss constitutes man’s freedom. Namely, that he is free to 
make a choice, one not only between becoming God and playing His role, but also 
between employing his freedom and renouncing it. The second is that which leads to 
fallenness. But the first, carrying a greater existential risk, is not as obvious as to its 
endpoint. Surely, it does not imply that man jump to his certain death by leaping into the 
abyss. For this precisely is what he does in choosing fallenness, eating from the Tree 
when told that it will bring him death, doing so out of doubt. No risk is therefore present 
in this choice, for man, certain of his doubt and therefore of his survival, would by it 
choose the familiar, which is what would allow him to choose it in the first place. And 
even if his bravery were such that he would knowingly choose death, by no means would 
it amplify his freedom. The first is, instead, the choice to keep to God’s word, approach it 
in every thing he names, becoming God progressively, by way of nearness. The freedom 
of this choice is the choice of freedom. For he must make it over and over again, with his 
every enunciation—while that of falling, especially if it arrives at death, is made once and 
for all, is always the last choice. In fact, by choosing his post, and thus his freedom, man 
inaugurates the wholly “new” even with respect to God Himself. For if the results of 
man’s offence are foreseeable—not only because deducible from the minutia of creation, 
but also because clearly stated by God240—the same cannot be said for the results of 
man’s obeisance. It is thus, by provoking, through repetition, the manifestation of what 
cannot be derived that man truly becomes creator. 
2.5 Name and Judgment 
5 Man’s tongue, as the impartable’s imparting and symbol of the unimpartable at once, is 
even in its double-dealing doubled. This couple doesn’t share the axis of the paradisiacal-
fallen. To it, rather, does it add a secondary axis, through the rows of “name” and 
“judgment” drawn, creating a chiasmus. So that: where name is symbol and judgment is 
                                                 
240 “But of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it; because in the day that 
thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die.” Gen. 2:17. 
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imparting, fallen is the language “used,” while Edenic where the inverse holds. And yet, 
hardly is this chiasmus an impenetrable wall: for while the situation in which both words 
would be imparting is, at least diachronically, out of reach, the same is not true of one in 
which they both would be symbolic. The latter marks the interval between the pre- and 
post-lapidary, the transitional state by which one turns into the other. Such a deduction of 
transitional states bespeaks the possibility of inverting the decay suffered by language, 
and in a sense the Fall itself. 
5.1 It is by taking on a supplementary symbolic function that the imparting name readies 
the Fall. And what fills it, by its vanity of knowledge, is the proper (human) name: 
instead of naming, this “name” symbolizes, namely, this person in his unimpartability, in 
the fact that he’s made not from the word but by godly hand. Man is thus distanced and 
brought closer to God, the unimpartable. By being named, by the emergence of the 
human name, man’s role as namer is infested by ambivalence. And all products of the 
latter, all thingly names, threaten to follow its fate, in the image of its malformation: to 
have their credibility suspended. The introduction of the name-as-symbol opens the gates 
to the endeavor of turning the symbol (back) into a name, and thereby making it mere 
sign.—But entering the fray first is judgment, as the symbol of the Tree’s 
unimpartability, in predication (“of the Knowledge of Good and Evil”) and warning 
(“thou shalt not”).241 It not an unimpartable designating another unimpartable, but an 
unimparting of unimpartability. As such, it is inaccessible to man’s impartability-directed 
knowledge while being present to him nonetheless. Herein, then, judgment, since not a 
name given by man, can be for him only that name given the Tree by God so that he may 
come to name it. Man therefore aims to name what judgment symbolizes: to impart 
unimpartability itself. And this endeavor strictly mirrors man’s attempt to close the gap 
                                                 
241 The second-“because… thereof”-half of God’s pronouncement is a judgment, which, purely as 
a judgment, symbolizes the Tree’s unimpartability. This unimpartability is also symbolized by 
God’s designation of the Tree in the first-half of his warning—making it unnamable for man—
and expressed in “thou shalt not eat of it”: a “prohibition” which doesn’t mean that man shouldn’t 
eat from it, nor even that he can’t, but that even if he could he would and will not. Only by the 
occurrence of man’s death is the occurrence of his eating from the Tree possible. Only in that 
moment (individual to each man, common to mankind only at world’s end) does the Tree become 
impartable to man. Judgment occurs after death. It is not for man’s employment. 
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between himself and his own name.242 In one case, man strives to in-form the Tree’s 
name by his knowledge, in the other, to in-form himself in his name’s image, such that it 
may be his (or: he its) genuine reflection. Here is the endeavor by which, in an all-
pervasive crisis, man casts off his confusion for a moment, only to hand himself over to 
chaos. 
∞.4 Blind fidelity can be as much of a transgression as deliberate rejection. The choice of 
naming must itself be made in every instance. To name by habit is to name even when the 
conditions of such action are lacking. Such fidelity is therefore only yet another instance 
of man’s discontent at being post, for it betrays his great indignation at being posterior to 
himself. Therefore does he dissolve all contradictions into the “diction” that came first. 
And thus does he, at once, partition the divine and reduce its timeless cardinality to 
progressive ordinality. 
5.11 No matter the motive and means, selfsame are man’s punishment and crime: aiming 
to impart the unimpartable—his crime; imparting only the unimpartable—his 
punishment. Above all, it’s this change in meaning that exhibits the occurrence of the 
Fall. The unimpartable can’t be imparted unless understood only as the unimparted or 
not-yet-imparted, and thereby no longer as such. Man’s crime is therefore that of 
substituting “the unimparted” for “the unimpartable.” But since what’s imparted must 
continually impart itself, it can never be as such unimparted, but only unimparted-as-yet 
in human language, in name. The unimpartable is then something that not only is 
impartable, but is currently imparting itself, but without name. Since through naming 
man also imparts himself, this “unimpartable”-cum-unnamed-and-imparting is the limit 
of his own (self-)imparting, is the place within (and outside) man where he’s not-yet-
imparted, but can be. It is the very potentiality of man’s naming. In aiming to name it, 
then, man names naming itself (and knows knowledge itself). But this naming is also a 
second naming of the names through which things already impart themselves to him, he 
                                                 
242 For Adam this would be the case inasmuch as he would once more fulfill the role of namer. 
And, if the two Edenic Trees are one and the same, then Eve’s offence is the prime example of 
this stubbornness to keep the name: it’s her attempt merely to abide to “Eve” (hawwah)—from 
“the living” (hay)—by eating from the Tree of “Life” (hayim). 
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them, and he himself. But a second naming no longer of things’ impartability. A naming 
that yields names which rather than imparting things, impart man’s naming of them, his 
ability to name them. Thus imparting of impartability comes to a dead end. For things’ 
names are thus unimpartable, rendering things themselves unimpartable from man’s 
purview. And man imparts immediately precisely this unimpartability, of things and man. 
Which, when taken as the “unimparted,” puts this process in motion once again, adding 
to the deck only yet another set of secondary-names. The use of one unimpartable to 
designate another is the use of signs. 
5.12 At its purest, the language of mathematics can symbolize the unimpartable in a way 
matched only by God’s word (through judgment) and the human name. This occurs, 
namely, in numbers. Where “2” may be an arbitrary sign for the number it designates, 
“II” is not—unless as a sign for two held up fingers, or as short-hand for “2nd.” It is 
instead something that indicates a mathematical object. The latter is unimpartable. Not in 
the sense of the unimparted-as-yet, but in that of an idea. Understood as a “set,” it is the 
limit of “an” impartability, where “II” is the “inscription,” the symbol, of this limit within 
that impartability. In this sense only is “II” a written being. Its function is to point. Only 
when its pointing is the gesture of a finger does it turn into mere sign. Like judgment and 
the human name, it’s not “made” for man’s casual use, but only to be read. To understand 
words as such numbers is an attempt at turning name to symbol, which ends only in 
making it a sign. This is the mistake of mysticism’s theory of language. On the whole, 
mathematics follows such a theory. 
5.14 The emergence of the symbol and the attempt to efface it are props in the transition 
staged by ancient tragedy.243 Only with human dialogue does the proper name come 
about, and only with God’s inflexible command does man find himself constrained, like a 
hero, by higher orders. At the same time, the dominion is still that of the pure word, the 
                                                 
243 “[T]ragedy marks the transition from historical time to dramatic time.” Walter Benjamin, 
“Trauerspiel and Tragedy,” trans. Rodney Livingstone, in Selected Writings, Volume 1, 1913-




name.244 A great action, a great decision, on the hero’s part, is what culminates the hero’s 
crisis—what fulfills the hero’s historical time—beforehand infinite and unfulfilled, where 
empirical events had no relation to when they occurred—as an idea.245 An idea that over-
determines the hero, individuates him, by bringing together the events of his entire 
existence, and hands him over to both death and guilt.246 Oedipus from the beginning 
refuses to take the plague as the incomprehensible work of the gods, or of nature. Instead, 
he believes it to have a guilty human agent to which it can be traced, however indirectly. 
And one who’s not himself. Thus does he enter the realm of judgment. But, just as with 
the Tree, the evildoer is precisely he who wants to find him, or: the answer is the 
questioner himself. And this awakened judgment cuts through Oedipus’ entire life like an 
abstraction. This tendency toward judgment is present in his earliest appeal to oracles. 
Oedipus’ “first” mistake is that of wanting knowledge of the unknowable, of the yet to 
be, and so a priori. Of wanting to name the symbol inscribed in his name, even 
apophatically. Seeking this a priori knowledge from oracles without taking them at their 
word, hearing what he wants to hear, ignoring the indeterminacy of their prophecies—
                                                 
244 “Tragedy is not just confined exclusively to the realm of dramatic human speech; it is the only 
form proper to human dialogue. That is to say, no tragedy exists outside human dialogue, and the 
only form in which human dialogue can appear is that of tragedy. […] [T]ragedy […] is […] a 
ruling force” within which prevails an “indissoluble law of inescapable order. […] [T]he pure 
word itself has an immediate tragic force.” Walter Benjamin, “The Role of Language in 
Trauerspiel and Tragedy,” trans. Rodney Livingstone, in Selected Writings, Volume 1, 1913-
1926, ed. Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1996), 
59. “[I]n tragedy the eternal inflexibility of the spoken word is exaulted.” Ibid., 61. 
245 “At specific and crucial points in its trajectory, historical time passes over into tragic time; 
such points occur in the actions of great individuals. […] Historical time is infinite in every 
direction and unfulfilled at every moment. This means we cannot conceive of a single empirical 
event that bears a necessary relation to the time of its occurrence. […] [T]he determining force of 
historical time cannot be fully grasped by, or wholly concentrated in, any empirical process. 
Rather, a process that is perfect in historical terms is quite indeterminate empirically; it is in fact 
an idea.” Benjamin, “Trauerspiel and Tragedy,” 55. 
246 “Tragic time […] [is] an individually fulfilled time. […] In tragedy the hero dies because no 
one can live in fulfilled time. He dies of immortality. Death is an ironic immortality; that is the 
origin of tragic irony. The origin of tragic guilt can be found in the same place. It has its roots in 
the tragic hero’s very own, individually fulfilled time. This time of the tragic hero […] describes 
all his deeds and his entire existence as if with a magic circle. […] The tragic death is 
overdetermined—that is the actual expression of the hero’s guilt. Hebbel might have been on the 
right track when he said that individuation was original sin.” Ibid., 56. 
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this is his “second.” It’s one that’s fixed in the sphere of paranoia and suspicion, wherein 
the human name is taken to contain, like the thingly name, knowledge of its referent. 
Finally, his “third” mistake is that that of letting it, now in his grasp, shape his actions, of 
determining himself by it, even if by its negation, of acting only by reaction. And again, 
as with the Tree, he who wants this knowledge will beget it, but not divorced from that of 
which it is the knowledge. Solely in death can the human name escape its symbolism. 
That he’s as naked now as when abandoned by his parents, this is what Oedipus comes to 
realize. It’s his journey to this site that charges him with total guilt.247 
5.2 The completion of the Fall eliminates the rectifying culpa mea of heroic death. Death 
as such is no longer a possibility for man. For here, man is at most Man or “man”: thus 
already dead. What survives of him is a mere specter, haunting endlessly the same 
dilapidated houses and abandoned auditoriums. Although now signs, “name” has become 
“symbolizing,” and “judgment” “imparting”: but symbolizing the impartable and 
imparting the unimpartable, in turn. Judgment is herein the proliferation of abstractions, 
the turn away from things. This while the name becomes a serial killer or mass murderer 
on the loose. As long as the impartable imparts itself, unimparting has no place in its 
realm. By consequence, the name can only unimpart an impartable that, failing to self-
impart, is not really an impartable at all. Which means that it can only unimpart either an 
already-imparted or something at once impartable and unimpartable, between the two 
suspended, a mere potentiality. The first suggests not only dead things, but also a discrete 
view of time, therefore: a memory or a historical event. The second can be understood 
either as the “idea of” or as a silent man, even: as a fictional character. It follows that the 
name is not confined to reaching solely after the impartables ready-made for 
symbolizing, but can render symbolizable under its brand new reign those impartables 
that it had previously named. Accordingly does it: subject the thing to vivisection, petrify 
the fluid march of time, render man speechless and thoughtful, or make of him a stock 
character or role. The name bends every thing into the mere idea, better yet: a 
                                                 
247 For this part of the Oedipus story, see, for instance, Sophocles, “Oedipus the King,” in The 
Theban Plays, trans. Ruth Fainlight and Robert J. Littman (Baltimore: The John Hopkins 
University Press, 2009), 1-63. 
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photograph, of itself. A Faustian, world-decreating instrument, it is a name bled dry of all 
its previous “objective” knowledge. Two antithetical but synchronous extremes serve as 
the harbingers of its progress: a ground and inert world of matter and a spectral, moving 
world of spirit—where man is dealt his post as a mortician or a bibliothecary. 
5.21 Only with a map of the descent can the attempt to re-ascend be made. To assume 
that a new language, sprung from man’s pure intellect, can take the place of fallen 
language is just to hasten the descent. It’s to replace one set of signs by yet another. 
Conversely, to immediately take signs for symbols of the unimpartable is to entirely 
sidestep imparting and thus provide the sign with a yet firmer ground for its extension. 
Only the human name and judgment need turn into such symbols, and this to hand the 
thingly name back to its imparting function and end the domination of the sign. Such a 
reversal can be done only by abjuring the knowledge of good and evil, this empty a priori 
knowledge, with which they’ve both become invested. Suspending the guilt and use of 
judgment, reclaiming the language-freedom particular to man, obviating the concern that 
chains the whole of his attention: for his name—such is the highest task available to 
fallen man. What this entails is starting not over or beyond but with the sign, leaving at 
the door the binary of: good or evil, yes or no, truth or lie, useful or useless, accurate or 
inaccurate. “Only he says No/ who has knowledge of Yes./ But he who knows all,/ at No 
and Yes is missing pages.”248 Herein, scrutiny would in the sign’s opacity discern myriad 
layers of encrustation, an entire world of sludge and dross, a snapshot of the sign’s entire 
history. And now, with the voices of his inner space pacific, man would hear the moans 
of nature echo in the sign. At long last would it speak of its enslavement, revealing that it 
never was innocuously employed, as may have seemed, but was bent always to its 
master’s will, to his sufferings as to his orgiastic celebrations, and worse: despite its 
fiercest opposition, to all his other usual signs, each more sweaty, slovenly, and alcoholic 
than the next. Thus comes to light the mediate quality of abstraction’s (that is: mediacy’s) 
immediacy, releasing judgment from imparting and vice versa. Thus is the sign returned 
                                                 
248 “Spune Nu doar acela / care-l știe pe Da./ Însă el, care știe totul,/ la Nu și la Da are foile 
rupte.“ Stănescu, “Elegia Întâia,” 102. 
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its copyright, its impartability, with which it can emerge again as name or as imparting 
thing. And thus does abstraction, now the widower of the idea, leave behind its throne 
and scepter to take refuge in a monastery and become the very symbol of its wife’s 
celestial hereafter.249  
5.22 From a different viewpoint, this undoing is the operation of passing-over-settings. 
Not a subsumption of source-sign by target-sign is this passage, but an invitation for the 
sign to testify as to its complex of set relations. Herein, the sign’s shroud of immediacy 
and arbitrariness is as if taken by the wind; its hypnotic hold on things and on ideas 
broken. 
5.221 This is true of even the simplest over-passing. To translate “sign” into Romanian as 
“semn,” the passage is the following: in English the chain is “sign-significant-signifier-
signified-signage-signal-signature-signification-signify-significative-signatory,” and 
further “ensign-design-resign-designate”; in Romanian it is “semn-semnificant-x-
semnificat-x-semnal(a)-semnătură-semnificație-semnifica-semnificativ-x,” and further 
“însemna-desemna-resemna-desemnat.” To exchange corresponding terms, as they’re 
arranged herein, would mean to strip them of all meaning and work with them as with the 
variables of an equation. Even so, the English “signifier,” “signage,” and “signatory” 
have no Romanian equivalents, unless neologisms are introduced: “semnificar,” 
“semnaj,” and “semnător,” respectively. Such innovations, however, can only work if 
grounded on another, second equation, namely, of suffixes. This latter then reveals “-ly,” 
“-ing,” “-ful,” and “-ness” as English suffixes without equivalent in Romanian, making 
impossible Romanian neologisms for “significantly” and “signing,” as much as for 
possible English neologisms such as “signful” and “signness.” And it’s at this point, to 
find an equation more effective, that a turn to meaning becomes necessary. The latter 
yields the neologism “semnitudine” for the neologism “signness,” the neologism 
                                                 
249 Signs designating things would become thingly names once more. Signs that are things would 
become things once more. Signs that are abstractions can’t return to anything; at worst they take 
on this or that connotation from their exposed history and become signs for something else. But 
ideally, they allow the idealities attached to them to step back out of man’s language, and 
themselves retreat to being their mere symbols. 
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“semnos” for the neologism “signful,” “semnificativ” for “significantly,” “semnare” for 
“signing,” “semnătar” for “signatory,” “semnalizare” for “signage,” and “semnificant” 
for “signifier.” Which is to say that it upends the two “mathematical” equations it was 
supposed to supplement. Regarding the second, suffix equation: Romanian “-os” is made 
to equal not English “-ose” but “-ful”; Romanian “-ar” is diverted from English “-er” and 
aimed at “-tory”; English “-age” is given not Romanian “-aj” but the suffix equivalent to 
English “-ary” or “-ar,” the Romanian “-(a)re”; this “-(a)are,” instead of set beside its 
English equal, is handed to the English “-ing”; and, finally, the English “-ness” dances 
with Romanian “-itudine,” the soulmate of now-jealous English “-itude.” As for the first, 
sign-to-sign equation: “semnificativ,” which was supposed to be a match for 
“significative,” is also coupled to “significantly”; and Romanian “semnificant” 
encompasses both the English “significant” and “signifier.” And the disruption continues: 
“signification” means also “semnificare” and not just “semnificație,” which is closer to 
“significance,” in turn proximate to “însemnătate”; “desemnat” fits not only “designate” 
but also “designated,” while “designate” also has room for “desemna,” and this latter is 
completely unrelated to “design,” joined to the “sign”-foreign “proiecta”; “resign” covers 
“resemna” as much as the “sign”-foreign “demisiona,” which includes in it “remit”; 
finally, “însemna” touches on “ensign” but extends its arms much wider, holding to 
“signify” but wholeheartedly embracing the “sign”-foreign “mean,” itself friendly to it 
only in specific situations. The appearance of terms foreign to “sign” is the extreme 
indicator of the fact that this meaning-comparing process is required to extend over the 
whole of the two languages, and in such extension obviate in every instance the 
possibility of equating signs—especially since meaning can’t enter an equation if 
unattached to signs. 
5.222 If the first equation were sufficient in itself, the signs of each side matching 
perfectly—less possible for proper human names than for those resulting from the 
sciences’ baptismal acts, for instance “photon,” or “π”—then the two “settings” would be 
identical, and there would be no need to “pass” between them. This case is emblematic as 
much for monolingualism as for post-paradisiacal language. In the way that “π” acts as a 
sign—at once arbitrary and immediate, despite being a designating means—for “3.14...,” 
so every sign in fallen language is taken as immediately equivalent to what it designates, 
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and as holding exclusive rights to its designation. The same is true in passing from the 
English “π” to the Romanian “π,” with the proviso that, to be immediate and arbitrary, the 
trip can happen solely in the quietude of night, lest a trickle of Romanian pee end up on 
some English pie. But if the first equation were taken as sufficient despite not being so, 
then passing would involve using the first term’s diagram when operating on the second, 
and lead as if to wrongly teleporting from one city’s library to the other’s bookstore, or: 
to being apt for only the renting out of writing, a tourist in the second city as much as in 
an “author’s” books. Herein, the forced neologisms, the tourist’s signs of his signs, would 
to locals be mere gibberish or a linguistic parody. 
5.223 Were “sign” and “semn” to be understood like “π” and be as estranged from their 
kin as is the latter from the Grecian alphabet, then they would be components of a 
language different from both English and Romanian—and precisely when adopting this 
approach does philosophy echo the sciences and mathematics. This is the production of 
yet another language, one exemplary of judgment’s presence. Here originates the 
multiplicity of tongues. If not so understood, however, the passage from “sign” to “semn” 
inescapably demands an extra course through each sign’s variants. Which means that it is 
necessarily a passage over the abyss of meaning separating them, and thus one laying 
bare the intricacies fundamental to the sphere of each. Their immediate signification 
comes unfurled, and with it from their reign their meaning comes untied. Thus does mere 
abstraction turn into the symbol of an immaterial idea, discernable within the former’s 
meaning-structure. And only swifter does this revelation happen when the launched sign 
can little runway sight on which to land, as with the carrying of “know” into Romanian. 
While when the passage is between signs like the English “flower” and the Romanian 
“floare,” then is the main event no longer a comparison of meaning but a phonemical 
contrast instead, one whose resonance transforms each sign into a name once more. 
Herein is the sign from surdity disjoined. And the sonorous extension of this passage to 
that infinity where it embraces the entirety of languages is in its unity the word of God. 
5.224 Yet the sciences’ baptismal acts look the spitting image of Adamic naming. “Black 
hole,” for one, seems no less than the genuine description of its named, and thus appears 
successfully to carry knowledge of the latter. But the resemblance is a chimera, for in its 
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name or lack thereof no ethics are at stake: no sadness would it feel if man did fail in 
giving it a name. Moreover, God’s word is not the black hole’s origin, evident in the 
unimpartability, or the unimpartable as such, that its name means to express. And yet, an 
unimpartable that nonetheless imparts itself, but indirectly: by its discernable impact, 
caused by its disruption of space-time, on the stars in its vicinity. In this strict sense, an 
idea is a black hole and a black hole is an idea. It follows that “black hole” functions not 
as name but as symbol. Ultimately, the limit of man’s naming-faculty coincides with that 
of his perception-faculty, with the proviso that the latter be bereft of any artificial aid. 
5.23 The ubiquity of signs, the plurality of tongues, the mournfulness of nature, the re-
ascent assayed by passing-over: the features put on show in this transition-state are no 
less than the arch and backdrop of the Trauerspiel.250 The latter leads from after the 
Expulsion, through every circle of linguistic degradation, to the passage that restores 
Adamite naming.251 What served for Oedipus as the omega, is for the Trauerspiel the 
alpha. While when alerted to the threat of tragedy, the tragic hero is mostly brazen in 
advancing toward it, set firmly on according with himself, on carrying the guilt and 
knowledge of his own-most misdeeds, and on converting, in the end, his proper name 
from empty symbol to a name that can sustain the full weight of his figure—forthright to 
devise his sure evasion is the drama’s sovereign, resolving, with success, to thoroughly 
assume his role as king, and make himself into the symbol and bearer of significance.252 
Following this path, the king effectively damns language in order to secure his own 
existence: he throws off the tail of tragedy by devaluing his own-most name-struggle and 
acceding to his human-granted social function; and language he blasphemes in trading his 
                                                 
250 “[T]he mourning play marks the transition from dramatic time to musical time.” Benjamin, 
“Trauerspiel and Tragedy,” 57. (Translation modified.) 
251 “[The mourning play] describes the path from natural sound via lament to music.” Benjamin, 
“The Role of Language,” 60. 
252 “Tragedy threatens, and man, the crowning pinnacle of creation, is salvaged for feeling only 
by becoming king: a symbol, as the bearer of this crown.” Ibid. 
114 
 
divinely-conferred naming-faculty, welded to his inner-struggle, for an “illegal” judging-
faculty, the incentive proper to his social function.253 
5.231 But his damning-word goes further still, for the king’s function is precisely that of 
judging what belongs and what does not within the territory of significance. Therefore in 
its exercise does he from word sunder significance. No longer can the meaning of the 
word be the very word itself, but instead must be a “thing” without the word: an index of 
the word’s (historical) significance. If the pure word served as a wholly purifying tunnel 
for, and thus an indispensable aid to, nature’s ascent into the suprasensuous, this sundered 
word brings nature’s voyage to a halt.254 For, since the recent coronation, language has 
begun delineating its frontiers, and securing them with stone-faced border guards. 
Vigilantly eyeing nature’s things on their arrival at the border, these officers will either 
refuse them passage outright, or make it contingent on their carrying of alien meaning, 
which, accepted, will eternally enclose them in the kingdom. Such is it that only nature’s 
torso can get as far as the throne room. And by such predicament is nature pushed into 
the deepest woe.255 Words turn into symbolizing names herein, and thus leave nothing 
untrammeled or whole. 
5.2311 The king is not strictly a symbol of significance. While, like judgment and the 
Tree, he is what he symbolizes, like them too he can be a symbol only insofar as he 
remains inactive. In judging and apportioning significance, he perverts the latter’s status 
as idea, and becomes the mere sign of an abstraction. “Significant” thereby becomes the 
                                                 
253 “In the mourning play, guilt and greatness call not so much for definition—let alone for 
overdetermination—as for expansion, general extension, not for the sake of guilt and greatness, 
but simply for the repetition of those situations.” Benjamin, “Trauerspiel and Tragedy,” 57. 
254 “[M]idway through its passage nature finds itself betrayed by language […] Thus, with the 
double-sense of the word, with its significance, nature grinds to a halt […] These plays represent 
a blocking of nature, as it were an overwhelming damming up of the feelings that suddenly 
discover a new world in the word, the world of meaning, of an unfeeling historical time. […] [I]t 
is the two of the word and its significance that destroys the tranquility of a profound yearning and 
disseminates sorrow throughout nature.” Benjamin, “The Role of Language,” 60. (Translation 
modified.) 
255 “And nature in the mourning play remains a torso in this sublime symbol; sorrow fills the 
sensuous world in which nature and language meet.” Ibid. 
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name for that considered thusly by the king. Herein does the possibility of his usurpation 
become visible. 
5.232 With such a situation as its canvas, the Trauerspiel repeats its pattern endlessly, as 
though a fractal.256 The distance between word and meaning, as that between meaning 
and sound, becomes larger with its every instance, until they’re irreversibly detached and 
able to give voice to the lament of nature.257 And this repeats itself into the auditorium: 
from his own signification each spectator is loosened,258 his word a pure channel once 
more, his ear opened to the lament as, by reverberation, it builds into a language-unifying 
rhythm and turns finally to music.259 
2.6 Mathematics and Art 
6 Its formal law lying in duplication, man’s language is on no account a coliseum but 
always a proscenium. Its wings, mathematics and art, behave as if magnetic columns: 
                                                 
256 “[U]ntil death puts an end to the game so as to repeat the same game, albeit on a grander scale, 
in another world. It is this repetition on which the law of the mourning play is founded. Its events 
are allegorical schemata, symbolic mirror-images of a different game.” Benjamin, “Trauerspiel 
and Tragedy,” 57. 
257 “The interplay between sound and meaning remains a terrifying phantom in the mourning 
play; it is obsessed by language, the prey of an endless feeling […] The play must find its 
redemption, however, and for the mourning play that redemptive mystery is music—the rebirth of 
the feelings in a suprasensuous nature.” Benjamin, “The Role of Language,” 60-1. (Translation 
modified.) 
258 “This play is ennobled by the distance that everywhere separates image and mirror-image, the 
signifier and the signified. Thus the mourning play presents us not with the image of a higher 
existence but only with one of two mirror-images, and its continuation is no less phantasmal than 
itself. […] The mourning play, on the other hand, is in itself unclosed, and the idea of its 
resolution no longer dwells within the realm of the drama itself.” Benjamin, “Trauerspiel and 
Tragedy,” 57. (Translation modified.) 
259 “The mourning play is built not on the foundation of actual language but on the consciousness 
of the unity that language achieves through feeling, a unity that unfolds in words. In this process, 
errant feeling gives voice to sorrow in lament. But this lament must resolve itself; on the basis of 
that presupposed unity, it passes over into the language of pure feeling—in other words, music. 
[…] [T]he faculties of speech and hearing still stand equal in the scales, and ultimately everything 
depends upon the ear for lament, for only the most profoundly heard and perceived lament can 
become music. Whereas in tragedy the eternal immobility of the spoken word is exalted, the 
mourning play gathers the endless resonance of its sound.” Benjamin, “The Role of Language,” 
61. (Translation modified.) 
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when stacked together toppling the stage, but standing its frame still when kept apart, be 
it through sheer force or by a tête-à-tête. Neither states nor functions of man’s language, 
the twain the genres rather are wherein its products dwell—specifically, at its extremes. 
6.1 Within the paradisical state, outside the orbit of man’s speech resides the language of 
mathesis.260 Its home is in the sky above him, wherein its “signs” are readable and 
whence, bespeaking the ideas, they, these symbols,261 like the Tree, delimit the 
impartability below.262 Of music they’re the neighbors, the notes celestial from which it’s 
played, and in their asterisms toll the sound of the beatific Word.263 Mathematics—in 
this, its native language—is conveyed by sets of dots or finite lines alone. But, despite 
having the purest numerals on hand, it doesn’t follow that mathesis is in man’s linguistic 
reach. For, even etched in rock or shown with fingers, these empyreal flakes remain but 
symbols, such mimesis being, in their rhythm, a mere beat. In the image of the Tree and 
in the likeness of the human name, they are unimpartable.264 To read or replicate them 
man is able, but, in Eden dwelling, not to speak or write them. Only in his Fall does he 
                                                 
260 “Die Sprache der Mathematik ist die Lehre (‘The language of mathematics is the doctrine’).” 
Benjamin, “II, 140-157 Über Sprache,” 788. The Greek mathesis, “learning,” the German Lehre, 
“teaching.” At the same time, “[d]ie Mathematik denkt (‘mathematics thinks’).” Ibid., 786. 
261 “Die Mathematik spricht in Zeichen. […] Die Zeichen der Mathematik finden sich sozusagen 
auch am Himmel wider: nur sind sie da gelesene Zeichen—und in Mathematik geschriebene 
Zeichen. […] Der Name wird gesprochen/ Das Wort wird gehört/ Das Zeichen geschrieben/ Das 
Bild gelesen (‘Mathematics speaks in signs […] The signs of mathematics re-find themselves so 
to say in Heaven: only there are they read signs, and in mathematics written signs. […] The name 
is spoken/ The word is heard/ The sign written/ The image read’).” Ibid., 788. In these notes, the 
difference between read-sign and written-sign becomes evident in the final line, which marks 
“reading” as an activity directed at the image. 
262 “And God said, ‘Let there be lights in the expanse of the heavens to separate the day from the 
night. And let them be for signs and for seasons, and for days and years.’” Gen. 1:14. 
263 “Der Himmel is in den Gestirnen der Ort der gelesenen Zeichen und der (gehörten) Musik. 
[…] Sternbild—gelesenes Zeichen/ Mathematik—geschriebnes Zeichen (‘Heaven is, in the stars, 
the place of read signs and of (heard) music. […] Constellation—read sign/ Mathematics—
written sign’).” Benjamin, “II, 140-157 Über Sprache,” 788. 
264 On the point of mimesis: “The deepest copy-image of this divine word and the point where 
human language participates most intimately in the divine infinity of the pure word […] is the 
human name.” Benjamin, “On Language,” 69. (Translation modified.) 
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procure mathesis for himself and with it write his observations out in signs, be it of the 
ether or of nature. 
6.11 By its idea-aimed relationality, mathematics’ man-made sign exemplifies the twin-
sensed word.265 The “2” is set against the “II” in “meaning” something other than itself—
in “meaning” pure and simple: for the symbol, not being a name, doesn’t mean even 
itself—and in seeing its sufficient reason within this “something other.” Thus is the 
“discovered” formulation only ever an idea’s explication, which, by weight of its 
precision, replaces the idea altogether, cuts it out from its domain. The world is at its core 
composed of numbers, constants, ratios, and sets. Hence the sign of mathematics is this 
core. Evident herein is the language-accord between mysticism and mathematics. It’s 
their mutual neglect of the unimpartable that leads to the paradoxical coincidence of their 
belief in the world’s pure givenness—which precludes considering man’s role, and 
thereby self-reflection, and is without an ethics in its silence—and their employ in the 
world’s de-creation. 
6.12 If Adamic mathematics’ “thinking” is not to “contemplating” unrelated, in 
fallenness its life is by “equating” or “computing” formed. Equation as the archetype of 
thinking has deduction for its primary manifestation. As passing-over’s opening 
balancing-act minds not the gap between meaning and sign, and that twixt two signs 
similar in function, so between different ideas deduction feigns continuum of thought.266 
The two are the reverse and obverse of one and the same falling blade. For, in the 
mathematic context, coincidence of sign with meaning results primarily from the 
conversion of originary symbolizing into meaning—that is, from abandoning the 
unimpartable entirely, and engendering by this an absolute continuum. By itself, 
                                                 
265 “Theory, of course, cannot relate to reality but belongs together with language. Implicit here is 
an objection against mathematics.” Walter Benjamin, “Aphorisms,” in Early Writings, 1910-
1917, trans. Howard Eiland (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 2011), 271. (Translation 
modified.) 
266 “[D]eduction [reduces ideas to concepts] by projecting them into a pseudo-logical continuum.” 




however, this coincidence gives strict meaning-determinacy to a sign, and the latter’s 
meaning loses, as a consequence, its originary indeterminacy. Through such hypostasis 
does the idea turn into the object of a sign, that is, into a mere abstraction. The continuum 
of ideas is then completed in the coincidence of two different signs. For the latter means 
above all the act of rendering mute both the sound and shape of these signs, from the start 
cleansing them of those few qualities through which they’re able to disclose ideas. 
Simultaneously does this act submit them to their common function, which they begin to 
mean “in place of” but nonetheless as if it’s their idea. Finally, are the meanings of each, 
those ulterior to their common function, disclosed to be equated in turn, effectuating the 
smooth passage from one “idea” to another. But that the whole of such a metamorphosis, 
passing through abstraction and induction, is in deduction shortened by a leap and has 
only its results presented.267 
6.13 Constellation is the figure of non-synthesis. The latter has the stars for its 
constituents, stars that, with its double-hyphens, it both connects and keeps apart: that it 
together holds suspended twixt identity and non-identity, in each case infinite or pure. 
Idea-and-idea are its sidereal units. Ultimately, “a” non-synthesis between ideas makes 
them simultaneously: commonly indeterminate and uniquely determinant. If infinitely in 
identity, the “ideas” are just “the idea,” bereft of multiplicity, or: the absolutely 
indeterminate, the univocally determinant. If infinitely non-identical, the heavens are 
their common-place no more: while one stays clinging to the sky’s expanse, the other is, 
in its existence, a foreigner to all discerning, perhaps a stranger even to existence. The 
gap between them turns to an unbridgeable abyss, debilitating the formation of ideas: 
only singly—to the exclusion of all others—can one occupy the sky and be, perforce in 
univocity, determinant. On meeting its extinction, the idea—by dint of its epochal 
remnants, fossils of its own determinations—comes determinate in turn. If finitely 
identical, thus finite in their non-identity as well, the ideas are determinate from the 
                                                 
267 “In such a philosophy of art the 'deduction' of the genre would be based on a combination of 
induction and abstraction, and it would not be so much a question of establishing a series of these 




beginning, the instances of their identity and non-identity materializing their 
comparison.—Non-synthesis alone sustains the pulse of the ideas. And in by this pulse 
beats out their symbols. For the univocally determinant idea, determined by the chain 
securing it to the created world, is really a determinate idea. And the latter is a mere 
abstraction, while its symbol: no more than a sign. Between a symbol and an idea non-
synthesis also resides. A symbol is in no case an idea, but neither from it absolutely other, 
for this would render it a sign. So too the two are incomparable in their relation: both are 
indeterminate while determinant, but in different ways, the idea establishing the 
determination as if from above, the symbol maintaining it as though from the sides.268 
Whence it follows that symbol-and-symbol can also be the units of non-synthesis. It is 
rather signs that can on no account such units be. For, although never in infinite non-
identity, they are comparable and interchangeable, able to sit in infinite identity. This is 
evident in their complete lack of determining and absolute abundance of determinacy. 
6.131 Non-synthesis holds exclusively for ideas and for symbols. To make it hold 
between signs means to cancel it out, and affect ideas and symbols in turn. It means to 
force ideas into the comparison and identity of signs: into analysis or synthesis. The 
formalization of non-synthesis is therefore a contradiction in terms. Man’s fallen 
mathematics along with logic’s esteemed deduction is this very contradiction. 
6.2 Only in the wake of the Descent does art come into being. Facing the mundanity it 
brings, man takes arms against creation in riposte: he wills to de-create it and re-make it 
in his image. Thus his ends belie his means, betraying them from their inception. Himself 
formed, not created, his grasp is limited to form: he therefore registers creation as 
formation, “to de-create” as “to de-form,” re-creating as re-forming. These “de-” and “re-
” define man’s will to art, their lack his faculty of naming. Through art, creation’s hand is 
forced. Nature is de-formed externally in art, without consideration for its inner form. 
The purloined faculty of “the above”—namely, judgment—its highest guide, art supra-
                                                 
268 Which doesn’t mean their determination is a set of borders. No map can draw it out and nor 
any schema grasp it. Discerned it can be only from inside it. It is as if more an ever-moving set of 
borders, themselves invisible, spotted only when knocked against, and only in that instant. 
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forms destructively. So is what man wills by it begotten: grotesque, or fantastic, 
figurations of creation.269 These, in their first instance, are the tools and signs required by 
this operation: the very hands of man. As it develops further, the coalescence of handily 
de-formed creation and formulas empyrean-abstracted becomes art’s modus operandi. 
6.21 The origin of supra-form is naught but judgment’s own: the assay to identify the 
form—name—with the inform—symbol—or the reverse. By consequence, the supra-
form’s proliferation entails at once that of de-forming: the ring through which one term 
must pass in order to become the other. As the advent of its owner’s death withers human 
name into mere name, bringing the inform to a form, so the thing’s conclusive rest 
dissolves its name into a symbol, casting out its man-accorded form to welcome in its 
place inform. Precisely in its supra-forming must art not just traverse but be the very 
agent of this de-formation, so that its every figuration bears the latter witness. Yet this 
happens also, and moreover, in the artwork’s own-most de-formation: the one occasioned 
not by way of art, but solely by that nature which in its every element subsides. This is 
the re-appearance of creation proper, emerging from the very form meant to enslave it. 
Thus does art become nature’s receiver. Thence can its works be the shapes of nature, as 
man’s names are its forms.270 
                                                 
269 “Fantastic figurations arise where the process of de-formation does not proceed from within 
the heart of the form itself. (The only legitimate form of the fantastic is the grotesque, in which 
fantasy does not destructively de-form, but destructively supra-forms[)].” Walter Benjamin, 
“Imagination,” trans. Rodney Livingstone, in Selected Writings, Volume 1, 1913-1926, ed. 
Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1996), 280. 
(Translation modified.) 
270 “There is a language of sculpture, of painting, of poetry. Just as the language of poetry is 
partly, if not solely, founded on the name language of man, it is very thinkable that the language 
of sculpture or painting is founded on certain kinds of thing-languages, that in them we find a 
translation of the language of things into an infinitely higher language, which may still be of the 
same sphere. […] For an understanding of artistic forms, it is of value to attempt to grasp them all 
as languages, and to seek their connection with nature-languages. An example that is appropriate 
because it is derived from the acoustic sphere is the kinship between song and the language of 
birds.” Benjamin, “On Language,” 73. (Translation modified.) 
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6.22 From here too can the artwork be receptive of ideas.271 For, in the dissolution that 
from within it unfolds, it presents the passage whereby form and inform exchange places. 
Which means: the name, whether the art-thing’s supra-form or the image it constructs, in 
its emptying out, and the symbol, whether the characters of its story or the artist’s 
signature, filling up, the former pointing, by its direction, to the un-form, the ideas, the 
latter to the Form, God’s word. The Trauerspiel is an artwork exemplarily receptive of 
this passage.272 
6.3 The de-formation of art that the latter exposes is the basis of the presentation of a 
second version of non-synthesis. One characterized not by separation-by-linking but by 
revelation-by-covering-over: namely, the darkness of the space between the stars. It 
entails the coincidence, rather than the mutual absence, of infinite identity and infinite 
non-identity between two terms: namely, name and symbol. In the passage from one to 
the other, their substance is one and the same, but the distance between them is an abyss. 
Held together, they express the transience of the created. This non-synthesis is one, 
namely, between day and night, impartability and unimpartability, the known sun and the 
unknown stars, the presence of God’s word and its retreat in the ideas. The former thus 
comes marked by the latter’s death, and bespeaks the eventual extinction of one star to 
the profit of multiple stars, as one name fragments into a symbol’s various shards. 
Herein, the limit of impartability is made visible, and thus repeatedly, as much with every 
sunset as for every star itself a world’s sun. Ideas are thus revealed. In impartability’s 
every dissolution are they discernable. Their own non-synthesis thus emerges as its 
unspoken precedent.273 
                                                 
271 “Pure receiving is the basis of every work of art. And it is always directed at two features: at 
the ideas and at nature in the process of de-forming itself.” Benjamin, “Imagination,” 281. 
272 “It [the world of the mourning play] is the site of the proper reception of word and speech in 
art.” Benjamin, “The Role of Language,” 61. (Translation modified.) 
273 “This de-formation [proper to nature itself] shows […] the world caught up in the process of 
unending dissolution; and this means eternal ephemerality. It is like the sun setting over the 
abandoned theatre of the world with its deciphered ruins. It is the unending dissolution of the 
purified appearance of beauty, freed from all seduction. However, the purity of this appearance in 
its dissolution is matched by the purity of its birth. It appears different at dawn and at dusk, but 
not less authentic.” Benjamin, “Imagination,” 281. 
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Σ If language is thrice told, its telling is dealt by the half-dozen with man’s each die. 
Once thrown, this die’s facing vertical sides are art and mathematics, man’s imitation of 
God’s word in its creativity and proper naming of the world. Their unseen but see-able 
doubles are the symbolic and imparting functions of language, man’s facsimile of things’ 
split between imperfect to-speaking and perfect out-speaking. Its always-visible top side 
is the imprint of man’s fallenness, and its invisible under-side that of his Edenic past—
invisible unless the die be picked up to be tossed again. Mutatis mutandis, the same is 
true of a page. 
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Chapter 3  
3 Metaphrastic Inductions: The 1916-1917 Theoretical 
Fragments 
(Stope I) 
3.1 1916  
Indeed this year bespoke the Fall, with slip upon the ichor of Verdun and Somme, the 
micturition of Dada’s top-turve, the atrament of Sassure’s Course. And yet more terms—
among the many in “On Language”—did Benjamin lay down atop this lubricous 
superficies. 
3.1.1 “Eidos und Begriff” 
“Concept” and “essence” are defined in their eponymous essay as sundry terms: their 
spheres “don’t intersect above all, or even in part.”274 While an object’s “concept” 
comprehends the object as having “its place in this real time-course and in this real 
space-location,” this same object’s “essence” regards the object as “eidetically existing in 
an eidetic time in an eidetic place.”275 Put briefly, “the singular-factual is for the concept 
essential”276 because “the concept is based on its one object” a “concept ‘of’ this object,” 
but the essence of an object has nothing to do with the singular-factual, so that “an eidos 
of a singular-factual object is never the singular-factual within it.”277 Despite the fact that 
                                                 
274 “decken sie nicht einmal partial sondern überhaupt nicht.” Walter Benjamin, “Eidos und 
Begriff,” in Gesammelte Schriften VI, ed. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991), 29. As the German title evinces: not quite eponymous. 
Which is to say that “eidos” is to be understood as “essence.” 
275 “in diesem wirklichen Zeitverlauf und an diesem wirklichen Raumort seine Stelle.” Ibid., 29. 
“einer eidetischen Zeit an einem eidetischen Ort eidetisch existerendes.” Ibid., 30. 
276 “das Singülar-tatsächlisches ist für den Begriff wesentlich.” Ibid., 30. 
277 “der Begriff ist auf seinen einen Gegenstand gegründet”; “Begriff ‘von’ diesem Gegenstande”; 
“[e]in Eidos […] von einem singülar-tatsächlichen Gegenstand ist niemals Eidos auch des 
Singülar-tatsächlichen daran.” Ibid., 31. 
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“they are never the same in their form,”278 however, concept and essence do, or at least: 
can, “correspond in each case”279: as long as “the concept doesn’t refer itself to a 
singular-factual as to its object,” they always “coincide content-wise.”280 But this 
correspondence is gained only at a price, for its basis must always be “another concept” 
which is “from the point of view of the concept: subordinating”—and can be called “the 
concept of the concept”—and “from the point of view of the essence correlatively 
assigning”—and can be called “the concept of the essence.”281 
As the outermost blood corresponds in color to the heart only when aerated, so the 
“concept” corresponds in content to the “essence” only by becoming “the concept of the 
concept.” Which is to say, the “other” concept is “the concept of the content” on which 
“concept” and “essence” agree. A singular-factual table, this-table-here-and-now, for 
instance, has an equally singular-factual time-and-space-determinated concept. Strictly 
speaking, this-table-here-and-now is bereft of “essence”—namely, insofar as it is merely 
hic et nunc. Only when the concept is no longer of this-table-here-and-now but of “a” 
table does it find a corresponding essence. But “a table”—or, the concept of “a” table—
is, when placed beside the concept of “this-table-here-and-now,” the concept of a 
concept. Once under the tutelage of a “concept of a concept,” this table can be described 
as to its color, surface, leg-count, material, and so on: which is to say, once “the singular-
factual concept” is regarded as, or transformed into, a form vis-à-vis its “singular-factual 
content”—the form becoming “the concept of the concept” and the content “the concept.” 
Simultaneously, if “there is no essence of the essence,”282 this is because the essence 
cannot be a content even of itself: solely the concept (of a concept) does it have for its 
content, and this in a relation not of form and content but of correspondence. If, instead 
                                                 
278 “sie ihrer Form noch niemals dasselbe sind.” Ibid., 31. 
279 “entsprechen sie sich in jedem Fall.” Ibid., 29. 
280 “inhaltlich zusammenfallen werden”; “sich der Begriff nicht auf ein Singülar-tatsächliches als 
seinen Gegenstand bezieht.” Ibid., 31. 
281 “ein andrer Begriff”; “vom Begriff aus gesehen: überordnen”; “der Begriff des Begriffs”; 
“vom Wesen aus gesehen corelativ zuordnen”; “der Begriff des Wesens.” Ibid., 31. 
282 “[e]in Wesen des Wesens […] gibt es nicht.” Ibid., 31. 
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of the concept of this-table-here-and-now, the concept of ability were at stake, then, 
again, the concept of ability-as-the-content-of-a-concept would allow for the description 
of the attributes of ability. And this while the concept of ability-as-the-content-of-an-
essence divulges ability’s additional attribute: of having an essence, it being this 
essence’s correlate. Thus, unlike a concept, an essence is indescribable or inconvertible. 
3.1.2 “Theses on the Problem of Identity” 
It is this point of convergence between “concept” and “essence” that serves as the subject 
of “Theses on the Problem of Identity,” namely the identity between the concept-of-
essence and concept-of-concept. Since a relation of identity “can occur only in the case” 
of a “non-identical infinity” that “is potentially identical” and therefore not “non-identical 
in actuality”—thus “beyond identity and non-identity” but in “its transmutation […] 
capable only of” identity283—this infinity must be the kind that holds between “essence” 
and “concept.” It is evident that this condition “is presupposed for the object of a 
judgment,”284 for the table itself whose essence and concept are being thought, since it 
must be identifiable: therefore, neither an actual non-identical infinity, nor an identical 
infinity, as impenetrable as is a black hole to all light, or as an essence without object. 
The identity expressed as the judgment (i.e., “subject is predicate”), however, “does not 
have the same form” as the identity-relation in “the sentence A is A.”285 Said differently, 
the subject in the judgment is not the predicate in the same way that “A” is “A.” A 
judgment doesn’t express the subject’s identity-relation because it posits the identity 
between the subject and something other than the subject: “This table has four feet.” 
Were it to try, it would “resul[t] in tautology”286: “This table is this table.” 
                                                 
283 Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Problem of Identity,” trans. Rodney Livingstone, in Selected 
Writings, Volume 1, 1913-1926, ed. Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, MA: 
The Belknap Press, 1996), 75. (Translation modified.) 
284 Ibid. 




By contrast, “A is A” expresses an identity between the essence and the concept of one 
and the same object. Strictly speaking, in doing this, this sentence also asserts that the 
content of the essence and the content of the concept are identical. In the essence of the 
table is the concept of the table, for instance, “the first […] is no more a subject than the 
second is a predicate, for otherwise something other than” the concept of the table 
“would be state-able” of the essence of the table “and the latter would be assignable to 
something other” than the concept of the table.287 Understood as subject-predicate, this 
sentence would assert that the essence of the table is itself open to a set of predicates. 
What it asserts instead is that the concept assigned to the essence of the table must be the 
same as the concept of the table and, since they stand in a 1:1 relation, this concept must 
be the concept of the table’s concept. This is reinforced by the fact that essence is concept 
“is not reversible,” the same relation holding between essence and concept herein as 
between “I” and “myself” in the expression “I myself”: the second “emphasizes the 
identity” of the first—or at least “an analogue” in the sphere of the first—being “only the 
inner shadow” of the first.288 In other words, the concept-of-concept emphasizes the 
identity of the concept-to-the-essence, the fact that the latter must be a concept-of-
concept, or the identity of its objective analogue: of the table, which would have a 
plurality of essences determined by time and space and thus be entirely non-identical to 
itself—split between essences, or: without essence altogether—if the concept-to-its-
essence would be a singular-factual concept. And the concept realizes this emphasis 
insofar as it is the inner shadow of the essence, what attests to it in any light, and not the 
shadow that it casts or the light upon it thrown hic et nunc. 
It is evident, then, that “A is A” states neither “the equality of two spatially or temporally 
distinct stages of A”—namely, that the-x-concept of table is the-y-concept of the table—
nor “the identity of an a existing in space or time”—that the-concept-of-concept of the 
table is the-concept-of-the-concept of the table—but a “beyond space and time”-A 
                                                 
287 Ibid., 76. (Translation modified.) 
288 Ibid.  
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identical with A289: that essence is concept. And the apogee of its translucence is 
encountered in the fact that in order for A and A, essence and concept, to enter into an 
identity-relation at all, the first can “[be] identical with itself […] that is to say, the 
second” as little as the second with the first […] [o]r consequently with itself.”290 At the 
same time, the first is “in and for itself something identical” as much as the second.291 
This second identity is one wherein both essence and concept have their being match 
their appearance, or their potentiality match their actuality: the essence is an ideality 
appearing only eidetically, while the concept is an abstraction that appears only 
abstractly. 
But this alone doesn’t safeguard essence from “appearing,” that is, from being “found” in 
singular instances, or being forgotten altogether and confused with the concept. It is 
therefore only in the first identity that this is achieved, for there, in essence is concept or 
“A is A,” the concept-to-the-essence is revealed to be the concept-of-the-concept-to-the-
essence, and the essence is thus fully identified with its eidetic being, understood as 
lacking any one phenomenal correlate. On the other hand, the concept passes no such 
test. It not only has various phenomenal correlates, but it also can be further 
subordinated, namely to the-concept-of-the-concept-of-the-concept: the empirical 
instance of a concept-of-concept. This disparity between the first A and the second 
accounts for the difference in “predicatability” between the essence and the concept. 
Furthermore, that “[t]he second partakes in only a formal-logical identity as the thought, 
but the first partakes in yet another metaphysical identity”292 attests precisely to the fact 
that while the concept-of-concept is identical with itself only in being (a) thought, or: the 
subject of a judgment, and is empirical when not, the essence corresponds to a thought, 
can be the subject of a tautology, and in so doing attains self-identity outside of thought. 
                                                 
289 Ibid. 
290 Ibid., 76-7. (Translation modified.) 
291 Ibid. 
292 Ibid., 77. (Translation modified.) 
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The “Theses” thus expands the argument of “Eidos und Begriff,” showing at once how 
the difference between essence, concept-of-concept, and object can be discerned in their 
distinct ways of being self-identical, albeit without clarifying how this is the case for the 
object, and the extent to which the concept-of-concept needs from the concept to be 
distanced so that their bridge not cover up the airy presence of the essence underneath. 
The exercise of these discriminations within a particular case is itself the transmutation of 
the a-identical from potentially identical to actually identical, the endpoint of the latter 
being “A is A.” If in “On Language,” Benjamin claims that “[t]ranslation traverses 
continua of transmutation, not abstract realms of equality and similarity,”293 this doesn’t 
simply mean that translation is completely independent of any concepts-of-concepts. 
Rather is the case that the identity posited by translation between, for instance, English 
sign and Romanian semn, does not come in the form the-concept-of-the-concept-of-sign 
is the concept-of-the-concept-of-semn. For this form entails both that sign and semn have 
the same space- or time-bound really-existing object, which means: are wholly 
interchangeable, and that the key to identifying the two lies in the comparison of their 
definitions, that is, the predicates proper to each. The coexistence of these two 
ramifications results in thinking that the attributes of sign-semn are predicated of the 
object itself—a process that is therefore the absolute antithesis of translation. In the latter, 
even so, the concept-of-concept is at play, namely, in distinguishing between the object, 
the essence, and the concept-of-concept of sign and of semn, in turn. It is in the tendency 
of both “sign” and “semn” towards actualizing their self-identity, of transmuting, that 
they come to be identified. While the attributes of their concepts are not matched as in 
paint-by-number, it’s the particular hanging-together of sign’s predicates and the 
equivalent of semn’s predicates that make available the passage from the first to the 
second, this hanging-together being the quintessential signal of a corresponding essence. 
Only once the identity of sign and semn is no longer understood as either an empirical or 
an abstract one can their translation happen: by the identity of their essence. 
                                                 
293 Walter Benjamin, “On Language as Such and the Language of Man,” trans. Edmund Jephcott, 
in Selected Writings, Volume 1, 1913-1926, ed. Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings 
(Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1996), 70. (Translation modified.) 
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3.1.3 “Letter to Herbert Belmore” 
Like Rasputin’s repeated murder, discrimination passes from identification, to translation, 
and, by the “end of 1916,” in Benjamin’s letter to Herbert Belmore, ends up at the hands 
of criticism. The latter is defined as “decomposing [the thing,] expos[ing] its inner 
nature,” attacking the thing “diathetically.”294 Thereby does it differentiate “the genuine 
from the nongenuine […] undertaking […] heavenly unmaskings.”295 Apart from the 
semantic similarity that “diathesis” bears to “Übersetzung,” criticism also repeats the 
latter’s work on dissolving the supremacy, that is: the mask, of the abstract concept. 
Inasmuch as the thing has a struggle brewing inside it, a diathesis, between its concept 
and its essence, its veiling is facilitated by the abstract concept’s synthesis. Criticism 
separates essence from concept and thus also the genuine—the truly proper to the thing: 
its concept and its essence—from the non-genuine—the abstract concept added to it from 
the outside. But herein does its disentangling pursuit reach its natural end, wherefrom 
language picks up the thread “displacing everything critical to the inside, displacing the 
crisis into the heart of language.”296 In the terms of “On Language,” criticism 
distinguishes between the linguistic and spiritual essence of the thing—a distinction 
covered up by abstraction’s zeal to make impartable the unimpartable and unimpartable 
impartability—allowing language to thereafter baptize it. As W.B. Yeats says in a poem 
from that same lapsarian year: “Transformed utterly:/ A terrible beauty is born.”297 
3.2 1917 
Insofar it is “the semblance of criticism, of κρινω [krino], of discriminating between good 
                                                 
294 Walter Benjamin, “To Herbert Belmore [Late 1916],” in The Correspondence of Walter 
Benjamin, 1910-1940, ed. Gershom Scholem and Theodore W. Adorno, trans. Manfred R. 
Jacobson and Evelyn M. Jacobson (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1994), 84. 
295 Ibid. 
296 Ibid. (Translation modified.) 
297 W.B. Yeats, “Easter, 1916,” in The Collected Poems, ed. by Richard J. Finneran (New York: 
Pallgrave MacMillan, 1989), 181. 
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and bad” that language “does not hold upright,”298 criticism is akin to the selfsame 
judgment that it combats. It’s only appropriate that in this year of revolution against 
lordship, of continual dispute ‘tween Mensheviks and Bolsheviks, judgment itself be that 
on which light falls, as though through a looking-glass, prompting only “[t]he genuine 
[to] remai[n]: […] [the] ash.”299 
3.2.1 “Das Urteil der Bezeichnung” 
It’s natural, then, that “Das Urteil der Bezeichnung” discriminates between two types of 
judgment: the eponym of this essay’s title, the judgment of designation, and the judgment 
of meaning, non-genuine and genuine judgment. While, in the first, “a subject can’t, 
under the presupposition of its identity, be a subject in any other judgment that stands in 
any logical nexus with the first,” in the second, “can occur only a subject that—in 
principle—can be identical to the subject of other judgments that stand in a possible 
logical nexus with it.”300 For instance, if one judgment reads “a designates the BC side of 
a triangle” while another reads “a equals 52,” then in the two “the subject is a different 
one”: “in the first judgment a means a fixed phonetic and written sign, but in the second 
it means side BC of a triangle.”301 
Russell’s paradox emerges from the fact that he “overlooks this”302: that is, from Russell 
                                                 
298 Benjamin, “To Herbert Belmore,” 84. (Translation modified.) The original reads “κριων,” 
which should be taken as a misspelling on Benjamin’s part of the etymological root of criticism, 
κρινω. 
299 Ibid. 
300 “kann [ein] Subjekt unter der Voraussetzung seiner Identität nicht Subjekt in irgend einem 
andem Urteil sein, das mit dem ersten in irgend einem logischen Zusammenhang steht”; “kann 
nur ein Subjekt, welches identisch auch Subjekt anderer Urteile die in einem möglichen logischen 
Zusammenhang mit diesem stehen, prinzipiell sein kann, vorkommen.” Walter Benjamin, “Das 
Urteil der Bezeichnung,” in Gesammelte Schriften VI, ed. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann 
Schweppenhäuser (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991), 9. 
301 “a bezeichnet die Seite BC eines Dreiecks”; “a gleich 52”; “ist das Subjekt ein anderes”; “in 
dem ersten Urteil a ein lautlich und schriftlich fixiertes Zeichen, im zweiten aber die Seite BC 
eines Dreiecks bedeutet.” Ibid. 
302 “[d]ies übersieht.” Ibid. 
131 
 
attempting to use, to maintain the same example, the sign a as the subject of a judgment 
different from that which, referring to it specifically, “expresses the copula 
‘designates.’”303 Consequently, the judgment “[‘]Impredicable is predicable or 
impredicable[’—]which underlies the Russellian paradox” and must be thought of as 
preceded by the designation judgments “[‘]Predicable designates the predicate of a 
judgment stating that a word could have its own meaning attributed to it as predicate[’]” 
and “[‘]Impredicable designates the predicate [of a judgment stating that a word] couldn’t 
have [its own meaning] attributed to it [as predicate’]”—is “false, more precisely 
senseless.”304 This either because it wants a sign (“impredicable”) to be the subject of a 
judgment other than that of designation, or owing to its having, within the form of a 
meaning-judgment, a “disparate order”305 of meaning between its terms. The last is 
merely another way of approaching the first: it refers to the fact that the “subject is a 
judgment and not a word,”306 which is what, by definition, the predicate (“predicable or 
impredicable”) requires it to be. A designation judgment alone can support such an order-
discrepancy, and never, as is herein attempted, a meaning judgment. And since such a 
discrepancy precludes the second term from being the predicate of the first, a third 
formulation of the difference between the two judgments comes into view: namely, that 
while meaning judgments have the form “S is P,” designation judgments reify their 
predicate into a second object and thereby reduce predication proper to the binary “is/is 
not.” Because of this, a designation judgment gives the impression that its produced 
object can thereafter be used as the subject, under the sign that designated it, of another 
judgment. But while this might be the case for the designation of what is already an 
                                                 
303 “die Copula »bezeichnet« ausdrückt.” Ibid. 
304 “[»]Imprädikabel ist prädikabel oder imprädikabel[«—]welches dem Russellschen Paradoxon 
zugrunde liegt”; “[»]Prädikabel bezeichnet das Prädikat eines Urteils welches aussagt, daß einem 
Wort seine eigne Bedeutung als Prädikat beigelegt werden könne[«]”; “[»]Imprädikabel 
bezeichnet das Prädikat [eines Urteils welches aussagt, daß einem Wort seine eigne Bedeutung 
als Prädikat] nicht beigelegt werden könne[«]”; “falsch, b[e]z[iehungs]w[eise] sinnlos.” Ibid., 9-
10. 
305 “disparater Ordnung.” Ibid., 10. 
306 “Subjekt ein Urteil und kein Wort ist.” Ibid. 
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object, the same is not true for the designation of a predicate, “impredicable is predicable 
or impredicable” being a clear example. 
A final consequence can be drawn from Benjamin’s commentary on Russell’s paradox: 
namely, that it leads to the confusion either of word and sign or of word and judgment. 
This is precisely how his assertion—from his supplement to this essay, “Lösungversuch 
des Russellschen Paradoxons”—that “Nothing can be predicated of a sign […] [t]he 
judgment in which a meaning is assigned to a sign is not a predicative judgment”307 must 
be understood. Which is to say that it mustn’t be taken as calling the sign “impredicable” 
in the sense of Russell’s paradox but—alongside making clear that designation doesn’t 
work with predicates—as rigorously distinguishing the sign from the word. It is only an 
instance of the latter that can be predicated as “impredicable” or “predicable,” and may 
participate in the entire realm of predication. While the sign must be assigned a meaning 
alien to it, since in itself it—like “a,” “predicable,” and “impredicable,” in their 
respective designation judgments—“mean[s] nothing but [a] phonetically and scripturally 
fixed comple[x],”308 that is, itself: a sign, a word means something other than itself. And 
just as a goes from meaning “sign-a” to meaning “the BC side of a triangle,” so a sign 
becomes a word after it has been assigned a meaning in a designation judgment. When, in 
the supplement, Benjamin claims that “Russel conflates the judgment of meaning and the 
judgment of predication”309 rather than “Russell confounds designation judgment and 
meaning judgment,” and thereby uses “meaning judgment” in a different sense than that 
of “Das Urteil,” he does so to adopt the viewpoint of the sign, where earlier it was that of 
the word. 
                                                 
307 “Einem Zeichen kann nichts prädiziert werden […] [d]as Urteil, in dem eine Bedeutung einem 
Zeichen zugeordnet wird, ist kein prädizierendes.” Walter Benjamin, “Lösungversuch des 
Russellschen Paradoxons,” in Gesammelte Schriften VI, ed. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann 
Schweppenhäuser (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991), 11. 
308 “bedeute[t] nichts als [einen] lautlich und schriftlich fixierte Komple[x].” Benjamin, “Das 
Urteil,” 10. 
309 “Russell verwechselt Bedeutungs- und Prädikatsurteil.” Benjamin, “Lösungversuch,” 11. 
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3.2.2 “Das Wort” 
The dynamic between sign and word is clarified in a fragment which itself is a sort of 
patchwork, “Das Wort.” What this text adds is the particular way in which a sign can be 
predicated, or: can partake of a judgment of meaning. The judgment “[‘]Trisyllabic 
(dreisilbig) is trisyllabic (or not-trisyllabic),[’] in contrast to ‘impredicable is predicable 
or impredicable,’ makes sense” precisely for the reason above, namely “because the sign 
trisyllabic means an attribute from the sphere of signs, the sign impredicable, however, 
means an attribute from the sphere of judgments.”310 A sign, then, can be predicated 
when what is predicated of it shares the sign’s sphere of meaning—and since the sign 
means itself, this sphere is that of signs. “Trisyllablic is trisyllabic,” however, also serves, 
in the same manner as “unapproachable is unapproachable,” to take the term opposed to 
“impredicable” in “Das Urteil,”311 for an example of “predicable” as defined in Russell’s 
paradox. Understood thus, “trisyllabic” is a word that can have its own meaning 
attributed to it as a predicate as long as it becomes “once more” a sign, and this without 
the judgment in which it acts turning into a designation. Predicable means any sign-
pertaining word attributable to itself, and hence is restricted mostly to the realm of 
adjectives. Impredicable, on the other hand, means the reverse and thus includes the vast 
majority of words—words that can’t be turned “back” into signs without falling out of 
meaning judgment, either by entering designation judgments or losing sense-ability 
altogether. 
Despite their congruity in this meaning judgment, yet another unbridgeable distance 
between the first “trisyllablic” and the second emerges in the fact that “[t]he identity of 
the subject [exists] only in the sphere of signs, in which there are no logical relations to 
                                                 
310 “[»]Dreisilbig ist dreisilbig (oder nicht-dreisilbig)[«] ist im Gegensatz zu »Imprädikabel ist 
Prädikabel od(er) Imprädikabel« sinnvoll”; “weil das Zeichen dreisilbig ein Attribut aus der 
Sphäre der Zeichen bedeutet, das Zeichen Imprädikabel dagegen ein Attribut aus der Sphäre der 
Urteile.” Walter Benjamin, “Das Wort,” in Gesammelte Schriften VI, ed. Rolf Tiedemann and 
Hermann Schweppenhäuser (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991), 20. 
311 Namely, “unnahbar.” Benjamin, “Das Urteil,” 10. 
134 
 
establish.”312 In other words, at least from the perspective of meaning, the sign 
“trisyllabic” is identical in each instance of its use, having a zero-sum effect on meaning 
no matter the kind or amount of designating judgments in which it partakes. It is thus like 
an object that has reached actual self-identity, wherein the differences between its 
essence, its abstract concept, and its concrete concept are completely nullified. Such self-
identity must therefore be conceived as belonging to a thing that means only itself and is 
graspable in any and all instances: a sign. Again, it’s by its lack of any meaning outside 
itself that nothing can be predicated of it. 
Unlike the sign, which “lack[s] intentiona[l] immediacy” and “can’t reach the signified 
itself, but only the signifier,” the word “has the intention upon the meaning,” it is “the 
designated […] the signifier […] the correlate of the signified in the sphere of the 
signifier,” and this latter “is language.”313 This means that once the sign passes through a 
designation judgment and becomes a word, the part of this word called the sign 
designates it continuously, or implicitly with its every use in a judgment of meaning. It is, 
in fact, what the sign designates—and thus that to which it attaches, irrespective of any 
previous kinship between the two, “indifferent of whether [the signifier is] familiar or 
not.”314 Moreover, the signifier as the correlate of a signified must be the “presupposition 
of each designation”315 insofar as the sign is precluded from designating another sign. 
Implicit in the latter rule is the fact that a sign is not required to remain attached to a 
signifier, to continuously designate it, it not being coeval with, and “hence” co-natural to, 
the word. One designation can always be replaced by another, new, designation, or can be 
one among many designations: so that “the” sign is subject to both time and space. By 
                                                 
312 “[die] Identität des Subjekts nur in der Sphäre der Zeichen [existiert], in welcher keine 
log[ische] Bez[iehungen] zu stiften sind.” Benjamin, “Das Wort,” 20. 
313 “mangel[t] […] intentiona[l] Unmittelbarkeit”; “kann nicht an das Bedeutete selbst, sondern 
allein heran an das Bedeutende”; “hat die Intention auf die Bedeutung”; “das Bezeichnete […] 
das Bedeutende […] das Correlat des Bedeuteten in der Sphäre des Bedeutenden”; “ist die 
Sprache.” Ibid. 
314 “gleichviel ob [das Bedeutende] bekannt [ist] oder nicht.” Ibid. 
315 “Voraussetzung jeder Bezeichnung.” Ibid. 
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contrast, the word is singular, standing in a one-to-one relationship with the signified. 
Therefore, if “[o]nly the signifier can reach the signified through intentional immediacy” 
because “to the signified there is only one unique access: by means of its essence,”316 the 
word reaches the signified “through” the latter’s essence. 
To reinsert the terms of “Eidos und Begriff” into this matrix is to understand “meaning” 
as necessarily involving two parallel and synchronized movements: one in which the 
abstract concept acts as the “exterior” correlate of the essence, and another in which the 
sign functions as the “exterior” correlate of the signified—together allowing the word to 
be the “inner” correlate of the signified. In other words, the word is transmutation: it is 
the locus of the identity-relation expressed in the sentence concept is essence. This is due 
to the fact that, unlike the sign and the abstract concept, it bespeaks the distinction 
between itself and what it means, interiorizing the crisis between linguistic essence and 
spiritual essence. The “A is A” identity-relation elaborated in “Theses on Identity” is 
therefore the presupposition of every meaning judgment. 
The Fall documented in “On Language,” on the other hand, originates in the attempt to 
express this identity-relation as a meaning judgment, giving rise to its sole possible 
permutation “A is not A,” and thereby to designation. Understood differently, the 
judgment “‘Impredicable is impredicable or predicable’”317 mirrors Adam and Eve’s 
judgment that “good is good or evil” (seeing as God had already judged his creation to be 
“good”). There is herein a double indiscretion—but really one and the same. First, 
Russell’s paradox takes either the abstract concept for the essence, or the word for the 
sign, and attempts to predicate something of them directly. Second, it reduces predication 
to the either/or of the impredicable or the predicable, so that no matter to which word 
“impredicable or predicable” is applied, this word is addressed as a sign and is thereby 
stripped of its elsewhere-directed meaning. That is, when man, instead of God, judges 
creation to be “good,” he does to it no less than what’s done to dreisilbig in the judgment 
                                                 
316 “[n]ur das Bedeutende kann in intentionaler Unmittelbarkeit an das Bedeutete heran”; “zum 
Bedeuteten gibt es kraft seines Wesens nur einen einzigen Zugang.” Ibid. 
317 “[»]Imprädikabel ist imprädikabel oder prädikabel[«].” Ibid., 19. 
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“Trisyllabic is trisyllabic.” The word doesn’t have its origin in a sign acquiring meaning. 
Instead, regardless of the copula “designates,” designation judgment simultaneously 
deprives a word of meaning, turning it into a sign, and gives the sign a meaning, turning 
it into a word. Just as every revolution comes twice or has two slopes, so there are two 
“types of” words: the one before and the one after designation. The word of the graphite, 
and the word “graphite,” made of the ink obtained from graphite. Herein can be found the 
ground for the multiplication of language, since every word is through this process open 
to construction. To subject a word to designation is therefore to bring its transmutation to 
a finish, to remove it from its relation of identity, by simultaneously making it completely 
self-identical (meaning only itself) and completely non-identical (tearing it from its own-
most meaning, re-purposing it in a different form). 
“A is A,” however, also works to make the second a, the abstract concept, formal-
logically self-identical as the thought, which means that, in the judgment of meaning 
descended from this identity-relation, word and abstract concept must be held together. 
Such coincidence falls nonetheless in favor of the word, wherein the abstract concept 
finds identity, since “this double occurrence of meaning in logic”—the fact that logos 
means both “thought” and “said”—“germinally and insinuatingly points to the speechly 
nature of knowledge.”318 Otherwise put, while some may claim self-identity for the 
abstract concept precisely when bereft of language, it is through the word instead that its 
self-identity may be available to it. Where the abstract concept means the object’s 
essence—rather than directly being the latter—there only does it serve it. If the “thought” 
and the “said” are analogues to the object’s spiritual essence and linguistic essence, 
respectively, logic makes them stand together insofar as “[l]ogic is meaning-analysis,”319 
asking of an object’s abstract concept “‘[w]hat does it mean’” or “‘why.’”320 The 
knowledge thereby gained—and thus all knowledge—proves itself essentially linguistic. 
                                                 
318 “diesem doppelten Vorkommen von Bedeutung in der Logik”; “auf die sprachliche Natur der 
Erkenntnis […] keimhaft und andeutend hingewiesen.” Benjamin, “Das Urteil,” 11. 
319 “Logik ist Bedeutungsanalyse.” Benjamin, “Das Wort,” 20-1. 
320 “[»w]as bedeutet es[«]”; “[»]warum[«].” Benjamin, “Das Urteil,” 10. 
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For what it asserts is that “only through its correlate in the sphere of the signifier” is 
“each signified (each object) […] knowable (subsists for knowledge).”321 
3.2.3 “The Ground of Intentional Immediacy” 
Instead of two, ever three for language should there be—whether concept-essence-thing, 
or sign-signifier-signified—as in Wallace Stevens’ lines of that same year: “I was of 
three minds,/ Like a tree/ In which there are three blackbirds.”322 And not only is this 
implicit in Benjamin’s selection of “triangle” as the object for the fragments “The 
Ground of Intentional Immediacy” and “The Object: Triangle”323 but also in the former’s 
distinction between three types of intention: (1) immediate and pure, (2) immediate and 
impure, and (3) mediate. Previously invoked in “On Language,” and serving as the crux 
of the “triangle”-directed fragments, “the name” is that which underlies the first of these 
intentions. Vis-à-vis the object, it is defined as “something in the [latter] (an element) that 
separates itself out from it,”324 that “is […] not signifying” but “relates itself onto the 
essence”325 of the object, and “is not accidental”326 to it. The name “is the analogue of 
the knowledge of the object in the object itself”: the “supra-essential [that] […] 
designates the connection of the object to its essence.”327 In view of the word, on the 
                                                 
321 “nur durch sein Correlat mit der Sphäre des Bedeutenden”; “jedes Bedeutete (jeder 
Gegenstand) […] erkennbar (besteht für die Erkenntnis).” Benjamin, “Das Wort,” 20. 
322 Wallace Stevens, “Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird,” in The Collected Poems (New 
York: Alfred K. Knopf, 1971), 92. 
323 To be precise, “Das Urteil” and “Das Wort” both use “triangle side” as an example. 
Additionally, beyond the point Benjamin is making, it’s also the trisyllabic that occurs in the 
latter text. 
324 Walter Benjamin, “The Ground of Intentional Immediacy,” trans. Rodney Livingstone, in 
Selected Writings, Volume 1, 1913-1926, ed. Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings 
(Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1996), 87. (Translation modified.) 
325 Ibid., 88. (Translation modified.) 
326 Ibid., 87. (Translation modified.) 
327 Walter Benjamin, “The Object: Triangle,” trans. Rodney Livingstone, in Selected Writings, 
Volume 1, 1913-1926, ed. Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, MA: The 
Belknap Press, 1996), 90. (Translation modified.) 
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other hand, the name “occurs in [it] bound to another element”328—that is, to “a sign”—
and therefore “is not within it pure.”329 Only “by means of the name [do] words have 
their intention onto the object,” only “through the name […] [do they] partake in it.”330 
Like the name, the word is an “indicator of the object of intention,” but, unlike the 
former, it is “not necessarily” so331: it “relates itself unclearly onto the essence.”332 
It is clear from the start that “mediate” applies to an entity requiring an interlocutor in its 
relation to the object of intention: and the sign, which reaches or designates neither the 
object nor “the name as something that’s within the object”333 but solely the object’s 
word, is quintessentially mediate—all the more so in that it “never relates itself 
necessarily [even] onto the designated.”334 It follows that “immediate” applies to an 
entity able to reach the object through itself alone, or through a part of itself to which it is 
bound by necessity. Thus is the word immediate to the object: on the basis of the name, 
which is common and necessary to both it and the object. “Pure,” on the other hand, is 
caught between the difference of the word and the name in their necessity vis-à-vis the 
object and the name’s occurrence as “impure” when bound, within the word, to a sign. 
The second reveals “pure” to mean simply “non-empirical” or “ideal.” The first adds to 
this the requirement that a “pure” entity be internal to the object of intention, not separate 
from and signifying it. The “impurity” of the word is evident not only in the fact that it 
can easily become mere sign in a judgment of designation, but in its very distance from 
the object, one allowing for the two to eventually fall out of synchrony so that a different 
word may be required for the object, and vice versa. The second definition is therefore in 
agreement with the first: the temporality to which the word is subject by virtue of its 
                                                 
328 Benjamin, “Intentional Immediacy,” 87. 
329 Benjamin, “The Object,” 90. (Translation modified.) 
330 Ibid. (Translation modified.) 
331 Benjamin, “Intentional Immediacy,” 87. (Translation modified.) 
332 Ibid., 88. (Translation modified.) 
333 Ibid., 87. (Translation modified.) 
334 Benjamin, “The Object,” 90. (Translation modified.) 
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sign(s)’s empiricity doesn’t leave unpunished the word’s distance from the object, a 
distance which is thereby an effective one. 
By contrast, the name occupies a special place: it has a “specific nature […] by means of 
which it can occur bound in the word.”335 Which is to say that the name is neither 
entirely ideal like the essence nor pseudo-non-empirical like the abstract concept, but is 
unique in being both entirely ideal and cable of binding to an empirical. A name can have 
one foot in each boat: and when they drift from one another much too far, at once do they 
a different partner find. While the word loses its name in designation, and with it too its 
object, the latter does so only when it passes entirely out of existence.—Finally, the 
difference between name and word, or the pure name and the impure name, can be 
understood as that between the a priori and the a posteriori: while the name within the 
word emerges from the latter’s use, the one within the object “appears” in advance of the 
object itself. This is the sense in which the pure name is supra-essential: establishing 
beforehand how the object connects to its un-appear-ability (its essence). 
Since, as under criticism’s lens, the object “decomposes itself into name and essence,”336 
the name, to use the terms of “On Language,” is its linguistic essence, or: the object’s 
impartability—reflected in the word’s impartability, language being the internalizer of 
such crisis. But while the object’s language is imparted by appearing, the word’s 
impartability is discursive, tied to man’s successive uses. In Paradise, the word was the 
name itself, unattached to any sign, immediately bestowing of the object’s language. 
Emptied out, refilled, thus “second-hand” after the Fall, the word had its co-natural 
relation to its object severed—but not without a trace. Attention to the latter combined 
with opposition to any further damage is what’s upheld by Benjamin’s theory of meaning 
and intentional immediacy. And this has its impetus in the sole means by which the 
object may still speak: the hidden name, the up-speech (ana-logos) of the object’s 
impartability. Again, as in the Stevens poem: “Icicles filled the long window/ With 
                                                 
335 Benjamin, “Intentional Immediacy,” 88. (Translation modified.) 
336 Benjamin, “The Object,” 90. (Translation modified.) 
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barbaric glass./ The shadow of the blackbird/ Crossed it, to and fro./ The mood/ Traced in 
the shadow/ An indecipherable cause.”337 
Insofar as this hidden name “appears” only in the word’s use, that is, in meaning 
judgments, it’s as true that the word requires the concept as the reverse. For instance, if 
“‘this sentence’ (as the subject of the judgment [‘This sentence belongs to mathematics’]) 
is not a concept […] [then] one would have to proceed to the assumption of a signified to 
which no concepts are assigned, a singular signified object.”338 The argument here folds 
back upon “Eidos und Begriff”: insofar as the word means the object by way of the 
latter’s essence, it can’t have a singular-factual object for its signified. A singular-factual 
object has no essence; or, the essence of an object excludes the singularity of the object. 
If the thing lacks an essence, then the word that signifies it lacks a name, and the word-
signified model of meaning consequently gives way to a sign-object model. Furthermore, 
it’s not simply that the sign thereafter designates the object. Without an essence, the 
object is solely its hic et nunc appearance; it lacks impartability altogether. The sign, 
then, “designates” the object itself, and this object must either be absolutely ephemeral or 
ubiquitous and eternal in its presence. Either way, it falls out of the criteria by which it 
could be predicated, by which it could partake in meaning judgments. It is rather the 
relations that its sign establishes through repeated use in different contexts by which the 
object “gains” an essence, which is really that of the sign itself. The object, in short, 
becomes the abstract concept of its sign. Where this sign-object model holds most 
evidently is in the names of historical events and countries, that is, artificial delimitations 
of time or space—the true objects of these types of signs. In the philosophy of language, 
it finds its exemplar in Saussure’s theory of language, wherein the word is composed of a 
sign and a concept arbitrarily related.339 This “bourgeois” model is one that springs from 
the use of “meaning and concept on the one hand, and word and linguistic sign on the 
                                                 
337 Stevens, “Thirteen Ways,” 93. 
338 Benjamin, “Intentional Immediacy,” 88. (Translation modified.) 
339 For Saussure’s definitions of sign, signifier, and signified, as well as his distinction between 
langue and parole which will come into play further on, see Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in 




That “[t]wo concepts are never identical”—so that “the concept of the equilateral triangle 
is not identical to the concept of the equiangular triangle”341—is part and parcel of the 
word’s proper use. Like concepts, no two words sit in equivalence. The use of a word 
entails its combination with another, and if two such combinations were equivalent, their 
use would, rather than advance, subtract from the name’s disclosure. At the extreme, 
were this condition to be overlooked, the thing would have a single concept, and would 
lie beyond predicatability, since what’s predicated of the already concept- or attribute-
wielding object in a meaning judgment can only be another of its potential concepts, as 
evident in “The equilateral triangle has equal angles.”342 Bearing a single concept, it 
would exist beyond space and time, the two axes of appearance, and lack any discrepancy 
between its linguistic and spiritual essence. Its single concept, or: its single word-
formation, would directly be the object and its essence. Evidently, this “mystical” model, 
which issues from an inattention to that difference holding between any concepts, is more 
or less identical to the “bourgeois.” 
While the word is the linguistic correlate of an eidetic core belonging to an object, the 
concept instantiates one of the word’s definite forms or combinations. Given that “we 
never think in concepts,” the concept is, rather than an intention, the product of a word’s 
utilization, or the very “objec[t] of [an] intention, insofar as [it is] provided with a certain 
epistemological position-index.”343 The concept makes a (meaning) judgment possible in 
that “[b]y [it] is the identification carried out, whose purpose is the object’s know-
ability”344 and consequence its predic-ability. This identification is within the concept’s 
reach because, instead of linking to the object from the outside—as does an intention—it 
                                                 
340 Benjamin, “Intentional Immediacy,” 88. (Translation modified.) 
341 Ibid. (Translation modified.) 
342 Ibid. 
343 Ibid. (Translation modified.) 
344 Ibid., 89. (Translation modified.) 
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“descends from [it] and with it is in kinship.”345 The concept is the object’s answer to 
that intention with designs upon it. “This table is the intended”346 serves as the précis of 
such a moment, namely, one where the intention takes its aim towards that object which, 
pari passu with the former, emanates the brief Fata Morgana of its concept. In view of 
“Theses on Identity,” this sentence of identification is no more than a version of the 
former “A is A,” and therefore at once claims the concept of the essence is the concept of 
the concept, and expresses the object’s triple nature while within intention’s orbit, the 
guarantee of its identity. Said differently, the object through this statement interdicts from 
predication its talis qualis self and its kin-concept simultaneously. Hence, the statement’s 
“S is not P,” namely, “made of wood.”347 And hence are concepts “sublated in 
judgment.”348 The appearing, or imparting, of the object is what meets its predication 
here instead. The concept deputizes for the object, playing the intended: at once “the 
object onto which intention self-relates” and “the object just produced through this 
relation by intention.”349 Thereby does “[t]he judgment relat[e] itself onto the object 
through the concept.”350 
Since word and intention, on the one hand, essence and object, on the other—as much as 
the concept’s accord with the word’s externality and its co-natural relation to the object—
herein threaten to become confused, an illustration is required. This table, for instance, 
has within it the condition of its manifestation, the extent to which it can appear—
whether empirically (the colours and shapes it can have, the material from which it can be 
made), speculatively (the degree to which it can be remembered or be used as an 
example), or materially (how it may react to other objects). This condition is its name. 
Evidently, the latter also governs the type of intentions that can be had towards the table: 
                                                 
345 Ibid. (Translation modified.) 
346 Ibid. (Translation modified.) 
347 Ibid. (Emphasis mine.) 
348 Ibid. (Translation modified.) 
349 Ibid. (Translation modified.) 
350 Ibid. (Translation modified.) 
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the intention to have dinner on it, or to describe it, or to repair it. This table is only 
accessible to man through his intentions, namely, those proper to it. When the table 
becomes the object of an intention, it appears to man in a determinate way. To a dinner-
intention, for instance, are pertinent the table’s sturdiness, material, position, cleanliness, 
height, and shape. Not, however, its weight, cost, way of fabrication, history, and 
brethren. These bounds allow the table to become know-able: to enter meaning 
judgments, judgments of predication. The appearance itself of the table in the dinner-
intention is one of the table’s concepts. The name therefore conditions the concepts that 
the table can have. It is the totality of the ways in which anyone and anything can relate 
to the table. This name can be found also in the table’s word—for after all it’s by the 
word that thought advances, and intentions happen in the sphere of thought. It therefore 
includes all the intentions man can have toward the table. Like the table, though, the word 
cannot appear except in an intention, in being used. A word withdrawn from all intention 
is not so much a word as the sign of that word. It’s precisely the structural likeness 
between the impartability of the word and that of the object that allows the first to mean 
the second. That the table’s word is present in the absence of its signified doesn’t mark a 
mismatch, since the table nonetheless appears—merely doing so within a non-empirical 
intention. 
Within the purview of the dinner-intention, the table is the dinner-table. This identity 
between object and concept is, however, presupposed by the intention. It therefore stands 
outside of predication. Which is to say that within the dinner-intention, the table can’t be 
thought of as the dinner-intended-table. The latter is a concept of the table different from 
the concept “dinner-table,” and appears not within the intention of using the table for 
dinner but that of reflecting on the table as the object of a dinner-intention. Thus does the 
identity between the concept and the object slip intention: only a concept of it, and 
therefore a particular intention, being attainable. And hence the concept of the table in 
“This table is the intended” is heterogeneous to that in “This table is made of wood.”—It 
follows that to signify a table bereft of any concepts of its own, and therefore of 
accessibility by intention, means to signify the table in itself, the table stripped of its 
appearance; more precisely: the table devoid of an in-itself. Simultaneously it would 
entail using a word that itself stands outside of use. In short, a sign that designates a 
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general concept. Simultaneously, to equate the dinner-table with the fabricated-table 
would rely on separating from its use the table’s word. The two yield one and the same 
result, being only two different angles from which to approach the same process. 
It is evident, therefore, that included in meaning-the-table is the presupposition that it is 
an in-itself. This latter generates the finitude of each appearance of, concept of, or 
intention towards the table, but itself comes to light only at the limit of the table’s 
predication. Said differently, the name within both word and object conditions not only 
the ways in which the table can be related-to, but the way in which it can’t as well.351 
The name therefore is not strictly the object’s linguistic essence, but the adjoining-gap 
that stands between it and the object’s spiritual essence. Once the table’s (possible) 
relations are articulated in their totality, making evident thereby its impartability, this 
latter bespeaks its unimpartability, its not. “The” concept of the table can be understood 
as its impartability. Would it include, as does the word (by virtue of the name), the table’s 
not, then its articulation would allow the table in itself to be defined exhaustively (as in a 
dictionary or encyclopedia). The identity the concept has as “the,” and no longer this or 
that concept, it gains in imitation of the word’s “incomparable one-foldness,” or 
“univocacy.”352 Only by it can it signify the object’s unimpartability, having signifying 
relations of its logical function to metaphysics.”353 This identity, granted in “A is A,” is 
not itself predicable however, or: does not occur within a meaning judgment. Were it the 
object of an intention, the intention would be one emerging from the object in itself. It is, 
in fact, the way the object’s concepts look from the purview of the object’s essence. This 
is why any endeavor to articulate it in a judgment results inevitably in tautology. Put 
differently, the concept’s identity is not intended by the word and is therefore never the 
result of equating two concepts. That “[i]n the word lies ‘truth,”354 while “in the concept 
                                                 
351 Only one way, in the latter, because while the table may have many a privation, it has only one 
negation. 
352 Benjamin, “The Object,” 91. (Translation modified.) 




lies intentio, or at most knowledge,” then, is due to the difference between the givenness 
of the first’s self-identity and the derivative-nature of the second’s own, which is another 
way of saying: the fact that the word echoes the impartability of the object while the 
second merely points to it as that which it is not. 
Thus, the concept that necessitates the word is not the same as that necessitated by the 
word. There are three types of concepts at play in these triangular fragments: the concrete 
concept, hailing as though from the object’s kin, the abstract concept, to the object 
external but engaged, and the general concept, separated from the word as if by six 
degrees. It’s no coincidence that they accord to begreifen’s three possible meanings: (1) 
to regard as, (2) to fully comprehend, and (3) to subjectively fathom, understand. 
3.2.4 “Notizen zur Wahrnehmungsfrage” 
While hidden in these fragments, the distinction between the abstract and the concrete 
becomes much more explicit in “Notizen zur Wahrnehmungsfrage,” which also adds to 
them yet one more type of concept. This fragment’s starting-point is the sign, an 
“appearanc[e] on a surface,” which “could be understood” as a “configuration in the 
absolute [surface].”355 Although in principle, the sign could have any signified, in its 
“occurrence only one, in accordance with the context in which it occurs, out of the 
infinite number of possible signifieds, is necessarily assigned.”356 Once occurred, the 
sign is bound by “the criterion” of “the univocacy of the respective what-is-to-be-
assigned” and a “meaning, which this univocacy has as presupposition.”357 The sign 
“transmute[s] into a signifier.”358 Of note is that the sign’s occurrence can be taken for 
                                                 
355 “Erscheinun[g] auf einer Fläche”; “könn[te] […] aufgefaßt werden”; “Configuratio[n] in der 
absoluten [Fläche].” Walter Benjamin, “Notizen zur Wahrnehmungsfrage,” in Gesammelte 
Schriften VI, ed. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1991), 32. 
356 “Vorkommen nur ein nach Maßgabe des Zusammenhanges in welchem sie vorkommt aus den 
unendlich viel möglichen Bedeuteten notwendig zuzuordnen ist.” Ibid. 
357 “das Kriterium”; “die Eindeutigkeit des jeweilig Zuzuordnenden”; “Bedeutung, welche diese 
Eindeutigkeit zur Voraussetzung hat.” Ibid., 33. 
358 “in ein Bedeutendes […] verwandel[t].” Ibid. 
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the word’s use as little as the “context” or the “nexus” of the former for the intention 
wielded by the latter. The in-itself-bereft-of-meaning sign—a priori infinite in scope—
occurs as word, wherein it’s tied to one particular object, which it means. It transmutes 
from the a-identical to the actually identical. Which means that the occurrence of the sign 
is but a designation, and its nexus is the word to which it latches. Consequently, the word 
in its incomparable univocacy acts the basis not just for that identity held by the abstract 
concept, but so too for the one borne by the sign. 
Once become configuration, what follows for the signifier is its interpretation. This is 
done, namely, by “assign[ing] the meaning of its mean-ability”359 to it. Put differently, 
“[t]o interpret something means to assign to it as a signifier the mean-ability it has as 
signifier.”360 Its very interpretation is that which is assigned, “the schema” of its 
meaning, “the canon of the possibility which makes the signifier able to signify 
something.”361 While, to be precise, the sign’s occurrence does involve a word’s use in a 
particular intention after all, its name belongs not to this totally determinate level, but to a 
more general realm wherein the word is coupled with a single object. The signifier’s 
mean-ability, then, refers to the totality of intentions by which it could mean the object: it 
is, namely, its impartability. Finally, the schema, or: meaning, of this impartability is the 
object’s abstract concept. 
If, to the signified, the meaning is diaphanous—in that it sets out to reveal the object and 
the signified is in it but the concrete concept offered by the object in response, making 
the meaning shine blatant as a blush through the signified—the “interpretation isn’t 
transparent to that which is interpreted.”362 The interpretation “relates itself onto the 
                                                 
359 “die Bedeutung ihrer Bedeutbarkeit zuordnen[d].” Ibid. 
360 “[e]twas deuten heißt demselben als einem Bedeutenden die Bedeutbarkeit als Bedeutendes 
zuordnen.” Ibid. 
361 “das Schema”; “der Kanon der Möglichkeit der macht daß ein Bedeutendes etwas bedeuten 
kann.” Ibid. 
362 “Deutung ist dem was gedeutet wird nicht transparent.” Ibid. 
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interpreted (Gedeutete), which is pre-posed,”363 shielding it from immediate visibility. In 
other words, the abstract concept, the impartability of the signifier—or: of the object 
whose signifier is interpreted—is covered over by the signifier itself—or: the object’s 
pre-posed concrete concepts—which is what appears. On the other hand, “the meaning 
relates itself onto the meant (Bedeutete) which is not pre-posed,”364 or: the intention on 
the object doesn’t obscure the object’s concrete concept. The two terms of the object, 
intention and concrete concept, don’t differ in their determination, but are in singular 
accord, and stand outside the possibility of opposition. By contrast, interpretation’s two 
sides—whether abstract/concrete concept, or imparting/impartability—are entirely 
distinct by nature, and the noeticity of one always prevails over the empiricity of the 
other. The italicization of prefixes Be- and Ge- means to emphasize the fact that while 
meaning is inflicted upon the object, turning it into a signified, and making their 
agreement inevitable, interpretation merely goes to making the object cohere as the 
interpreted, without precluding the object itself. Evidently, the object of the first is its 
own product, while the object of the second is a given. 
The interpretation of the word, which “is called its key,”365 is therefore the object’s 
abstract concept. The object, however, finds yet another, even “higher” concept, in its 
perception (Wahrnehmung), or: true-taking (Wahr-nehmen). More clearly put, the 
interpretation’s elaboration of the totality of concrete concepts or intentions attributable 
to the object is also an elaboration of the latter’s position in the midst of other objects, of 
the relations it has to everything else. Hence the dinner-table specifies the table’s set of 
relations to dinner, while the table-food its relation, supplemented by a shorter or longer 
chain of predicates, to objects of ingestion. It is the table’s privations, in which the table-
food shares, that, far from being understood as its non-relations, most clearly evince its 
possibility of relating to everything. Nonetheless, insofar as this interpretation, in tracing 
the table’s every relation, always has the table as its starting-point, it is not yet 
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perception. The latter is “not configuration in the absolute surface but the configured 
absolute surface”366 and to it “an [amount] of infinitely many possible interpretations can 
be ascribed.”367 Consequently, if, in an interpretation, the table is as if the entry point 
common to an infinity of different mazes, in perception, no such entry point exists—so 
that the table can be but a single point through which the line, for instance, starting from 
“dinner” and arriving at “dishes” passes. 
“[I]n regard to anything that’s yet to be determined ‘in each and every instance’” then, 
it’s only natural that “the interpretation-possibilities of perception are […] one-fold or 
one-way.”368 For, the lack of such determinacy makes necessary that the table always be 
the starting-point. Insofar as “each and every instance” does “not pertain to the 
occurrence,”369 it’s clear that at stake in perception is not the sign’s possible occurrences 
but the word’s possible intentions, or: relations. The movement of determining the latter 
is the basis of the sign’s univocacy, of the transmutation that the a-identical endures. 
Once the signifier is fulfilled in its determinacy, or identity, however, its monosemy 
dissolves in its relations. “Therefrom follows that with [perception] one can no longer 
speak of ‘occurrence’ in the foregoing sense […] nor of meaning,”370 the word hereat 
able no more of reverting to its sign. 
In other words, perception sees—and is—“a” nexus, not an instance or a unit, and is 
ungraspable therefore as something actualized: as the absolute surface configured, it can’t 
serve as entry-point to any maze, nor is itself a maze, but the totality of all possible 
mazes—univocacy, inasmuch as it relies on one maze as on one meaning, falling outside 
its grasp. Because it can transmute into a signifier as little as its infinite (non-)identity can 
                                                 
366 “nicht Configuration in der absoluten Fläche sondern die configurierte absolute Fläche.” Ibid., 
32. 
367 “eine [Anzahl] von unendlich vielen möglichen Deutungen zuzusprechen.” Ibid., 33. 
368 “[M]it Hinblick auf irgend ein noch zu bestimmendes ‘jeweils und jedesmal’”; “[d]ie 
Deutungsmöglichkeiten der Wahrnehmung sind […] einfach.” Ibid. 
369 “jedesmaligen”; “nicht das Vorkommen betrifft not pertain to the occurrence.” Ibid. 
370 “Daraus folgt daß bei [der Wahrnehmung] von ‘Vorkommen’ im obigen Sinne nicht mehr 
gesprochen werden kann […] auch nicht mehr von Bedeutung.” Ibid., 32-3. 
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tend towards identity, the key of its submission to identification “is not applicable”371 (as 
a rule may be). Perception has a “pure key,” a key inseparable from it and to no 
appearance fettered, which “the perceived is.”372 If an impure key is evident in that the 
signifier isn’t interpreted by its signified, and vice versa, but by perception, then the pure 
is visible in that the perceived interprets its perception, and vice versa. More clearly put, 
unlike the signifier, perception can’t be an object of interpretation, pre-posed in regard to 
it, but is rather like that meaning which shines through its signified. Nonetheless, while 
meaning is not without a signifier, perception has no similar dependence. In short, to 
meaning and the signified correspond a signifier, but no perceiver to perception and the 
perceived. This is the same as saying that neither perception, nor its interpretation, 
occurs—hence the latter’s lack of applicability. As occurrence, the signifier has an 
outside by definition, from which it is interpreted. But this outside is not that of the sign’s 
other possible occurrences—and therefore of its other possible objects—but rather that 
common to both itself and its signified, made up of their possible instances (within this 
occurrence). Perception, on the other hand, along with the perceived, has no outside of 
other instances, so that it interprets itself: as the perceived. This latter is an impartability 
assigned to the signifier, the coherence of all its possible instances, and thus itself beyond 
instantaneity—one made not from the many impartabilities of the signifier, but from the 
many interpretations of perception. 
Therefore is perception the concept of the-concept-of-the-concept. Whence its auto-
hermeneutic logic of tertium datur, in league with the ambiguity particular to “of,” 
which—as evident when said of a self-portrait’s status vis-à-vis its painter—means both 
“by” and “of” him. It’s through it that interpretation has had its object vacillate between 
the object’s concrete concepts and the word’s possible intentions, or: that the intended 
and the intention have been interchangeable. In truth, the impartability proper to the 
object is its abstract concept, while interpretation is proper, rather, to the word. 
Perception is the culprit of their identification, wherethrough they imitate its status as 
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both act and object. When not turned toward perception, interpretation is impure: it relies 
on the appearances of a sign(ifier) and thus differs from the abstract concept, which, in 
turn, abstracts from the appearances of an object. Once the interpretation is complete and 
directs itself toward perception, it loses the “of a” or “of the,” and eliminates the gap 
between itself and its objective counterpart. The unity of abstract concept and 
interpretation can be called the object’s true concept. Or—since “[p]erception relates 
itself onto symbols,”373 as Benjamin asserts in the associated fragment “Perception is 
Reading”—a symbol or symbolic concept. 
Essential to perception, then, is “[p]ragmatism”: wherein it’s “the useful (the good) [that] 
is true,”374 the exemplarily consumed, and not the eternal-theoretical-metaphysical. 
“Insensateness,” which “is a […] perception” is not impractical but merely names a 
practice “alien to the community,”375 a lack of common sense. “Earlier” on, the 
“handling of insensateness”376—in both its presentation and its treatment—involved 
understanding the latter as a relation to symbols. It’s precisely on the margins of sense, 
where sense disintegrates—and with it imparting and intention—that the symbolic 
concept emerges. This is all to say that perception is by no means knowledge: knowledge 
has imparting and impartability as its object, while perception is this very object, or lies 
in the crack between impartability and unimpartability. It is no wonder, then, that “the 
crowd [is unable] to distinguish between knowledge and perception,”377 seeing as it is the 
community of sense. In other words, knowledge imparts common sense, and its totality 
makes up the content of impartability, while perception transmutes this totality into unity 
and therein points beyond the merely sensical. The crowd, therefore, as a false unity in its 
emergence has precisely this transmutation—which manifests the difference between 
                                                 
373 Walter Benjamin, “Perception is Reading,” trans. Rodney Livingstone, in Selected Writings, 
Volume 1, 1913-1926, ed. Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, MA: The 
Belknap Press, 1996), 92. (Translation modified.) 
374 Ibid. 
375 Ibid. 
376 Ibid. (Translation modified.) 
377 Ibid. (Translation modified.) 
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knowledge and perception—as a blind spot. Ironically, it’s common sense that, by nature 
of its generality, belongs to theory rather than to practice. 
3.2.5 “On Perception” 
But the distinction that holds between knowledge and perception can only be concretized 
through the investigation of a third term—experience—taken up by Benjamin in “On 
Perception.” The fact that this essay-fragment begins with a first section, “I. Experience 
and Knowledge,” suggests other unwritten but imaginary sections which, in combination 
with the title, could have been titled “II. Experience and Perception,” and “III. 
Knowledge and Perception,” making the two paragraphs that begin with “Philosophy is 
absolute experience”378 and the note which reads “To be in the being of knowledge is to 
know”379 their respective sketches. Were knowledge, perception, and experience to be 
taken as analogues of the “three configurations in the absolute surface: sign, perception, 
symbol” then just as “the first and third must appear in the form of the second”380 so 
knowledge and experience can appear only “on” the form of perception. And insofar as 
the “Notizen” fragment addresses “the relation of perception to the sign,”381 it can be 
seen as analogous to “the third section of ‘On Perception.’”382 This is all to say that if 
experience is the third term that serves as a key to the distinction between knowledge and 
perception, then it must be understood from the get go as the very transmutation that 
occurs between the totality of the first and the unity of the second. 
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379 Ibid. 
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It is this very understanding of experience that “On Perception” seeks to re-establish after 
its loss during the Enlightenment. Kant’s metaphysics of nature posited the possibility of 
having knowledge be “the system of nature,” allowing for “the a priori constitution of 
natural objects on the basis of the determinations of the knowledge of nature in 
general.”383 But in order for this to come about, the validity of the categories 
fundamental to knowledge had to be confirmed—namely, through “their relation to 
spatio-temporally determinate nexuses.”384 Consequently, “[t]his meaning of 
metaphysics could easily lead to its complete coincidence with the concept of 
experience,” a coincidence that would annul the “certainty of the knowledge of 
nature.”385 Kant therefore had to “relate all knowledge of nature, as well as all 
metaphysics of nature, to space and time as the ordering concepts in nature” while 
“making these determinations toto coelo different from the categories.”386 This then 
“created the need for an aposterior fundus of the possibility of experience,” one which 
was posited by Kant as “the matter of sensations,” and was “artificially distanced from 
the animating center of the categorical nexus through the forms of intuition by which it 
was only imperfectly absorbed.”387 Thus came about “the separation of metaphysics and 
experience” or “of pure knowledge and experience.”388 
To put this differently, Kant wanted to arrive at the signify-ability of words from without 
their configuration in the absolute surface (their parole), namely by unfolding it from the 
categories that make knowledge possible (of their langue): to posit for the word “table” 
the rules of its possible occurrences as the rules and principles of grammar and logic. The 
problem was that the validity of these rules themselves couldn’t merely be presupposed 
but needed unfolding in time and space—that is, they needed examples to support them. 
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Where the knowledge of the signify-ability proper to “table” and the categories 
determining this knowledge occur in time and space, however, there they become 
configurations in the absolute surface: they become parole. And this means, in part, not 
only that every knowledge gained is as momentary, fleeting, and unreliable as an 
appearance, but that the rules and principles of grammar are no more valuable than 
myths. A distinction had to be made, therefore, between the actual use of words and their 
theorization, and Kant could only do this by bracketing space and time from the 
empirical. Kant, that is, made space and time a priori—so that theorization could happen 
safe from the threat of empiricity—while simultaneously differentiating them from the 
categories: unlike the latter, they couldn’t be exemplified and thereby predicated of 
anything, including of the categories themselves, nor needed any validation. The surface 
was, in this sense, always-already configured and words were always-already known in 
their signify-ability. Nevertheless, what had to be accounted for was the realm of parole, 
the fact of these words actually signifying a specific thing. Kant therefore introduced the 
“matter of sensation,” or the sign—the material correlate of the word—which 
“express[es] the separation between the forms of intuition and the categories,”389 as well 
as between the word and its signify-ability. The sign as such was set apart from 
interpretation, and imperfectly placed on the side of space and time: it was denied 
signify-ability but without thereby becoming mere appearance. It had, that is, a density of 
its own which was unrelated to the surface; it was, in part, a thing-in-itself. Thus emerged 
the complete separation between philosophical language (langue) and everyday language 
(parole). 
This could also be cast in more “objective” terms as follows. Kant’s interest in arriving at 
an object’s concept from the intention-less use of the object’s word required that the 
possibility of seeing the word itself as an object, of directing an intention toward a word, 
be precluded—lest the object’s and the word’s concepts get confused. He did this by 
asserting the a priority of objects’ concepts vis-à-vis intentionality while simultaneously 
preserving their distance from words’ concepts. To the problem generated therein, of how 
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objects are nevertheless open to intentions, or what the difference between an object and 
its concept is based on, Kant responded with the “matter of sensation,” the quiddity or 
hypokeimenon of the object: entirely foreign to words’ concepts and partly heterogeneous 
to objects’ concepts in their haeccity. This quiddity or hypokeimonon is the first instance 
of the thing-in-itself. Thereby does Kant disrupt “even if not the nexus, at least the 
continuity, of”390 the object-realm and the language-realm. 
Kant’s fear, in short, was of “an exaggerated use of reason, […] the dissolution of an 
understanding that no longer related itself onto any intuition” due to the “unrestricted 
application of the categories.”391 A scenario evident both in the confusion of objects’ and 
words’ concepts and in the erosion of knowledge in time and over space, resulting in 
idealism and empiricism, dogmatism and skepticism, or the mystical and the bourgeois 
theories of language, respectively—evidently, two sides of the same circle. What his fear 
excludes is the possibility of avoiding dogmatism and skepticism “by other means”392: 
through, for instance, “speculative idealism […] a speculative—that is, one that 
deductively grasps the in-concept (Inbegriff) of knowledge—metaphysics,”393 a 
“speculative thinking […] by which the whole of knowledge is deduced from its 
principles.”394 This option, which would “establish the closest possible continuity and 
unity” between knowledge and experience, and which, resembles less idealism and 
empiricism, than rationalism, is dismissed by Kant because his “concept of experience 
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[…] has nothing like the same plenitude as that of earlier thinkers,” it being a “concept of 
scientific experience” separate “in part […] from the center of the knowledge-nexus” and 
“as far as possible from the vulgar concept of experience.”395 In short, “philosophy […] 
could have no interest in the salvation of [such] experience for the in-concept of 
knowledge.”396 
To be precise, the scientific experience in question is that typified by the objects of 
mathematics and physics—triangles and stars, respectively—and characterized by its 
difference from both reason and sensibility, thought and common sense. All three have 
their own separate apriority, the third’s being that of “the other, apparent forms of 
intuition”397: in other words, man-made conventions, myths, or pre-existing schemata. 
Insofar as it is removed from vulgar experience, the experience related to knowledge is 
an empty, lifeless one. Kant calls experience the signifier instead of the signified, 
stripping all interpretative value from the latter. It’s no wonder, then, that this experience 
is “not followed by any cometary tail,”398 seeing that, in their separation, both scientific 
experience and vulgar experience lack essence, the first by definition, the second due to 
willful ignorance. But this is also to say that the project of a speculative idealism, the 
deduction of the in-concept of knowledge, is inseparable from the Platonic “saving of 
phenomena,” which in turn relies on these phenomena having an essence. And it’s here 
that the fragments on perception and those on the triangle lock together, the possibility of 
interpreting perception being open only to an interpretation that makes the signifier’s 
signify-ability point—or, being identical to it, itself points—to the essence of the 
signified as the perceived. Inbegriff, in other words, may be a cipher for Wahrnehmung, 
passing through the Latin con-cipiō and per-cipiō.399 To obtain it would therefore mean 
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398 Nichita Stănescu, “Elegia întâia,” in Necuvintele (Bucharest: Jurnalul Național, 2009), 101. 
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to turn interpretation on itself, to find the interpret-ability of interpretation: to perceive—
something made possible by “the abolition of the strict distinction between the forms of 
intuition and the categories”400 inasmuch as the categories of thought are thereby 
themselves disposed to being interpreted. 
Since, as Benjamin suggests, in the present era “the immediate and natural concept of 
experience[:] […] the concept of ‘experience’” stands conflated with “the concept of 
experience in the knowledge-nexus[:] […] ‘knowledge of experience,’”401 the distinction 
between these two—that is, between the signified and the signifier—must be the first 
order of business. This confusion is evident in that, just as the Bedeutete is merely the 
past participle version of the present participle Bedeutende, so “for the concept of 
knowledge, experience is nothing new and extraneous, but only itself in a different 
form.”402 The fact that “experience as the object of knowledge is the unitary and 
continuous plurality of knowledge”403 means that what the signifier signifies is, rather 
than an object “out there,” its own signify-ability, its configuration—its set of relations 
and combinations—on the surface. Consequently, “experience itself does not occur in the 
knowledge of experience, precisely because,” like the signifier vis-à-vis its signify-
ability, “the latter is knowledge of experience and therefore a knowledge-nexus.”404 
What marks experience’s “stand[ing] in a completely different order than that of 
knowledge itself” is its functioning as a “symbol of this knowledge-nexus,” of “the unity 
of knowledge.”405 This is evident in that “the landscape itself” that a painter copies “does 
not occur in his image” but “could at best be designated as the symbol of its artistic 
nexus,”406 or: the signified doesn’t occur in its signifier but is the symbol of the latter’s 
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signify-ability. Set against understanding things as “made in the image of man,” the 
signified in that of the signifier, this example’s self-reflexivity seems to place what is 
originally the signified in the position of the signifier’s interpretation, and, consequently, 
what is originally the interpretation in the position of the interpretation of interpretation: 
so that things may nonetheless “reflect (themselves in) man.” If the signified is thus 
“endow[ed] with a greater dignity than the image,”407 this is due to its ability of leading 
to perception. 
The distinction to be drawn, therefore, is between a conception in which the signified is 
taken for the signify-ability that the signifier signifies, and one where the signified is the 
symbol of this same signify-ability. It, along with the subordinate distinction it contains, 
was erased by the Enlightenment’s elimination of experience’s “proximity to God.” As a 
result, “the logical deducibility of the world,” the “interest in the necessity of the world,” 
foundered, and was replaced by “the consideration of its arbitrariness, its non-
deducibility.”408 But that “the world” signifies less “experience” than the Inbegriff of 
knowledge: interpretation’s interpret-ability. It wasn’t “experience,” then, as much as 
“interpret-ability” whose necessity and deducibility was replaced by arbitrariness and 
non-deducibility, especially since “even the most divine experience was never nor will 
ever be deducible.”409 Hence the skepticism of the empiricists. But it was nonetheless 
experience itself to which these attributes were attached, confused as it was with the 
knowledge of experience, leading Kant to renounce even the deducibility of “the 
experience in knowledge.”410 In other words, he rejected the interpretation of signify-
ability, evident both in his assumption of signify-ability as always-already given and in 
his differentiation between objective concepts and linguistic concepts. 
Kant’s failure vis-à-vis language becomes the very theme of Benjamin’s final 
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differentiation between “knowledge of experience” and “experience.” The “language-
use” in which is set the problem of how “the concept of ‘experience’ in the term 
‘knowledge of experience’ is related to the mere concept ‘experience’”—this use of 
language is “not a false one.”411 In fact, it implies that what’s at stake is precisely the 
difference between a linguistic concept, always set in a combination or within a phrase, 
and an objective concept, functioning as a proper name. The fact that “the experience we 
experience in experience is identical with the one we know in the knowledge of 
experience”412 means that no absolute distance, of the kind posited by Kant, subsists 
between the objective and the linguistic concept. On the other hand, the “difference of 
behavior toward it” whereby “it is experienced in experience but deduced in 
knowledge”413 marks experience and knowledge as two different types of intention 
toward experience: ones that don’t occupy the same plane. Put differently, just as in the 
theory, first exhibited in “Eidos und Begriff,” of (non-)identity—where essence is 
concept inasmuch as the concept of essence is the concept of the concept, but the essence 
has a metaphysical identity while the concept has only a logical one—experience and 
knowledge agree on the level of content, but differ on the level of form: there can be an 
experience of experience, properly speaking, as little as an essence of essence, while a 
second-order knowledge of a first-order knowledge is as probable as the concept of a 
concept. To confuse the two, in short, would mean confusing designation with 
predication—which entails that experience, or the signified, is a necessary presupposition 
of knowledge, or signify-ability. This while to disrupt their continuity would mean to 
make an incision within knowledge itself, designating one half as “knowledge” and the 
other as “experience,” and thus renounce both experience, or the signified, and the 
deduction of knowledge, or interpretation, altogether. That is, it would result in the 
abandonment of perception. 
Experience (excipiō) is therefore not simply the passage out of knowledge-signify-ability 
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(concipiō) and into perception-interpret-ability (percipiō),414 differentiated, respectively, 
by dependence on and independence from an object. This would hold true only of “the” 
section titled “Knowledge and Perception.” In other words, experience, knowledge, and 
perception stand together in such a way that the term excluded from the bipartite relation 
considered always operates as the passage between the two terms included. “Experience 
and Knowledge” has perception for the passage from experience to knowledge, while the 
transmuting term belonging to the separate section presumably entitled “Experience and 
Perception” is knowledge. But that this section speaks from yet a higher plane than those 
roamed thus far: “knowledge” and “perception” are herein sacralized—in the manner of 
the “absolute” placed before “experience”—as “philosophy” and “language.” Therefore, 
“[p]hilosophy is absolute experience deduced in the systematic-symbolic nexus as 
language” which means that “[a]bsolute experience is, in the view of philosophy, 
language.”415 This would entail that, for the term in passing, the borders on either side of 
“and” are identical—or, more exactly, that it is their identity. As applied to “Experience 
and Knowledge,” perception is consequently the content on which experience and 
knowledge coincide: both the signified and the signifier have within them the object’s 
name, the first in its pure form, the second impurely bound to a sign. 
“Experience and Perception,” on the other hand, by means of the term “absolute 
experience”—that is, “the experience we experience in experience,” experience itself—
begins precisely from this essence. Meanwhile, as its partner, absolute experience has the 
name, “language understood, however, as systematic-symbolic concept.”416 If, in the 
section previous, the “knowledge-nexus” and the hypothetical “knowledge concept” were 
to be understood as the “nexus-of-knowledges” and the “understanding-intuition 
                                                 
414 Erfahrung is understood here as excipiō (in the context of concipiō and percipiō) due to the 
tradition of translating the German er- prefix with the Latinate ex- prefix: hence the more often 
encountered “experience.” Meaning, “to except,” “to take out,” and “to rescue,” excipiō, 
communicates at once the pedagogic connotation of erfahren—wherein I learn my lesson just as I 
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concept,” respectively, then it follows that the “systematic-symbolic” be understood as 
the nexus between pure concepts and pure experiences, whose concept is rational-
intuitive, or: nominative-essential. To rephrase the words of “Über Wahrnehmung in 
sich,” (a fragment contemporaneous to both the one at hand and to “Notizen”), namely, 
that “[s]urface that is the configuration—absolute nexus”417: the absolute surface (read: 
experience) is in an absolute nexus with the absolute surface configured (read: 
perception). It’s only natural, then, that the form of the systematic-symbolic nexus, of the 
con-cept that grasps together name and essence, is characterized by configuration: 
absolute experience “specifies itself into types of language, […] immediate 
appearances418 of absolute experience,” amongst which “one […] is perception.”419 Just 
as knowledge saw experience merely as “itself in a different form,” its uniform and 
continuous plurality, so perception is, from the viewpoint of experience, no more than the 
latter’s articulation. Put differently, perception is the name that at once acts as the 
linguistic essence to a spiritual essence and embodies their relation: between experience 
itself and experience as an object of knowledge; intelligible as the analog signified (the 
name) by its corresponding signifier. 
Herein, as did perception in a different complex, knowledge comes to serve precisely as 
the content-identity of the other two terms. But that, due to perception’s self-reflexivity, 
name and essence have a double identity of content, firstly in the object that decomposes 
into them, and second in the name itself. Thus it seems that, as in Kant, the signified 
comes to be confused with signify-ability, except that herein the strict difference between 
signify-ability and interpret-ability is no longer in effect. Thus pure knowledge allows for 
interpret-ability’s signification at once with leaving room upon itself wherein the essence 
and the signified can meet. In short, it turns to “name,” and pushes the distinction 
between knowledge and perception to retire, a condition from which it escapes only in 
                                                 
417 “Fläche die Configuration ist—absoluter Zusammenhang.” Walter Benjamin, “Über die 
Wahrnehmung in sich,” in Gesammelte Schriften VI, ed. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann 
Schweppenhäuser (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991), 32. 
418 At the root of both configuration and specification, figurō and speciēs, stands “appearance.” 
419 Benjamin, “On Perception,” 96. (Translation modified.) 
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the formulations that “[d]octrines of perception […] belong in the ‘philosophical 
sciences’” and “[p]hilosophy […] is doctrine.”420 Said differently, pure knowledge is the 
pure key of perception: the perceived. 
The final phrase, appropriately called “Notes,”421 is the sketch of the third “Knowledge 
and Perception” section. If the issue was that of how false totality turns into unity, how 
common sense gives way to insensateness, the resolution presents itself as follows: 
“Being in the being of knowledge means knowing.”422 Common sense, that is, points to 
the insensate only when pragmatic, only once seen neither as a final product of an 
external operation nor as an empty sign now given and immediately passed on. As in a 
game of telephone, only when the circle doubles on itself does the insensate make its 
entrance. A generality that seeks its “being”—the copula by which it came to be—in 
order to identify with it, as knowledge does in (knowledge of) experience is (knowledge 
of) knowledge, is one involved in knowing precisely where it turns into perception. In 
short, perception is herein proclaimed the form of knowledge, and experience the path to 
it from content. 
3.2.6 “On the Program of the Coming Philosophy” 
On the eve of the second Russian Revolution came inscribed the similarly insurgent—but 
also, like Prokofiev’s contemporaneous trendsetting First Symphony, rigidly 
anachronistic—“On the Program of the Coming Philosophy.” It begins precisely with the 
issue of turning common sense, “the deepest premonitions of (the) time and the 
presentiments of a great future,” into knowledge “by relating them to the Kantian 
system.”423 This time and this great future are the transience of profane history and the 
coming of the Messiah, while their respective premonitions and presentiments constitute 
                                                 
420 Ibid. (Translation modified.) 
421 Because earlier undertaken in the “Notizen.” 
422 Ibid. (Translation modified.) 
423 Walter Benjamin, “On the Program of the Coming Philosophy,” in Selected Writings, Volume 
1, 1913-1926, ed. Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap 
Press, 1996), 101. (Translation modified.) 
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the current knowledge of experience or Zeitgeist424—one, dismissed by “virtue” of its 
arbitrariness and non-deducibility, in need of being recognized as knowledge. The future 
philosophy must therefore be “truly time- and eternity-conscious”425: aware of both the 
transience proper to experience and this transience’s eternity, that form, imprinted in 
Kant’s system, which is “impart[ed] in a certain way [by] every experience”426 It follows 
that “the scope and depth of knowledge” should take a back seat to “its justification.”427 
To do the opposite would be to take these foresights immediately as knowledge (as 
empiricism does), and open up the gates to “empty flights of fancy”428 (à la Berkeley). 
Justification is instead the weighing of the knowledge of experience against the principles 
of knowledge, so that, the more sizably this knowledge of experience is granted entrance 
to the realm of knowledge proper, the closer will it be to the fundus (eternity): “the 
knowledge of which we can give the purest account will also be the deepest.”429 And 
being that the fundus’ content is ephemerality, this knowledge of experience would 
herein become recognized in its inherent passing or its transmutation. Inasmuch as the 
images of the future as well those of the present are thus to be acknowledged as 
ephemeral, transience and eternity are to be liberated from their mythical, reductive 
concepts. The same is, by consequence, true for the philosophy to come itself: “t]he more 
unforeseeable and daring,” the more inaccessible to premonitions and presentiments, to 
becoming the object of knowledge (of experience), that the “unfolding of the future 
philosophy,” its own transience, “shows itself” to be, the “deeper,” more fundamental, 
that it will have to “struggle for certainty,” the more inaccessible to knowledge will its 
eternity be, “whose criterion is systematic unity or truth.”430 
                                                 
424 More precisely: “the world-image [which] change[s].” Benjamin, “On Perception,” 95. 
(Translation modified.) 
425 Benjamin, “Coming Philosophy,” 100. 
426 Ibid., 101. (Translation modified.) 
427 Ibid., 100. 
428 Benjamin, “On Perception,” 94. 
429 Benjamin, “Coming Philosophy,” 100. (Translation modified.) 
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Where the Kantian system seems to oppose rather than advance this philosophy, 
however, is in its concept of experience. For, what’s required for the justification that 
would guarantee at once the inaccessibility of transience and that of eternity is that the 
prime matter of investigation be “a temporal experience.”431 Instead, Kant split 
experience into one whose transience he took as given, putting this experience beneath 
investigation, and an experience, “identical with the object realm” of “mathematical 
physics,” that he deemed eternal and in no way “singular temporal.”432 Therefore, in both 
cases, what he wielded was, whether in its irrelevance or its certainty, “the representation 
of [a] naked, primitive, self-evident experience”: in short, less an experience and more a 
“worldview,”433 an image of experience. Like a word stripped of the name within it, or an 
object of its essence, it was thereby “reduced to a zero-point, to a minimum of meaning,” 
of “content” or “authority […] to [which] one would have to submit uncritically”—its 
only, “we may say: mournful,”434 meaning being its very lack thereof, the possibility of 
attaining the certainty of its lack. In other words, something is nonetheless salvageable 
from Kant’s “low” concept of experience: the “astonishingly small and specifically 
metaphysical weight” it has in lacking meaning can serve as the temporal experience to 
be investigated, weighed against the principles of knowledge, and—in the realization that 
“Kantian thinking” was “religious[ly] and historical[ly] blin[d],”435 or: indifferent to 
eternity and transience as such—indicate at once the eternity of the relation between 
transience and eternity, and the transience of their engagement in a certain way. 
Furthermore, their relation, as that between experience and knowledge, the very 
investigation to be broached, is to be comprehended in “perception.”436 
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This third member of eternity is precisely “the supreme principle […] of knowledge”437 
that thereafter served as the opening wherein Kant could doubt the “self-evidence” of this 
experience and consequently engage in “the consideration of its arbitrariness” and “non-
deducibility,”438 whose “certainty and justification”—by adding members to eternity 
(principles, categories, ideas)—“extracted and developed a depth […] adequate for a new 
and higher type of experience to come.”439 And yet, instead of opening the possibility 
whereby experiences that are not prefigured can “come,” this depth is stagnant by itself, 
the wall that by schematization it has build allowing no experience to enter other than the 
“low.” Put differently, once the justification of this experience is complete and it 
becomes once more self-evident, that investigation which can point beyond the images of 
transience and eternity is no longer in effect, which, in turn, renders the members of 
eternity (categories, ideas) know-able and ultimately common-sensical. Since, minus the 
continuous “struggle” for certainty, depth disappears, it needs the supplement provided 
by typology, wherein the ideas are themselves investigated and assigned a purified 
knowledge: a “typical.” In this way, they shed their frozen images as members of eternity 
and cast them into transience, taking on once more the own-most inaccessibility of the 
eternal. Which means at once that the ideas acquire their own transmutation and that the 
transient experience “beneath dignity” and philosophical consideration acquires a 
determination: a passport to its subsequent investigation. In turn, these new experiences, 
lacking a subsuming knowledge and unschematized, make necessary yet new categories 
and, in consequence, experiences. The “typical of Kant’s thinking” is therefore what’s to 
be kept, “pointed out and clearly raised up”440—a claim true for all criticism inasmuch as 
only so can the eternal, the idea, in the text reveal itself and thereafter contaminate the 
                                                 
437 Benjamin, “On Perception,” 94. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant claims, namely, that 
“[t]he conditions of the possibility of experience in general are at the same time conditions of the 
possibility of the objects of experience.” Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, ed. Paul 
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1998), 293. 
438 Benjamin, “On Perception,” Ibid. 95. (Translation modified.) 
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world in such a way as to allow for new experience. 
On the other hand, as evident in the very self-reflexivity of such a process, only those 
concepts that are themselves self-reflexive—entailing also that they take the verb-form—
can vis-à-vis ideas serve as types441: hence perception’s status as a “type of language.” 
Within the theory of concepts, the type is the symbolic concept, the concept of the 
concept of the concept, a symbol. It’s precisely through the typical, then, that “the 
epistemological foundation of a higher concept of experience”442 can occur, a concept, 
that is, of experience as temporal. If its lower-concept, or: -type, can best be called 
“representation” then, following the first title of “On the Program,” its higher-concept has 
“perception” as its proper name. Furthermore, insofar as they are symbols of ideas—the 
correlates of that which lies beyond the know-able—types unlock the door of 
metaphysics: they are the pre-words, the “prolegomena[,] of a future metaphysics,” and 
their procurement coincides with the “imagin[ation]” of this very “future metaphysics, 
this higher experience.”443 Manifest in the resemblance of Metaphysik and Erfahrung 
with Verwandlung—all three meaning, loosely, völlig, or: absolute (metá-, er-, ver-), 
change (phúō, fahren, wandeln), or: phúsis444—is the transmutation found in the identity-
relation, and with it also the identities its two terms hold: the metaphysical identity of 
essence and the logical identity belonging to the (pre-)word. Which means that the 
concurrence of idea and the types, wherein each finds its singular identity, has for a basis 
nature’s absolution, the removal of the last eternal pillars from its realm.445 In that this 
                                                 
441 Wahrnehmung, Erkenntnis, Erfahrung, Darstellung, Vorstellung, and so on. 
442 Ibid. (Translation modified.) 
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Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1996), 281. 
444 And, moreover, in the fulfillment of its muteness (mūtus) heard in “transmute” (trans-mūtō). 
445 In “Imagination,” the eponymous concept, understood as “[p]ure reception,” is seen to “always 
[be] directed at two features: at the ideas and at self-unsetting nature.” Ibid. Furthermore, the 
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ever-changing nature is the sought-after higher experience, its absolution coincides with, 
on the one hand, an exacting contemplation—possible due to the typical—of the realm 
hitherto homogeneously transient and, on the other, with a final relegation of that eternity 
which was conceived as proper to the geometric-mathematic realm. That an imagining of 
future metaphysics and higher experience is possible at once with the attainment of the 
types is inherent to the latter’s symbolizing function: a type, in fact, is a conjecture, a 
con-iaciō, a co-throw, a sún-bállō, of experience and metaphysics, that—as in the 
technique of conjectural emendation—aims precisely at the reconstruction of an altered, 
soiled, and cryptic fragment in the name of its inherent meaning. 
It follows, then, that symbol is to type as name to schema. The former lies between the 
unimpartable and signify-ability, the absolute surface as such and this very same surface 
configured, while the latter between signified and signifier, a knowledge of experience 
and the categories. Name goes also by “impartability,” “signify-ability,” “perception.” 
Symbol by “the impartability of an impartability,” “interpret-ability,” and “the 
perceived.” In other words, the symbol is the name’s interpretation, the doubling of its 
signify-ability, which, were it a sphere, would have a zero-value radius: and as such 
would act as the immediate appearance of unimpartability. If a name is but a sign that’s 
common to some apathetic mass, and schema a mere frozen image torn from its inherent 
dynamism, then, respectively, its signified and its exuberance, can only through the 
symbol be restored. 
And yet, the ease of taking name for symbol or vice versa and the paucity of grounds 
whereon to hand over a type to an idea, bespeak, as symptoms, the incoherence proper to 
Kant’s knowledge-concept. Hence should “the revision […] begin not from th[e] side [of 
experience and metaphysics] but from the side of the knowledge-concept” and aim at 
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“the establishment of a new knowledge-concept.”446 Put differently, integral to the latter 
is a “witherward[ness]” allied to “representation”447 through their common atemporal 
present-ness, one whereby the wholly new is excluded a priori. This presence is the 
summa of those “primitive elements” or “sickness-germ[s]”—contained within “Kant’s 
knowledge-theory”—of “an infertile metaphysics which excludes all others,” leaving 
inaccessible at once “the realm of metaphysics” and, at least to knowledge, that “of 
experience in its entire freedom and depth.”448 Accordingly, Kant’s knowledge-concept 
from the first takes as given a typology whose types obstruct all further typification, 
evident in that his doctrine is bereft of the “radicalism and […] consequence”449 which, 
by folding knowledge back upon itself, would yield yet other types. Present-ness, or 
opposition, is the icon of a knowing that occurs atop two lined up pillars, as inexorable as 
mountains, or: ideas. As such, it brings with it an image of eternity presumed to be the 
latter’s equal in its foreignness to transience. The typical at stake in Kantian knowledge is 
therefore no longer a proper typical, since being so implies existing only as an action. 
And a knowledge-theory can’t have an invariable knowledge of ideas at its core without 
itself being a metaphysics. Consequently, it is precisely through these pseudo-types’, 
these eternal images’, “annihilation” that knowledge-theory comes to be “shown a 
deeper, metaphysically fulfilled experience”450: the wealth of un-representable transience 
“below” (and eternity “above”). 
On the other hand, a “historical germ” or element can subsist within a knowledge-theory, 
gathered as it is from transience’s most proper realm instead of taken as a given (and thus 
being a principle rather than a pseudo-type). Such a germ is that “deepest relation” twixt, 
said generally, the concept of experience and that of knowledge, and, specifically, “that 
experience, the deeper exploration of which could never lead to metaphysical truths, and 
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the knowledge-theory, which was not yet able to sufficiently determine the logical place 
of metaphysical research”451—or: between vulgar-mathematical experience “without 
qualities” and present-idolizing knowledge without “a room of its own.” Which is to say 
that while (α) wavering on whether the ideas should be found in the analytic-constitutive-
schematic logic or the dialectic-regulative-typical logic leads to confusing schema and 
type, name and symbol, categories and ideas, each time in favor of the former, thus 
making the entirety of knowledge oppositional and rendering its purity impossible, (β) 
being unable to attain from an experience the glimpse of an idea due to the former’s total 
lack of temporality results in the conflation of perception and representation, thing-in-
itself and noumenon, essence and signified, tending always toward the latter, and thereby 
turning entirely predic(t)able all of experience, reducing its significance to naught.452 The 
equivalence between these two operations is evident not only in their linguistic but also in 
their structural homology453: type points to essence through ideas to attain perception, 
and schema aims at signified through categories to obtain representation. 
It’s only natural, then, that “the most important of th[e] [metaphysical] elements” in 
question are “subject and object,” or: the comprehension of “knowledge as a relation 
between”454 the two. This precisely is why, rather than name and symbol standing 
independent of each other in knowledge-theory’s wavering, or the name becoming 
subsumed to the symbol, the inverse of the latter comes to be the case. In other words, the 
subject-object structure leads to the production of an opposition between knowledge and 
experience wherein experience is always only to be understood as the object of 
knowledge, and the latter is never to be thought except as having an experience for its 
object. Consequently, both self-reflexivity (“freedom”) and transience (“depth”)—the 
latter already implicit in the former’s activeness—are precluded, rendering typification 
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along the lines of schematization, and therefore the idea the type’s object. By contrast, a 
“subordination” of name to symbol would entail also their proper autonomy since they 
would imply each other in their individual folding-in-upon-themselves, that is, 
typification: an idea’s self-reflection would allow for an experience not pre-sent-able 
(because transient), while an experience’s self-reflection would allow for the discovery of 
an idea equally un-pre-sent-able (because eternal). Knowledge would, instead of standing 
posed against experience, be another name for it, would be its passage into truth, of its 
name into a symbol. Therefore: the interpretation of interpretation is signification. 
Furthermore, herein the historical germ of kinship between knowledge and experience is 
involved inasmuch as pure knowledge brings with it pure experience, where “pure” 
means first and foremost “autopoietic.” 
If the conception of “knowledge as a relation between subject and object” is “closely 
connected” to the second important metaphysical element, “the relation of knowledge and 
experience to human empirical consciousness,” this is inasmuch as the latter “has objects 
opposing it.”455 To be clear, in empirical consciousness, knowledge plays the subject and 
experience the object, while in the first metaphysical element, knowledge is the very 
relation twixt the two—just as name is at once the linguistic essence to a spiritual essence 
and the way the two stand toward each other. Hence is experience-as-object only ever the 
relation between knowledge and experience called “knowledge of experience.” What 
therefore becomes clear is that Kant’s knowledge-concept thinks the self-reflexivity of 
knowledge as no more than the continual subordination of knowledges to one another, 
expressible in a knowledge-hierarchy. Co-natural to this is that Kant’s knowledge only 
ever knows itself not in the sense of folding back upon itself, but, rather, of projecting a 
part of itself “outside” itself and “thereafter” taking this expelled part as its object. As a 
consequence, things are herein “in our image.” 
Certainly, in a way, Kant and the neo-Kantians “overc[a]me the object-nature of the 
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thing-in-itself as the cause of sensations,”456 the empiricist conception wherein the 
essence of the object can itself be thought of as an object inasmuch as it functions as the 
cause of concrete concepts. This was a two-tiered conception of knowledge: on the lower 
level sovereignty belonged to the object, which gave concrete concepts (simple ideas) to 
sensibility without the provocation of any intention, while on the higher level sovereignty 
belonged to the subject, who aimed his intention upon the object’s abstract concept 
(complex idea) and through it upon the object’s essence, predicable as the cause of 
concrete concepts and in analogy to the abstract concept. Such a conception evidently 
bore the risk of thinking “the essence of essence.” The (Neo-)Kantian overcoming of this 
view entailed opening the first-tier to intentionality, so that the subject participates in the 
appearance of the concrete concept and the object’s essence thus loses its causal quality 
along with its object-nature. The second-tier now aims toward the object’s abstract 
concept, which, with the disappearance of the essence’s “objectuality,” is conceived 
under the form of “relationality.” Accordingly, knowledge is still tied to an object, the 
primary interest merely turning from substance to function. It follows that the “subject-
nature of the knowing consciousness” has yet “to be eliminated,” since it is “formed in 
analogy to the empirical consciousness,”457 subjected to this sphingian abstract concept 
as the latter consciousness to that sirenic concrete concept. The (Neo-)Kantian 
understanding of the abstract concept as an object is precisely an effect of including 
knowledge-of-experience, “that surface experience of these centuries,” into knowledge-
theory not as a concept but, rather, as an unchangeable “metaphysical rudiment”458: of 
taking it as the meaning of a signifier’s complete configuration on one of many surfaces 
instead of on the absolute surface. Thus is a particular relationality flattened into an 
object. 
But the problem lies equally with “the representation” of the first-tier within Kant’s 
knowledge-concept, since it’s of “an individual psychosomatic I which receives 
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sensations by means of its senses and forms its representations on their basis.”459 In other 
words, it represents the concrete concept—formed with the participation of 
intentionality—not as emerging from the object’s reaction to an intention, but from the 
subject’s reaction to a sensation: the concrete concept is therefore an intention that, like 
the abstract concept vis-à-vis the concrete concept, articulates a lower-order concept (the 
sensuous concept) which is merely given. It’s only right that this knowledge-theory has 
the quality of sickness, since, just as “sick people […] relate the sensations of their bodies 
not to themselves but rather to other essences,”460 so a subject’s sensuous concepts 
emerge neither from him (as do intentions) nor even with him (as do concrete concepts), 
but to him, as the work of a entirely obscure essence. This means, further, that these 
sensuous concepts exist in generality, are part and parcel of a commonality of sense. So 
that such a representation—that is as given in non-intentionality “in the manner of” 
essences, as, in fact, sensuous concepts—of the contents proper to knowledge 
simultaneously turns the latter into a “commonly human”461 common sense and, in the 
very present-ness of this representation, renders common-sensical the knowledge-
concept, turning it into “a mythology.”462 Put differently, common sense becomes 
common both as a sense and as a concept. And the knowledge-concept—namely, 
wherein knowledge is necessarily knowledge-of-empiria—gains the same degree of 
givenness that’s held by sensuous concepts. Furthermore, as the midpoint twixt the lower-
tier of knowledge and knowledge as a whole, knowing consciousness with its abstract 
concepts in turn falls prey to being mere mythology. For empirical consciousness no less 
than theomorphoses sensuous concepts, and concocts concrete concepts as their myths, 
which pass thereafter through the abstract concepts of the knowing consciousness, the 
elements of their mythology. Evidently, in this Kantian context, the concept of 
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experience, the totality of concrete concepts, “is metaphysics or mythology.”463 Or: this 
“experience” is a symptom of metaphysics’ illegitimate presence in the realm of 
knowledge, of the concept being bedecked to appear eternal, of subtracting concrete 
concepts from the realm of temporality—and doing so twice over: as bastard essences 
(namely, sensuous concepts), ever complete in their presence, and as adulterated abstract 
concepts (that is, produced concrete concepts), dwelling in the realm of unchanging 
dúnamis wherein they are as bereft of content as drawings are of color—and inserting 
them into a finite and closed set. 
In sum, Kantian “knowledge” is one mythology among various other “knowledge-
mytholog[ies].”464 Given the preclusion of both the state wherein it lies outside any 
intentionality, and that other wherein it is inseparably entwined with an intention, the 
concrete concept comes to function as the object of an abstract concept. Herein, 
experience, “experience as it is grasped with reference to the individual psychosomatic 
human and his consciousness,”465 plays the role of concrete concept while knowledge 
that of abstract concept. Alongside these, knowledge itself, the “real knowledge,” 
functions as a general concept (or: the abstract concept) and “classifies empirical 
consciousness systematically into types of […] insensate consciousness”—one such type 
being “knowing empirical consciousness”—that have for correlates “just as many types 
of experience” which is “in all its types the mere object of this real knowledge.”466 In 
conceptual-terms, the general concept specifies itself into abstract concepts, each of 
which is correlated to a concrete concept, itself one specification among many of the 
homogeneous sensuous concept called “experience”: the object of the abstract concept. 
The disturbance of common sense known as insensateness is thus present in abstract and 
in concrete concepts equally, in that they are deviations from the two pure instances 
belonging to this sense, namely, the (“eternal”) general concept and the (“transient”) 
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sensuous concept. It follows that the types of experience, or concrete concepts, would—
“in regard to their relation to the empirical consciousness,” or: the abstract concept, at 
least “so far as truth,” or systematic unity with this concept, “is concerned”—“have the 
value of imagination or hallucination,”467 of (natural) dissolution or (mental) digression. 
In other words, the relation between concrete concepts and abstract concepts is wholly 
external. So that even the correspondence twixt them is based not on exclusive pairing, 
but on proportionality of quanta. And the same therefore holds for the relation between 
concrete concepts themselves: namely, that they have little systematic unity, given that 
they lack an individual essence around which to run centrifugally and consequently a 
particular abstract concept toward which to spin centripetally. 
But more is at stake in understanding “types of empirical consciousness” as “types of 
insensateness.”468 For insensateness is the ally of “the objects of […] perception” with 
which “the insensate […] identify themselves in part” such that the former are to the 
latter “no longer objecta, standing opposite them.”469 That is, the abstract concept is, in 
insensateness, partly identified with concrete objects. This rough doctrine of perception 
must be recognized as Kantianism’s most effective step towards a higher concept of 
experience. For the fact of this confusion manifests itself in each relation between 
empirical consciousness and type of experience precisely in the attempt at rendering the 
concrete concept into the object of the abstract concept. Whence results the formula 
proper to the symbol, namely, the concept of the concept of the concept, one wherein the 
object-subject gap dissolves—and with it the initial assay—because it reads both (the 
concept of) the concept of the concept and the concept of the concept (of the concept). 
Nonetheless, the limit of this step is manifested in its very method. Being premised on the 
will to pose the concrete concept contra its abstract compatriot, an act of “will” due to 
their mutual subjective origin, it precludes by consequence the possibility that there be 
“an objective relation between the empirical consciousness and the objective concept of 
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experience.”470 Put differently, the one-way street implicit to the subject-object structure 
allows the abstract concept to give unity to concrete concepts, but never the reverse, the 
latter therefore being mere disintegrations vis-à-vis the former’s systematic unity. Which 
means that abstract concepts’ unity is herein presupposed, there being “only gradual 
distinctions,” namely, “of value,” between them, whose “criterion cannot be the rightness 
of knowledges”471 because these concepts lack all specificity in regards to concrete 
concepts. As such, barred is the “relation” of an act of knowing to an abstract concept as 
to its object—that is, the concept of the abstract concept—a relation which would 
simultaneously tolerate that punches be returned, thereby forcing the connection twixt the 
abstract and concrete into inexorability, and furnish “the true criterion of the value-
distinction among the types of consciousness,”472 or abstract concepts, that is, of their 
systematic unity, turning its static “eternal” givenness as presupposed into a continuous 
unfolding. 
The rectification of Kant’s knowledge-theory would start therefore from the imperative 
of grasping “[e]xperience […] as systematic specification of knowledge.”473 This means, 
on the one hand, understanding the sensuous concept to be just another type belonging to 
the general concept, thus turning abstract concepts into one another’s objects and 
stripping common sense of its foundation, while, on the other, apprehending a particular 
concrete concept as one type of the many suited to an abstract concept. The latter case 
entails that knowledge-of-experience be recognized foremost as knowledge and, on that 
account, be forced into releasing experience per se from its tight grip. The ambiguity 
inherent to inherited “experience,” or to the concrete concept, is echoed by the dictum 
that’s at hand: experience should be conceived as a type of knowledge, while experience 
itself as the very process of knowledge-specification, the effective interpreting of 
interpretation. In words belonging to the “Language” fragments, the call is for the thing’s 
                                                 
470 Ibid., 104. (Translation modified.) 
471 Ibid. (Translation modified.) 
472 Ibid. (Translation modified.) 
473 Ibid., 103. (Translation modified.) 
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self-imparting to once more surface by way of the unfolding of that name-sign nexus, that 
is, the word. In those of the “Perception” fragments, the goal is for signified to manifest 
itself in the configuration of perception with interpretation, to wit, the perceived. For this 
imparting and this signified can, respectively, be heard and seen alone in such 
articulations. In view of this, by no means is the hypothesis that “genuine experience”474 
bears “idea” as its name an idiotic one.475 
This higher experience, “pure” of any prefiguration or image, rests precisely “upon the 
pure knowledge-theoretical (transcendental) consciousness”—which is not merely 
distinct but “different in type from any empirical consciousness”476—generated in this 
rectification. In short, empirical consciousness is to the abstract concept, or interpretation, 
what pure consciousness is to the symbolic concept, or typification. Despite this stricter 
form of difference, the connection between “the psychological concept of consciousness” 
and “the concept of the sphere of pure knowledge”477 is analogous to that between the 
former and “the objective concept of experience.” More succinctly, the abstract is to the 
symbolic as concrete to the abstract.478 This relation can be specified as one wherein the 
higher term serves as the content of the lower, as argued in “Eidos und Begriff.” The 
latter’s tripartite relationality—between concrete concept, abstract concept, and 
essence—maintains that the abstract emerges from the coincidence-in-content of the 
concrete and the essence, and comes to supra-ordinate the first and be the second’s 
correlate. The same is true of the symbolic concept, which, acting as the content of both 
abstract concept and idea, encompasses the former and points towards the latter. This 
formula could also be said as “the higher is the concept of the lower,” thus making 
synonymous, on the one hand, concept and content, and, on the other, essence and form 
                                                 
474 Ibid. 104. 
475 Idiotic from ídios: “private (as opposed to public), pertaining to self, one’s own”; “separate, 
distinct”; “peculiar, specific, appropriate.” 
476 Ibid. (Translation modified.) 
477 Ibid. (Translation modified.) 




(that is, eidos).479 
Better yet, pure knowledge is the realm extending between the symbolic and the abstract 
concepts, while psychological knowledge is that spanned between the abstract and the 
concrete concepts. Their relation is evidently that between a higher and a lower form of 
knowledge. But, unlike in the two-tiered knowledge held by Kantianism, here the lower 
cannot function as the object of the higher. Instead, pure knowledge is merely the name 
for empirical knowledge turning back upon itself: it is the unified and continuous “state” 
of psychology never given as a particular knowledge of the latter. Put differently, if 
psychology takes the form of knowledge as a given, and ignores its borders in attending 
to its contents, pure knowledge is—not the examination of this form as if it were the 
content of a yet higher form, but—the consideration of its contents in relation to its 
borders—the “deduction” of the margins, finish, and permeability of the surface from 
what lies upon it. It is due to its distinction between first and second intention that “the 
age of Scholasticism”—and, insofar as it “restitute[s]” the latter by making this 
distinction the “logical place for [its] problems”:480 phenomenology—can delineate the 
relation between these two types of knowledge. For, empirical consciousness is first-
intention, specifically its formal part, which is unable to relate itself to its objective part 
as it does to its real object. This while pure consciousness is formal second-intention, 
having neither formal first-intention, nor the real object itself, but the objective first-
intention as its proper object. Evidently, in a theory that confuses “knowing 
                                                 
479 More obvious in Latin philosophical terminology, where con-teneõ is not far from con-cipiō, 
the semantic difference between “hold” and “seize” being minimal (seizing being hearable in 
obtain and detain), the proximity of Begriff and Inhalt in German requires more steps. Begriff, in 
that it has a kindred verbal form as begreifen with which it shares the prefix be- and the form 
begriffen (past-participle of verb, dative plural of noun), suggests that it’s once a transitivization 
of the intransitive meaning of greifen, namely, “to take hold” or “to coagulate” (figuratively), and 
noun-formation from the past-tense of this verb. Begriff would thus mean “the consolidated,” 
which, unsurprisingly, is close in meaning to “concrete” (from concrēscō). On the other hand, 
Inhalt derives from halten (“to stop, to hold, to halt”), which finds similarity with the Latin sistō 
(“stand firm, halt”). Insistō could then easily be a rough Latin equivalent of Inhalt. Either way, it 
now becomes clear that the solidity of Begriff and the subsistence of Inhalt echo one another in 
their consistency. 
480 Benjamin, “Coming Philosophy,” 104. (Translation modified.) 
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consciousness” with “empirical consciousness,” the object of the first and the object of 
the second also become confused. Considering that, in Scholasticism, the linguistic and 
intentional realms coincided—so that the objective first-intention is a word—this 
conflation entails also one between the word (“experience”) and experience itself. 
Consequently, the Enlightenment, as much as Kantianism, sat in ignorance of language. 
Since: words were to be themselves received in their empiricity, that is, as signs, and 
assigned an image, while things were to be passed over in silence. And any “higher” 
consciousness was merely the assigning of another image to this “image-sign,” thereby 
the addition of another “meaning” to its repertoire or its concatenation in a chain of 
image-signs. 
That this truly higher knowledge is a prolegomena means that words (legomena), not 
objects, are what it turns towards, and that it directs itself before (pro), not through, them. 
So is empirical present-ness exchanged for a present-ness wherein no-thing is present. 
And this “fore-words,” as preface to a metaphysics, must, with each fulfillment, make 
more and more of its terrain discernable. In pure knowledge, then, experience, inasmuch 
as “systematic specification of knowledge,” is the objective second-intention: the 
“product” of pure knowledge, the appearing of the surface made possible through its 
circumscription, and with it perforce the appearing of its contents in coherence. Thus, the 
latter coherence is “the structure of” that appearing called “experience,” and “lies within” 
the set of limits posited by circumscription, that is, within “the structure of knowledge,” a 
coherence that’s “to be unfolded from” this set:481 in pure knowledge’s development. 
And thus too, the product of this transformation, the unity of contents obtained by 
relegere from the limits of the surface, is itself “contain[ed]” in “experience […] as the 
true”—or, the systematically unified—kind: “religion.”482 The latter, then, is “based on 
pure knowledge,”483 the process of unfolding by which knowledge is itself articulated, as 
on its material cause. It follows that, if “philosophy is based” on the experience-matrix’s 
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inherence to its knowledge equivalent, and experience contains, as its true variant, 
religion, then “philosophy can and must think” the “in-concept” of pure knowledge “as 
God.”484 Put differently, religious experience is the effective completeness of the surface, 
the terminus of the unfolding carried out by pure knowledge, while the in-concept—
percept, “incept”—“God” is no less than the, now ascertainable, surface per se. The first 
symbolizes the second, and in so doing, lays transience bare in its purest form: as the 
span extending from some end to some beginning. 
Inasmuch as pure knowledge is at once bereft of any object and manifest only through the 
self-reflection of the empirical consciousness, it can be understood precisely as 
knowledge’s “autonomous, very own sphere,” having “total neutrality with reference to 
the concepts object and subject.”485 Like an intransitive verb, this sphere cannot be 
crossed or fixed from without by any “two metaphysical entities”486; it is itself in 
continuous transition. In other words, the abstract concept, in its “-ability,” is by 
necessity in transit toward itself, and this transit, visible only “as if” from its completion, 
is the eidetic concept, whose “own” “-abilities” are the ideas, foremost among them time.  
It’s precisely this “new concept of knowledge,” gained “from the purification of 
knowledge-theory,”487 that brings with it a corresponding new concept of experience 
wherein experience is at once that of this pure knowledge’s unfolding and of its own 
emergence—is, in other words, “in accordance with the relation Kant found between the 
two”: that “the conditions of knowledge are those of experience.”488 In this way, 
                                                 
484 Ibid. (Translation modified.) The equivalence herein is that between the umfaßend (especially 
since wahre vis-à-vis its container) and the Inbegriff, especially considering the meaning of 
latter’s adjectival form, inbegriffen, as “included” or “implied” (and, in this sense, Inbegriff also 
lies close to Inhalt, “subject-matter”). It could equally be said that religion is the perception 
(Wahrnehmung) of experience and God that of pure knowledge. The word-play is compounded 
by the further similarity of the re-legō (re-collect) and um-faßen (re- or around-grasp). 
485 Ibid. (Translation modified.) 
486 Ibid. 
487 Ibid. (Translation modified.) 
488 Ibid. (Translation modified.) 
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experience turns from being the object of empirical consciousness, “related to the 
empirical consciousness,” to being the specification of pure knowledge, “relat[ed] […] 
exclusively to the transcendental consciousness.”489 Evidently, such a new concept of 
experience makes room, in turn, for religious experience, or metaphysics, which can “link 
all of experience,” without exception, “to the concept of God,” that is, pure knowledge, 
“through ideas,” or: the unfolding of this knowledge, “immediately.”490 Put differently, 
religious experience, or “the experience of God,” is this very “exclusive” link of 
experience to pure consciousness. Chrono-logically speaking, time is void of content: the 
temporalized does not precede temporalisis, but follows it. In this precise sense does pure 
knowledge have words as its exemplary “objects.” The experience of God is language, 
whose doctrine is philosophy. 
A first step toward this higher experience is the Neo-Kantian “remov[al]” of “the 
distinction between the intuition and the understanding” and therefore the dissolution of 
that myth of an “experience in the usual sense,”491 namely, of common sense empirical 
consciousness held together solely by the a priori forms of intuition. That said, since 
common sense was what in Kant supplied experience with continuity, Neo-Kantianism’s 
“restructuring of the concept of knowledge” brought about “the disintegration and 
parting-up of experience into the individual realms of the sciences”—that is, insofar as 
“its presentation as the system of the sciences”492 was never, despite the assays of this 
movement, made reality. Consequently, “a pure systematic continuum of experience,” to 
replace that given by the forms of intuition, must “be found in metaphysics,”493 or in 
language: vulgar experience must be replaced by religious experience—common sense 
                                                 
489 Ibid., 104-5. (Translation modified.) 
490 Ibid., 105. (Translation modified.) 
491 Ibid. (Translation modified.) 
492 Ibid. (Translation modified.) 
493 Ibid. (Translation modified.) 
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by God.494  
Nevertheless, religious experience and sui generis experience are not identical, for this 
would leave experience just as empty as it was during the Enlightenment. It would be 
exclusively of the irrational, mystical genus. “Higher experience,” then, includes, at once, 
experience and true experience. If pure consciousness, or “dialectics,” is the “passing 
between the doctrine of experience [qua experience] and that of freedom,” the dialogue 
they hold, then true experience is precisely this dialogue’s restructuring, its analogy, its 
raising-up-to-speech: the “sublat[ion]” of “the distinction between the realms of nature 
and freedom.”495 In the terms of “On Language,” the passage between the language of 
things and God’s word is the language of man, where the latter is both pure knowledge 
and religious experience. Nonetheless, this should in no way “end up in a confounding of 
freedom and experience,”496 in a conflation of the word divine with things’ language. 
The same applying to mistaking God for His experience: that is, for language or 
metaphysics. What this “restructuring” entails is, furthermore, a “new transcendental 
logic” or knowledge-theory: a new science of pure knowledge wherein are analyzed pure 
concepts—acts of pure thinking—which relate to objects a priori.497 So that thereby the 
                                                 
494 Or at least “God’s word.” As in the last sentence of “On Language”: “All higher language is 
the translation of lower ones, until in ultimate clarity the word of God unfolds, which is the unity 
of this language-movement.” Benjamin, “On Language,” 74. (Translation modified.) 
495 Benjamin, “Coming Philosophy,” 106. (Translation modified.) Herein the play found earlier 
between umfaßen and relegō is extended to encompassing Umbildung, their twin, and stands 
separate from that between Dialektik and Übergang. The latter turns on the translation of the 
Ancient Greek diá- as the German über- and the Latin inter-, so that opposed to relegō is 
intellegō, to religion the intellect. Complementing this is the further possible translation of re- 
into the Ancient Greek aná-, so that diá-légō finds its partner in aná-légō. 
496 Ibid. 
497 “In the expectation, therefore, that there can perhaps be concepts that may be related to objects 
a priori, not as pure sensible intuitions but rather merely as acts of pure thinking, that are thus 
concepts but of neither empirical nor aesthetic origin, we provisionally formulate the idea of a 
science of pure understanding and of the pure cognition of reason, by means of which we think 
objects completely a priori. Such a science, which would determine the origin, the domain, and 
the objective validity of such cognitions, would have to be called transcendental logic.” Kant, 
Critique of Pure Reason, 196. 
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noumenal, or the ineffable “category of causality through freedom,”498 previously found 
within the understanding, within human language, as its limit—as the world of things that 
forms thought’s outermost horizon, the moral law before all ethics—acquires its new 
home in God’s word. Ecce “the crystal-pure elimination of the unsayable in language.”499 
Therefore, despite the “restructuring” of their relations, these three ideas, the three parts 
of Kant’s system, are “to be maintained” in their “trichotomy,” which is “one of the great 
headpieces of [its] typology” having “its decisive foundation […] in the trinity of the 
relational categories.”500 These categories, unlike in “[t]he formalist […] post-Kantian 
systems,” must be understood as the only three terms proper to the dialectic: “the thesis 
as categorical relation, the antithesis as hypothetical relation, and the synthesis as 
disjunctive relation.”501 The first of these relations, lying on the axis substance-accident, 
can be grasped grammatically as the use of passive voice and logically as a material 
conditional, so that it comprehends both the form of cogito ergo sum and the receptivity 
inherent to its subject: if something appears, then it appears to me. On the other hand, to 
the hypothetical, dichotomized as cause-effect, most suitable are an active voice and the 
logical biconditional. Its realm is that of spontaneity, where subject and agent coincide, 
and predication, where the second term subsumes the first. It finds expression in cogito 
“ergo sum”: I am solely while I think (something that appears to me). Finally, the 
relation of disjunction, marked by reciprocity, has the middle voice and the inclusive 
disjunction in its corner. Here, the subject and the object have reached commonality, and 
even “or” fails to divide them: cogito-sum. Evidently, the disjunctive is a synthesis of the 
categorical and the hypothetical as the final cause is that of the material and formal cause, 
                                                 
498 Benjamin, “Coming Philosophy,” 106. 
499 Walter Benjamin, “To Martin Buber (Munich, July 1916),” in The Correspondence of Walter 
Benjamin, 1910-1940, ed. Gershom Scholem and Theodore W. Adorno, trans. Manfred R. 
Jacobson and Evelyn M. Jacobson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 80. (Translation 
modified.) 
500 Benjamin, “Coming Philosophy,” 106. (Translation modified.) The terrain, namely, is the 
“transcendental dialectic,” wherein lie the three ideas of the soul, the cosmos, and God, each with 





Regarding the most recent couple, freedom and experience—as languages: that of God 
and that of things—these three relations posit God receiving things, things subsumed to 
God, and, ultimately, the equivalence of one to the other. In this case, the disjunctive 
relation leads tout court to animism. Accordingly, applying these relations to the other 
pairs at hand, the dialectic between language and God ends in mysticism, and that 
between experience and knowledge, passing through the knowledge of experience and 
the experience of knowledge, leads to positivism. No less are they to hold between 
individual experiences, or, more precisely, concepts, forming from their synthesis the 
mathesis generalis known as common sense. It follows that the synthesis given by the 
third relation-category is the essential ingredient of the fall into the bourgeois and 
mystical theories of language, both of which produce the dissolution of the trinity at 
hand. In that “another relation between thesis and antithesis is possible beside synthesis,” 
the latter’s replacement with “another concept, that of a certain non-synthesis of two 
concepts in another,”503 is paramount to the emergence of a higher concept of experience. 
Such a non-synthesis fits under the reflexive or reciprocal voice and is articulated as a 
logical conjunction, with “and” as its exemplary sign and intersection its most proper 
place. The cogito cogitans of the disjunctive is thus replaced by the se cogitat and 
cogitant inter se of the connective relation, “The object is manifesting” with “The object 
manifests itself” and “Objects manifest each other.” In its quintessence, non-synthesis is 
called apóthesis: it is a removal, a displacement, a setting beside themselves of the two 
terms, wherein each forget themselves.504 Effectively, however, non-synthesis bears the 
name of diáthesis: simultaneously the “a priori” linguistic form of which the thesis and 
antithesis are the specifications, and the distribution-differentiation of the various terms 
                                                 
502 That is, the telos is, as in “Theses on Identity,” the locus of potentiality’s complete delivery to 
actuality. 
503 Ibid. (Translation modified.) 
504 Furthermore, apóthesis lies within the realm of the imagination, insofar as the latter “is the 
genius for forgetting.” Benjamin, “Imagination,” 282. 
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crossing its surface.505 With it, the language of things and that of God manifest one 
another in manifesting themselves, such that the thesis and antithesis are, instead of 
melted down and then recast into a shape dissimilar to both, reinforced in their 
individuality. And this holds from pair to pair, be it even of experiences. As the 
categorical and hypothetical come in the connective to a standstill, the material and 
formal cause proceed, from the viewpoint of the efficient that precedes them, at the same 
pace. Apóthesis, then, is the coincidence of absolute singularity with utter kinship, as 
evident in the duplicity of impartation’s meaning. By it, doctrina universalis deposes 
mathesis generalis, and the godly word’s universality succeeds the generality of common 
sense. 
What a “new” transcendental logic brings to Kant’s system, however, is the “complet[e] 
revis[ion]” of “the table of the categories,” starting with the change that follows from 
“the sublation of distinction between transcendental logic and aesthetics”506: the 
inclusion of the forms of intuition among the pure concepts of understanding. And this 
inclusion coincides with the discovery of apóthesis, space-time being precisely the non-
synthesis intruding between categories and rectifying their “isolation and lack of 
mediation” in regard no less to one another as to “the other highest philosophical 
concepts of order”507: the forms of intuition and the dialectical illusions. The further 
renovation of the transcendental logic would by consequence entail replicating vis-à-vis 
the dialectical illusions the relation of the categories to the intuition-forms. To be clear, 
herein each order-concept acts as the diáthesis of two other order-concepts; better yet, 
order-concepts are “diathetical” to one another.508 Thus, instead of standing separate 
                                                 
505 Nicht-Synthesis can be translated as much as non-synthesis as un-synthesis. As an undoing or a 
reversal of sún-thesis (together placing), it can be rendered both as apó-thesis (“away from” 
placing) and as diá-thesis (separately placing). The latter was first introduced in the 1916 letter to 
Belmore as a synonym for “critique.” 
506 Ibid. 
507 Ibid. 106-7. (Translation modified.) 
508 The synonymy between order(-concept) and diáthesis being evident in that both diatíthēmi and 
ordnen signify “to arrange.” 
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once the continuity of generality is stripped away, they form a continuum. It follows that 
“the table of the categories” would “take a place among other members” of “a doctrine of 
orders” or “itself be expanded into such a doctrine.”509 That “concept of identity […] 
unknown to Kant” that “constitutes the highest of transcendental logical concepts and is 
perhaps truly suited to founding the sphere of knowledge autonomously beyond the 
subject-object terminology,” namely, diáthesis, makes possible the treatment of 
“biological” kinds “of experience […] on the ground of the transcendental logic”510 
inasmuch as the latter becomes open to the autopoiesis proper to the biological. The 
doctrine of orders thus also comes to contain “the ground-concepts” of “the descriptive 
natural sciences”511 as those of any discipline or part of a discipline related to 
autopoiesis, linguistics being the most obvious example. For the same reason, “[a]rt, 
jurisprudence, and history” come to be “orient[ed]” towards the categories “with much 
more intensity”512 than in Kant. 
Evidently, these orders, new and old, are not absolute but only relative non-syntheses. 
Their doctrine must be “based on or bound to logically earlier ur-concepts,”513 which 
themselves are pure diatheses—that is, on the ideas.514 In other words, a (pure) diathesis 
turns the thesis and antithesis into relative diatheses. That in Kant “[t]he transcendental 
dialectic […] demonstrates […] the ideas upon which the unity of experience rests”515 
but not the latter’s continuity means that he conceives ideas as syntheses and the 
experience in question as empty. For, the transcendental dialectic tries to show the ways 
in which the understanding can’t apply to the hyperphysical, and thereby to expose its 
                                                 
509 Ibid. (Translation modified.) 
510 Ibid., 107. 
511 Ibid. (Translation modified.) 
512 Ibid. 
513 Ibid. (Translation modified.) 
514 In the use of Ordnung and Urbegriff the play is on principium and incipiō, Ordnung coming 
from ōrdior meaning “begin (to weave)” and finding its equivalent in incipiō—and thereore also 
Inbegriff—and Ur-begriff perfectly translating prīmus-cipium. 
515 Ibid. (Translation modified.) 
185 
 
limits: the ideas, from whose viewpoint, therefore, knowledge and experience are 
indistinguishable (both being dependent on appearance). While this makes evident the 
unity of experience, which is to say: the delimitation of possible experience, it also 
fragments this experience into the acts of thought with which it is equated. On the other 
hand, if it’s a matter of “the deepened concept of experience”—“metaphysical 
experience”—to which “continuity is almost as indispensable as unity,”516 then the ideas 
act as diatheses. Put differently, from the viewpoint of the ideas of this renewed dialectic, 
experience and knowledge are equivalent only in their intranslate-ability, and ideas are no 
more than this impossible translation or its guarantee. If, in synthesis, the ideas were also 
synthesized through their simple delimitation from the physical—which is their only 
definition—then, in diathesis, they are no less diathesized: “the highest concept of 
knowledge,” God or the concept of identity, is as much what grants experience 
independence from the acts of thought, as that on which occurs “[t]he convergence of the 
ideas.”517 Therefore, if man’s language as much as that of things are forms of the very 
divine word which makes their mediation possible, knowledge and experience are ideas. 
On the basis of a new transcendental dialectic, then, ideas turn definable—a dialectic, 
though, which, since ideas manifest themselves and thus each other, runs purely of itself. 
It’s precisely this “of itself” that forms the link between identity, diathesis, autopoiesis, 
freedom, God, and the absolute.518 
                                                 
516 Ibid. (Translation modified.) 
517 Ibid. (Translation modified.) 
518 “Identity” derives from idem (“same”) and thus stands with autós (“same”). The latter, in also 
meaning “self, by or in itself,” then brings together ídios (“pertaining to self, private, separate, 
distinct, related to”), éthō (“self-place”), freedom (whose Proto-Indo-European root, *preyH-, 
denoting “to love,” maintains the self-contradictory meaning of each other term), and absolute 
(ab-solvo, “set free,” “untie”). Evidently, this chain of linguistic similarity is the very structure of 
the concept diathesis. God shares in this nexus not only because of its configuration as the 
absolute (surface), but also as the correlate of diathesis in a double sense. Where the latter means 
the “(grammatical) voice,” God (or: Gott) is “the called” or “the invoked” (in-vōx) by virtue of its 
Proto-Indo-European root *ghaw-, while where it means, or serves as, continuity, God is “the 
continued” or “the poured” according to its other root *ghew-. For a larger analysis of *se and 
autós see Giorgio Agamben, “*Se: Hegel’s Absolute and Heidegger’s Ereignis,” in Potentialities: 
Collected Essays in Philosophy, ed. and trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1999), 116-37, and “On the Sayable and the Idea,” in What is Philosophy?, 
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Inasmuch as “[t]he great restructuring […] which must be undertaken upon the concept 
of knowledge […] can be gained only through a relation of knowledge to language”519 
the key-words of the Kantian system already yield a sketch of what’s to come. To begin 
with, the transcendental dialectic is not merely the isolated realm of diathesis, but is 
inherently a cipher of the transcendental logic as a whole: the partition of the first into 
diá-légō mirrors that of the second into trans and legō. To call it “transcendental 
dialectic,” then, is to confer on it the function of engaging with the trans-, über-, or diá- 
itself. It may be called the apodialectic, and signify “selecting and rejecting, picking out” 
or, in facultative language, “discernment.” It is a sorting of and through the categories 
and ideas. And this precisely is pure consciousness or knowledge. On the other hand, the 
analytic yields in its partitioning the aná-lúō, relating not to diá-légō but to ab-se-luo, the 
absolute, or God. It is a continuous advance toward complete separation, a diathetic 
assay: religious experience, language, or the analogic. Finally, the transcendental 
aesthetic, understood as aisthēsis, “perception,” stands on the same ground as eîdos, the 
former’s *h2ew- root sharing with the latter’s *weyd- root the meaning of “to see.” And 
this includes the realm of the ideas, Vernunft, which, derived from vernehmen, rests in 
kinship with percipiō. Here lies the material common to both the apodialectic and the 
analogic. 
It follows that “all philosophical knowledge has its unique expression in language,”520 
that it—being the intellegō—finds its unity inter legō. And in this lies its “systematic 
supremacy […] over science as well as mathematics,”521 the “Überheit” of its standing-
together (sún-hístēmi) wherein it diathesizes science, mathematics, and many other 
realms, while apodiathesizing the ideas. This new concept of knowledge is “gained from 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
trans. Lorenzo Chiesa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2018), 35-90, both of which broach a 
similar line of thought. 
519 Benjamin, “Coming Philosophy,” 107-8. (Translation modified.) 




reflection on the linguistic essence of knowledge”:522 it emerges from thinking the 
Inbegriff of knowledge as God’s word, from reflecting on the legō within intellegō. 
Hence, in holding to this legō, it allows for a relegō, and “create[s] a corresponding 
concept of experience […] encompass[ing] realms” such as that “of religion.”523 In the 
words of “On Language,” the apodialectic reflects on the name of knowledge, on its 
impartability, and thereby discloses the symbolizing of the unimpartable that’s called 
religion, or the analogic. If experience is then “the unified and continuous manifoldness 
of knowledge”524 this is because, as symbolizing, it forces the convergence of all 
impartabilities upon the single unimparable while delimiting their realm from that 
belonging to the latter. 
                                                 
522 Ibid. (Translation modified.) 
523 Ibid. 
524 Ibid. (Translation modified.) 
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Chapter 4  




A term renounced only with the composition of “Goethe’s Elective Affinities,” appearing 
thereafter only in a negative key, system dates back to the seeds of Benjamin’s 
dissertation project: the Kantian system whose typology Benjamin posits, in the “Coming 
Philosophy” essay, to be philosophy’s foremost task. As the etymology of its Greek 
predecessor, sústēma, indicates, system forms a “linguistic family” with synthesis, 
symbol, constellation, coexistence, constancy, configuration, and Gestalt.525 It follows 
that at stake is not so much a renunciation as a transformation or translation. In fact, its 
appearance alongside “symbol” or “symbolic” in “On Perception,” where Benjamin 
refers to “the systematic symbolic nexus” and “systematic symbolic concept”526 belies an 
attempt at re-interpreting this German Idealist term from the outset. The order proper to it 
emerges in the “constellation” of two separate uses of an inclusive disjunction: “whose 
criterion is systematic unity or truth”527 and “whose decisive category is doctrine, even 
truth, not knowledge.”528 Therefore does system, albeit understood afresh, stand also 
                                                 
525 This in the sense that sústēma means “with”-“standing,” which comes to be translated into the 
Latin as “constancy” and into the German by “Gestalt” while bearing similarities to the other 
terms listed—including “sym”-bol—by way of its “with.” 
526 Walter Benjamin, “On Perception,” trans. Rodney Livingstone, in Selected Writings, Volume 
1, 1913-1926, ed. Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap 
Press, 1996), 96. 
527 Walter Benjamin, “On the Program of the Coming Philosophy,” trans. Mark Ritter, in Selected 
Writings, Volume 1, 1913-1926, ed. Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, MA: 
The Belknap Press, 1996), 100. 
528 “dessen entscheidende Kategorie Lehre, auch Wahrheit, nicht Erkenntnis ist.” In the phrase 
that follows that latter, Benjamin says “sie sich in Wahrheit oder Lehre verlieren (‘they lose 
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beside truth and doctrine “whose ground is revelation, language,”529 these being the 
other two terms connected to “the systematic symbolic” in “On Perception” as absolute 
experience and language, respectively. 
Leaving aside the conceptual mire of these phrases, system has its origin, for Benjamin, 
in Kant’s notion of “systematicity,” which is to say: the third idea of pure reason, God, 
understood also as the transcendental ideal.530 Seeing as this idea is derived, in the 
Critique of Pure Reason, from the third category of relation, “community,” Benjamin’s 
intention of rehashing it is stated outright in “Coming Philosophy”: 
The trichotomy, whose metaphysically deepest relations are still undiscovered, has 
its decisive foundation within the Kantian system in the trinity of the relational 
categories. […] The formalist dialectic of the post-Kantian systems, however, is 
not based on the definition of the thesis as categorical relation, the antithesis as 
hypothetical relation, and the synthesis as disjunctive relation. But besides the 
concept of synthesis, another concept, that of a certain non-synthesis of two 
concepts in another, will become very important systematically, since another 
relation between thesis and antithesis is possible besides synthesis. This can hardly 
lead to a fourfold structure of relational categories, however.531 
Additionally, system also has a doctrinal aspect in Kant such that “doctrine” and 
“systematicity” can be regarded as synonyms,532 partly disentangling the above-invoked 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
themselves in Truth or Doctrine’).” Walter Benjamin, “Zum verlornen Abschluss der Notiz über 
die Symbolik in der Erkenntnis,” in Gesammelte Schriften VI, ed. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann 
Schweppenhäuser (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991), 39. 
529 “deren Begründung Offenbarung, Sprache ist.” Ibid. 
530 See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. 
Wood (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 553-9. 
531 Benjamin, “Coming Philosophy,” 106. 
532 “By the transcendental doctrine of method, therefore, I understand the determination of the 
formal conditions of a complete system of pure reason.” Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 627. 
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knot. Hence the further use of this term under the sign of “mathematicity” in “Versuch 
eines Beweises”533—insofar, that is, as Lehre and máthēsis bear a coincidence of 
meaning: “learning-teaching.” Finally, towards the end of “Über die Symbolik,” 
Benjamin claims that “[t]he role of the system […] is played in Plato precisely by the 
Dialogue,”534 thereby turning what seemed a dead, final end in Kant into an ever open, 
changing horizon. 
Herein lies the (non-)synthesis or (non-)system which means to replace the previous 
understanding of the system. Extrapolating from Kant, systematicity coincides with 
simultaneity, the third analogy of experience, one that holds at once between different 
“experiences” and between the other two analogies of experience: persistence and 
succession (or: eternity and transience).535 In other words, the system or synthesis that 
Benjamin has in mind is, namely, one that doesn’t itself acquire substance and thus 
doesn’t allow for a fourth set of judgments, categories, or principles (a set called, in its 
final form, “empirical thinking”—in “Coming Philosophy”: empirical consciousness). 
Regardless of their proper inter-configuration, the couples soul-cosmos, outer-inner, 
perception-intuition, quality-quantity, formal-real, sensible-intelligible and so on, are, in 
the non-system, held from any fusion. If a fourth, then, is to be asserted, this is only 
insofar as, instead of being the actualization of the third, it is, rather, the third’s 
counterpart, both functioning as no more than purer instantiations of the first and second. 
In this sense precisely should the relation between Kant’s Critiques be understood: 
                                                 
533 See Walter Benjamin, “Versuch eines Beweises, dass die wissenschaftliche Beschreibung 
eines Vorgangs dessen Erklärung voraussetzt,” in Gesammelte Schriften VI, ed. Rolf Tiedemann 
and Hermann Schweppenhäuser (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991), 40-2. 
534 “Die Rolle des Systems […] spielt bei Platon genau der DIALOG.” Benjamin, “Über die 
Symbolik,” 39. 
535 For Kant’s definitions of “Axioms of Intuition,” “Anticipations of Perception,” and 
“Analogies of Experience,” see Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 283-321. Additionally, for Kant’s 
definition of the “aesthetic idea,” used in the paragraphs to follow, see Immanuel Kant, Critique 
of the Power of Judgment, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 218-9. Finally, in both cases, also see Howard Caygill, A 




namely, that the Critique of Judgment which was meant to synthesize the Critique of 
Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason is itself split into two critiques, of 
Aesthetic Judgment and of Teleological Judgment, thus repeating their difference. 
If systematicity also holds between equals, however, this system must be a non-system no 
less. That is, neither is system to be understood, following only the “Axioms of Intuition,” 
as the whole composed of disparate parts, be these “experiences” or “knowledges,” nor, 
following only the “Anticipations of Perception,” as the unity of a single “experience” or 
“knowledge,” a unity excluding the possibility of this particular experience’s or that 
particular knowledge’s relation to its brethren otherwise than through succession. Instead, 
each part and every unity are to be understood as fragments. Which is to say, namely, that 
each “experience” is to relate to another “experience” as to a “knowledge,” and, mutatis 
mutandis, each “knowledge” as to an “experience.” The horizontal understanding of the 
(non-)system is thus commensurate to its vertical understanding. In the last instance, this 
allows each “experience” to be symbolic—in this term’s usual understanding—of (1) 
another “experience,” (2) a “knowledge,” (3) the “system of experiences,” (4) the 
“system of knowledges,” and vice versa. As unclear as the status of (3) and (4) may be, 
their proper names, if “On Perception” is to be followed, are absolute experience and 
language, in turn. 
It is precisely this notion of the non-system that Benjamin will then argue, in “The 
Concept of Criticism in German Romanticism,” as being proper to the philosophy of the 
Athenaeum. As he quotes Schlegel: “it is equally fatal for the mind both to have a system 
and to have none—hence, it will have to decide to combine both.”536 What this means, to 
be clear, is a “thought [that] moves beyond discursivity” (or: “discursive thinking”)—
which fails to “satisfy his [Schlegel’s] intention upon intuitive comprehension”—“and 
                                                 
536 Walter Benjamin, “The Concept of Criticism in German Romanticism,” trans. David 
Lachterman, Howard Eiland, and Ian Balfour, in Selected Writings, Volume 1, 1913-1926, ed. 
Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1996), 140. It is 
pertinent to mention that the manner in which Benjamin wrote his dissertation—specifically as 
regards his citations—makes the selection of phrases from the Romantics itself part of his 
writing. In other words, quoting Benjamin’s quotations of Schlegel is sometimes equal to quoting 
Benjamin himself.  
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intuitiveness” (or: “intellectual intuition”)—which fails to “satisfy his systematic 
interests.”537 In other words, a rejection of understanding thoughts as either parts of a 
whole that must be totalized (like numbers), or as singularities bound to succeed one 
another immediately (like colours).538 The system, by consequence, is to be neither the 
transcendental idea—the lawfulness that allows for the passage from one thought to 
another, and functions as a concept without intuition—nor the aesthetic idea—which 
provides boundless material for consideration, and can be understood as an intuition 
without concept—but, rather, the beautiful ideal, expressible in an individual. Thoughts 
held together as an intensive magnitude: this is the Romantic definition of system, a 
system whose “moments” or “examples” are conceptual terms.539 
It should be clear from this that Benjamin’s dissertation constitutes yet another attempt 
on this thinker’s part to mediate between—or find an alternative out of—two false 
extremes. But that, this time, he is intent on documenting someone else’s assay in this 
direction—namely, the Romantics’. For, as Benjamin claims more or less implicitly, the 
approach of “intellectual intuition” is that proper to Fichte, specifically when considering 
his notion of the “I,”540 while that of “discursive thinking” can be associated with 
“grasp[ing] the absolute systematically” and therefore with Kant.541 It is, of course, only 
                                                 
537 Ibid., 139-40. 
538 Put differently, analytic indeterminacy or absolute determinacy. 
539 “Terminology is the sphere in which [Friedrich Schlegel’s] thought moves beyond discursivity 
and intuitiveness. For the term, the concept, contained for him the seed of the system; it was, at 
bottom, nothing other than a preformed system itself. Schlegel’s thinking is absolutely 
conceptual—that is, it is linguistic thinking. Reflection is the intentional act of the absolute 
comprehension of the system, and the adequate form of expression for this act is the concept. In 
this intuition lies the motive for Friedrich Schlegel’s numerous terminological innovations and 
the deepest reason for the continually new names he devises for the absolute.” Ibid., 140. 
(Translation modified.) 
540 As Benjamin puts it, “[Fichte] recognizes only a single case of the fruitful application of 
reflection—namely, of that reflection which occurs in intellectual intuition. What results from the 
function of reflection in intellectual intuition is the absolute ‘I,’ an active deed, and accordingly 
the thinking of intellectual intuition is a relatively objective thinking.” Ibid., 128. It is this 
“absolute ‘I’” or “absolute reflection” back to which Benjamin traces the Romantic “idea of art.” 
541 Ibid., 138. Benjamin, namely, argues that the impulse of the Romantics (more specifically: of 
Friedrich Schlegel) was the “absolute comprehension of the system” and that “they” make “the 
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natural that, insofar as Kant and Fichte were the German philosophers circa 1795 (when 
Romantic thought began to bloom), the Romantics would posit them as their central 
adversaries. Such are the two false extremes of philosophy. When it comes to literary 
criticism, however, Benjamin states the erroneous dichotomy explicitly as one between 
the Enlightenment, “the idea of sitting in judgment over artworks, of rendering a verdict 
according to written or unwritten laws,” and Sturm und Drang, which had “limitless faith 
in the privilege of genius” and led to “the sublation of all fixed principles and criteria of 
judgment.”542 
What should be clear is not only that Enlightenment criticism is to be (at least in part) 
associated with Kant’s “discursive thinking” or “systematization of the absolute,” with all 
the rules and laws that Kant brings to bear within this sphere, or that Sturm und Drang 
should (again, at least in part) include, given its glorification of the genius’ intuition, 
Fichte’s philosophy of the “I,” but that what Benjamin is positing doubly herein are only 
two further instances of the dichotomy he first broaches in his essay “On Language”—
namely, the bourgeois theory of language which, privileging the sign, opens the gates to 
judgment and abstraction, and the mystical theory of language which, seeing no distance 
between word and essence, promises immediate access to truth.543 It is therefore 
furthermore by “begin[ning] in the middle,” by functioning as “the middle term in the 
medium” between not only “simple ur-reflection” and “simple absolute reflection,”544 but 
also these two theories of language and of art, that the philosophy of the Athenaeum is to 
function as a non-system or non-synthesis. As should be evident from the later direction 
of Benjamin’s writing: to the extent that the Romantics fail in accomplishing this, they 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
opposite tendency [i.e., the systematic comprehension of the absolute] into an objection against 
Kant.” Ibid., 139. 
542 Ibid., 143.  
543 For a study wherein Kant (along with his philosophy) is described as prototypically 
“bourgeois,” see Lucien Goldmann, Immanuel Kant, trans. Robert Black (London: Verso, 2012).  
544 Benjamin, “The Concept of Criticism,” 137. 
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too must be seen as one half (the bourgeois one) of yet another (higher) instantiation of 
this false dichotomy, the other (mystical) half of which is Goethe.  
4.2 Critique 
(Polyhymnia) 
Given as an “example” of the Romantic system, and therefore of the non-system, 
“critique”545 is a term that, related to its ancestor, krïnō, makes palpable the impasse 
reached by Kant in the Critique of Judgment. For Kant could just have well have called it 
the Critique of Critique. It’s to be understood, then, that it indicates the “division, 
decision, judgment, separation” at once of the pure from the empirical and of the 
instances of each from one another. True to its nature, critique is itself divided between 
“includ[ing] the knowledge of its object,”546 which, lying within the object, is rather a 
self-knowledge, and the judgment of its object, or self-judgment.547 This distinction—
which is one pertaining to the type of object—follows the one between “teleological 
judgment” and “aesthetic judgment,” respectively: self-knowledge of a natural object, 
self-judgment of a work of art. In either case, critique acts as the ground of the system, or: 
of the system’s manifestation. Only where an object is both separated from other units 
and from itself can it embody the non-system. And precisely so does Benjamin define 
                                                 
545 “[T]he Romantic concept of critique is itself an exemplary instance of mystical terminology” 
Ibid., 141. (Translation modified.) “This positive emphasis in the concept of criticism does not 
diverge as widely as one may have thought from Kant’s usage. Kant, whose terminology contains 
not a little of the mystical spirit, prepared the way for this emphasis by opposing to the 
standpoints of dogmatism and skepticism, both of which he rejected, less the true metaphysics in 
which his system is meant to culminate than the ‘criticism’ in whose name that system was 
inaugurated. One can therefore say that the concept of criticism has a double sense in Kant—the 
double sense which in the Romantics is raised to a higher power, since by the word ‘criticism’ 
they refer to Kant’s total historical achievement [i.e., his system] and not only to his concept of 
Kritik.” Ibid., 142. 
546 Ibid., 143. (Translation modified.) 
547 “Insofar as criticism is knowledge of the work of art, it is its self-knowledge; insofar as it 
judges the artwork, this occurs in the latter’s self-judgment. In this last office, criticism goes 
beyond observation: this shows the difference between the art object and the object of nature, 
which admits of no judgment.” Ibid., 151. 
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“critique” in his dissertation: the work is submitted by it to a limitation of its form, to the 
identification of its contingency, and comes to dissolve in the medium of Art.548 
The issue, of course, is that the Romantics thereby end up subsuming the “secondary 
qualities” of perception to the “primary qualities” of intuition. Or, put differently, they 
eliminate the problem of indivisible unities. Works come to be seen as fragments rather 
than parts—and this is the achievement of Schlegel and Novalis—but lose, in the process, 
any connection to natural objects: in both the sense that they are seen as artificial and 
bracketed out of any natural consideration, and in that they don’t “represent” anything 
outside themselves. Thus do the Romantics ultimately understand the system as the 
totality of art-works and as identifiable in a particular manifestation: the novel—an 
understanding belied by a confusion of the empirical and the pure registers.549 It follows 
that, in the Romantic theory of art, critique is itself the non-system.—For the sake of 
clarification, Romantic critique can be said to function in the following way. A particular 
work-unity is taken up by the critic and decomposed into its parts, parts that can then be 
                                                 
548 “[P]ractical, determinate reflection and self-restriction constitute the individuality and form of 
the work of art. In order for criticism […] to be the suspension of all limitation, the work must 
rest on limitation. Criticism fulfills its task insofar as, with greater closure of reflection and more 
rigorous form in the work, it drives these the more manifoldly and intensively out of itself, 
dissolves the original reflection in one higher, and so continues. In this project, criticism depends 
on the germ cells of reflection, the positively formal moments of the work that it resolves into 
universally formal moments. It thus represents the relation of the individual work to the idea of 
art and thereby the idea of the individual work itself.” Ibid., 156. 
549 “Schlegel simply gave a false interpretation to a valuable and valid motive. This was the effort 
to secure the concept of the idea of art from the misunderstanding of those who would see it as an 
abstraction from empirical artworks. He wanted to define this concept of an idea in the Platonic 
sense, as a proteron té phusei, as the real ground of all empirical works, and he committed the old 
error of confounding ‘abstract’ and ‘universal’ when he believed he had to make that ground into 
an individual. It is only with this in view that Schlegel repeatedly and emphatically designates the 
unity of art, the continuum of forms itself, as one work.” Ibid., 167. “The novel (Roman) is the 
highest among all symbolic forms; Romantic poetry is the idea of poetry itself.—The ambiguity 
that lies in the expression ‘romantic’ was certainly taken gladly into account by Schlegel, if not 
exactly sought after. […] Hence, we are to understand throughout, as Haym does, the essential 
meaning of the term ‘romantic’ as ‘novelistic.’ This meanins that Schlegel upholds the doctrine 
‘that the genuine novel is a ne plus ultra, a summa of all that is poetic, and he consistently 
designates this poetic ideal with the name of “romantic” poetry.’ As this summa of all that is 
poetic, in the sense of Schlegel’s theory of art, the novel is therefore a designation of the poetic 
absolute.” Ibid., 173. 
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connected to the parts of various other decomposed work-unities. Insofar as this art-nexus 
is infinite, however, there always remain connections “to come,” which will come once 
another new work will be ready for decomposition and insertion in the nexus. Every work 
contains within it further possible connections, a “to come,” the “new”—called, by 
Benjamin, the work’s “symbolic form,” or its “prosaic core,” pro-vorsus meaning quite 
literally “turned forwards.”550 
If work (Werk) were to be understood as a word (Wort), the word “component,” for 
instance, would, once submitted to critique, be, in the “first” instance, decomposed into 
com- and ponent. The latter would then be related to de- (deponent), ex- (exponent), pro- 
(proponent), and so on, while the former to pare (compare), form (conform), clude 
(conclude), and so on. In another instance, component would be understood to have the 
grammatical form “noun,” and be related to compositional (adjective) and compose 
(verb), the latter of which could further yield its conjugated forms. Breaking pōnō (as the 
Latin root of ponent) down further into po and sino leads to an even larger field of 
permutation than in the first instance. Where component is what Benjamin calls the 
“presentational form” of the work-word, com-po-nent is its symbolic form, open to 
entering into any relations “to come.” The fact that component’s symbolic form can be 
manifested empirically as com-po-nent, however, is inherent to this word only insofar as 
it is a “composite noun.” Which is to say that critique has the “composite noun” as its 
exemplar. “Stance”’s symbolic form, for instance, can’t be made visible without adding 
something to it: “in-stance.” And the same situation is true of a composite verb such as 
compose, for its symbolic form necessitates, for its appearance, the addition of a further 
element to the presentational form: “com-pos-ed.” On the other hand, if the symbolic 
form of the composite adjective “circumstantial” can be made immediately visible as 
                                                 
550 Benjamin speaks of the relation between presentational form, symbolic form, and critique—so 
important to what follows—thusly: “[T]he fundamental properties of symbolic form consist in 
such purity of the presentational form that this is refined into a mere expression of the self-
limitation of reflection and is distinguished from the profane forms of presentation[.] […] 
Criticism of art exhibits this symbolic form in its purity; it disentangles it from all the inessential 




“circum-stant-ial,” it is nevertheless an adjective ad nothing, tending, as it does, toward 
being read as “the circumstantial.” And this is no less true of prepositions, adverbs, or 
pronouns so long as they are composite. The symbolic form is therefore determined as 
being exclusively a “composite noun”—or, in Benjamin’s terms, the idea of every work 
is a novel, the novelized, or the prosaic inside the work. While the novel is itself an idea. 
And, were this “symbolic form” to be understood in the terms of “On Language,” this is 
to say that the idea-proper-name is not only limited to appearing, of all lexical forms, as a 
noun, but also that alone the noun-form of x or y word is its idea. It is evident, moreover, 
that, submitted to critique, “component” loses all reference. The only meaning or content 
that it may have being the exemplarily indeterminate “prosaic,” the “to come” with which 
it will enter into a new connection—and, simultaneously, the nexus wherein it is already 
embedded (this too being “to come”). 
It follows from this that critique can not have the work as its content, can not be “about” 
the work, but must instead be immanent to it, be its autopoietic unfolding. Insofar as “the 
theory of art” is analogous to “the theory of the knowledge of nature” for the 
Romantics,551 the same thing can be said of the former as was said, in “Part One” of the 
essay, of the latter: namely, that the self-thinking of the subject—“the thinking subject 
(thinking of thinking) of thinking”—is equivalent to the self-thinking of the object—“the 
object thought of, thinking (of the thinking of thinking)”—neither having to transcend 
their own spheres in order to reach the other.552 And this exposes the Romantics as being 
                                                 
551 “All the laws that hold generally for the knowledge of objects in the medium of reflection also 
hold for the criticism of art. Therefore, criticism when confronting the work of art is like 
observation when confronting the natural object; the same laws apply, simply modified according 
to their different objects.” Ibid., 151. 
552 “Experiment consists in the equivocation of self-consciousnes and self-knowledge in the 
things observed. To observe a thing means only to arouse it to self-recognition. Whether an 
experiment succeeds depends on the extent to which the experimenter is capable, through the 
heightening of his own consciousness, through magical observation, as one might say, of getting 
nearer to the object of finally drawing it into himself. […] It would thus be permissible […] to 
speak of a coincidence of the objective and the subjective side in knowledge. Simultaneous with 
any cognition of an object is the actual coming-into-being of this object itself. For knowledge, 
according to the basic principle of knowledge of objects, is a process that first makes what is to 
be known into that as which it is known.” Ibid., 148. 
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at once pantheistic, every object being a subject for them, and anthropocentric, confusing 
natural (God-made) objects with aesthetic (man-made) objects in the name of “absolute 
reflection.” Another meaning is thus added to the fact that Romantic critique can’t be 
“about” the work: it can only be “on” the work or “about” the work’s form, while the 
work itself is left behind, a conclusion implicit in the Romantics’ insistence on the 
“reality” of the idea, on its empirical existence as the novel. Consequently, the distinction 
that Benjamin asserts between “the theory of the knowledge of objects” and “knowledge 
of the system or of the absolute,” or between critique and non-system—wherein the 
former “comprises the minimum of reality” in that “the content of reality and all of 
thinking […] remain[s] undeveloped and unclear” in it while the latter “comprises the 
maximum of reality” in that this same content “is developed to its highest clarity”553 in it, 
as in component and com-po-nent, respectively—fails to hold. Its success was dependent 
on the non-system’s incompatibility with any one presentational form, including the 
novel.—In short, the Romantics, despite their efforts, betray the non-system’s non-
synthesis between intuition and perception, extensive magnitude and intensive 
magnitude, Critique of Pure Reason, and Critique of Practical Reason, and subsume the 
latter to the former in their theory of art. Embedded in Benjamin’s dissertation is 
therefore the suggestion that Schlegel’s 1808 conservative-Catholic turn which brought 
him closer to Fichte—and thereby to the latter’s 1807 nationalism—emerges precisely 
due to his Athenaeum-period (1798-1800) oversight of “practical reason.”554 
 
                                                 
553 Ibid., 130. 
554 This is partly intimated in the following statement by Benjamin: “We can understand what 
motivated the inimical attitude toward Fichte in the Windischmann lectures, and how Schlegel, in 
his review of Fichte of 1808, although certainly not wholly without prejudice, could characterize 
the earlier contacts of his circle with Fichte as a misunderstanding based on the polemical attitude 
of both toward the same enemy, an attitude that was forced on them both.” Ibid., 129. 
Additionally, as Benjamin insists on stating, “[Friedrich Schlegel] had no understanding of the 
value of ethics in the system.” Ibid., 137. 
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4.3 Content + Form 
(Melpomene, Thalia) 
Goethe, on the other hand, as Benjamin argues in the dissertation’s “epilogue,” “The 
Early Romantic Theory of Art and Goethe,” is guilty of the opposite mistake: that of 
priviledging content altogether over form. A linguistic way to express this difference or 
opposition is as that between morphology, the science of forms (morphe), and phonetics, 
the study of contents (phone)555—their respective objects being morphemes and 
phonemes, in turn. Where the Romantic “idea” of the work is analogous to a word’s 
morpheme,556 Goethe’s “Urbilder” (or: pure contents) of the work are analogous to a 
word’s phonemes. Accordingly, the idea of art or the absolute form is a Proto-Indo-
European root, while the ideal of art is sound qua sound or the voice qua voice. It 
therefore appears that the Romantic and Goethean conceptions of the work are too 
heterogeneous to allow for the kind of comparison that may deem their relation to be one 
of opposition or chiasmus. Where the truth of the Romantic work is a formation (Gestalt) 
of art, as a(n English) morpheme is a formation of Proto-Indo-European, the truth of the 
Goethean work is the image-configuration (Gebilde) of nature, as a phoneme is an image-
configuration of natural sound. In the first, critique functions as the excision of this truth 
from the particular work, and thus the disclosure of its participation in art, albeit not 
without changing the previously held concept of the latter. In the second, on the other 
hand, composing entails configuring, successfully or unsuccessfully, an image of nature 
and setting it down in a work, a process which, however, doesn’t change in the least the 
“absolute nature” at stake and whose product can’t be dissolved back into this absolute 
nature through critique insofar as the realms of the two terms are entirely alien. Put 
                                                 
555 Phone (voice) must herein be see as related to the German inhalieren (inhale), which, 
precisely by way of sound, suggests Inhalt (content). 
556 As Benjamin himself suggests in a footnote: “The Romantics, too, looked into [the laws of 
artistic genres], not in order to define the genres of art but with a view to finding the medium, the 
absolute, in which works were to be critically dissolved. They conceived of these investigations 




succinctly and dramatically, the Romantic theory of art is solipsistic-monistic while 
Goethe’s is Manichean-dualistic. 
A rapprochement between the two, as Benjamin attempts obscurely, must start with the 
identification—originating in the Romantics—between critique and the existence of the 
work, or between criticizing and composing. In this precise sense, Goethe’s “critique” 
can be understood as referring to the process of formation-imitation—the Romantics’ to 
the process of deformation-limitation. Put differently, Goethe’s passage is one directed 
downwards—from the “high” (pure content) to the “low” (the work)—and inwards—
from the solely intuitable “tither” (Urbilder) to the perceptible par excellence “hither” 
(the work)—to the same extent as the Romantic passage reaches upwards—from the 
“low” (the presentational form) to the “high” (the absolute form)—and outwards—from 
the “(thinking of) thinking,” or the subjective, to the “(thinking of) thinking of thinking,” 
or the objective. It would follow, from this chiasmic scheme, that, as the Romantics 
purloin unities and representations from perception and treat them as totalities to be 
infinitely decomposed and parts to be infinitely totalized in intuition in turn, so Goethe 
purloins totalities and parts from intuition and treats them as unities to be represented and 
representations of perception, respectively. In Kantian terms, the distinction here is, on 
the one hand, that between (1) treating (α) a work (a representation of a unity) as (β) a 
category (as a quantitative, therefore pure part of a transcendental idea) and (2) doing the 
inverse and treating (β) as (α), and, on the other, that between (3) treating (γ) an aesthetic 
idea (a unity: indemonstrable-non-deducible but presentable) as (δ) a transcendental idea 
(a totality: unpresentable but demonstrable-deducible)557 and, as in (2), (4) conceiving of 
(δ) as (γ), where (α) and (γ) are solidary in “the Anticipations of Perception” as are (β) 
and (δ) in “the Axioms of Intuition.” 
Concretely, and a bit closer to Benjamin’s text, Goethe’s theory of art understands the 
work in the following way. Were the word bee to be taken as a work, a Goethean view 
would see it as a sound (IPA: /biː/); this sound would be, for him, the imitation and 
                                                 
557 Keeping in mind that an idea is “[a] concept made up of notions [i.e. categories].” Kant, 
Critique of Pure Reason, 399. 
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contraction of a sound heard in nature. The meaning of “nature” herein becomes clarified 
with the following consideration: despite having only one syllable, bee is to be seen as a 
“composite,” a composite, namely, of various—different as to time, place, and source—
receptions of this “same” sound “in nature.” Once the composition of this sound is 
complete and written down, it may or make not take hold in the world of language—
others may or may not think it to be the best composition of the sound they too have 
heard in nature. In either case, the (written) word has this composite sound, which 
Benjamin calls “true, visible nature,” as its content. What’s important is that this 
composite sound itself doesn’t ever appear “in nature.” Nature as it appears, what 
Benjamin calls “appearing, visible nature,” hic et nunc, may only have the correlate of 
this sound hidden within it, intuitable but not perceivable. The correlate of this sound 
dwells within what Benjamin calls “Nature-Truth,” or the realm of Ur-phenomena, 
Urbilden, or pure contents—and the word alone (and not “appearing, visible nature”) is 
capable of presenting it, namely “imagistically”; that is, insofar as the composite sound 
bee is at once the content of the written word bee and the image of the Ur-sound bee. 
The different concepts forming the matrix between Goethe and the Romantics can now 
be named: (1α) presentational form (1β) symbolic form (2β) symbolic content (“true, 
visible nature”) (2α) presentational content (“appearing, visible nature”) (3γ) pure form 
(“absolute form”) (3δ) symbolic form (4δ) symbolic content (4γ) pure content (“Nature-
Truth”). It is the very identity-in-terms of (1β) with (3δ) and (2β) with (4δ) that functions 
herein as an immanent mark of both the Romantics’ and Goethe’s renunciation of non-
synthesis for the sake of synthesis—which is to say: makes clear the inevitability of that 
subsumption which bears the form “x as y.” Focusing on the forms at stake in the work 
“Ode on a Grecian Urn” by John Keats, it could be said that its presentational form is 
“the ode,” its symbolic form “(lyrical) poetry,” and its pure form “art.” To understand, 
like the Romantics, the “ode” as “poetry” and therefore as one among a plurality of other 
forms of poetry allows for its connection to the latter. It subsequently forces an 
understanding of “art,” which was to be merely the unity represented by the “ode,” as the 
totality, once more “poetry,” which (re-)emerges from this process of aggregation. To the 
extent that the “first” poetry and the “second” poetry are confused, the presentational 
form “ode” can immediately be identified with the pure form “art.” This is, of course, 
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inconceivable in the example of the “ode,” however, because poetry is too specific a 
symbolic form—its contours are too firm—in order to be understood as what emerges 
when the unity called “art” is conceived as totality. Put differently, what would be 
identified would merely be the “ode” with a “form of art,” and not with art itself, given 
that the “ode” can hardly be conceived as a plurality of presentational forms of poetry. In 
this sense there are two poetries, or, better said, “poesies”: the poem and poetry. Were 
James Joyce’s novel Ulysses at stake, however, such an distinction would no longer hold. 
In its case, the presentational form would be “the novel,” its symbolic form “prose,” and 
its pure form “art.” Where “ode” could only be understood as one form of poetry among 
others, the “novel” can include all other forms of “prose.” In this sense, it already is the 
symbolic form, “prose.” On the other hand, art understood as the “totality” of 
presentational forms complies with “prose” such that the novel itself can be understood 
as art.558 Unlike poesy, prose is uncountable. 
Nevertheless, “ode” is not a form of poesy isolated from all other forms of “poesy,” and, 
insofar as it is connected to them through critique, one of its particular instances—Keats’ 
ode—can have a prosaic quality and thus dissolve into art as a whole. Romantic critique, 
in short, is the fragmentation of a poem into its formal components, paying attention to 
where the poem deviates from its strict “proposed” form (meter, rhyme, structure, 
schemes and tropes) and joins “other” forms. It is the attempt of grasping the degree to 
which poesy can be taken for prose: this latter being the beautiful ideal as understood by 
the Romantics.—Turning to the contents at stake in the same Keats poem, the 
presentational content is, to remain concrete, its mood (its diction, imagery, alliteration, 
consonance, and assonance as it appears to a spectator), the symbolic content is its theme, 
and the pure content is its moral. More concretely still, the “Grecian urn” with its images, 
the meaning of these images, and the relation between beauty and truth, respectively. Just 
like Keats’ poem, Goethe takes the theme as the mood of the poem: the meanings of the 
images that the speaker sees embedded in the urn are themselves speculated upon in the 
                                                 




poem—to the point where the “mood” itself is addressed. “Ah happy, happy boughs!”559 
But this also leads to taking the theme also as its moral, the “real” meaning of the images 
lying solidly beyond the poem, in the “thou” addressed. The poem therefore pushes, and 
critics have had to follow this thread, the reader towards the desire to inspect this urn that 
so concerned Keats. It begs, in other words, a comparison between the poem and the 
“real” urn. And this is the poem’s whole “metaphysical conceit”: that “Ode on a Grecian 
Urn” is the “real” urn that it addresses. In this way, it is the presentational content of the 
poem (instead of its symbolic content) which functions as the visible manifestation of the 
pure content, the “real urn,” and the rule that Ur-phenomenal nature stay hidden in 
appearing nature no longer applies. Hence the poem’s last lines: “to whom thou say’st,/ 
‘Beauty is truth, truth beauty,—that is all/ Ye know on earth and all ye need to 
know.’”560 
Put linguistically, Goethe-Keats takes the composite sound bee and assimilates it, on the 
one hand, to the “said” or “written” bee, therefore believing it to be appear-able, and, on 
the other, to the “unsayable” “unsound-able” Ur-phenomenon of which it is the image, 
therefore rendering its “composite” artificiality natural. Insofar as these two moments—
these two symbolic contents, one of which is a plurality/part the other a totality—are not 
distinguished, the presentational content can itself immediately be the pure content, 
appearing nature: Ur-phenomenal nature, albeit—and this is the conceit—only for the 
genius, capable as he is of “intellectual intuition.” And, furthermore, only that appearing 
nature which is prototypical: plantly, organic nature—this (genius or plant) being the 
beautiful ideal as understood by Goethe. (Therefrom the Romantic concept of the 
beautiful ideal where the idea of art is understood as the totality of art whose infinity is 
reconfirmed with the appearance of every new work, and Goethe’s concept of beautiful 
ideal where the ideal of art is understood as the “organic” unity of art, essentially 
unchangeable and ever-reiterable in its representations, works. The Romantic beautiful 
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ideal is to the idea of the world what Goethe’s beautiful ideal is to the idea of the soul. 
Therefore do both fall short, as should be evident, of the idea of God.) As such, the error 
propagated by the Romantics can be identified, albeit bearing a different shape, in 
Goethe. What Benjamin identifies, indirectly, as the source of these two errors is the 
absence of a concept of content in the Romantics and of form in Goethe. Which means 
that the difference between the “first” symbolic form and the “second”—as well as that 
between the “first” symbolic content and the “second”—is that between form and 
content. 
An attempt to reformulate the categories at stake is therefore necessary. A better 
definition would be: presentational form is a part understood as a totality; pure form, a 
unity understood as totality; presentational content totality understood as plurality; pure 
content, a totality understood as unity; symbolic form, a presentational form (part-as-
totality) as pure form (unity-as-totality), or: part as unity; symbolic content, a pure 
content (totality-as-unity) as presentational content (totality-as-plurality), or: unity as 
plurality. It follows that the symbolic content emerging from the second “as” movement 
in Goethe—namely, the one wherein the composite sound bee is taken to be the Ur-
phenomenal sound “in” nature, the symbolic content which would itself be natural, as if 
nature composed itself—is, in truth, the symbolic form. This while the symbolic form 
emerging from the second “as” movement in the Romantics wherein “art” is conceived as 
a totality, as poetry or prose, is no more than the poem’s symbolic content. 
Finally is the sought-after rapprochement between Goethe and the Romantics reached. 
The initial figuration of the Romantic theory of art found critique in the building of a 
bridge between the two extreme poles towards a third “medial” term which it, naturally, 
presupposed. Its Goethean counterpart precluded critique by positing the “work” as this 
very medial term from which is built and which builds two separate bridges, for each of 
the two content-extremes. Put another way, the Romantics assumed there to be an infinite 
intention of the two terms towards one another, one existing ab origine and having no 
final end—an infinite intention called critique. Goethe, by contrast, believed in a finite 
coincidence between the two terms, a coincidence echoing the one there ab origine but 
entirely out of reach—where the finite coincidence is understood as the work. The 
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realignment achieved (or: intimated) by Benjamin allows for the separation of form 
(finite intention and finite coincidence) from content (infinite intention and infinite 
coincidence) and therefore the non-synthesis or non-system of the Romantic and 
Goethean theories of art. It therefore also allows for the positing of artistic creation 
(privileged by Goethe) as critique (privileged by the Romantics) and vice versa. This will 
take the form, in the writings that follow his dissertation, of outlining a Goethean concept 
of critique, culminating—if the dissertation is to be understood as his Critique of Pure 
Reason—in the essay “Goethe’s Elective Affinities,” his Critique of Practical Reason. It 
would only be appropriate to understand The Origin of German Tragic Drama and One-
Way Street, Benjamin’s simultaneously published 1928 books, as the two critiques 
making up his Critique of Judgment. 
4.4 Kinship + Material Content + Truth Content 
(Erato, Clio, Calliope) 
Distinct from both analogy and similarity, Verwandtschaft means to echo the 
Verwandlung of yore, so that it may be understood as “partaking in the same transition,” 
a synonym, therefore, of Beziehung where each side draws the other with it wherever it 
may go: as do wife and husband (an example of an “elective kinship”) or parents and 
children (a “blood kinship”).561 By beginning “Goethe’s Elective Kinships” with 
differentiating between Sachgehalt and Wahrheitsgehalt, Benjamin is from the first 
making the argument that these two “elements” of the work have an elective kinship. 
Hence, if analogy “is a scientific, rational principle” which relies on the notion of 
“causality,”562 it would allow for the Gehalt, or seal, to be deduced from the Sache by 
means of a material cause—“the material of the wax” or “insight into its [the Sache’s] 
subsistence”—a final cause—“the goal of the fastening” or “exploration of its 
destination”—or a formal cause—“the signet (in which one finds concave what in the 
                                                 
561 Walter Benjamin, “Analogy and Relationship,” trans. Rodney Livingstone, in Selected 
Writings, Volume 1, 1913-1926, ed. Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, MA: 
The Belknap Press, 1996), 208. (Translation modified.) 
562 Ibid., 207. 
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seal is convex)” or “premonition of its content.”563 That, instead, the Gehalt of the Sache 
is accessible only “by someone who has had the experience of sealing and becom[e] 
evident only to the person who knows the name that the initials merely indicate” or “in 
the philosophical experience of its divine imprint, evident only to the blissful intuition of 
the divine name,”564 is in precise accordance to kinship “which can be immediately heard 
only in feeling.”565 Put differently, analogy “is a metaphorical similarity,” a “similarity of 
relations.”566 Similarity proper, on the other hand, is a “nonmetaphorical” similarity 
between substances, or of substance, manifesting itself as an “identity of certain 
relations” belonging to the two terms at stake.567 Where similarity “shows itself to rise 
above analogy […] it [is] the herald of kinship.”568 What similarity’s achieved 
superiority over analogy would entail, then, is the victory of an identity of relations over 
a similarity of relations. It is in this way that kinship, despite being only accessible 
immediately to feeling, may nevertheless “be rigorously and modestly conceptualized in 
the ratio.”569 
In the context of the dissertation, “the conflation of analogy and kinship,” one that is “an 
utter perversion” typical of “the sentimentalist,”570 is committed by both the Romantics 
and by Goethe. While the Romantics regard “analogy as the principle of a kinship,” 
namely that between art and ur-phenomenal nature, turning the “knowledge of nature” 
into the model proper to the “knowledge of art,” Goethe takes kinship “for the principle 
of an analogy,” an analogy between knowledge and the natural object, making the 
                                                 
563 Walter Benjamin, “Goethe’s Elective Affinities,” trans. Stanley Corngold, in Selected Writings, 
Volume 1, 1913-1926, ed. Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, MA: The 
Belknap Press, 1996), 299-300. (Translation modified.) 
564 Ibid. (Translation modified.) 
565 Benjamin, “Analogy and Relationship,” 208. (Translation modified.) 
566 Ibid., 207. (Translation modified.) 
567 Ibid. 
568 Ibid., 208. (Translation modified.) 
569 Ibid. (Translation modified.) 
570 Ibid., 208-9. (Translation modified.) 
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“knowledge of art” the model proper to the “knowledge of nature.”—In the context of the 
Goethe essay, on the other hand, Sachgehalt and Wahrheitsgehalt have a kinship similar 
to “the marriage of heaven and hell,” one accessible not by confusion with analogy but by 
the purification of analogy through similarity. 
To be clear, the relationship that Benjamin outlines between these two terms in the first 
paragraphs of his essay is like the marriage between a husband and a wife. Although 
“united at the beginning of a work’s history”—the “truth content [being] bound up with 
its material content,” if the work is significant, “unseemingly and intimately”—the two 
“set themselves apart from each other in the course of [the work’s] duration,” material 
content “com[ing] to the fore” “to the same extent” as “the truth content […] remains 
hidden.”571 It is perhaps truth content that should be read as the husband while material 
content as the wife.572 What sets them apart are “the Realia in the work” which “rise up 
before the eyes of the beholder all the more distinctly the more they die out in the 
world.”573 Although “[c]ritique seeks the truth content of a work of art” while 
“commentary, its material content,” the material content’s appearance over the truth 
content results in the former’s interpretation “becom[ing] a prerequisite for any later 
critic” such that he must “begin with commentary.”574 Only in this commentary does the 
“invaluable criterion of his judgment” suddenly spring out for the critic; “only now can 
he put the critical ground-question of whether the semblance of the truth content is to the 
material content or the life of the material content is to the truth content indebted.”575 
Since, as husband and wife set themselves apart, “they decide on the work’s 
immortality.”576 
                                                 
571 Benjamin, “Goethe’s Elective Affinities,” 297. (Translation modified.) 
572 Which would give a sexual valence to the line “the works [read: marriages] that prove 
enduring are precisely those whose truth content [read: husband] is most deeply sunken in their 
material content [read: wife],” Ibid. 
573 Ibid. (Translation modified.) 
574 Ibid., 297-8. 




The old-fashioned story of marriage that Benjamin thus puts forth is one in which a 
young married couple is ever in one another’s company, but, with time, with the passing 
of their prime, the wife makes more and more of a social appearance while the husband 
remains more and more in hiding. It is therefore with the interpretation of the wife that 
the critic must begin so as to get at the husband, until suddenly the critical question 
emerges: whether he appears only because she forces him, and she is vibrant only 
because he gives her the means for it. It is this question which answers that pertaining to 
the immortality of their marriage. For, an answer in the negative would be that they are 
independent enough of each other to bring their marriage to an end. Yet another reading 
is possible, however, within the limits of “marriage,” one wherein the truth content is the 
genuine feeling felt by a couple while the material content is the couple’s expressed 
feeling. Although, at the beginning of a marriage, there is an intimate and unapparent 
connection between “true feelings” and “feelings expressed,” the passing out of the world 
of acts of romance between the two lovers throws light on those words that the two use to 
express their affection in public. In this way, the true feelings they have for one another 
become more and more concealed while their words of love stick out more and more. To 
get to the true feelings, then, the critic has to assess their expressions of love. The 
criterion of his judgment thus arises: whether the appearance of true feelings is due to 
feelings expressed or the continuance of feelings being expressed is due to true feelings. 
This second illustration naturally leads to conceiving of material content and truth 
content as the form and content of the work, respectively.577 But that these must be 
understood within a wider range: form extending to every sensuous appearance of the 
work, including the work’s materials, subject matter, and “structure,” and content 
encompassing the work’s ultimate meaning. With time, Benjamin argues, the form and 
content of the work are set apart due to the latter’s concealment under the appearance of 
the former, an appearance made possible by the passing out of existence proper to, for 
                                                 
577 Beatrice Hanssen interprets these two terms in a similar key. Beatrice Hanssen, Walter 
Benjamin’s Other History: Of Stones, Animals, Human Beings, and Angels (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1998), 88. 
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instance, the work’s subject matter.578 As long a certain set of Realia exists in the world 
and the work at once, it’s impossible to consider the relationality of this set within the 
work. With its death, the field is open to commentary in its concern for establishing the 
form of the work—that is, the readability or perceiveability of the work. In this context 
the criterion of whether the content appears due to the form or the form has life due to the 
content emerges. It is the critical question: the critic looks as if upon the commentator’s 
operation, observing whether the latter leads, even for a split second, to the appearance of 
the content, and whether the commentator’s task can or can’t come to an end, after which 
the work’s content can be definitively settled. For the immortality of the work depends on 
whether or not the work’s form and content can undergo a continual separation—implicit 
to which being that they don’t ever become absolutely separate. In this sense, the life of 
the work is to be defined as the separation that the work undergoes between its form and 
content. 
While the material content functions as the form of the work, in the world it is rather the 
content of the Realia. The Gehalt of the Sache, however, is non-deducible: an 
investigation of the Sache yields not its Gehalt. Only a philosophical experience of its 
divine imprint, of, that is, the consequence of that act wherein “the most essential 
contents of existence”—or “the divine name”—“imprint themselves on the thing-
world,”579 can yield the material content. Insofar as “the achieved insight into the 
material content of subsisting things […] coincides with insight into their truth content,” 
making the “truth content […] that of the material content,”580 “divine imprint” is to be 
read as the material content while “divine name” as the truth content. In the world, then, 
a Sache is imprinted by a Gehalt, leaving the former with a Sachgehalt, a coincidence of 
the phenomenal Sache and the spiritual Gehalt, such that the Wahrheitsgehalt refers 
exclusively to the latter term and is thus not “the content of the matter” as much as the 
Gehalt per se. That a philosophical experience of this Sachgehalt was possible previous 
                                                 
578 Or: the societal/literary norms represented in/use by the work. 
579 Benjamin, “Goethe’s Elective Affinities,” 298. 
580 Ibid., 300. 
210 
 
to the Enlightenment means that it could be intuited in the mark of the expressionless—of 
that which resists human language insofar as it is divine Word—that the Sache bears.581 
But that this only holds for the thing-world. Where works of art are at stake, on the other 
hand, “the striving for immediacy”—philosophical experience of the divine imprint, 
“blissful intuition of the divine name”—is nowhere more misguided, it being necessary 
that “the study of the matter and its destination, like the premonition of its content, […] 
precede each and every experience.”582 This is simply owing to the fact that works have 
not undergone any “divine imprinting” with their coming into being,583 meaning that, at 
their inception, they are entirely destitute of a material content: this is why, although 
called Sachgehalt, it is, for the work, its form.584 At its origin, the work is merely a 
collection of Realia, or the image of a Sache, a collection or image that isn’t yet 
distinguishable in its own right from the world, and whose truth content is identical to 
that of these Realia. As the worldly Realia “die out,” however, they make visible the 
artistic Realia while pushing the work’s truth content (previously accessible by way of 
the worldly Realia’s divine imprint) into obscurity. This allows for commentary: the 
                                                 
581 Furthermore, this expressionlessness typical of thing-language is particularly accessible with 
the Sache’s death, past which, unlike man, it becomes entirely mute. In this sense, the 
philosophical experiences caused by the dying out of wordly Realia do necessarily precede 
commentary. Moreover, the ground of commentary is death. 
582 Ibid. (Translation modified.) 
583 “[T]he work of art has not been ‘created.’ It has sprung from something; those without 
understanding may wish to call it something that has ‘arisen’ or ‘become’; but it is not a ‘created’ 
thing under any circumstances. For a created object is defined by the fact that its life—which is 
higher than that of what has ‘spring’ from something—has a share in the intention of redemption. 
An utterly unrestricted share. Nature (the theatre of history) still possesses such a share, to say 
nothing of humanity, but the work of art does not.” Walter Benjamin, “Categories of Aesthetics,” 
trans. Rodney Livingstone, in Selected Writings, Volume 1, 1913-1926, ed. Marcus Bullock and 
Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1996), 220. “Form arises in the realm 
of unfathomability, but a created object is created out of nothing. […] Created being and 
configuration, artifact and form: these are related to each other as what has been created is related 
to what has sprung into being.” Ibid., 221. 
584 The Enlightenment’s complete ignorance of material content—this age’s alienation from the 
notion of a “divine imprinting,” the fact that “the search for such a thing [the material content] 
was foreign to them [Goethe’s contemporaries],” “the poverty of th[e] material contents” of the 
experience proper to Kant and Basedow’s age—could, from Benjamin’s viewpoint, be expressed 
as this age’s insistence that the thing-world is man-made, that it is an artwork. Ibid., 298. 
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study of the artistic Realia and their Bestimmung, lead by a premonition of the work’s 
material content. As more and more worldly Realia pass out of existence and artistic 
Realia are investigated further, the work grows, obtaining a material content. But, where 
for Sache the disclosure of the Sachgehalt meant also that of the Wahrheitsgehalt, the 
same is not true for the work: the latter’s truth content can’t be the truth content of its 
material content, but only to its material content, seeing that the latter is, rather, its 
material form. An extra step is therefore necessary, namely, that of critique. Its function 
is precisely one of deciding on the inter-dependence of the work’s material form and truth 
content, the affirmative version therewith giving the work the stamp of the expressionless 
and turning, alchemically, what was material form into material content. 
If analogy governed the relation between artistic Realia and the work’s truth content at 
the work’s origin, and similarity that between the work’s Realia and its obscure truth 
content in the realm of commentary, then only with critique is the work’s material 
content akin to its truth content. In the thingly realm, this last relation is known as a 




The “expressionless,” whose stamp renders an artwork “true,” is an eminently ambiguous 
term in Benjamin. It has, that is, a double meaning: both “what does not express 
anything,” as in an expressionless face, and “what does not have a corresponding 
expression,” as in something that’s inexpressible. Put differently, it has a formal meaning 
and a contentual meaning, respectively. It’s to be expected that the first of these two 
makes a prominent appearance towards the end of “The Concept of Criticism,” where 
Benjamin baptizes it with the name “prose” or “the prosaic” and characterizes it, by way 
of Hölderlin, as effectuating “austere sobriety”585 by virtue of its mechanical-calculable, 
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reiterable,586 unemotional, unaffected aspect as well as its non-specificity. Its prominence 
is due to the fact that it solves the confusion that the Romantic theory of art threatens to 
fall into—the confusion, namely, between the pure and the empirical that emerges when 
the Romantics posit the novel as the idea of art. Thus does the conclusion that “[t]he idea 
of poetry [and therefore of art] is prose” furnish “the real meaning of the theory of the 
novel, which only in this way is understood in its deep intention and freed of an 
exclusively empirical reference to Wilhelm Meister.”587 Given that Benjamin defines “the 
idea of art” as “the medium of absolute reflection of forms,”588 prose should be seen as 
precisely a medium, a middle term, between the sublime empiricism of intellectual 
intuition (Fichte) and the systematic transcendentalism of discursive thinking (Kant), its 
sobriety being antithetical at once to ecstasy589 and to beauty.590  
Expressing nothing (but itself), prose is, to be clear, both the medium wherein all genuine 
literary artworks are composed and subsist591 and that part of any literary artwork 
wherein it (the work) expresses nothing—wherein it is, to give an example, mere formal 
play or calculation—remaining thereby “indestructible.” Benjamin calls this the “prosaic 
core” of the work, but it can just as easily be dubbed that part of the work wherein “pure 
form” appears. “Critique,” which is itself written in prose and means to be an 
instantiation of austere sobriety (when genuine), aims at no less than the “presentation of 
                                                 
586 As Benjamin quotes Hölderlin as saying claiming that modern poetry lack precisely what it 
requires, namely, that “its procedures can be calculated and taught and, once learned, reliably 
repeated thereafter in practice.” Ibid., 176. Additionally, he claims that it’s “by means of 
mechanical reason […] [that] the work is soberly constituted within the infinite—at the limit 
value of limit forms.” Ibid. 
587 Ibid., 173. 
588 Ibid., 165. 
589 “What dissolves in the ray of irony is illusion alone; but the core of the work remains 
indestructible, because this core consists not in ecstasy, which can be disintegrated, but in the 
unassailable, sober prosaic form.” Ibid., 176. 
590 Beauty is “incompatible with the austere sobriety that, according to the new conception, 
defines the essence of art.” Ibid., 177. 
591 “Prose is the creative ground of poetic forms, all of which are mediated in it and dissolves as 
though in their canonical creative ground.” Ibid., 174. 
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the prosaic kernel in every work”592 by way of testing what survives a process of prosaic 
presentation, a process wherein both ecstasy and beauty are dissolved.593 Given that 
critique is a process of “the destruction of the work” and this prosaic core remains 
indestructible, the former is bound to come to a standstill precisely at the point at which it 
presents the latter. Which is to say that the prosaic core at stake is inherently 
uncriticizeable.—It should be evident that, since more and more of a work becomes 
“prosaic” or “expressionless” over time—having left behind its initial expressiveness—
critique can be described not just as only possible later, but also as this very passage of 
time (the manner in which time passes at the level of artworks, within the medium of art). 
It follows that, insofar as each artwork has a particular expiration date for its 
expressiveness, it contains the germ of its own critique.594  
It’s in this sense that Benjamin employs the term “expressionless” towards the end of 
“Goethe’s Elective Affinities,” in a passage that once more invokes Hölderlin’s concept of 
“occidental Junoian sobriety.”595 Just before he brings in Hölderlin, Benjamin defines the 
expressionless as that which “halts (Einhalt gebietet) this semblance [of life], spellbinds 
this movement, […] interrupts the harmony [of beauty]” and “shatters whatever still 
survives as the legacy of chaos in all beautiful semblance: the false, errant totality—the 
absolute totality”596 whose other name is “beauty.”597 Same as the prosaic is synonymous 
                                                 
592 Ibid., 178. (Translation modified.) 
593 So should be interpreted Benjamin claim that “the concept of ‘presentation’ is understood in 
the chemical sense, as the generation of a substance through a determinate process to which other 
substances are submitted.” Ibid. (Translation modified).  
594 As Benjamin quotes Schlegel, “The work not only judges itself—it also presents itself.” Ibid. 
(Translation modified.) 
595 Benjamin, “Goethe’s Elective Affinities,” 341. 
596 Ibid., 340. 
597 In an earlier fragment that leads up to “Goethe’s Elective Affinities,” Benjamin speaks of “the 
coherent, harmonious totality of beauty” and defines the beautiful as “multiplicity assembled into 
a totality.” Walter Benjamin, “The Theory of Criticism,” trans. Rodney Livingstone, in Selected 
Writings, Volume 1, 1913-1926, ed. Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, MA: 
The Belknap Press, 1996), 218-9.   
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with—and leads to—“a thoughtful and collected posture” or “infinite mindfulness,”598 so 
the expressionless arrests aesthetic enjoyment, the suspension of disbelief—or, better put: 
the flowing, intoxicating harmony that reigns in expressiveness. The expressionless, 
Benjamin concludes, must therefore be identified with Hölderlin’s concept of the 
“caesura,” which—as he quotes Hölderlin—is a “counter-rhythmic rupture” that “meet[s] 
the onrushing change of representations at its highest point” such that “not the change of 
representation but the representation itself very soon appears.”599 Within the caesura, 
“every expression simultaneously comes to a standstill, in order to give free reign to an 
expressionless force inside all artistic media.”600 In this sense, then, expressionless prose, 
or the expressionless as “that which does not express anything (but itself),” is the 
resistance of the medium itself, the purely formal element of the work,601 which—in the 
terms Benjamin uses in his dissertation—at once dissolves illusion and delimits the 
work—a delimitation which, in the Goethe essay, takes the form of prohibiting the work 
of art from “seem[ing] wholly alive, in a manner free of spell-like enchantment” and thus 
“ceasing to be a work of art.”602—Finally, if Benjamin gives the expressionless, the 
prosaic core lying within all artistic media, a seemingly active role within this passage, 
this is insofar as it also refers to and includes the act of critique immanent to every work 
of art, it (the expressionless) being specifically described by Benjamin as a “critical 
force.”603  
The second way of understanding the “expressionless,” namely as the inexpressible, as 
what cannot be expressed or lacks any adequate expression, imposes itself due to the fact 
that Benjamin’s sole philosophical use of the term “expression”—prior to “Goethe’s 
Elective Affinities” (and its corresponding fragments)—appears in the “On Language” 
                                                 
598 Benjamin, “The Concept of Criticism,” 175. 
599 Benjamin, “Goethe’s Elective Affinities,” 340-1. 
600 Ibid., 341. (Translation modified.) 
601 Form being precisely that which “enchants chaos momentarily into the world.” Ibid., 340. 
602 Ibid. 
603 Ibid. (Translation modified.) 
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essay, in the particular context of the conflict waged within all linguistic formation, 
between, namely, “what is expressed and expressible and what is inexpressible and 
unexpressed.”604 In this apophatic sense, it can also be said to appear in the “epilogue” to 
the dissertation, specifically as the ur-phenomenona, archetypes, or pure contents which, 
according to Benjamin, should be seen as incapable of being “found in any work”—
works being, in turn, incapable of “attain[ing] to those invisible […] but intuitable […] 
archetypes”—but capable, after all, of becoming visible in art “after the fashion of a 
likeness,” while “in the nature of the world” they remain “present but hidden (that is, 
overshadowed by what appears).”605 Since, as is later communicated in “Goethe’s 
Elective Affinities,” the German bard employs “nature” in an ambiguous manner, 
“designat[ing] […] at once the sphere of perceptible phenomena and that of intuitable 
archetypes” and thus allows “the ur-phenomena as archetype too often [to] tur[n] into 
nature as model,” Benjamin’s insistence, in the dissertation, on the inexpressibility of the 
ur-phenomena parallels his insistence on expressionless prose: it resolves the 
“contamination of the pure domain and the empirical domain”606 to which Goethe’s 
theory is equally prone by virtue of the privilege it accords to genius and myth.  
In fact, as is intimated in a fragment that precedes the writing of the dissertation, for 
Benjamin, “expressionless prose” and the “inexpressible ur-phenomena” are inter-
dependent, are two halves of the same matrix. For, if the “[e]ternal content” are “those 
metaphysical appearances that cannot manifest primarily linguistically, whose originary 
essence is counter-posed contradictorily to the linguistic in the sense of the out-spokens 
and the out-speakables,” then “prose [is] its proper secondary linguistic form-of-
expression.”607 It can only be in this sense, then, that ur-phenomena can become visible 
                                                 
604 Walter Benjamin, “On Language as Such and the Language of Man,” trans. Edmund Jephcott, 
in Selected Writings, Volume 1, 1913-1926, ed. Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings 
(Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1996), 66. 
605 Benjamin, “Concept of Criticism,” 180-1. 
606 Benjamin, “Goethe’s Elective Affinities,” 314-5. 
607 “[e]wiger Gehalt […] sind daher metaphysischen Erscheinungen welche nicht primär 
sprachlich auftreten können, deren ursprüngliches Wesen knotradiktorisch der sprachlichen 
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in art “after the fashion of a likeness”—the inexpressible, namely, being expressed in art 
there where the prosaic expressionless reigns supreme. And this is no less than what 
Benjamin implicitly argues at the beginning of the third section of “Goethe’s Elective 
Affinities.” Therein, he speaks of the work’s truth content as being “the business of 
critique” to excavate, but claims that critique must always “stop short” of—come to a halt 
vis-à-vis, in the same manner as beautiful semblance is halted by the prosaic 
expressionless— formulating it—of, in other words, expressing it.608 Consequently, 
where critique remains expressionless, and therefore—following its nature—where it 
encounters and presents the expressionless prosaic core of the work, the part of it that’s 
pure form, there it also manages to point towards the inexpressible truth content, 
archetype, or pure content of the work.  
Simply put, the expressionless, by its very ambiguity, implicitly manages a short-circuit 
between the Romantics’ pure form and Goethe’s pure content, resolving the very problem 
that Benjamin poses in the “epilogue” of his dissertation. It is no less than the non-
synthesis between form and content—which is to say: their co-existence such that the 
purest instance of one intimates the purest instance of the other. This is precisely what 
Benjamin means when he claims that “[t]he expressionless [understood as: the prosaic] 
while unable to separate semblance [understood as: expressivity] from essence 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
Schicht im Sinne des Ausgesprochenen und Aussprechbaren […] entgegengesetzt ist”; “die Prosa 
[ist] seine einzige sprachliche sekundäre Ausdrucksform.” Walter Benjamin, “Die Form und der 
Gehalt,” in Gesammelte Schriften VI, ed. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991), 125-6. 
608 “The ideal of the problem […] does not appear in a multiplicity of problems. Rather, it lies 
buried in a manifold of works, and its excavation is the business of critique. The latter allows the 
ideal of the problem to appear in the work of art in one of its manifestations. For critique 
ultimately shows in the work of art the virtual possibility of formulating the work’s truth content 
as the highest philosophical problem. That before which it stops short, however—as if in awe of 
the work, but equally from respect for the truth—is precisely this formulation itself.” Benjamin, 
“Goethe’s Elective Affinities,” 334. After all, as Benjamin will say later in the essay, “[a]rtistic 
creation neither ‘makes’ anything out of chaos nor permeates it; and one would be just as unable 
to engender semblance, as conjuration truly does, from elements of that chaos. This is what the 
formula produces.” Ibid., 340. 
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[understood as: the inexpressible] in art, prevents them from mingling”609: that is, that 
sober prose is no less than the prohibition on the inexpressible being empirically and 
immediately expressed in art. And this is, further, the very dictum of existential writing, 
such that it should come as no surprise that these two meanings of the “expressionless” 
co-exist in the “Letter on Buber,” where precisely the most “objective and sober manner 
of writing,” which performs “the crystal-pure elimination of the unsayable in language,” 
is what allows for the “sphere of the wordless [to] revea[l] itself in its unsayably pure 
power.”610 For, the existential writer is precisely he who, in the name of “detached 
attachment” and “inner dialogue,” refuses all “expressions” and “expressivity”—jargon, 
ready-made formulations and formulas, a harmonious and prefigured structure—at the 
risk of losing the movement of thought and falling into non-sense. After all, that 
“something beyond the poet”—the expressionless caesura, the medium of writing itself—
“interrupts the language of poetry”611 is the constant and continual experience of the 
existential writer vis-à-vis his own language. If his writing should nonetheless be 
described as poetic, it is strictly in this prosaic, sober, interruptive sense. 
 
 
                                                 
609 Ibid. 
610 Walter Benjamin, “To Martin Buber (Munich, July 1916),” in The Correspondence of Walter 
Benjamin, 1910-1940, ed. Gershom Scholem and Theodore W. Adorno, trans. Manfred R. 
Jacobson and Evelyn M. Jacobson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 80. 
611 Benjamin, “Goethe’s Elective Affinities,” 341. 
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Chapter 5  
5 Breviary of Ideas: The “Epistemo-Critical Prologue” 
(A Contribution) 
5.1 Name Capital 
1. The apparent difficulty of Benjamin’s “theory” of ideas originates from its necessarily 
linguistic nature. It is unsurprising, then, that the “linguistic turn” did away with the 
esteem of any such theory altogether. For, the idea as a transcendent archetype, a 
transcendental rule, a unity of concept and reality, present in the mind, constitutive of 
reason, or accessible to “visions,” is merely a higher type of concept, a figment of the 
mind that even a slight consciousness of language would dispel. At the same time, its 
replacements, as linguistic figures, whether Da-sein or différance, are merely higher 
signs, neologisms themselves held up by higher concepts and themselves depose-able by 
a proper understanding of language, albeit one more attentive. To hold that language is 
itself “the” theory of ideas is what lends the “Prologue” its originality. 
 The rationalist or idealist is a hermit, a stoic bookworm anesthetically sequestered .א
from the world. His antipode is the empiricist or materialist, the worldly merchant 
skeptical of anything that he himself has not encountered. Atween them the philologist 
or linguist pendulates. For in his cubicle, throughout a book, upon a page, atop his 
desk, he sees the universe entire, and what within the world he meets he reads and 
colligates. 
2. A feature particular to German—and, furthermore, to the baroque612—can shine a light 
on Benjamin’s “ideas” from the outset: the capitalization of all nouns and of all 
                                                 
612 “With the baroque, the place of the capital letter was established in German orthography. It is 
not only the aspiration to pomp, but at the same time the disjunctive, atomizing principle of the 
allegorical approach which is asserted here. Without any doubt many of the words written with an 
initial capital at first acquired for the reader an element of the allegorical. In its individual parts 
fragmented language has ceased merely to serve the process of communication, and as a new-
born object acquires a dignity equal to that of gods, rivers, virtues, and similar natural forms 
219 
 
nominalized words.613 As such, German can be considered an allegorical language or a 
language whose nouns are all names. Put differently, a language wherein “noun” sheds its 
technical meaning as a part of speech and becomes once more a name, a nōmen—namely, 
for “name.” Naturally, this capitalization is visible only from without German, from the 
viewpoint of another language, in the act of translation, such that Benjamin’s “idea” is to 
be defined not only as a name, but, in the sense appropriate to the “Translation” essay, as 
a pure name.614  
3. It follows that an illustration of “idea” can be offered by the capitalization, in English, 
of any non-capitalized noun: for instance, Dog.615 As Benjamin puts it: 
The being beyond all phenomenality, to which alone this force belongs, is that of 
the name. This determines the giveness of ideas. But they are not so much given in 
an ur-language as in an ur-hearing, in which words posses their naming nobility, 
unlost to knowing meaning. […] The idea is a linguistic thing, it is, in the essence 
of any word, the element in which it is a symbol. In empirical hearing, in which 
words have disintegrated, they possess, in addition to their more or less hidden, 
symbolic side, an obvious, profane meaning. It is the business of the philosopher to 
reinstate, through presentation, the primacy of the symbolic character of the word, 
in which the idea comes to self-consciousness, and that is the opposite of all 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
which fuse into the allegorical.” Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. 
John Osborne (London: Verso, 1998), 208. For more on the role of capitalization in Benjamin’s 
reading of German baroque plays, see Jane O. Newman, Benjamin’s Library: Modernity, Nature, 
and the Baroque (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), 88-111. 
613 Benjamin implicitly says this in the “Prologue” itself when referring to the “capital-coinages 
of philosophical reflections.” Benjamin, Origin, 37. (Translation modified.) 
614 See Walter Benjamin, “The Task of the Translator,” trans. Harry Zohn, in Selected Writings, 
Volume 1, 1913-1926, ed. Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, MA: The 
Belknap Press, 1996), 253-63. 
615 Given that there are two “dog” constellations, Canis Major and Canis Minor, the example is 
not altogether incidental. Similarly, Benjamin uses “bread” as an example in the “Translation” 
essay with an implicit allusion to the Eucharist. 
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outwardly-directed imparting. […] this can only happen through a recollection that 
first of all goes back to ur-hearing. […] [I]n philosophical contemplation, the idea 
is released from the heart of reality as the word, reclaiming its naming rights.616  
In short, the transition from “dog” to “Dog” both effectuates and depends on the profane 
meaning’s disappearance. This doesn’t entail, however, that “dog” is to become a mere 
sign, the skeleton of a word, as Benjamin coins it in his homonymous fragment, for, as 
“Dog,” it lies not in the empirical domain but in the original, ur domain while the 
skeleton is “the empirical, self-imposing, grinning ‘meaning’s shine.”617 Instead, to use 
Saussure’s terms, the emergence of “Dog” strips “dog” of its signified and its signifier: 
the mental representation to it corresponding and its grammatical function (as “a” or 
“the”) both fall away. The name answers to a-grammaticality and a-representationality.618 
 Two different types of names are at stake herein: the forename, or ur-name, and the .א
surname, or über-name. Where the former is given, the second is assumed. 
 Only in translation can such a capitalization disclose the idea—herein, from German .ב
to English. And so too, it is in translation that “dog” loses its signifier altogether: dog, 
Hund, chien, cane, câine, no matter. 
 Within German, on the other hand, capitalization can only be exhibited in its .ג
undoing. German accomplishes this in compounds, in subsumptions of the word at 
                                                 
616 Benjamin, Origin, 36-7. (Translation modified.) 
617 “der empirisch sich vordrägende, grisende Bedeutungsschein.” Walter Benjamin, “Das Skelett 
des Wortes,” in Gesammelte Schriften VI, ed. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991), 15. 
618 Such an understanding of the idea as a name lacking “a” and “the” is inspired by Cacciari’s 
own interpretation of the “Prologue,” wherein he claims that “[o]ne communicates with the Angel 
through the intransitivity of the name. If an intransitive dimension of the name gives itself, so that 
the name resonates as the thing itself, without reason or aim, then the idea is representable […] 
there one needs to listen for the sound of the word still living: House, Bridge, Fountain, Door, 
Window, Tree, Tower, Column. One needs to say them in this way as none of ‘these’ things, 
captured in the net of discoursing, has ever in its intimacy imagined itself to be. One needs to say 
each of them as an individual idea.” Massimo Cacciari, “The Problem of Representation,” in The 
Necessary Angel, trans. Miguel E. Vatter (Albany, New York: SUNY Press, 1994), 47-8. 
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hand to genitives. Obtained by another noun, becoming a property or predicate, the 
initial noun loses its ideality and, in this very loss, shows it for the first time. 
 The identity between (pure) name and idea is discoverable not only by tracing their .ר
interaction through Benjamin’s texts, but also by taking Benjamin’s admiration for 
Kant’s “mystical” terminology seriously.619 Thus: noumenon evokes nōmen. Or: 
nōmen is another name for noumen(on). 
5.2 Concept and Idea 
4. Translation is an inter-linguistic manner of presenting the idea. The latter’s intra-
linguistic, monolingual presentation, by contrast, requires an operation on the referents—
that is, on the world of phenomena. More exactly put, if “dog” is not related to the 
German Hund, then it must be related to “really-existing” dogs in order to present the 
Dog-Idea. Phenomena, however, 
do not […] enter into the realm of ideas whole, in their crude empirical state, 
adulterated by semblance, but only in their elements […] They are divested of their 
false unity[.] […] In this their division, phenomena are subordinate to concepts, for 
it is the latter which effect the dissolution of things into the elements. For ideas are 
not presented in themselves, but solely and exclusively in an arrangement of 
thingly elements in the concept: as the configuration of these elements. […] 
[T]hose elements which it is the function of the concept to elicit from phenomena 
are most clearly evident at the extremes. The empirical […] can be all the more 
profoundly understood the more clearly it is seen as an extreme.620 
The operation on the referents that makes present the Idea thus involves (i) the extreat of 
phenomenal dogs from their various living contexts, the suspension of their space-time, 
and, in this state, (ii) their differentiation from cats, mice, humans, plants, tables, chairs, 
                                                 
619 Walter Benjamin, “To Gerhard Scholem [December 7, 1917],” in The Correspondence of 
Walter Benjamin, 1910-1940, ed. Gershom Scholem and Theodore W. Adorno, trans. Manfred R. 
Jacobson and Evelyn M. Jacobson (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1994), 103. 
620 Benjamin, Origin, 33-35. (Translation modified.) 
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the world as a whole, resulting in (iii) the emication of their qualities or predicates—that 
is, their elements. These latter are most evident at the extremes: in the largest dog, the 
smallest dog, the hairiest dog, the loudest dog, the most docile dog, the most colorful dog, 
the most monochromatic dog, and so on. For instance, in Fido, the most loyal dog, 
“loyalty” appears as an element of dogs. The exhibition of the Dog-Idea is therefore 
accomplished as the set of predicates proper to appearing dogs. 
But that, thus defined, the idea and the concept appear indistinct, when, in fact, it is 
erroneous to understand the most universal references which language makes as 
concepts, instead of recognizing them as ideas. It is absurd to attempt to explain 
the universal as an average. The universal is the idea.621 
Their difference hangs not on their source or on their elements, but on their treatment of 
the latter. The dog-concept, the mental representation of the dog, whether subjective or 
conventional, averages out the dog-extremes and thus subsumes the elements of dogs. It 
is the “dog” that’s neither the largest nor the smallest, neither the hairiest nor the most 
hairless, neither the most loyal nor the most disloyal: the “normal” dog, wherein “large,” 
“small,” “hairy,” “hairless,” “loyal,” “disloyal” are all determined in a particular way. As 
a Durchschnitt, a “cutting-through,” the dog-concept is Procrustean. It is the intersection 
of dogs, the set of predicates common to dogs.622 
The idea, by contrast, is the unadulterated juxtaposition of the elements of dogs, of the 
extremes in which these elements are visible. Thus does it include every variety of dog, 
being that through which the most dissimilar of dogs relate, the “set” of those elements 
(of dogs) that are excluded from the intersection (of dogs).623 It follows that the Dog-Idea 
                                                 
621 Ibid., 35. 
622 Reading Durchschnitt as “intersection” in the set-theoretical sense, as a set containing the 
elements common to two or more sets. Evidently, everything lying outside the intersection(al set) 
is “cut off.” Given the “All” in “Allgemeine,” even certain dogs, deemed too far outside the 
“normal,” can be excepted. 




appears both before and after the dog-concept—as the disordinate preceding it and the 
superordinate exceeding it—albeit only after the conceptualization, or predication, of 
phenomenal dogs.624 Thus are there two different kinds of concepts at stake in 
phenomena’s elemental dissolution: (i) the element-concepts (the qualities-predicates of 
dogs), each of which is an idea on its own, and (ii) the average-concept (of the dog), 
strictly distinct from the (Dog-)Idea. It is to the first that Benjamin refers when he asserts, 
in his first draft of the “Prologue,” that “concepts […] are, therefore, from the perspective 
of the idea, parts of the idea, from the perspective of phenomena, elements of 
phenomena,”625 but to both when claiming that 
[t]hrough their mediating role concepts enable phenomena to participate in the 
being of ideas. It is this same mediating role which fits them for the other equally 
basic task of philosophy, the presentation of ideas. […] The set of concepts which 
assist in the presentation of the idea lend it such a configuration. […] [T]he 
question of how [ideas] are related to phenomena arises. The answer to this is: in 
the representation [read: concept(ualization)] of phenomena.626 
For, element-concepts (“large,” “small,” “hairy,” “hairless”) and the average-concept 
(“dog”) mediate the presentation of the (Dog-)Idea both.—Furthermore, due to the 
elements’ dual nature, as concepts and ideas, the presentation of the (Dog-)Idea appears 
                                                 
624 Samuel Weber claims that “[t]he concept accomplishes this decomposition and dissemination 
[of phenomena’s prexisiting empirical organization] […] by departing from its traditional role of 
establishing sameness […] to discern […] what separates and distinguishes [phenomena] from 
each other” and that “the ‘idea’ […] is [Benjamin’s] term in the ‘Epistemo-critical Preface’ for 
the alternative use to which the concept is to be put.” Samuel Weber, Benjamin’s –abilities 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 7-8. Benjamin, however, speaks of no such 
two “alternative” uses of the concept and by no means considers the idea as something to be 
wielded (at least not in the “Prologue” itself). Which is to say that (i) the idea should by no means 
be understood as a different version of the concept, and (ii) the concept must, in its operation, do 
both: be at once that which differentiates phenomena from one another and that which gathers 
them together in their commonality. The difference can be expressed as that between the process 
(of differentiation) and the final product (of sameness). 
625 “Die Begriffe […] sind eben von der Seite der Idee, her deren Teile, von der Seite der 
Phänomene her deren Elemente.” Walter Benjamin, “Einleitung,” Gesammelte Schriften I, ed. 
Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991), 934. 
626 Benjamin, Origin, 34. (Translation modified.) 
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no different from the presentation of (element-)ideas. More exactly, in the predication of 
dogs, which involves their differentiation from a vast multiplicity of other phenomena, 
various ideas are presented. They are made determinate and turned into mere concepts 
only once they are subsumed by the dog-concept. Nonetheless, to the extent that they 
exceed the latter and present the idea, they are themselves presented. 
Finally, a yet other angle where concept and idea separate and meet appears in the 
consideration that 
phenomena are not incorporated in ideas. They are not contained in them. Ideas 
are, rather, their objective, virtual arrangement, their objective interpretation. […] 
Ideas are to things as constellations are to stars. […] The significance of 
phenomena for ideas is confined to their conceptual elements. Whereas phenomena 
determine the circumference and contents of the concepts which encompass them, 
by their existence, by their commonality, and by their differences, their 
relationship to ideas is the inverse of this inasmuch as the idea, the objective 
interpretation of phenomena—or rather of their elements—determines their 
together-belonging to each other.627 
Or, put differently, while the dog-concept contains-incorporates-encompasses the 
phenomenal dogs, as, namely, their intersection, the Dog-Idea is the “objective 
interpretation” of phenomenal dogs and/or of dogs’ element-concepts. Given that 
“interpretation” here, as inter-phrasis, is to be understood as “translation,”628 the Dog-
Idea is the translation of phenomenal dogs—not their translation into a higher language 
that subsumes them, but the translation between different phenomenal dogs, hence an 
objective or immanent translation.—In sum, this makes the Dog-Idea capable of 
                                                 
627 Ibid. (Translation modified.) 
628 Although the etymology of “pret” (in interpret) is unclear, Benjamin’s attention to 
“periphrasis” in the “Language and Logic” fragment that leads up to the “Prologue” supports its 
reading as deriving from the Greek “phrasis” (speech, expression, idiom). Walter Benjamin, 
“Language and Logic,” trans. Rodney Livingstone, in Selected Writings, Volume 1, 1913-1926, 
ed. Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1996), 274. 
225 
 
preserving phenomenal dogs in their singularity while saving them, namely, from their 
transience, from their inevitable passage out of existence. Herein, singularity and 
extremity coincide. For it is, after all, the most extreme cases (the tallest dog, the hairiest 
dog, the most hairless dog, the most beautiful dog, the ugliest dog, the friendliest dog) 
which are most evidently transient, unrepeatable, and therefore indigent of redemption. 
What the latter proffers phenomena is a part in eternity, the being of ideas.629 
 The manner in which several ideas—herein called element-ideas—organize .א
themselves around a central idea is entirely consistent with Plato’s theory. For that 
which is regarded as the ultimate idea and toward which all other ideas are inclined 
changes from one Platonic dialogue to another: in the Symposium—Beauty; in The 
Republic—Justice; and in Parmenides—the One. 
5. It should be evident then that the monolingual, intra-linguistic presentation of the idea 
is still a form of translation, which is to say that it isn’t monolingual after all. This raises 
the possibility of including within “phenomena” those of the linguistic sort. Thus, chien, 
cane, câine, Hund, and “dog” are all phenomena which, in their intersection, or, better 
yet, in translation, allow for the presentation of the Dog-Idea, existing in no particular 
language, but in all of them at once—like the day exists in all places at once, as one of 
Plato’s metaphors for the idea goes.630 Certainly, translation commonly understood 
occurs between two languages, between, for instance, “dog” and Hund. The process of 
conceptualization, the extraction of conceptual elements or elemental concepts, occurs 
through the analysis of differences and similarities between the connotations, denotations, 
grammatical functions, and usage, to name only a few facets, of “dog” and those of 
Hund. The meaning of “dog” and that of Hund are compared and made to intersect, but 
                                                 
629 In his 1923 letter to Rang, Benjamin terms this extreme-singular, which is to be redeemed in 
the idea’s presentation, “creaturely life”: “The task of interpreting works of art is to gather 
creaturely life in the ideas. To establish the presence of that life.” Walter Benjamin, “Letter to 
Florens Christian Rang,” trans. Rodney Livingstone, in Selected Writings, Volume 1, 1913-1926, 
ed. Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1996), 389. 
(Translation modified.) 
630 Plato, “Parmenides,” trans. Mary Louise Gill and Paul Ryan, in Complete Works, ed. John M. 
Cooper (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), 365. 
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first of all evinced. The elements from which the first is composed surface especially at 
the extremes, in the most extreme use of “dog,” in its most remote denotations and 
connotations, where, from the viewpoint of grammar, it brushes up against non-sense, the 
same being true of Hund. The elements of each that intersect constitute the concept, the 
sense common to “dog” and Hund, that which is commonly regarded as “translate-able.” 
What falls outside this “common” sense, on the other hand—the elements that lie outside 
its intersection—are nonetheless juxtaposed by this sense, and in this state present the 
“untranslate-able” Dog-Idea, the pure name “for” dog. 
Thus are there two symmetrical translations at stake in the idea’s presentation: that 
between and from (the languages of) things, and that between and from (the languages of) 
words. It should be evident that these need occur in one and the same movement.631 
Which means, put briefly, that the phenomenal dogs are, in their presentation of the Dog-
Idea, given, or conceived as, proper names (whether “that dog” and “this dog,” “dog A” 
and “dog B,” or “Fido” and “Lassie”). In both cases, the concept and the idea serve as 
mediators rather than as objects of translation. But while the concept operates between 
and above phenomenal dogs or dog-words—leading to a one-sided vertical translation of 
phenomenal dogs into “dog” or “dog” into phenomenal dogs, depending on the starting 
point—the idea takes effect between phenomenal dogs or dog-words and the dog-concept 
itself, be it a dog-word or a phenomenal dog, respectively. Put differently, unlike the 
concept, the idea never hypostatizes into a word or a phenomenon. It is the coincidence 
of word and phenomenon, and the difference ‘twixt phenomenon and concept. 
5.3 Bastard Reasoning 
6. The presentation of the idea is therefore, vis-à-vis induction and deduction, 
“neither…nor” and “both…and.”632 For, 
                                                 
631 Only so does “ur-hearing” coincide with the presentation of ideas through the 
conceptualization of phenomena. 
632 “It [the khôra] oscillates between two types of oscillation: the double exclusion (neither/nor) 
and the participation (both this and that).” Jacques Derrida, “Khōra,” trans. Ian McLeod, in On 
the Name, ed. Thomas Dutoit (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 91. 
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[w]hereas induction reduces ideas to concepts by failing to arrange and order them, 
deduction does the same by projecting them into a pseudo-logical continuum. […] 
This consideration would seem to do away with the distinction between the 
quaestio juris and the quaestio facti as far as the highest objects of philosophy [that 
is, ideas] are concerned. This much is indisputable and inevitable.633 
To be clear, in Kant, the quaestio juris is a manner of authenticating the concept by way 
of deduction. For instance, “unity” appears an empty abstraction as long as a logical 
deduction that establishes what it refers to—as something within thought, as one of its 
categories—is not realized. On the other hand, the quaestio facti is a manner of 
authenticating the concept by way of induction, which is to say, by way of referring to a 
phenomenon as an example of it: “dog” is confirmed by pointing to a phenomenal dog. 
Evidently, the former means to be used for pure concepts while the latter for empirical 
concepts.634 A parallel to Benjamin’s opposition between Goethe and the Romantics is at 
work herein. For it is precisely Goethe that follows the method of induction in his 
treatment of the ur-phenomenon as something he could have direct insight into by 
looking at nature, and the Romantics that solely employ deduction, presuming that they 
can extract a work’s idea from a concept-continuum. The idea’s presentation, however, 
must by necessity involve both levels indiscernibly and can be called, following the 
meaning of this term in Plato’s Timaeus, a “bastard”—or “hybrid”—reasoning. 
 The term “bastard,” nothō, in “bastard reasoning” means to say, moreover, that the .א
reasoning at stake is born out of wedlock, is born of an illegal union. This reasoning 
therefore mixes induction and deduction, perception and understanding, the empirical 
and the ideal, in a manner that is itself without understanding, without concept, 
pattern, or predictability. Precisely for this reason does it therefore appear “bastard” in 
                                                 
633 Benjamin, Origin, 43-46. 
634 See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. 
Wood (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 219-223. 
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the English sense of the word: as if without parents, untraceable back to any 
prototype.635 
7. It follows that another name for idea, as Benjamin understands it, is khôra. Thus, the 
chain connecting khôra, the whole number, monad, and idea has its legitimacy 
confirmed.636 In short, the idea lies between the phenomenon and the concept, as that 
which allows for the passage ‘twixt them while disallowing their confusion. What 
Benjamin thereby effectuates, apart from a reconciliation of Goethe and the Romantics, is 
a mutual transposition of Plato’s theory of ideas and Hegel’s dialectic. As in the latter, 
the idea is where concept and reality are linked, but as in the former, this link is 
ultimately a third term. Which is to say that Benjamin precludes Hegel’s final attempt to 
fuse concept and reality, the “absolute Idea” wherein the two lopsided syntheses of 
concept and reality, called subjectivity (in favor of the concept) and objectivity (in favor 
                                                 
635 Finally, “bastard reasoning” can also be said to be what Gerhard Richter describes as “a 
certain kind of orphanhood, a becoming-orphaned. The one who inherits becomes an orphan. This 
is not only because an inheritance is typically bequeathed in the case of a parent’s, guardian’s or 
elder’s prior death, but also because the price that is paid for inheriting something, including an 
intellectual or immaterial legacy, is to be thrown into the condition of having been left behind, a 
scene of departure and leave-taking, mourning, and the experience of becoming, literally and 
figuratively, orphaned. No inheritance without orphans. Indeed, the primal scene of the Erbsünde, 
which in the Biblical tradition is believed to have set into motion the perpetual sinfulness of 
humankind into which one is born, is inexorably tied to the scene of Adam and Eve’s 
abandonment, the moment in which they are permanently expelled from the Garden of Eden by 
their creator.” Gerhard Richter, Inheriting Walter Benjamin (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 28. 
This becomes more obvious in the subsequent sections wherein the ideas are made visible as 
inherited, and inherited, specifically, from Paradise. 
636 In his “Letter to Rang,” Benjamin links the idea to whole numbers and to the monad in 
claiming that “Leibniz’s entire way of thinking, his idea of the monad, which I adopt for my 
definition of ideas and which you evoke with your equation of ideas and numbers—since for 
Leibniz the discontinuity of whole numbers was of decisive importance for the theory of 
monads—seems to me to comprise the summa of a theory of ideas.” Benjamin, “Letter to Rang,” 
389. At the same time, Giorgio Agamben claims that “mathematics […] moves on a ‘bastard’ 
level, in which quanta of signification—not of words, but of numbers—enable us to keep together 
aporetically intelligible and sensible elements” and “[t]he neutralization of the dichotomy 
between ideas and sensible things [is] made possible by the χώρα,” this being “the condition of 
possibility for geometry and mathematics.” Giorgio Agamben, “On the Sayable and the Idea,” in 
What is Philosophy?, trans. Lorenzo Chiesa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2018), 78-82. 
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of reality), are sublated by a perfect synthesis, the full identity of concept and reality.637 
Against this, the idea is non-synthesis.638 
Keeping in mind that “ideas are not presented in themselves, but solely and exclusively in 
an arrangement of thingly elements in the concept,”639 the idea, like the khôra, must, in 
itself, “be totally devoid of any characteristics,” it must “never in any way whatever 
tak[e] on any characteristic similar to any of the things that enter it,” thus never 
“depart[ing] from its own character in any way,” and this because “its nature is to be 
available for anything to make its impression upon […] to receive in itself all the 
elemental kinds” and be “modified, shaped and reshaped by the things that enter it.”640 
Put differently, the Dog-Idea must be universal, must remain open to all phenomenal-dog 
extremes and thus safe from the determination of any one phenomenal dog. 
Consequently, that an extreme such as Fido may be saved by or within the Dog-Idea does 
not mean that the Dog-Idea is thereafter “similar” to Fido, that Fido becomes a prototype 
which subsequently aids in the presentation of the Dog-Idea, for this would make the 
latter into no more than a concept (subsuming the Fido-concept). As is implicit to this 
example, by redefining the Platonic idea as khôra, Benjamin temporalizes it—not in the 
sense that the idea becomes temporal, that it is somehow “given in the world of 
phenomena,”641 but rather in that it metamorphoses from being non-temporal to being a-
temporal or para-temporal. 
                                                 
637 See Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, “The idea,” in The Science of Logic, trans. George Di 
Giovanni (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 670-75. 
638 The path from khôra to non-synthesis is made possible by the relationship, in Ancient Greek, 
between khôra and khōris, the latter of which means “separately” or “differently.” 
639 Benjamin, Origin, 34. (Translation modified.) 
640 Plato, “Timaeus,” trans. Donald J. Zeyl, in Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper 
(Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), 1253. 
641 Benjamin, Origin, 35. (Translation modified.) The translation reads “Ideas are not among the 
given elements of the world of phenomena,” when it would more accurately read “The ideas are 
not given in the world of phenomena,” following the German, “Die Ideen sind in der Welt der 
Phänomene nicht gegeben.” Walter Benjamin, “Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels,” in 
Gesammelte Schriften I, ed. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser (Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp, 1991), 215. 
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 Evidently, the Dog-Idea must be that wherein phenomenal-dogs appear but which .א
doesn’t itself appear, save within these phenomenal-dogs’ appearance. It follows that 
its presentation requires a suspension of becoming, a halt to the flux of appearances. 
This is made clear in the following quotation that Benjamin extracts from Hölderlin: 
Thereby, in the rhythmic sequence of the representations wherein the transport 
presents itself, there becomes necessary what in poetic meter is called caesura, 
the pure word, the counter rhythmic rupture—namely, in order to meet the 
onrushing charge of representations at its highest point, in such a manner that 
not the change of representations but the representation itself very soon 
appears.642 
 As should be clear from their number, Hegel’s ideas—namely, Life, the Will, and .ב
the Absolute Idea—are modeled on Kant’s own: the World, the Self, and God, 
respectively. Benjamin places God between the World and the Self, wherein it 
functions as their non-synthesis. Thus, every non-synthesis between the world (the 
language of things) and the self (the language of man) is a god (a divine word), that is, 
an idea. 
8. What this means, in short, is that the idea functions as, if not quite a “historical 
category,” a category of history. It’s no wonder then—despite the exclamation mark—
that “Origin is Idea!”643 At the intersection of origin and khôra, the idea appears as “that-
                                                 
642 Quoted in Walter Benjamin, “Goethe’s Elective Affinities,” trans. Stanley Corngold, in 
Selected Writings, Volume 1, 1913-1926, ed. Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings 
(Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1996), 340-41. 
643 “Ursprung ist Idee!” Benjamin, “Einleitung,” 936. This is supplemented by also keeping Peter 
Fenves’ observation that “a word from within the Platonic lexicon that would correspond to 
origin—[…] such a word is readily identifiable: khōra (spacing, receptacle, matrix).” Peter 
Fenves, The Messianic Reduction: Walter Benjamin and the Shape of Time (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2011), 185. It is also important to keep in mind the shift from the terminology 
of “origin” and “fact” to that of “idea” and “phenomenon” towards the end of the “Monadology” 
section of the “Prologue” as well as the opening line of Derrida’s “Khōra”—“Khōra reaches us, 
and as the name.” Derrida, “Khōra,” 89. Moreover, Plato claims that “[i]t is […] appropriate to 
compare the receiving thing to a mother.” Plato, “Timaeus,” 1253. And this while Benjamin 
states that “Ideas […] are the Faustian ‘Mothers.’” Benjamin, Origin, 35. Benjamin, after all, had 
both the Symposium and the Timaeus in mind when composing the “Prologue,” as his “Letter to 
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which-arises (Entspringendes) from coming-into-being and passing-out-of-being,” an 
“eddy in the stream of coming-into-being,” an eddy in whose “rhythm […] the material 
of emergence” is “swallow[ed up].”644 In other words, the Origin-Idea opposes the world 
of becoming-appearance-phenomena, “appearing” only on the margins of the empirical, 
where the latter disintegrates. Just as “[o]rigin […] has […] nothing to do with 
emergence”645 in the sense of being a thing’s first instance, the first appearance of the 
thing, so the Dog-Idea is neither the “first” phenomenal dog—a sensible prototype or 
model of dogs—nor the “first” word for dog, the ur-word for dog in some ur-language no 
longer spoken.646 The Origin-Idea is not forever passed, Entsprungenen, but is, rather, 
still present, still effective, Entspringendes, without thereby being any more apparent.647 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
Rang” attests. Benjamin, “Letter to Rang,” 389. Finally, Fenves himself comes close to 
identifying “name” and “origin” in an earlier essay that broaches Benjamin’s “Prologue”: 
“According to Benjamin […] the infinitude of certain words is the sole object of philosophical 
contemplation. Such words cannot fail to be monadic. Entirely isolated from the communicative 
function of discourse, these words are nevertheless far from static; on the contrary, each one runs 
counter to—and thus springs from—an incessant flow, and this springing forth from the flux of 
‘becoming and passing away’ […] is, according to Benjamin, what is meant by Ursprung 
(origin), regardless of what speakers mean to say when they use this term. The flux of discourse 
is similarly transformed in each monadic word: It no longer succumbs to ‘becoming and passing 
away’ and, instead, retains only its ‘fore- and after-history.’” 80. Peter Fenves, “Of Philosophical 
Style—From Leibniz to Benjamin,” boundary 2 30, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 80. 
644 Benjamin, Origin, 45. (Translation modified.) 
645 Ibid. (Translation modified.) 
646 Although the negation of such a ur-language sounds like a negation of Adamic language, it is 
rather directed at an ur-language which would have been spoken for the sake of communication. 
And therefore still an empirical, or human, language. 
647 Weber claims that “an ‘origin’ is historical in that it seeks to repeat, restore, reinstate 
something anterior to it. In so doing, however, it never succeeds and therefore remains 
‘incomplete, unfinished’ Yet it is precisely such incompleteness that renders origin historical.” 
Weber, Benjamin’s –abilities, 89. This should be seen as a misreading of Benjamin’s definition of 
the origin, however. For, Benjamin doesn’t claim that the origin is itself a restoration and 
something unfulfilled but that its rhythm is only recognize-able thusly—or, that it emerges from 
coming-into-being and passing-out-of-being. 
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In fact, it is through it that phenomena materialize, it being their “receptacle” or 
“wetnurse.”648 Consequently, only in removing phenomena from their becoming, in their 
conceptualization, can the Origin-Idea appear, albeit apophatically, as that which eludes 
the concept. And, simultaneously, in the appearance of the Origin-Idea alone are 
phenomena saved: not as concepts, which are no less subject to becoming, but precisely 
by the “exhibited” inherence of the non-conceptual within them.649 That the Origin-Idea 
is “to be known as restoration and re-establishment, but […] precisely because of this, as 
something incomplete, inconclusive”650 means not that, destined to repeat until it is 
fulfilled, it is marked by becoming in turn. Instead, the Origin-Idea is selfsame in its 
every appearance; that which changes are the “means” by which it appears. Only insofar 
as the latter are incomplete is it characterized by incompleteness, and, so too, by 
repetition. In this sense does “the dialectic which is inherent in origin […] sho[w] one-
time-ness and repetition to be conditioned by one another in all essentials.”651 An 
absolute end to becoming, of which the Origin-Idea is a hint or fragment, would also put 
an end to the latter’s iterability. 
 Another way of understanding the play between singularity and repetition inherent .א
to the idea is as a Sisyphean task. The symbolic primacy of the word is re-established 
by means of the disintegration of phenomena, only to be covered over yet again, due 
to the passage of time, by profane meaning, albeit a different, singular one, which, 
once disintegrated in turn, will itself singularily present the idea and thereby repeat it. 
                                                 
648 Plato, “Timaeus,” 1251. 
649 “Wesenheit des Dinges ist jeweilen das, was ihm unter Absehung von allen Relationen, in 
welchen es gedacht werden könnte, zukommt (‘Essentiality of a thing is always what remains to it 
when one ignores all the relationships in which it could be thought’).” Benjamin, “Einleitung,” 
928. 
650 Benjamin, Origin, 45. (Translation modified.) 
651 Ibid., 46. (Translation modified.) 
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5.4 Preposterous History 
9. It is on the basis of this, the Origin-Idea’s iterability, that phenomena can be related 
across history. The Dog-Idea, for instance, reappears with every proper conceptualization 
of dog-phenomena, and eternalizes, in each such appearance, a different set of (extreme) 
phenomenal-dogs. The phenomenal-dogs “eternalized” in this (present) presentation of 
the Dog-Idea thus join the phenomenal-dogs “eternalized” in that (past) presentation of 
the Dog-Idea. At the same time, the second, past phenomenal-dogs themselves 
“reappear” in this presentation of the Dog-Idea, and both the first and second 
phenomenal-dogs will “reappear” in future presentations of the Dog-Idea. Consequently, 
the conceptualization of present dog-phenomena must be supplemented by an invocation 
of past dog-phenomena (of those that have been saved) in order for the Dog-Idea’s 
presentation to occur. This does not mean, however, that prior dog-concepts must be 
recollected (which is impossible)—but only past dogs, recoverable by way of their proper 
names. Naturally, such remembrance proves difficult at best. Its extension is limited to 
those things that allow for anthromorphism. It is here, therefore, that the importance of 
the artwork surfaces, and here too that the natural object must give place to the aesthetic 
in illustrating the theory of ideas. For, only art preserves phenomena such that they may 
be recollected and, in this sense, can be said to give them proper names of sorts: 
“Monet’s water-lilies,” for instance. This (present) presentation of the Dog-Idea, then, 
will involve the conceptualization of these phenomenal-dogs as well as the invocation of 
“fictional” or “portrayed” dogs, beside which they (the most extreme of them) will 
stand—themselves, in one sense or another, represented.652  
This is what Benjamin means in claiming that “[o]rigin does not stand out from factual 
findings, but […] concerns their pre- and post-history,”653 which “is—as a token of their 
having been redeemed or gathered into the world of ideas—not pure history, but natural 
                                                 
652 Nevertheless, in their conceptualization involving differentiation from all other phenomena, 
the disintegration of dog-phenomena must indeed be supplemented, namely by the 
conceptualization of all other phenomena, especially those closest to them, in order to present the 
Dog-Idea. 
653 Ibid., 46. (Translation modified.) 
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history.”654 By reappearing in every presentation of an idea—or, in short, by participating 
in an idea—saved phenomena have both a pre-history of appearances and the guarantee 
of a post-history. For instance, Don Quixote’s participation in the Novel-Idea bestows 
upon it a pre-history of critical situations655 in which it has appeared and a post-history of 
such situations in which it shall appear, joined, at different times, by Robinson Crusoe, 
Demons, The Trial, and so on—the Novel-Idea being the sole basis on which these novels 
relate to one another, lacking, as they do, that pure, human history of “hereditary 
relationships between successive generations.”656 (For, aesthetic, as much as natural, 
objects, don’t produce or succeed one another; they don’t bear “extensive[,] […] essential 
connections”657 in a continuum.) Granted a pre- and post-history, a novel, “stand[ing] in 
the idea, […] becomes something different: a totality”658: that is, a plurality of 
phenomena, appearing in different situations which are discontinuous from one another, 
considered as a unity.659  
 On the other hand, “fall[ing] under the aegis of the concept,” a novel “remains what .א
it was: an individuality,”660 as in the kind of “art history” which is “no more than the 
history of subject-matters or forms, for which works of art seem to provide merely 
examples or models.”661 It should be clear, then, that such an art history starts from 
the concept, while that which Benjamin demands starts from phenomena, roughly 
                                                 
654 Ibid., 47.  
655 Where “criticism […] [is] the presentation of the idea.” Benjamin, “Letter to Rang,” 389. 
(Translation modified.) 
656 Ibid., 388. 
657 Ibid. 
658 Benjamin, Origin, 46. 
659 See Kant’s definition of “totality.” Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 215.  
660 Benjamin, Origin, 46.  
661 Benjamin, “Letter to Rang,” 388. (Translation modified.) 
235 
 
reproducing Kant’s dichotomy between determinate judgment and reflective 
judgment, respectively.662  
 Apart from phenomena’s salvation, at stake herein is also the syncopated .ב
appearance of ideas. The typical Platonic ideas—Beauty, the Good, Virtue, Love, even 
the Idea itself—don’t have continuity in their presentation. Especially in its latter half, 
the twentieth century marked a decline in their import and investigation, favoring, 
instead, Desire, Difference, and Language, themselves only of relevance in certain 
cultural epochs. More precisely, it’s not the popularity of one term or another that’s in 
question, since, without the mechanism of presentation, used loosely or taken for 
granted, terms such as “difference” and “repetition” are no more than jargon 
expressing (subjective or objective) concepts. Only an analysis of the sort present in 
Deleuze’s eponymous magnum opus truly presents these two ideas, giving them the 
ideality they’re due. Popularity is one of its effects. 
 Writ large, there are two types of history: human, linear history and natural, circular .ג
history, the stream of becoming and the helicoidal whirlpool within it. By associating 
culture-art-literature with natural history, Benjamin brings into focus the manner in 
which “progress” depends on the elimination of “tradition.” 
10. A redefinition of the manner in which the idea is presented becomes necessary to 
avoiding the confusion between an extreme phenomenon-become-totality and the idea 
itself. Were contemporary novel-phenomena at stake, their conceptualization would 
involve the reappearance of Don Quixote, Demons, The Trial, and so on. This 
conceptualization would function as the post-history of the named canonical novels and, 
at the same time, as the pre-history of the contemporary novel-phenomena at stake. At its 
limits, it would also indistinctly encompass the pre-history of the named canonical 
novels, the critical situations in which they reappeared, as well as the post-history of 
contemporary novels, insofar as, lifting the extremes into the world of ideas, it would 
                                                 
662 See Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Paul Guyer and 
Eric Matthews (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 1-51. 
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(further) establish the elements of any future conceptualization of novel-phenomena. 
Furthermore, due to this process also being a differentiation of novel-phenomena from all 
other phenomena—at a higher, more indistinct level, the differentiation of element-
concepts, and, at the highest, most indistinct, that of ideas—part of such a 
conceptualization would be a representation of the world as a whole in different 
instances: the world in which each named canonical novel appeared, each world in which 
they reappeared, the world in which contemporary novel-phenomena are appearing and 
canonical novels reappearing, and the world in which all saved novel-phenomena will 
appear. In short, “philosophical conceptualization” means “to establish the becoming of 
phenomena in their being.”663 
It should be clear, then, that every saved phenomenon, in the act of its salvation, “with its 
pre- and post-history [made evident], brings—concealed in its own form—an indistinct 
abbreviation of the rest of the world of ideas”664 and of phenomena besides. Or, put 
differently, every presentation of the idea is to accomplish “nothing less than an 
abbreviated outline of [the] image of this world.”665 The idea, on the other hand, 
“contains the image of the world”666 itself—that is, unabbreviated. Which means that, 
while the Novel-Idea entails a viewpoint on the world as a whole, in every instance-
instant of its becoming, being “a monad,”667 the phenomenon-(being-)saved entails but a 
finite outline of this viewpoint. They can be likened to a view upon the world as it will be 
seen at its end or in its absolute fulfillment, and a view upon the world “as if” this 
moment is its last: a foreshortened view.668 
                                                 
663 Benjamin, Origin, 47. 
664 Ibid. (Translation modified.) 
665 Ibid., 48. 
666 Ibid. 
667 Ibid., 47. 
668 Although Benjamin himself doesn’t use the notion of a “viewpoint,” perhaps on account of its 
subjectivist spirit, Leibniz’s Monadology does: “57. Just as the same city viewed from different 
sides appears to be different and to be, as it were, multiplied in perspectives, so the infinite 
multitude of simple substances, which seem to be so many different universes, are nevertheless 
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 It is no wonder then that Benjamin compares ideas to the stars. For, on the one .א
hand, to look upon the stars in the night sky is to look upon dead worlds, their light 
reaching the earth long after it was first emitted. On the other hand, from within the 
system of any one star, the whole universe is visible, with those parts closest to said 
system being most distinct in the night sky. Every solar system contains therefore a 
point of view on the entire universe—and more precisely on its end, or on it at its end. 
 The implicit apocalypticism of Benjamin’s theory of ideas was, in fact, explicitly .ב
characteristic of the art and literature (especially of the expressionist kind) that 
emerged at the time of the “Prologue”’s writing (or in its immediate pre-history). To 
give only a few examples: Jakob van Hoddis’ poem, “End of the World” (1911), 
Ludwig Meidner’s painting, “Apocalyptic Landscape” (1913), Wassily Kandinsky’s 
painting, “Composition VII” (1913), Karl Kraus’ play, “The Last Days of Mankind” 
(1918), and Alban Berg’s opera, Wozzeck (1925).669 
5.5 Idea and Truth 
11. This “as if” removal of phenomena from space-time in the disentangling of their pre- 
and post-history, this “mortification of the works” through their “colonization by 
knowledge,”670 draws open the curtain on the virtual realm. The latter is not identical 
with the conceptual, but is made available through it: it is, briefly, the interstitial world of 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
only the perspectives of a single universe according to the different points of view of each 
monad.” Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, “‘The Monadology,’ 1714,” in Philosophical Papers and 
Letters, trans. Leroy E. Loemker (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1969), 
648. 
669 In this sense, Richard Wolin is right to claim that ideas ”are less concerned with 
comprehending phenomena in the conventional sense than they are with the task of ‘representing’ 
or ‘interpreting’ phenomena as if they were being viewed from the standpoint of redeemed life.” 
Richard Wolin, Walter Benjamin: An Aesthetic of Redemption (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1994), 93. And this applies equally to his further claim that “origin refers to a history of a 
different type: […] a type of essential history, in which the phenomenon stands revealed as it will 
one day in the light of Messianic fulfillment.” Ibid., 96. 
670 Benjamin, “Letter to Rang,” 389. 
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ideas, in the limited, foreshortened way in which it is perceivable by way of the 
empirical. For, while the conceptual (and with it, the concept) is actual (when subjective) 
or potential (when objective or conventional) but not real, the virtual (and with it, the 
idea) is real but not actual or potential, while the empirical is actual and real but not 
potential.671 It is precisely in this reality, then, that the idea’s being “resembles the simple 
one of things,” although—lacking actuality—“is superior in its permanence.”672 And by 
this same virtue are ideas such as Tragedy and Comedy “themselves constructs, at the 
very least equal in density and reality to any and every drama, without being in any way 
commensurable.”673 
Virtually—that is, in a pure language of translation between German and other languages, 
especially Latin, upon the field of which Benjamin’s “Prologue” virtually plays—
virtuālis (“virtual”) stands beside verus (“truth”), ver (“spring”), versus (“verse”), and 
virtus (“virtue”). Thus, “the virtual,” in Benjamin’s own use, is commensurable to “the 
true,” and—by way of the Italian primavera and the English spring, ending in the 
German Ursprung—also to “the original.” It follows that calling the Origin-Idea the 
“virtual arrangement” of phenomena is tantamount to calling it their “true arrangement.” 
“The idea” and “the origin” rhyme with “the true.” They bespeak “a” truth.674 
                                                 
671 Although these distinctions are drawn from Benjamin’s own text, it is in Deleuze’s Difference 
and Repetition that they are further clarified. As Deleuze puts it, “[t]he virtual is opposed not to 
the real but to the actual. The virtual is fully real in so far as it is virtual.” Gilles Deleuze, “Ideas 
and the Synthesis of Difference,” in Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994), 208. 
672 Benjamin, Origin, 36. (Translation modified.) 
673 Ibid., 44. (Translation modified.) 
674 This is obvious in the terminology of an earlier fragment entitled “Truth and 
Truths/Knowledge and Elements of Knowledge”—especially insofar as Benjamin’s manner of 
conceptualizing “truths” therein is the same as that in which he conceptualizes “ideas” in the 
“Prologue,” particularly as expressed in the long citation given in the following section. See 
Walter Benjamin, “Truth and Truths/ Knowledge and Elements of Knowledge,” trans. Rodney 
Livingstone, in Selected Writings, Volume 1, 1913-1926, ed. Marcus Bullock and Michael W. 
Jennings (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1996), 278-9. 
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 It should be no surprise that Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition engages with ideas .א
and virtuality in one and the same chapter, claiming, specifically, that “[t]he virtual 
[…] is the characteristic state of Ideas.”675 Taken as a whole, Deleuze’s account of the 
ideas is, on the surface, quite similar to Benjamin’s, due, on the one hand, to the fact 
of explicitly sharing Leibniz as a predecessor, and, on the other, to Deleuze being 
willy-nilly part of Benjamin’s post-history. Where Deleuze strays from Benjamin’s 
account, however, is in understanding “[t]he idea […] as a structure.”676 For this 
means, in short, that Deleuze tilts the idea back towards Kant, that he identifies it with 
conceptualization, and that ideas, for him, are therefore limitless in number. This is 
most evident from the additional sense that the term “virtuality” acquired by the time 
of Difference and Repetition’s appearance due to the advent of computers, one to 
which Deleuze could not have been oblivious. Idea, as much as the virtual, must 
therefore entail something different in Deleuze: namely, a realm that, far from being 
(w)ho(l)ly inaccessible, is naught but the most complex conceptual level, that wherein 
the mathematical resides.677 This precisely is the reason why Deleuze still places 
“potentiality” on the side of the idea rather than, as Benjamin arguably does, on that of 
the concept.678 Furthermore, indicative of Deleuze’s still too conceptual understanding 
of the idea is also the fact that, subsequent to Difference and Repetition, the idea 
                                                 
675 Deleuze, “Ideas and the Synthesis of Difference,” 211. 
676 Ibid., 183. 
677 Part of this argument has to do with the extent to which the structuralist and post-structuralist 
philosophers contributed and drew inspiration from the invention of the modern media. An 
important source in this regard is Siegfried Zielinski, [… After the Media]: News from the Slow-
Fading Twentieth Century, trans. Gloria Costance (Minneapolis: Univocal Publishing, 2013). 
678 In this context, and somewhat against the thesis of Samuel Weber’s Benjamin’s –abilities, it’s 
significant that the “Prologue” doesn’t contain a single –barkeit. At most, the “Prologue” has an 
un-barkeit, Unabschließbarkeit (“unclose-ability”), and an absent –barkeit, the “knowability” of 
the “now” from the “Theory of Knowledge” fragment that lays the groundwork for the 
“Prologue.” See Walter Benjamin, “Theory of Knowledge,” trans. Rodney Livingstone, in 
Selected Writings, Volume 1, 1913-1926, ed. Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings 
(Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1996), 276-7. Perhaps every –barkeit is itself conceptual: 
impartability, translate-ability, knowability, (Romantic) criticize-ability and reproducibility are all 
versions of conceptualize-ability—this at least from the viewpoint of the “Prologue.” 
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disappears from his philosophical vocabulary and is replaced with the creative or 
created concept—that is, with conceptualization. 
 ,Other instances of “virtual translation” in the “Prologue” are the terms Gestalt .ב
Gehalt, and Betrachtung. The word “constellation” sounds, from a German point of 
view, like a composite of “con-” and the German verb “stellen,” such that replacing 
the first with its Germanic equivalent, “ge-,” and conjugating the second—as it 
appears to be in “constellation”—yields Gestalt. Given that Benjamin uses 
“entelecheia” interchangeably with “monad” in his draft, once this Greek word is 
broken down into enteles (“complete, full, accomplished”) and ekhein (“have, hold”), 
it can be translated into the German Gehalt. Finally, Betrachtung translates into 
English as “consideration,” from con-sīdus, “with-a-star” or “with-stars,” and thus 
coincides with “constellation.” Understood thusly, these three terms, along with 
virtuell, may all be called inter-linguistic puns. 
12. The question of ideas’ relation to one another must therefore be resolved at once with 
that of their relation to the truth. As Benjamin puts it, 
Truth is an intentionless being constructed from ideas […] ideas subscribe to the 
law which states: all essentialities [i.e., ideas] exist in complete and immaculate 
independence, not only from phenomena, but, especially, from each other. Just as 
the harmony of the spheres depends on the orbits of the stars which do not come 
into contact with each other, so the existence of the mundus intelligibilis depends 
on the unbridgeable distance between pure essentialities. Every idea is a sun and is 
related to other ideas just as suns are related to each other. The consonance 
between such essentialities is the truth.679 
Insofar as each truth-idea is a viewpoint on the world and therefore on all other truths-
ideas, any two truths-ideas are, in a sense, mutually exclusive. Or, put differently, they 
are so different from one another that their difference, unlike what happens in a 
                                                 
679 Benjamin, Origin, 36-37. 
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phenomenon’s conceptualization, is impossible to predicate. No third point of view exists 
which is capable of encompassing the first two. Mutatis mutandis for more than two 
truths-ideas. And this is no less than a definition of the truth. In other words, the truth is 
precisely the non-coincidence between, the mutual exclusivity of, coexisting truths-ideas. 
Were one truth-idea to subsume another, the two would not just lose their status as truths, 
as true, by no longer “con-sounding” the truth, but would also cease being ideas, 
becoming concepts instead. The Dog-Idea and the Canine-Idea, for example, are ideas 
only insofar as presenting one does not imply a presentation of the other, but, at most, a 
representation—a relation which is radically reversible. As soon as “canine” functions as 
a genus of the species “dog”—in Benjamin’s metaphor: if “dog” is conceived as no more 
than a planet circling the sun called “canine”—the two are, rather than ideas, concepts. 
Evidently, once they “become” concepts, the non-coincidence between them known as 
the truth is no longer in effect (saying “dog” is saying “canine” and vice versa). 
Therefore, given that an idea is both, vertically speaking, the non-synthesis between a set 
of concepts and a set of phenomena, and, horizontally speaking, the non-synthesis 
between two or more phenomena part of the same set, the truth is at once, vertically 
speaking, the non-synthesis between the conceptual (i.e., all concepts) and the 
phenomenal (i.e., all phenomena) as such, and, horizontally speaking, the non-synthesis 
between two or more non-syntheses (i.e., ideas). 
Rather than suggesting that the truth is double and that there are an infinite number of 
ideas, the cruciform character of ideas and of the truth maintains the oneness of the latter 
and marks the former by numeral finitude. Put differently, the truth is one and the same 
no matter whether it subsists between ideas y and z, a and b, m and l, or between every 
idea: insofar as the Canine-Idea and the Dog-Idea are incomparable, the difference 
between them can not be specified. This absolute difference is the same as that between 
the conceptual as a whole and the phenomenal as a whole, being the neutral ‘twixt them. 
Evidently, “the conceptual” and “the phenomenal” function, in this context, as ideas. The 
numeral finitude of ideas, on the other hand, does not follow quite as easily, requiring a 
detour for its “proof.” As was the case with the truth, it is one and the same idea that lies 
between any two, or all, phenomena part of the same set. In short, there is one idea for 
every set of phenomena. And this idea is identical to that lying between a set of concepts 
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and a set of phenomena. This is not to say, however, that this idea is also present between 
any two concepts part of the same set—given that concepts are not ideas: they tend 
toward synthesis. Therefore, there does not exist one idea for every set of concepts in the 
absolute, but only for every set of concepts corresponding to a set of phenomena. An 
idea, then, is the correspondence (or kinship) between a set of concepts and a set of 
phenomena. Another name for such a correspondence is “a (pure) name.” There are as 
many ideas as there are (Adamite) names. What characterizes such names, as much as 
ideas, is that they were “in” pre-history and will be “in” post-history. This precisely is the 
second meaning of Benjamin’s terms: pre-history also refers to “the period before 
history,” or, more exactly, the period before writing—at the extreme: the Edenic state—
while post-history also refers to “the period after history,” or, more exactly, the end of the 
world, the apocalypse—at the extreme: the Kingdom of Heaven to come. Simplifying 
immensely, the fact of the Fall, that the Edenic state has already come to an end (without 
the Kingdom of Heaven having come to replace it), marks the amount of (pure) names 
available by finitude.680 Hence “philosophy is […] a struggle for the presentation of a 
few, always the same words—of ideas.”681 
 The “proof” for ideas’ numeral finitude brings with it several implications. To begin .א
with, it entails that writing or history brought an end to the “neutral medium” between 
concepts and phenomena characterizing the Edenic state. And, indeed, once history 
began, all new names were given either to (a) theoretical constructs, (b) historical 
events, or (c) man-made things—this “or” being inclusive rather than exclusive, since 
the three are merely different ways of saying one and the same thing. In other words, 
they named not a correspondence between concept and phenomenon but, instead, mere 
concepts. As an example of (a), “boson” names a theoretical construct and the boson 
takes its name from the man, Bose. Only after its theorization, and naming, was the 
“boson” proven. As an example of (c), the “smartphone” names a man-made thing, a 
piece of technology, and therefore something not “given” but first conceptualized by 
                                                 
680 Ideas, after all, are points of view on the world at its end. 
681 Ibid., 37. (Translation modified.) 
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man and only thereafter produced, according to this concept. It may have been named 
only after becoming a phenomenon, but the name applies strictly to the concept: 
insofar as the thing ceases conforming to this concept, it loses the name. Finally, as an 
example of (b), the “French Revolution” names a historical event, which is both a 
man-made thing and a theoretical construct. In fact, “boson” and “smartphone” also 
name historical events. As was the case with many before them, they will not last until 
the world’s end, but will be replaced by others of the same nature as they.—History, in 
other words, is precisely that which effectuates the synthesis between concept and 
phenomenon—wherein phenomena are produced from concepts or turn into concepts. 
 That the truth is “realized in the round dance of presented ideas”682 suggests that it .ב
can be figured as “the hole” around which ideas dance.683 Simultaneously, a round 
dance is called a chorós in Ancient Greek, which, while connected to harmony by way 
of “chorus,” is homophonous with khôra. Therefore, if ideas are individual khôrai—
such that for Benjamin the khôra parts into a plurality of khôrai—the truth is the khôra 
itself. That khôra means “the proper place” (as in a hierarchy of being) accords with 
multiple khôrai evoking the harmony of the spheres, while that it also means “nation” 
is consistent with conceiving of ideas as the different existing (human) languages, vis-
à-vis which the khôra is pure language.684 
 In “On the Sayable and the Idea,” Agamben claims that .ג
God is everything since, like χώρα, he is the place of everything. God is in each 
thing as the place in which each thing is: he is the taking-place of every entity 
and, for this reason, and this only, identifies with them. It is not the mole and 
                                                 
682 Ibid., 29. (Translation modified.) 
683 And may even be a black hole around which the light of a dying star flits before forever 
disappearing. 
684 This remains implicit in the “Translation” essay and is made somewhat explicit in the 
“Language and Logic” fragment where Benjamin claims, using the word “essence” for “idea,” 




the stone that are divine: what is divine is the being mole of the mole; the being 
stone of the stone; their pure taking place in God.685 
Holding together (i) this identification of the khôra with God, (ii) the definition of the 
truth-khôra as the non-synthesis of the conceptual and the phenomenal, and (iii) the 
Self-World-God trinity of Kantian ideas, it follows that, for Benjamin, the Self is the 
conceptual, the World is the phenomenal, while between them, “in” God, all the ideas 
are to be found (including the Self and the World). In this sense is God-Truth “the 
realm of ideas.”686 Furthermore, implicit to this reassessment of the Kantian trinity is 
that the non-synthesis between Self and World is only one of multiple ways by which 
to invoke God—another may be the non-synthesis between Canine and Dog, for 
instance. 
 If, instead of Canine and Dog, at stake were a room and the chair which appears .ר
within that room, the same analysis would hold. Namely, the chair is not inside the 
room, it is not subsumed by the room: saying “the-chair-here” doesn’t imply “the-
room-wherein-it-is-found,” nor does “the-room-here” imply “the-chair-found-in-this-
room.” Or, rather, as far as the turns of phrase are concerned, this is precisely how 
things stand. Implicit to the room is not the chair itself but only “the-chair-found-in-
this-room”—that is, a representation, a concept of the chair “contained” within the 
room—just as implicit to the chair is not the room itself but only “the-room-wherein-
it-is-found”—again, a representation, this time “contained” within the chair. But the 
chair itself and the room itself are not implicit to one another; they are un-related, or, 
are in a relation of non-synthesis called the truth. 
13. If between ideas lies the non-synthesis called truth, then between concepts extends 
the synthesis called intention. That is, while truth is the discontinuum proper to ideas, 
intention is the continuum proper to concepts. “Between” any two concepts that are part 
of the same set there lies another concept, namely, the concept of the set itself. Further, 
                                                 
685 Agamben, “On the Sayable and the Idea,” 86. 
686 Benjamin, Origin, 32. 
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this set-concept is itself related to another set-concept: either the concept of another set of 
concepts or the concept of a set of phenomena. The latter is no less than the synthesis 
between the phenomena part of the same set. Its relation to the initial set-concept is a 
synthesis between itself and the latter, between, that is, the concept and the phenomenon, 
and this traditionally goes by the name of “intention” or “knowledge.” The synthesis 
between two set-concepts, on the other hand, is no more than a higher concept, itself 
capable of entering into further syntheses in a conceivably infinite pyramid of concepts. 
Between, for instance, a dog-concept and a wolf-concept lies the canine-concept wherein 
the two are synthesized. This resulting canine-concept can further be related to a feline-
concept such that their synthesis yields the mammal-concept. Evidently, this mammal-
concept can lead, in synthesis with other concepts, to the animal-concept, a life-concept, 
and so on. On the other hand, the canine-concept can be related to the concept of a set of 
phenomenal-canines, which were themselves synthesized, as phenomenal-dogs and 
phenomenal-wolves, into this concept. It should be evident that the synthesis of the 
canine-concept and the concept of a set of phenomenal-canines does not yield a “higher 
concept.” Instead, the concept of a set of phenomenal-canines is the canine-concept: they 
emerge in one and the same movement: in the synthesis of the dog-concept and the wolf-
concept occurs also the synthesis of phenomenal-dogs and phenomenal-wolves. Which 
means that, in fact, the phenomenal-dogs are already the dog-concept insofar as they can 
enter into a synthesis. Put differently, concepts are syntheses and only concepts can be 
synthesized. The synthesis between the conceptual and the phenomenal that intention 
announces is never more than one between the concept of the conceptual and the concept 
of the phenomenal. 
It should be obvious from this that no intention is adequate to truth, that truth “remains 
withdrawn from every type of intention, and certainly does not itself appear as intention,” 
it being precisely non-synthesis, the “death of intention” toward which “the proper 
conduct […] is […] an entrance into and disappearance in it”687—the proper conduct, 
namely, of any intention. It is precisely so that the presentation of the idea, whose being it 
                                                 
687 Ibid., 35-36. (Translation modified.) 
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shares with that of truth (or, even: is truth), operates: phenomena are conceptualized only 
so that, in the disappearance of the resulting concept, in the margins and limits of the 
concept with regards to the phenomena, its negative, the idea, may, for a moment, make 
itself manifest. Only this concept can be the object of knowledge, while truth is arrived at 
indirectly, or, better yet, unintentionally. 
 ,If the synthesis between different concepts of the same set is the concept of this set .א
then the idea is the set itself. 
 A summation of Benjamin’s theory of truth would define the latter not as the .ב
adaequatio but as the inadaequatio rei et intellectus. 
5.6 Presentation Problem 
14. The “unintentional” appearances—called presentations—of the idea are of several 
types. The word and the (art)work, for instance, are presentations that not only last 
beyond the instant of the presentation, but can themselves be subject to presentation, 
albeit not a presentation of themselves as much as a modification through which they 
once more present the idea. As such presentations, their inner and outer functions stand in 
solidarity. In short, and as is more clear in English than in German, requiring the addition 
of one letter rather than the substitution of two, the Werk functions in the same way as the 
Wort. 
The word “dog” decomposes into the dog-sign (written or spoken), the dog-sense (the 
mental representation of the dog-word), and the dog-meaning (that is, the Dog-Idea). 
Evidently, the dog-meaning is the non-synthesis between the dog-sign and the dog-sense, 
between “dog” and the dog-concept. “Initially”—which is to say, in its profane, 
imparting use—the dog-word is subject to synthesis between the dog-sign and the dog-
sense, and this synthesis is the dog-sense, the term Sinn itself being a “synthesis” between 
the empirical and the conceptual. Furthermore, not only does the dog-sense synthesize the 
dog-sign with the dog-sense, making the former a transparent means to the latter, but it 
also makes identical all discrete appearances of the dog-sign, on the one hand, and all 
discrete dog-senses, on the other. It is only in translation that this illusory homogeneity is 
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brought to an end. For, insofar as the sign “Hund” has much of the same sense as the sign 
“dog,”688 the immediacy of the relation between the sign “dog” and the dog-sense is 
shattered. Non-synthesis begins piercing through every synthetic link, setting apart dog-
sign from dog-sign and dog-sense from dog-sense, essentially “ruining” the initial totality 
of the dog-sense (a totality both conceptual and empirical, although only conceptually 
empirical). What remains is not, however, a dog-sign bereft of any significance, an empty 
sign(ifier), but, quite the opposite: a dog-sign that takes on a sublime significance, that 
points to the non-conceptual Dog-Idea. 
Likewise, an artwork decomposes into its outward form, its material content, and its truth 
content. Initially, the outward form and the material content will stand in synthesis, no 
matter how avant-garde the artwork—as with Sinn, the term Sachgehalt being precisely a 
synthesis between outward form (Sache) and content (Gehalt). Sarah Kane’s Blasted, for 
instance, upon its release in 1995, was immediately legible to the audience as a play 
“about” the interrelation of the Bosnian War, specifically the acts of rape perpetuated in 
its course, the everyday sexual violence that takes place in England (or: any Western 
country), and the public’s inability to see this very relation between the first and the 
second (on a political level: the lack of involvement of the West in the Yugoslav Wars). 
The critic, which in this first instance is merely a reviewer, could do naught but make 
explicit this very general interpretation of the play—namely, its relevance to the 
present—his review being predicated on an equation between the outward form of the 
play and this particular set of themes. Even on a more “academic” level, a review of the 
literary and performative devices of the play would itself have had to stop at the sense 
that these devices had at that moment—codified, as they were, in a particular way within 
academic discourse. A “true work of art,” might say the critic with access to these levels 
                                                 
688 The temptation would be to say that synonyms follow the same structure; that, in other words, 
synonyms are an example of intra-linguistic translation. But this is not necessarily true insofar as 
two words might only be synonymous on account of a concept that holds them together. The 
same is not the case, however, with inter-linguistic “synonyms.” Nevertheless, it may be possible 
for the comparison of synonyms to allow for the appearance of the idea. This precisely would be 
the power of writing (in which synonyms are actively searched after) and the power of dialogue 
(which inevitably comes to a head in a semantic argument). 
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both, is one displaying synthesis or coherence between the first (thematic) sense and the 
second (formal) sense. The counterpart to translation for the artwork, however, is time, or 
criticism proper. For, as time passes, the immediate thematic and formal content of 
Blasted’s outward form fades along with the immediacy of the Bosnian War and the 
implicit code of the literary conventions belonging to In-Yer-Face theatre. The same 
outward form, the same play-construct, is now capable of acquiring a new sense. Put 
differently, the synthesis between Blasted’s outward form and its initial material content 
is brought to a halt, thus rendering each piecemeal. The former sense (thematic and 
formal) is not lost, but now co-exists, sans synthesis, with a new sense. Even if it were 
lost—as happens with artworks that have had a much longer lifespan, such as Hamlet or 
Beowulf, both of which might require a “retrieval” of this sense—the “second” sense 
can’t act as a perfect synthesis insofar as at least the shadow of the “first” sense remains. 
The piecemeal, non-synthetic aspect of both the outward form and the (new) material 
content allows for a detailed analysis of each, which, rather than making them whole, as 
does the initial critic, explores the gaps between them as much as between one part of 
each and another. This is critique proper. Made manifest within, or by, these gaps is the 
work’s truth content, its idea.689 Herein, Blasted’s status as a true work of art relies not 
on coherence but on incoherence. Which is to say that true works of art are those capable 
of acquiring ever-new senses, and thus: of surviving. 
If word and work can be called first-order presentations of ideas, then translation and 
critique are second-order presentations, ones that operate on first-order presentations in 
order to present the latter’s ideas. It follows that the genetic “structure” of word and work 
must itself mirror that common to translation and critique: as critique operates on an 
artwork to unearth its idea, so the artwork, in its fashioning, must have operated on a part 
of nature (or the world) in order to present its idea. Thus, Georges Braque’s “Bottle and 
Fishes” (1910-12), for instance, emerges from the artist’s attempt to translate fish to a 
different phenomenal medium—or, put in linguistic terms, the artist is in the position of 
                                                 
689 As McCole puts it, despite his merely surface-level analysis of the “Prologue,” “[c]riticism 
extricates the idea or ‘philosophical truth content’ of the work of art.” John McCole, Walter 
Benjamin and the Antinomies of Tradition (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 151. 
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having to use different signs than those of phenomenal-fish to get to the same sense. 
Consequently, for the artist, as for the translator or critic, the phenomenal and the 
conceptual part ways and turn piecemeal, pierced as they become by non-synthesis. The 
artwork that emerges can be naught but a com-position or con-struction, a Gebilde, of 
artistic signs (in this case: colours, lines, shapes) meant to replicate the phenomenal 
fragments or natural signs that the artist sees. Braque’s painting makes this obvious by 
juxtaposing in a non-synthetic manner different viewpoints on fishes (and bottle). Thus 
with modern painting. A realist painting such as George Garrand’s “Ranger, a setter, 
property of Elizabeth Gray,” on the other hand, will take an additional step in attempting 
to synthesize the phenomenal fragments of the dog at stake, subordinating them to a 
strong concept of the dog. Which is to say that, while the modern artist is and remains all 
too aware of the difference between the medium of painting and the medium of natural 
appearance, the realist artist synthesizes them under the general concept of the visible. It 
should be evident that, herein, the Fish-Idea attains to presentation while the Dog-Idea 
does not. Consequently, it is Braque’s painting that remains open to further senses where 
Garrand’s painting is, by virtue of its extreme specificity, limited to one. 
The artist’s insight into disintegrated phenomena and concepts is further tied up with the 
placement of an artificial end to the world. For it is only in such an arrest that natural 
phenomena, here: fish-phenomena, can be broken into fragments, can be lifted from their 
natural space-time and differentiated from the world as a whole. Alone within an 
apocalyptic view, in an “as if” this was the world’s last moment, does sense, this time 
understood as “direction,” disappear, leaving fish-phenomena isolated from itself and 
from each other. The artist, to be exact, prematurely mortifies the natural thing to which 
he attends and with it the entire world.690 And through his artificial mortification is made 
                                                 
690 “Not until the End Time, at the end of time, when transience itself passes away, will eternity 
triumph over the deadly principle of time. It is the work of magic, whose last offshoot is art, that 
ties an eternal moment to the present time.” Jacob Taubes, “On the Nature of Eschatology,” in 
Occidental Eschatology, trans. David Ratmoko (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 8. 
This work of Taubes can be said to constitute part of the post-history proper to Benjamin’s 
“Prologue,” especially as regards the latter’s understanding of history. Despite the fact that 




visible the end of the world as such, albeit only from a particular viewpoint. It is insofar 
as the artwork’s initial critics share with the artist the same view on what the world’s end 
would look like that they can’t but misunderstand it, that its idea is inaccessible to them. 
The later, genuine critic, then, is one that mortifies the work itself, mortifies this artificial 
mortification of the world, in order to retrieve the point at which it touches that true 
viewpoint on the world’s end: the idea. 
 Evidently, the less historically determinate it is and the less verisimilitude it has, the .א
longer the work will last. Benjamin appears therefore to place all of his cards on 
modernist art.691 It seems that abstract art—whose prose equivalent is parabolic 
literature—is the kind that most exemplifies the “true,” lasting work. From which 
should follow that, only insofar as they exhibit modernist elements can other, older 
works be stamped as “true” in turn. These modernist elements, however, can’t be 
thought of simply as a set of literary or artistic devices-conventions. A romantic 
artwork is not modernist by virtue of sharing certain determinate features with a 
surrealist one. The abstraction at stake, in other words, runs deeper than the surface of 
the artwork. Therefore, by no means can it be said that Benjamin’s theory of art 
renders all abstract art “true” in one fell swoop. 
 The parallelism of word-work and translation-critique is the foundation of .ב
Benjamin’s theory of time. After all, critique, as krïsis, mirrors translation, as 
Übersetzung: both lie in the interval between two periods of stability or two settings, 
respectively. Which is to say that the “natural” flow of time is, no less than 
homogeneous mechanical time, the product of a concept, one brought to a standstill by 
critique-translation. Where such a flow is interrupted, where one second resists giving 
way to the next, the pause between the two virtually extending to the end of time—
therein does presentation “occur.”692 Put differently, non-synthesis is also in effect at 
                                                 
691 More precisely, early, pre-Marxist Benjamin. 
692 As Jean-Luc Nancy puts it in the essay “Of Divine Places” whose title (if not its subject 
matter) can be regarded as a contribution to the naming of these khôrai-ideas, “[o]ur history 
began with [gods’] departure […] They cannot return in that history—and ‘to return’ has no sense 
outside of that history […] But where the gods are […] our history is suspended. And where our 
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the temporal level, holding between any two instants, where every instant is an event. 
Considered thusly, Benjamin’s conception of time is a thoroughly ethical one, every 
instant being, in spite of appearances, decisive, open to decision. This ethical time—
or, better yet, its every “now of knowability”—is further characterized, due to the pre- 
and post-historical aspect of presentation, by having the structure of a causal loop: due 
to its non-synthesis not only with the preceding and the succeeding instant but with 
every other instant, it can only appear auto-poetic or self-generating. This is most 
evident as pertains to creative acts. The moment of “eureka!” stands out from all other 
moments: it is impossible to reconstruct or predict, except from the viewpoint wherein 
it has already occurred, and the thinker, artist, or inventor can’t discern whether the 
“new idea” that has taken hold of him is truly his own since it appears, once 
discovered, to have been there all along, as if it were absolutely obvious to anyone 
paying attention.693 Therefore, that every instant is an instant of crisis means that 
every instant is entirely new, that every now is a now of complete change and 
complete freedom.694 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
history is suspended, where it is no longer history, that is to say where it is no longer the time of 
an operation but the space of an opening, there something may come to pass.” Jean-Luc Nancy, 
“Of Divine Places,” trans. Michael Holland, in The Inoperative Community, ed. Peter Connor 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 145. 
693 Franz Kafka’s “The Next Village” is a perfect example of the non-synthesis between two 
instants. From within one instant the distance to the next seems infinite. And yet this distance is 
nevertheless covered—namely, in time. 
694 Cacciari’s own positing of an interrelation between “the problem of (re)presentation,” as his 
chapter on the “Prologue” is called, and Benjamin’s theory of time is of interest here. As he puts 
it, “[i]f the reflection of ‘normal time’ forgets or leaves no room for the consideration (Rücksicht) 
of representation, then the philosophy of the time of krisis, or better, of time as krisis, assumes as 
its own essential task the re-garding, the returning to meditate on the question of representation.” 
Cacciari, “The Problem of Representation,” 44. Additionally, he claims that “[t]he Angel 
incessantly searches for the just representation of a new time: present-instant, interruption of the 
continuum, Jetztzeit (now-time). Every Jetzt can represent this new time.” Ibid., 51. Due to 
relying on Benjamin’s latter texts—mostly his Arcades Project—Cacciari doesn’t draw 
Benjamin’s theory of time from within the “Prologue” itself, and thus somewhat misses the links 
it bears to translation and non-synthesis which are stressed herein. 
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15. From these preliminaries it should be clear that the treatise, as yet another mode of 
the idea’s presentation, is itself a critique, an artwork, a word—and vice versa. For 
Benjamin claims precisely that, in the treatise, 
tirelessly, [t]hinking makes new beginnings, returning laboriously to the matter 
itself […] pursuing different levels of sense in its consideration of one and the 
same object […] Just as mosaics preserve their majesty despite their fragmentation 
into capricious particles, so philosophical consideration [i.e., the treatise’s 
operation] is not lacking in momentum. Both are made up of the individual and the 
disparate; and nothing could more powerfully teach the transcendent force as much 
of the sacred image as of the truth. The value of fragments of thought is all the 
greater the less direct their relationship to the underlying conception, and the luster 
of the presentation depends as much on this value as the luster of the mosaic does 
on the quality of the glass paste. The relationship between the minute precision of 
the work and the proportions of the artistic and intellectual whole expresses that 
truth content can only be grasped through the most precise immersion in the details 
of the material content.695 
But while critique, the artwork, and the word are limited to presenting only one idea, 
given that “[t]here are as many ultimate truths are there are authentic works of art,”696 the 
treatise (and, with it, translation) is that mode of presentation which can present multiple 
ideas and thereby make possible the emergence of the truth itself. Therefore, the mosaic 
is doubly significant as a metaphor: its parts stand for both the treatise’s own parts and 
the ideas it presents. The treatise does this, as Benjamin’s own illustrates, by at once 
functioning as a critique of several artworks and subjecting a variety of words to (virtual) 
translation, emptying them of a general, transparent sense. 
 ”The general misunderstanding of philosophical writing as being somehow “other .א
or “higher” than literary writing has, excepting Lukács’ “letter” on the essay, 
                                                 
695 Benjamin, Origin, 28-9. 
696 Benjamin, “Truth and Truths,” 278. 
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precluded an extended analysis of its forms. Benjamin’s “Prologue” takes a step in this 
direction, briefly describing while also performing what the treatise form involves.697 
That it is a “produc[t] of the Middle Ages”698 and it is “designated by the scholastic 
term treatise”699 indicates that the exemplary treatises were those written by the 
scholastic philosophers. What differentiates these works from others should be evident 
from their typical title; a treatise is always “De …” or “On…”: about, namely, an idea. 
On the other hand, that the treatise is akin to the mosaic and it contains, as a term, a 
“latent hint to the highest objects of theology without which truth couldn’t be 
thought”700 suggests that the exemplary treatise was the Hebrew Mishna, broken into a 
limited number of tractates, or massekhtot, each dealing with a holy subject. From the 
fact that Mishna refers to both the book as a whole and the smallest unit of the 
Mishna, while the treatise is both the Mishna itself and any of its tractates—a situation 
that Benjamin invokes through the stones on Sinai metaphor in his draft—it follows 
that the treatise, as a form of philosophical writing, should be seen as fragmentary not 
only insofar as its sections stand separate from one another, but also in the sense that it 
itself, like every presentation, is only one piece of a larger mosaic. This last term itself 
means to invoke at once (i) Moses, and thus the stones of Sinai which break in a quasi-
fractal manner, (ii) the Muses, which are finite in number, and (iii) music, the scores 
                                                 
697 If Derrida is to be believed, Valery—and therefore Derrida himself—can be placed alongside 
Lukács (and Benjamin) as a “philosopher” to whom it at least occurred that philosophy’s forms 
are worthy of investigation: “A task is then prescribed: to study the philosophical text in its 
formal structure, in its rhetorical organization, in the specificity and diversity of its textual types, 
in its models of exposition and production—beyond what previously were called genres—and 
also in the space of its mises en scène, in a syntax which would be not only the articulation of its 
signifieds, its references to Being and to truth, but also the handling of its proceedings, and of 
everything invested in them. In a word, the task is to consider philosophy also as a ‘particular 
literary genre,’ drawing upon the reserves of a language, cultivating, forcing, or making deviate a 
set of tropic resources older than philosophy itself.” Jacques Derrida, “Qual Quelle: Valery’s 
Sources,” in Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1982), 
293. 
698 Benjamin, Origin, 29. 




of which have a form quite similar to that proper to “warp and weft” weaving (this 
being the common meaning of the term masekhet).701 
16. Common to these modes of presentation is their secondary nature. Presentation comes 
second: both to the thing it contemplates and to the idea(s) it presents. Its character is that 
of a leap over an unbridgeable abyss—lying, namely, between the presentation and the 
presented. In this precise sense does a “question of presentation” or a “presentation 
problem” exist, one “before” which the mode of presentation known as “philosophical 
writing […] must, at every turn, stand.”702 Thus, with every new paragraph written, sense 
interpreted, and sign’s appearance contemplated, the treatise glimpses the abyss.703 
The same is not the case with mathematics and the sciences (or: knowledge), for they 
rely, instead, upon the “total elimination of the problem of presentation”704 or the 
“considerat[ion] of this incoherence as accidental.”705 Given that only doctrine (or the 
truth) has that “conclusiveness […] which could be asserted […] by virtue of its own 
                                                 
701 On a more general note, examples of modern treatises include Benjamin’s Trauerspiel book, 
Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory, and Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition. Common to them all is that 
titles are used only in the division of chapters. The further subdivision of each chapter into 
paragraphs is not accompanied by titles for each paragraph, however, even if such paragraph-
titles are made note of in the “Table of Contents.” 
702 Ibid., 27. (Translation modified.) 
703 “The discontinuous treatise is presentation. It presents not by what it says, but by saying it 
intermittently. The pauses between paragraphs are not the omission of something that could be 
said and that the reader must fill in, but rather the renunciation of linking them, that is, of 
grasping the relationship between them and of communicating it as something understood. 
Interruption opens up the treatise to what is excluded from thinking, understanding, and saying. 
Presentation is not the communication of a sequence of thoughts, but the discontinuous 
arrangement of ‘fragments of thought’ […] whose coherence lies outside knowledge and flashes 
forth in gaps and breaks.” Hans-Jost Frey, “On Presentation in Benjamin,” trans. Michael Shae, in 
Walter Benjamin: Theoretical Questions, ed. David S. Ferris (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1996), 140. 
704 Benjamin, Origin, 27. (Translation modified.) 
705 Ibid., 33. (Translation modified.) 
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authority,”706 endemic to the matheme is the pretense of being Doctrine-Truth itself. As 
Benjamin puts it, 
[k]nowledge is a having. Its very object is determined by the fact that it must be 
taken possession of—even in the transcendental sense—in the consciousness. The 
property-character remains. […] For knowledge, method is a way of acquiring its 
object, the possessed—even through production in the consciousness […] [T]he 
methodology of knowledge […] derive[s] from a nexus established in the 
consciousness.707 
Insofar as it produces its own objects and thus encounters no objection, knowledge 
mimics the truth’s auto-poetic capacity all the while entirely renouncing “that area of 
truth towards which languages are directed.”708 
Put simply, while the artistic-philosophical looks and points outwards, to the beyond 
beyond itself, the mathematical-scientific turns continually inwards, to what it already in 
some way “has.”709 That Benjamin’s “Prologue,” instead of being “knowledge-
theoretical,” is “[k]nowledge-critical”710 means that its target, and what it wants to pierce 
through from the inside, is epistemology, the quintessential example of knowledge about 
knowledge. But, put more complexly, this outside-inside dichotomy does not hold: 
knowledge’s ultimate object, “perfect” knowledge or the total concept, lies ever outside 
its grasp and thus turns it into an infinite task, while the presented, the idea or the truth, as 
the khôra, sits at the very Urgrund of presentation, and is thus immediate to it as its most 
inward form, too intimate to function as an object. In short, philosophical writing, by 
addressing works of art outside itself, and doing so always on the margins of 
                                                 
706 Ibid., 28. (Translation modified.) 
707 Ibid., 29-30. (Translation modified.) 
708 Ibid., 27. (Translation modified.) 
709 Even the natural scientist, while seemingly directed towards phenomena, engages, in fact, with 
the concept of these phenomena—which he merely confirms—rather than with the phenomena 
themselves. 
710 Ibid. (Translation modified.) 
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conceptualization, where it is rather these works that address themselves to it while it 
records, is naught but the self-presentation of the truth. It is precisely in giving up all 
pretense of itself being Doctrine-Truth—of being, like the latter, “an indivisible 
unity”711—that such writing participates in it as its most proper, if bastard, exposition. 
 Science” and “art” are to be understood herein as ideal types: as the two extreme“ .א
poles of methodology.712 In other words, a determinate artist can also fashion an 
artwork “scientifically,” as is so much the case with realist or naively mimetic art. And 
so too, a science can undergo a phase wherein its investigations are predominantly 
“artistic,” as was true of 20th century theoretical physics. Furthermore, that an 
approach be scientific has less to do with rigor, and more to do with the desire to 
replace its object, a desire that can be termed technological. Equally, an approach is 
artistic not so much on account of its creativity, as on account of its openness to 
incoherence, or, in short, its openness as such.713 
                                                 
711 Ibid., 33. 
712 The English translation of the end of the “Philosophical Beauty” section renders 
“Forschunger” as “scientist” instead of as “researcher.” To be clear, it is not research and art that 
function as opposing poles, but science and art. “Research” is a part of science but also a part of 
philosophy. It is not the essential element of science as defined herein. 
713 Kristina Mendicino claims that “it is questionable whether Benjamin’s remarks in his prologue 
truly cast contemplation as the preferable alternative […] to those philosophical systems that are 
contrasted to the forms of the tractate and the esoteric essay at the outset of his prologue” and that 
“even mathematics participates in presentation through its apparently complete ‘elimination of 
the problem of presentation.’” Kristina Mendicino, “Before Truth: Walter Benjamin’s Epistemo-
Critical Prologue,” Qui Parle 26, no.1 (June 2017): 27-8. But that, with the above in mind, these 
claims fall somewhat short. For, while she’s right to insist on the non-intentional emergence of 
presentation, she threatens to confuse art and science as ideal types. Thus, she participates in the 
long line of Benjamin critics seeking to prove (ever anew) Benjamin’s concern with eliminating 
subjectivity, instead of taking this lack of subjectivity as a starting point. 
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Chapter 6  
6 On Second Reading 
(Methodology II) 
I. 
In the introductory, methodological pages of his S/Z, Roland Barthes famously 
distinguishes between the “readerly” and the “writerly”—adjectives714 both conjoined to 
“text,” although not in their every instance. While writerly is “what can be written (and 
rewritten),” readerly is “what can be read, but not written.”715 Or, put differently, the 
reader participates in producing the writerly while he is left “either to accept or reject”716 
the readerly product. It is arguable whether Barthes’ dichotomy is a mere echo of 
Umberto Eco’s, namely between the open and the closed work,717 given Barthes’ later 
differentiation of “text” from “work” along the same lines as that of the writerly from the 
readerly,718 as well as his very own admission in S/Z that, namely, “[t]he more plural the 
                                                 
714 Specifically: in the English, not the French. 
715 Roland Barthes, S/Z, trans. Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 1974), 4. 
716 Ibid. 
717 “[A] classical composition, whether it be a Bach fugue, Verdi’s Aida, or Stravinsky’s Rite of 
Spring, posits an assemblage of sound units which the composer arranged in a closed, well-
defined manner before presenting it to the listener. He converted his idea into conventional 
symbols which more or less oblige the eventual performer to reproduce the format devised by the 
composer himself, whereas the new musical works referred to above [Stockhausen’s Klavierstück 
XI, Berio’s Sequence for Solo Flute, Pousseur’s Scambi, and Boulez’s Third Sonata for Piano] 
reject the definitive, concluded message and multiply the formal possibilities of the distribution of 
their elements. They appeal to the initiative of the individual performer, and hence they offer 
themselves not as finite works which prescribe specific repetition along given structural 
coordinates but as ‘open’ works, which are brought to their conclusion by the performer at the 
same time as he experiences them on an aesthetic plane.” Umberto Eco, The Open Work, trans. 
Anna Cancogni (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 2-3. Eco’s choice of 
examples and the terminology that derives therefrom is more appropriate than Barthes’: Eco 
speaks not of writing the (writerly) text but of performing the open work. 
718 In “From Work to Text,” Barthes makes the following self-defeating statement: “The text must 
not be understood as a computable object. It would be futile to attempt a material separation of 
works from texts. In particular, we must not permit ourselves to say: the work is classical, the text 
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text, the less it is written before I read it”719 and consequently the more writerly. For, 
Barthes also claims that “the writerly text is not a thing, we would have a hard time 
finding it in a bookstore,”720 and the very text to whose “plural” he chooses “to remain 
attentive” in S/Z, namely, through a “step-by-step method” which means to “star the text, 
instead of assembling it,”721 is “Sarrasine” by Balzac, that most classical of French 
authors. Therefore are these two categories suspended between being essential attributes 
of certain objects and methods of engaging with the latter—modes, that is, of reading. 
There may be readerly and writerly texts just as there may be readerly and writerly 
readings, and the very use of “text” herein means to annihilate that epistemology which 
has its basis in an object-subject relation. 
This aside, where Barthes truly runs aground, perhaps caught in the mania of his age, is 
in using “writing” in a merely metaphorical manner: a text cannot be, properly speaking, 
“less written before I read it.” Or, a “text” may be so, inasmuch as it too belongs to the 
metaphorical domain. A work of literature, on the other hand, even if it is an incomplete 
draft to which further fragments are added as they are discovered, or a great pastiche 
crowded with layers upon layers of allusions, bringing ever more inter-texts to mind with 
each new reading, is composed of a finite set of already written signs. Like a painting, a 
literary work has borders. To say that it is less written and that the reader can add to its 
writing as he likes is tantamount to giving each viewer of a painting brush and paint so as 
to add whatever marks he deems appropriate to the canvas’ more light colored, less 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
is avant-garde; there is no question of establishing a trophy in modernity's name and declaring 
certain literary productions in and out by reason of their chronological situation: there can be 
‘Text’ in a very old work, and many products of contemporary literature are not texts at all.” 
Roland Barthes, “From Work to Text,” in The Rustle of Language, trans. Richard Howard 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 57. The fact that what he posits as the “work” in opposition to 
the “text” in this essay is what he calls the “readerly text” (and not, as expectation dictates, the 
readerly work) in S/Z only adds to the confusion. 
719 Barthes, S/Z,10. 
720 Ibid., 5. 
721 Ibid., 11-13. 
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painted, parts. Evidently, Barthes’ point is not so literal. The reader, as much as the 
viewer, “writes” the work by mentally filling in its “gaps.” Or, as in parody, pastiche, 
translation, and other such forms, the reader actually writes his own version of the work, 
reducing, enlarging, or merely altering its initial ambiguities. Yet here’s the rub! For this 
latter reader does, really, write, but what he writes is not the initial literary work. The 
parodist writes only his own work. 
By virtue of being based on a metaphorical understanding of “writing,” Barthes’ notion 
of the writerly, especially if understood as writerly reading, or reading-as-writing, 
ultimately serves to cover over a much more abysmal, destabilizing process proper to 
interpretation, one from which it nevertheless emerges. This chaotic undercurrent is, 
namely, the reading that occurs while writing—where “to write” is limited to the act of 
standing before, ready to fill, the page. In other words, what Barthes conceals by 
transferring writing to the realm of reading is that the reader and the writer live in 
separate realms, ‘twixt them lying an abyss. While the reader, no matter how complex 
and involved his reading, reads but does not write, the writer writes and reads 
simultaneously. The reading of the reader and that of the writer are, therefore, entirely 
different. And this for the simple reason that the writer’s reading is self-reflexive and 
therefore fundamentally split: apart from reading that about which he writes, the writer 
first and foremost reads his own writing as he’s writing it. 
From a certain point of view, however, the reader himself, or his reading, can also be 
understood as split. For, while reading the text that he faces, his entire personal 
bibliography, any of his prior readings of this text, as well as a set of various intra- and 
inter-textual associations force themselves into his attention, such that he springs back 
and forth between reading the written text and “reading” the various thoughts that it 
evokes within him. Wolfgang Iser somewhat captures this split reading, albeit not without 
giving it a subjectivist slant, when claiming that “[t]ext and reader no longer confront 
each other as object and subject, but instead the ‘division’ takes place within the reader 
himself” insofar as he “take[s] as a theme for [him]sel[f] something that [he] is not,” 
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namely “the thoughts of another.”722 Therefore, “in reading there are these two levels—
the alien ‘me’ and the real, virtual ‘me’” every text “draw[ing] a different boundary 
within our personality.”723 In more “objective” terms, “the alien ‘me’” corresponds to the 
reading of the physical written text, and “the virtual ‘me’” to the “reading” of the 
“product[s] of the reader’s mind working on the raw material of the text,”724 where 
virtual, for Iser, is precisely the realm which emerges between text and reader.725 Except 
that the reading of the virtual implicit to Iser’s theory renders reading metaphorical to the 
same extent as Barthes’ writerly does writing. Properly speaking, only writing can be 
read. 
It follows that, even were a split in effect within the realm of reading, its “power” would 
fall short of that characterizing writing. For, in the realm of writing, the split is either 
between two actual readings (each of which is doubled by a metaphorical reading) or 
between two metaphorical readings (one of which is the double of an actual reading). 
These are typical, in turn, of writing about another text and of writing about “ideas.” 
Rather than speak of reading being split in two at the level of the reader and split in three 
or four at the level of the writer, a simpler, non-metaphorical formulation would 
acknowledge a split at the level of the writer (either between two actual readings or 
between reading and writing) that does not transpire at the level of the reader. Given the 
                                                 
722 Wolfgang Iser, “The Reading Process: A Phenomenological Approach,” trans. Catherine 
Macksey and Richard Macksey, in Reader-Response Criticism: From Formalism to Post-
structuralism, ed. Jane P. Tompkins (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 1980), 
67. 
723 Ibid. 
724 Ibid., 54. 
725 “[T]he literary work has two poles […] the artistic pole is the author’s text, and the aesthetic is 
the realization accomplished by the reader. In view of this polarity, it is clear that the work itself 
cannot be identical with the text or with its actualization but must be situated somewhere between 
the two. It must inevitably be virtual in character, as it cannot be reduced to the reality of the text 
or to the subjectivity of the reader, and it is from this virtuality that it derives its dynamism. As 
the reader passes through the various perspectives offered by the text, and relates the different 
views and patterns to one another, he sets the work in motion, and so sets himself in motion, too.” 
Wolfgang Iser, “Interaction between Text and Reader,” in The Reader in the Text: Essays on 
Audience and Interpretation, ed. Susan R. Suleiman and Inge Crosman (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1980), 106. 
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tendency towards semantic confusion caused by the fact that the writer can be ascribed a 
reading, but one fundamentally diverging from the act that usually bears this name, his 
may be called a second reading. It should be obvious, at this point, that Iser and Barthes 
yield their respective theories from their status not as readers but as writers—specifically, 
as writers about texts. The split between “alien ‘me’” and “virtual ‘me,’” as much as that 
between writerly reading and readerly reading, have their basis in the split between the 
writer’s reading of his own writing and his reading of the writing about which he writes, 
one which is metaphorically projected into the realm of the reader. 
II. 
To be clear, second reading, where the writer’s subject matter is another text, is 
composed of two parts or vectors: the reading of the text being written about while 
writing about it, which can be called lectorial reading, and the reading of the text written 
while writing it, scriptorial reading.726 Considering that both the reader’s reading, which 
can be called first reading, and lectorial reading have the same text as their object, the 
specific relation or difference between them presents itself as a problem. In his 
Rereading, Matei Călinescu distinguishes between “reading” and “rereading,” or a first 
reading and a second reading, along the lines of linearity and circularity.727 While 
reading is accompanied by anticipation and what Iser more generally refers to as a 
dynamic horizon of expectations, rereading is marked by a depth of intra- and inter-
textual associations that are only possible once the distance between the beginning and 
                                                 
726 The choice of lectorial and scriptorial means not only to repeat, with a difference, Barthes’ 
readerly and writerly, but also to hint at the ultimately religious nature of the realm proper to 
writing. In other words, the writer always reads, whether his own writing or those of which he 
writes, as if reading scripture. 
727 “[W]hen I speak of first reading […] I mean a hypothetically linear reading, continuous, fresh, 
curious, and sensitive to surprising turns or unpredictable developments (which include 
unpredictable intertextual associations).” Matei Călinescu, Rereading (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1993), 7. “At least heuristically, it is justifiable to speak of a first linear reading 
and of a metaphorical circular rereading, specifying that the latter’s circularity is naturally 
expansive, that the circles of understanding that it draws around the center of a particular work 
are increasingly large and involve reading and rereading other works, many other works, ideally 
(in Borgesian spirit) all other works, the totality of what has been written.” Ibid., 8. 
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the end of the text is reduced—namely, by way of (a first) reading. To map these 
categories onto those of first reading and lectorial reading without further ado, however, 
would mean to artificially eliminate the discontinuity between the reader’s realm and the 
writer’s realm. For, as Călinescu himself admits, the reading-rereading distinction is 
blurry at best728 and is meant to function mainly in a heuristic manner, such that even a 
first reading can have the attributes of rereading.729 This means, in short, that to equate 
lectorial reading with rereading is to see no difference between reading for the purpose 
of writing, that is, reading-towards-writing or research, and reading while writing. As 
before, writing must be limited to the act of writing rather than understood 
metaphorically, as “organizing” or “structuring.” From the viewpoint of second reading, 
all reading, any and every reading and rereading, done prior to confronting the page with 
pen in hand belongs to first reading. 
Nevertheless, the term reading-towards-writing points to a certain truth in qualifying 
lectorial reading as rereading. This is, namely, because rereading is first and foremost the 
operation of the writer. The purest model of rereading is the writer. Călinescu suggests as 
much in claiming that, “when I write about what the first reading of a literary piece is like 
(was like, should be like), I cannot but place myself in a perspective of rereading” which 
brings with it “a certain amount of checking (rereading).”730 To be precise, a reader 
doesn’t read-towards-writing without having had the experience of being a writer, and 
therefore having at some point read lectorially. The reader’s rereading is therefore 
modeled after, modeled in anticipation of the writer’s rereading, or lectorial reading. It 
follows that Călinescu, although in a slightly different key, joins Barthes and Iser in 
projecting onto the reader the experience of the writer. The fact that the reader’s 
rereading is a mere projection, a pale copy of the writer’s, is confirmed by the 
                                                 
728 “[T]he distinction between reading and rereading, […] [can be] diluted to the formula of 
(re)reading—the parenthesis indicating its floating, optional character.” Ibid. 
729 “What should be clear is that reading and rereading often go together. Thus, under certain 
circumstances the first reading of a work can in fact be a double reading; that is to say, it can 
adopt, alongside the prospective logic of reading, a retrospective logic of rereading […] [A]n 
informed reader will be in a position to read and reread at the same time.” Ibid., 18-9. 
730 Ibid., 7. 
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unbridgeable distance between the two. While the reader’s rereading is potentially 
infinite, and for this very reason has its infinity deferred, opening onto the realm of 
infinite research, the writer’s rereading is made finite by the act of writing, forced as the 
writer is to choose one from a vast multiplicity of interpretations. In this sense, the 
writer’s lectorial reading is always the last (re)reading. Because it is the last, and knows 
itself as such, it flips over into madness, looks into the abyss of rereading, just before it 
sets down into writing, where it is intensively charged with the infinity that it arrests. 
III. 
And yet, while not incorrect, such a definition of lectorial reading on the basis of its copy 
can’t but fall short of one gained from its archetype. In other words, lectorial reading is 
itself, at least in part, a projection of a further, more extreme type of reading, namely 
scriptorial reading, onto the-text-written-about. This is most clearly seen in the case of 
citation, where the two slopes of second reading meet. When citing the text written 
about, the writer writes (out) this text, such that what he writes coincides with what he 
writes about. Evidently, herein scriptorial reading is applied to the text written about. 
And precisely such an application functions as the purest form of lectorial reading. It 
follows that any complete definition of this type of reading must succeed a delineation of 
scriptorial reading, whereof it is the image. 
The reading that the writer operates upon his own writing in the act of writing is first of 
all one that does away with, or at least substantially alters, any intention that the writer 
might have had prior to writing. It is not writing’s articulation of thoughts that’s primarily 
at stake in this alteration, even if it is, indeed, writing’s difference from thinking that 
functions as the source of the latter’s subversion. Instead, it is the writer’s very ability of 
reading what he has written, and, in reading and re-thinking it, of choosing either to 
follow a different strand of the initial argument or to replace the argument altogether. 
Were the writer unable to read his own writing, a gap would indeed persist between his 
intention and his writing but the writer’s writing wouldn’t undergo an alteration, 
alongside that of his intention, in the very act of writing. To be more specific, in the 
writing of a sentence, the writer, reading his own writing, sees a multiplicity of 
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connections that were invisible to him previously. Faced with these associations, which 
exceed the scope of the ones that he initially planned to lay out, and which may even 
contradict his initial thesis, the writer must either set about erasing and rewriting what 
he’s written, following a new line of argument which can just as easily come to a 
standstill, or continue writing, albeit now according to the arguments that his own writing 
offers him, that flash up from his reading of what he’s written or still writing. Thus does 
scriptorial reading, when attended to, render writing discontinuous, and, in consequence, 
itself proceeds by fits and starts. 
Insofar as scriptorial reading is based on the writer being the first reader of his own text, 
it also functions, at the limit, as the last reading of said text before it is relinquished to the 
reader proper. Put differently, the fact that the writer can read his own text means that he 
can alienate himself from it, and in doing this, play, at least partially, the role of the 
external reader of this text. He is therefore in a position to anticipate and respond to his 
audience’s reading of what he’s writing while he’s writing it. Although the difference 
‘twixt the two may be as blurry as that between reading and rereading, alongside the 
writer’s own “isolated” reading of his text exist also all the readings that “he himself” 
would not apply to the text but which he “imagines” other readers will. This type of 
“monologic” discourse—or inner dialogue—practiced by the writer has its most exacting 
documentarian in Mikhail Bakhtin. Particularly in his commentary on Dostoevsky’s short 
novels, Bakhtin makes the argument that “the orientation of one person to another 
person’s discourse and consciousness is, in essence, the basic theme of all of 
Dostoevsky’s novels.”731 In this vein, “[a]fter almost every word Devushkin [the 
protagonist and one of the narrators of Dostoevsky’s Poor Folk] casts a sideward glance 
at his absent interlocutor,”732 which is to say that, as is true of Dostoevsky’s other 
protagonists, his “consciousness of self is constantly perceived against the background of 
the other’s consciousness of him—‘I for myself’ against the background of ‘I for 
                                                 
731 Mikhail Bakhtin, “The hero’s monologic discourse and narrational discourse in Dostoevsky’s 
short novels,” trans. Caryl Emerson, in Bakhtinian Thought: An Introductory Reader, ed. Simon 
Dentith (London: Routledge, 1995), 159. 
732 Ibid., 158. 
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another.’”733 At the level of his speech, this means that “[t]he other’s rejoinder wedges its 
way […] into [it], and although [being] in fact absent, its influence brings about a radical 
accentual and syntactical restructuring of that speech” such that “its shadow, its trace, fall 
on his speech, and that shadow, that trace is real.”734 To borrow a coinage from 
Nietzsche, it can be said that, according to Bakhtin, Dostoevsky’s protagonists are, as far 
as their discourse is concerned, reactive. And, given that he is, while engaged in reading 
his own writing, in a position similar to that of one of Dostoevsky’s protagonists, no less 
can the writer be characterized by this term. 
With this in mind, not only is the writer’s intention thwarted by the proliferation of 
associations that reading his own writing brings, but it is also forced to constitute itself 
reactively, pushed into a corner and asphyxiated by the various demands that the writer 
imagines to be placed upon him. It is not, therefore, simply that the writer formulates his 
argument in response to a critical, intellectual, political, and personal context, and then, 
with this argument formulated, begins to write. But that, in the very act of writing, his 
initial plan is attacked—and continuously so—by both a thinking process that exceeds his 
grasp and a set of norms that are only actualized in this act. In other words, as pertains to 
the writer’s reactive status, the very demands to which the writer subjects his writing 
change in the very process of writing, such that his intention reacts ever anew. After all, 
the true measure of being reactive, and therefore of being subjugated, is to be so at every 
step, to be in a constant state of vigilance. 
It should be evident that, at the extreme, the infinity of ever growing associations and the 
checkmate that lurks around every corner and becomes more evident with every move—
both of which scriptorial reading makes manifest—would, if yielded to, result in the 
writer’s utter silence. And, of course, such an end to writing would also bring with it an 
end to scriptorial reading. Therefore, as was the case with lectorial reading when 
defined vis-à-vis rereading, essential to scriptorial reading is that it be overcome—for 
                                                 
733 Ibid., 159. 
734 Ibid., 161. 
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only thus can it continue. What this means is that the writer must choose—at every step, 
ever anew—which now-emerging pathway he will follow, and this while also choosing 
which of the plurality of voices that reverberate inside his head to take seriously and 
which to pass over in silence, or even: while ignoring their objections and criticisms 
altogether. Given that he cannot stand back from the act of writing while writing, his 
choice is founded purely on itself and is thus a true risk. The text written is no more than 
a record of these choices. It’s important, however, that the writer’s choice not be 
understood as the revival, or the ultimate victory, of his intention. Rather than the writer 
eliminating scriptorial reading and turning a blind eye to his own writing, herein he 
dissolves his intention altogether, arrests its appearance time and time again, so as to 
allow “his” writing to follow its own indecipherable course. Thus, instead of falling 
silent, the writer, in order to write without betraying his scriptorial reading, becomes 
mad with his own text. 
In sum, scriptorial reading opens up two perspectives on the text being written—which 
can be called “obsessive” and “paranoid,” in turn—that force the writer, on the one hand, 
to stray off course and stutter, and, on the other hand, to make decisions as regards his 
writing which are groundless, and which he has no way of “re-grounding” without either 
ignoring scriptorial reading altogether or falling into the same problem yet again. A 
writing that keeps a sideward glace on scriptorial reading therefore has no option but to 
appear apodictic—while, in fact, proceeding by way of unannounced hypotheses. 
Ultimately, this shows the most seemingly impersonal discourse to be an absolute 
confession, the most authentic diary (of which poetry is, of course, the supreme 
example). 
IV. 
Citation brings this entire mechanism of scriptorial reading to bear on the cited words. 
Which is to say that, in citing the text written about—and more generally, in writing 
about it—the writer behaves as if he is himself the author of this text, one which he 
thereafter scriptorially reads. Naturally, he’s aware that the text written about is not, in 
fact, his own. But, given the freedom that he has, namely, of choosing which words to 
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cite, even to the point of editing them for his own purposes—but, most of all, given that 
he must transcribe them, such that he’s made to look at them anew—the writer’s reading 
of these words takes on the features of scriptorial reading. Already implicit to this 
description of citation is that lectorial reading must proceed as a sort of close reading. In 
transcribing another’s words, the writer is forced to take them one at a time, noticing 
what he missed when playing the role of “mere” reader. Over the course of this close 
reading, the two perspectives on the text opened up to the writer vis-à-vis his own writing 
now open up in regards to the text cited or written about. The writer at once falls into the 
potentially infinite depth of the source-text’s detail and is surrounded by a certain breadth 
of hermeneutic norms, which begin a potentially infinite dialogue within him. 
Yet, given that such a lectorial reading takes place within the act of writing, its mise en 
abyme—same as that of scriptorial reading—must end in or with writing. Except that, 
while scriptorial reading, at the extreme, halts the writer’s writing, and with it itself, 
lectorial reading, at the same extreme, may halt the writer’s writing of “his own” text, 
but not his transcription of the source-text. Caught in lectorial reading’s hall of mirrors, 
the writer, instead of turning silent, plays a role between that of the reader and that of the 
writer, namely, that of the scrivener or scribe—specifically, one that, like a punished 
pupil, rewrites the same lines over and over again. Therefore, insofar as the text he reads 
is not his own, the writer is presented, instead of with the choice of continually erasing 
(what he’s written) or following (an ever divergent path of thought), that of endlessly 
repeating (the text he’s writing about) or following (this text along a different path). 
Where the first requires the writer to arbitrarily decide to write the second requires that he 
continue the source-text—if, that is, he wishes to be a writer and not merely a scrivener. 
What such a continuation of the source-text entails on behalf of the writing that emerges 
from lectorial reading, is that, while not being mere repetition of the source-text, it also 
cannot part with it entirely. With a sideward glace upon lectorial reading, the writer is to 
the source-text as the narrator is to the hero in Bakhtin’s description of Dostoevsky’s 
novels—namely, “literally fettered” to him, unable to “back off from him sufficiently to 
give a summarizing and integrated image of his deeds and actions” given that “[s]uch a 
generalizing image would already lie outside the hero’s own field of vision,” presuming, 
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as it does, “some stable position on the outside.”735 Like narration in Dostoevsky, 
lectorial reading is “without perspective,” the writer “find[ing] himself in immediate 
proximity” to the source-text, able to structure the representation of the latter only “from 
this maximally close, aperspectival point of view.”736 In The Pleasure of the Text, 
Barthes designates such an attitude vis-à-vis the source-text as the one proper to the 
hysteric who “takes the text for ready money” and “throws himself across the text.”737 
Insofar as the source-text is, for the hysteric, a text of bliss, it is “outside criticism, unless 
it is reached through another text of bliss: you cannot speak ‘on’ such a text, you can 
only speak ‘in’ it, in its fashion, enter into a desperate plagiarism, hysterically affirm the 
void of bliss.”738 And, following Barthes’ “typology of the pleasures of reading” to the 
end while keeping in mind that both lectorial reading and scriptorial reading are marked 
by an obsessive-paranoid attitude, if the writing that emerges from the former bears a 
hysteric attitude, the one emerging from the latter bears a fetishistic attitude, the attitude, 
namely, of “I know very well, but…” corresponding to “a divided-up text, the singling 
out of quotations, formulae, turns of phrase.”739 
It should be no secret that, outside the moment of citation, lectorial reading is followed 
by scriptorial reading, and that the writing arising from one and that arising from the 
other must, ultimately, be one and the same. In other words, the script of the writer’s 
experience is the following: (i) he rereads the source-text as he is writing about it or as he 
writes it out; (ii) he sinks into the abyss that his lectorial reading reveals and is rendered 
stuck writing and re-writing the source-text; (iii) he emerges from this abyss by choosing 
a particular course mapped out by the source-text and extending it, a course that can have 
its origin in the use of a single word or term, in the gap between one phrase and another, 
                                                 
735 Ibid., 180. 
736 Ibid. 
737 Roland Barthes, The Pleasure of the Text, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1975), 63. 
738 Ibid., 22. 
739 Ibid., 63. 
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in the ambiguity of a particular set of words, or in any other of its elements; (iv) as he 
writes this continuation, he begins to read it; (v) he becomes trapped in the abyss of 
scriptorial reading, stop-starting his writing, erasing it as soon as he loses sight of its 
sense and re-writing it again, but without any progress; (vi) he escapes this Hamletian 
stage by embracing the lack of continuity in his writing, by forcing it through despite its 
incoherence, letting it coagulate into a sense only where it wishes. It follows, then, that, 
on account of the process that as a whole is called second reading, the writer’s writing is 
(pock-)marked not only by the infinity of associations that he must abandon-while-
preserving and the pandemonium of voices he reacts to, but also by the source-text that 
sets his agenda. At the same time, due to the disturbance brought about by scriptorial 
reading, the writer’s writing on the text doesn’t just continue the text in the sense of 
bringing it, or a part of it, to a higher point of articulation but also continues it by 
returning it to a more primordial state, to the ambiguous, thick, unrefined texture it bore 
before seeing the light of day in that first articulation given to it by its author. Simply put, 
the writer at once articulates and disarticulates the source-text. It is in this sense that close 
reading, or what Barthes calls the step-by-step method, can emerge only from the 
coincidence, in citation, of lectorial reading and scriptorial reading, as, namely, “a way 
of observing the reversibility of the structures from which the text is woven.”740 Perhaps 
this is, in part, what Benjamin, quoting Hofmannsthal, means by his injunction “to read 
what was never written.”741 
                                                 
740 Barthes, S/Z, 13. 
741 Walter Benjamin, “On the Mimetic Faculty,” trans. Edmund Jephcott, in Selected Writings, 
Volume 2, Part 2, 1931-1934, ed. Michael W. Jennings, Howard Eiland, and Gary Smith 
(Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1999), 722. Additionally, the first paragraph of Agamben’s 
late supplementary preface to Infancy and History, “Experimentum Linguae,” is a further 
testament to what second reading’s disarticulation of the source-text may reveal: “Every written 
work can be regarded as the prologue (or rather, the broken cast) of a work never penned, and 
destined to remain so, because later works, which in turn will be the prologues or the moulds for 
other absent works, represent only sketches or death masks. The absent work, although it is 
unplaceable in any precise chronology, thereby constitutes the written works as prolegomena or 
paralipomena of a non-existent text; or, in a more general sense, as parerga which find their true 
meaning only in the context of an illegibile ergon. To take Montaigne’s fine image, these are the 
frieze of grotesques around an unpainted portrait, or, in the spirit of the pseudo-Platonic letter, the 
counterfeit of a book which cannot be written.” Giorgio Agamben, “Experimentum Linguae,” in 




By no means is second reading “evident,” however. For the most part, every effort is 
made to conceal it, to pretend it away, to disregard its every manifestation as no more 
than hallucination. The writer is urged to keep to his announced intention, which, on the 
assumption that writing is no more than exscription, can easily survive the latter’s “slings 
and arrows.” According to this alternate script, the writer’s experience is the following: 
(i) previous to writing, he reads the source-text and forms a thesis, pinpointing several 
quotations meant to evidence it, playing, the whole time, the role of reader rather than of 
writer; (ii) in the act of writing, he merely writes out the “ideas” he held previously and 
transcribes the quotations that he holds as proof without re-engaging either, as if what he 
writes was already composed (in his mind) previous to him writing it (out). Evidently, the 
writer is herein at one moment before writing and in the next after writing, the present of 
writing being altogether absent. Properly speaking, this writer is no writer—for he 
doesn’t write, he does not perform the act of writing. Second reading can therefore be 
concealed not only through its projection into the realm of the reader, but also through the 
projection of first reading into that of the writer. 
In fact, within this script, even if, on the first reading, the writer draws his interpretation 
of the source-text from this text itself without imposing upon it his own pre-held 
concept(s), he nonetheless thereafter holds to this interpretation over and above the 
source-text, subsuming the source-text to it as if the former were identical to this one of 
its interpretations. (This is, more or less, what the reader does vis-à-vis the source-text: in 
order to continue reading, he must form a concept of the text which provides a certain 
moveable feast of expectations and which, upon reaching the text’s end, congeals into a 
set interpretation.)742 And it is from this replacement of the source-text by a particular 
                                                 
742 It is, of course, difficult to differentiate, within Iser’s analysis of the reading-act, what belongs 
to the realm of the reader and what to the realm of the writer—that is, where he describes first 
reading and where second. Nevertheless, the extent to which reading is, for him, aligned to an 
intention is visible insofar as he describes “the reading process [as] selective, and the potential 
text [as] infinitely richer than any of its individual realizations. This is borne out by the fact that a 
second reading of a piece of literature often produces a different impression from the first.” Iser, 
“The Reading Process,” 55. 
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interpretation that the “writer”’s ability to write “on” it emerges. For it signals an end to 
the “writer”’s engagement with the source-text and thus his taking leave of the latter in 
favor of its interpretation. The “writer” turns his back on the source-text, orders it silent, 
and thus places himself above it, “over” it. It is no longer the source-text that he “writes” 
about but his interpretation of the source-text. Such a writing that is not a writing, 
situated “over” both the source-text and itself, can’t but seem devoid of gaps, leaps, 
decisions. Or, better yet, its every fissure is prefigured, even to the point of being named 
as such, in a meta-commentary—so that it’s between the latter and the commentary 
proper that the only distinct fissure in this writing lies. It should be evident, then, why 
deconstructive criticism focuses its efforts on this type of fissure above all,743 for it is the 
last refuge of writing proper, once second reading has been entirely suppressed, and 
therefore the only locus wherein such a writing can have its seemingly intact intention 
punctured.744 
(Of course, the writer of second reading is not guiltless of mortifying the source-text in 
turn. It’s rather that he practices this mortification not prior to the act of writing but in its 
very course. In other words, the writer proper stabs into the source-text—and into his 
own text—with his every decision to follow one path rather than another, and where the 
source-text exhales its last breath there the writer’s own text ends, there the writer 
relinquishes his role as writer. This writing, informed by second reading, is therefore no 
more than a graveyard or a murder scene. Put more “philosophically,” the thinker is 
constitutively incapable of reconstructing his thinking process. He cannot say how he 
                                                 
743 “All these critics seem curiously doomed to say something quite different from what they 
meant to say. Their critical stance—Lukács’s propheticism, Poulet’s belief in the power of an 
original cogito, Blanchot’s claim of meta-Mallarméan impersonality—is defeated by their own 
critical results.” Paul de Man, “The Rhetoric of Blindness: Jacques Derrida’s Reading of 
Rousseau,” in Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism, 2nd ed 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 105-6. See also Jonathan Culler, On 
Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1982), specifically section 5 of the second chapter, “Critical Consequences.” 
744 Another way to say this is that the very fissure between commentary and meta-commentary is 
the trace of the second reading (and the writing it could have produced) that didn’t take place, or: 
was disavowed. Stretching it or closing it is the work of deconstruction. 
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arrived at B from A. It’s no surprise, then, that the majority of thinkers seem to be saying 
the same thing. For when they write they don’t reconstruct their thinking process so much 
as, thinking they can reconstruct it, put forth an artificial construct molded on the goal of 
intelligibility and informed by a conventional set of oppositions, forms, and lines of 
argument. And it’s only second reading that can lead out of this impasse inasmuch as it 
instructs the writer-thinker to prioritize the thinking that he does while writing over the 
one he did prior to writing. Thus, in stopping, doubting, straying writing, the writer opens 
up the space for his thought to be written, even if only negatively.) 
It would be a gross misunderstanding, however, to separate texts into those empty of 
second reading and those saturated by it, and thus to replicate Barthes’ readerly-writerly 
dichotomy. At issue is, instead, the story of the text. Every text is ultimately informed by 
second reading—despite the authority of its author. The true distinction is between texts 
that disclude this reading and those that occlude it. Deconstruction, understanding this 
distinction very well, is oriented toward exposing the second reading inherent to a 
particular source-text. But performing such an action is not a guarantee that the text 
written by the deconstructive writer itself discludes this reading. Quite the contrary: 
deconstruction itself participates in the erasure of second reading inasmuch as it proceeds 
by way of writing “on,” even if it be “on” the second reading “deposited” within a 
source-text. If Paul de Man claims, in his essay on Derrida’s reading of Rousseau, “The 
Rhetoric of Blindness,” that “Derrida deconstruct[s] a pseudo-Rousseau by means of 
insights that could have been gained from the ‘real’ Rousseau,”745 then such an 
accusation shows the obliviousness to second reading of both de Man and Derrida. For, 
while de Man makes clear how Derrida imposes himself “on” Rousseau, he does not 
himself succeed in going beyond the framework of good-and-evil as long as he still 
speaks of misreading—where “good” interpretation is still understood as adequacy to the 
source-text, even if misreadings themselves participate in the “good,” and even if this 
“good” be an infinite task—and ultimately uses both Rousseau and Derrida merely to 
                                                 
745 De Man, “The Rhetoric of Blindness,” 139. 
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further his own thesis regarding blindness and insight.746 Deconstruction thus seems to be 
in the paradoxical position of at once discluding second reading and occluding it. In 
truth, it doesn’t even manage to disclude the source-text’s second reading inasmuch as no 
determinate second reading can, in fact, be commented upon, can be read or interpreted 
itself, even negatively, while this precisely is what deconstruction tries to do. Translation 
and extension alone can perform such a disclusion.747 
VI. 
More exactly put, in his “Semiology and Rhetoric,” de Man shows that each text contains 
an aporia. In the case of Proust’s Recherche, he evinces a preference for metaphor over 
metonymy that relies, in its presentation, on metonymy. It appears, then, that “the text 
does not practice what it preaches”748 and thus errs, such that it needs a critic to expose 
this false pretension, an exposition whose name is deconstruction. In fact, claims de Man, 
“[t]he deconstruction is not something we [the critics] have added to the text but it 
constituted the text in the first place.”749 It’s not that Proust claims the superiority of 
metaphor over metonymy, while the truth is the contrary or the reverse. It’s that the 
Recherche itself contains both possibilities—possibilities of reading that are mutually 
exclusive yet included by Proust mutually. Thus, in “reading the text” against its explicit 
statements, in reading its deconstruction, the critic is “only trying to come closer to being 
as rigorous a reader as the author had to be in order to write the sentence in the first 
place.”750 De Man’s interest in the second reading inherent to the source-text is therefore 
obvious. To translate this into the terms found in “The Rhetoric of Blindness”: while it 
appears that Proust is blind to the insight that is his use of metonymy to support 
                                                 
746 “The critical reading of Derrida’s critical reading of Rousseau shows blindness to be the 
necessary correlative of the rhetorical nature of literary language.” Ibid., 141. 
747 “Deconstruction” is not synonymous with “Derrida.” There are texts by the latter that 
genuinely continue their source-text. 
748 Paul de Man, “Semiology and Rhetoric,” in Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in 
Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1979), 15 




metaphor, such that he needs a critic to reveal “his” insight-oversight, Proust is, in fact, 
quite aware of this aspect of his text: he deliberately chose to place these mutually 
exclusive readings together and thereby make the text an allegory of its own reading. 
This is more or less how de Man interprets Rousseau, whom he considers a “non-blinded 
author”751 whose “text has no blind spots […] account[ing] at all moments for its own 
rhetorical mode”752 and “postulates the necessity of its own misreading […] know[ing] 
and assert[ing] that it will be misunderstood.”753 In this context, Derrida’s mistake, 
Derrida’s own blindness, is that of making his method of deconstruction “apply to the 
wrong object,” for he attempts “to deconstruct Rousseau”—that is, to show how 
Rousseau makes logocentric-presentist claims which his language subverts—when 
“[t]here is no need.”754 Nevertheless, this Derridean blindness-misreading “comes closer 
than any previous version to Rousseau's actual statement,” that is, contains the greatest 
insight vis-à-vis Rousseau, “because it singles out as the point of maximum blindness the 
area of greatest lucidity: the theory of rhetoric and its inevitable consequences,”755 which 
is to say, it claims that Rousseau is blind to precisely the thing of which he’s most 
aware—allowing for de Man’s inversion: that Rousseau is aware of the thing to which 
he’s most blind. Although Derrida differs from Lukács, Poulet, and the other critics de 
Man deconstructs—namely, insofar as each of the latter put forward a methodology that, 
applied, lead to moments of insight to which it was blind, while Derrida’s “chapter on 
method,” although aimed inappropriately, “is flawless in itself”756—he belongs with 
them, rather than with Rousseau, in the “critical but blinded”757 category.758 In both 
                                                 
751 De Man, “The Rhetoric of Blindness,” 139. 
752 Ibid., 141. 
753 Ibid., 136. 
754 Ibid., 139. 
755 Ibid. 
756 Ibid. 
757 Ibid., 141. 
758 “Derrida found himself in the most favorable of all critical positions: he was dealing with an 
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cases, blindness is “the necessary correlative of the rhetorical nature of literary 
language”: while the “blinded” is blind to aspects of his own language or blind to aspects 
of a source-text, the “non-blinded” has his blindness “transferred […] to his first 
readers,” which “need, in turn, a critical reader who reverses the tradition and 
momentarily takes us closer to the original insight.”759 Deconstruction, then, is not a 
deconstruction of the source-text but a deconstruction of, namely, its interpretation(s). 
The practice of the deconstructionist can only be that of deconstructing previous, “naïve” 
readings of a particular source-text, including such readings that exist within the source-
text. Its task is therefore negative: it takes a straightforward, “logocentric-presentist,” 
holistic interpretation of the source-text—one that it either posits or finds—only to 
thereafter subvert it. It thus makes manifest the resistance to interpretation, that is, the 
deconstruction, within the source-text. 
De Man is never wholly blind to second reading—that is, the vortex experienced by the 
writer when reading his own writing that prevents him from sustaining a stable intention 
and a stable interpretation of the source-text over the course of his writing. The difference 
between the “non-blinded” and the “blinded” text is more or less the same as that 
between the disclusive and the occlusive text. Thus, the play between blindness and 
insight within the occlusive text emerges from the attempt, on the part of this text’s 
author, to eliminate his second reading in favor of first reading, to control his second 
reading through a meta-commentary, a task that he is bound to leave unfinished. The 
moments to which he, as a first reader, is blind, and that serve as his greatest insights, are 
precisely the traces of second reading—which second reading makes—in his text. On the 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
author as clear-sighted as language lets him be who, for that very reason, is being systematically 
misread; the author's own works, newly interpreted, can then be played off against the most 
talented of his deluded interpreters or followers. Needless to say, this new interpretation will, in 
its turn, be caught in its own form of blindness, but not without having produced its own bright 
moment of literary insight.” Ibid., 139 This is a description of what de Man himself does in this 
essay, mutatis mutandis. 
759 Ibid., 141. 
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other hand, in the disclusive text, the author fully puts aside first reading such that this 
text is empty of blind spots without also being empty of second reading’s trace. Herein, 
the disclusive text is itself the trace of second reading. In both cases, deconstruction 
attempts to disclude the second reading in the source-text by breaking the spell of 
occlusion over it called first reading, by proving first reading wrong. Inasmuch as the 
disclusive text can be said to deconstruct itself, that is, to contain its own 
deconstruction—and thus at a quite formal level—deconstruction can be identified with 
second reading. 
The same is not true of deconstructive criticism, however. For, de Man shows more 
interest in the second reading present within source-texts than the second reading of his 
own text. He brackets, that is, the problem of second reading where it applies to himself 
such that his world seems made of finished source-texts and finished critical texts—or: 
such that he never considers writing as an act. De Man resigns himself to writing an 
occlusive text, with its own blindness and its own insight, and considers this enough to 
disclude the second reading present in the source-text, never questioning the extent to 
which and how the former (writing an occlusive text) might bear on the possibility of the 
latter (discluding second reading). After all, writing an occlusive text means engaging in 
first reading and therefore inevitably occluding both the second reading of the text being 
written and the second reading of the source-text being read. This is the ground from 
which de Man can confidently write “on,” and write “on” more than one source-text at 
once, even turning this into a critical prescription. Otherwise put, only in writing “on” 
can more than one source-text be attended to at the same time, can comparison—the one 
required for deconstructing “naïve” readings—take place. And insofar as he can claim 
that his occlusive text manages, in fact, to disclude the second reading within other 
source-texts, this second reading that he discludes still lies within the orbit of the “on,” 
albeit an apophatic “on.” 
Furthermore, as his vocabulary of “misreading” suggests, de Man is still devoted to 
object-adequacy: deconstruction is, for him, a way of sheltering the source-text from 
dishonorable eyes, of “going back to the things themselves,” of keeping true to the text at 
least to the extent of recognizing it properly. Yet, rather than figuring his object in a naïve 
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metaphysico-presentist manner, de Man posits it as having a certain degree of 
unreadability, as constitutively resisting adequacy. His project of adequacy must 
therefore be one of having adequacy to the-impossibility-of-having-adequacy-to-the-
object, or: to the self-inadequacy of the object.760 This is why every misreading of the 
source-text also constitutes an insight into it—for, precisely as a misreading, it confirms 
the object’s unreadability—and why de Man is content with writing an occlusive text that 
merely reveals misreadings as misreadings. In this way, however, deconstructive 
criticism presupposes itself, or its own necessity: misreadings contain insights vis-à-vis 
the object, but only insofar as they are revealed to be misreadings, namely by a 
deconstructive critic whose own reading is also a misreading, the insight of which is 
dependent, in order to be revealed, on a further deconstructive critic, and thus ad 
infinitum. Therefore, to complete the circle, the object is itself dependent on the semi-
guardianship offered by the deconstructive critic. A project that would truly be 
inadequate, or would renounce adequacy, to the object, however, would necessarily be 
one of adequacy to something other than the object. 
In fact, de Man can perhaps be described as committing a similar mistake to Stanley 
Fish—specifically the latter’s Surprised by Sin, the main argument of which is that 
“Milton [in Paradise Lost] consciously wants to worry his reader, to force him to doubt 
the correctness of his responses, and to bring him to the realization that his inability to 
read the poem with any confidence in his own perception is its focus.”761 Fish, that is, 
projects his second reading into Paradise Lost. As Jonathan Culler argues in On 
Deconstruction, “what Fish reports is not Stanley Fish reading but Stanley Fish 
imagining reading as a Fishian reader. Or […] his accounts of the reading experience are 
                                                 
760 In this sense, despite Graham Harman’s arguments to the contrary, deconstruction (if 
identified with de Man) is in accord with object-oriented ontology, specifically when it comes to 
literary objects. See Graham Harman, “The Well-Wrought Broken Hammer: Object-Oriented 
Literary Criticism,” New Literary History 43, no. 2 (Spring 2012): 183-203. 
761 Stanley Eugene Fish, Surprised by Sin: the Reader in Paradise Lost (London: Pallgrave 
Macmillan, 1967), 4. 
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reports of Fish reading as a Fishian reader reading as a Fishian reader.”762 Which is to 
say, this projected-reading is merely a representation, a falsification of Fish’s reading, a 
story of the latter: Fish is not being true to his reading. Culler’s assessment, namely that 
Fish represents-falsifies his reading, is correct but applied to the wrong object. For he 
assumes that the reading Fish represents is his first reading while in truth it is his second. 
This, namely, is why Fish is, on Culler’s own account, distinguished by the “propensity 
to fall into the same traps over and over again” unable to “notice that premature guesses 
often prove wrong and to anticipate this possibility as he reads”763—for this is a feature 
peculiar to second reading. The problem is not, therefore, that Fish misrepresents his 
reading but that he represents it in the first place. Or: the argument that a reading is 
misrepresented can apply only to a first reading. Every representation of a second 
reading, on the other hand, is a misrepresentation. Where a second reading is 
nevertheless represented, however, it is inevitably represented in the form of a first 
reading and molded into a set of narrative strictures. Thus, as Culler claims, all such 
fishy(an) stories of reading “follow an innocent reader, confident in traditional 
assumptions about structure and meaning, who encounters the deviousness of texts, falls 
into traps, is frustrated and dismayed, but emerges wiser for the loss of illusions” such 
that “[t]he outcome of reading […] is always knowledge.”764 
Culler then continues by arguing for a set of alternative, deconstructive “[s]tories of 
reading” that, “refus[ing] the idealizing denouements[,] stress instead the impossibility of 
reading,” stories where the text “undo[es] the oppositions on which it relies and between 
which it urges the reader to choose” and therefore “places the reader in an impossible 
situation that cannot end in triumph but only in […] an unwarranted choice or a failure to 
choose.”765 Such is the case, Culler claims, with de Man’s reading of Profession de foi. 
                                                 
762 Culler, On Deconstruction, 66. 
763 Ibid., 66. 
764 Ibid., 79. Evidently, Culler is contradicting himself in claiming at once that Fish’s reader 
doesn’t learn from his mistakes and that he emerges with knowledge. It is in the gap between 
these two statements that the truth of Fish’s stance is found. 
765 Ibid., 80-81. 
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Of course, Culler bases the rectitude of deconstructive stories over and against fishy(an) 
stories on the possibility of a correct representation of a first reading. Consequently, from 
the viewpoint of unrepresentable second reading, de Man’s story emerges as being 
equally fishy. The difference lies in their respective understandings of first reading onto 
which they mold their represented second readings. For, while Fish holds to a rigorously 
temporal view of first reading, de Man identifies it with its results. Naturally, this leads 
Fish to represent his second reading diachronically and de Man to do so synchronically—
de Man’s being, rather than a story, an allegory. And it’s this represented second reading 
that de Man, as Fish did in Surprised by Sin, assigns to the text, which, given its 
exteriority, makes a better host for synchrony than for diachrony. Put differently, de 
Man’s writing “on” the source-text is part and parcel of his writing “on” his reading: 
instead of presenting his second reading “of” the source-text, he represents it; instead of 
figuring it as an act he sees it as a finished product. 
VII. 
In his methodological preface to Hölderlin-Studien, “Über philologische Erkenntnis,” 
Péter Szondi, in line with the discipline of hermeneutics, distinguishes the science of 
literary study from the other sciences, history included, arguing that “the epistemological 
problems confronting literary study stem from the temptation to submit its perceptions 
[…] to criteria which, far from assuring its scientific status, place that status in doubt 
since they are inadequate to the object it studies.”766 The criterion of non-literary sciences 
that Szondi most focuses on is that of “see[ing] the particular only as a specimen, not as 
an individual entity,” this being the principle, as he calls it, of “once is never (einmal ist 
keinmal).”767 The latter underlies as much these sciences’ general approach, that is, their 
recognition of “only universal laws” by which they “seek to explain appearances,” 
intimacy wherewith they “sh[y] away from” for the sake of scientific “distance,”768 as 
                                                 
766 Péter Szondi, “On Textual Understanding,” in On Textual Understanding and Other Essays, 
trans. Harvey Mendelsohn (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 22. 
767 Ibid., 13. 
768 Ibid., 12-14. 
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their central task, namely “to convey knowledge of their objects, to reproduce the object 
once it is understood in order to make it a part of available knowledge” and thereafter “to 
place the deciphered image of the [object] on the same level with the [object] itself.”769 
If, on the other hand, literary study is to be true to its own object, it must, claims Szondi, 
follow the work of art’s demand that it “not be compared,” that it “be treated as existing 
in absolute independence of all others” as “a whole, a microcosm,”770 and do this, 
namely, by—rather than “aim[ing] at producing a description of the [artwork] that would 
be considered an end in itself”771—trying to interpret texts “at first in accord with the 
concrete process whose results they are […] which itself cannot be established without an 
understanding of individual passages and works,”772 one achieved only if literary study 
“immerses itself in the works themselves.”773 Specific to this philological type of 
knowledge gained in literary study, is the fact that “it can exist […] only through 
constantly confronting texts, only through continuously referring knowledge back to its 
source in cognition, that is to say, by relating it to the understanding of the poetic 
word.”774 
Evidently, Szondi’s distinction between the literary and the scientific approach broadly 
resembles that between second reading and first reading, respectively. In fact, this latter 
distinction reveals the truth of the first. After all, for a literary object to be approached 
scientifically, it must itself be open to such an approach—and, equally, for literary study 
to resemble the natural sciences it must be capable of doing so. It follows that submitting 
a literary object to the scientific gaze is part and parcel of reading it, such that Szondi’s 
distinction, in order to hold, can’t be theoretico-methodological but must, instead, be 
practical: he is describing two forms of praxis vis-à-vis literary objects. Rather than the 
                                                 
769 Ibid., 5-6. 
770 Ibid., 14. 
771 Ibid., 5. 
772 Ibid., 13. 
773 Ibid., 22. 
774 Ibid., 5. 
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“subject” choosing one over the other—a choice requiring a further politico-moral 
justification, the best and least “mythical” being that of “doing justice” to the object—it 
is one or the other that determines the role that the “subject” will play, the two in question 
being first reading and second reading. The choice belonging to the “subject” is, rather, 
between resisting the role assigned to him or yielding to it: the writer will inevitably read 
secondarily, but the extent to which this reading will inform his writing is his choice. 
Naturally, the bestowal of primacy on disclusive writing inevitably requires a politico-
moral justification in turn. But this justification can no longer be figured as adequacy to 
the object, and must instead, if it too is to avoid “myth,” be that of “doing justice” to the 
“subject”’s role, to the praxis proffered him. 
This is not, however, to contradict Szondi in his insistence that philological knowledge 
must immerse itself in its object and be a “perpetually renewed understanding”775 but 
only in his claim that this is done “for the sake […] of its appropriateness to the 
object.”776 Szondi confuses attention-to-the-singular and immersion-in-the-object with 
adequacy-to-the-object, an equivalence entailing, on the one hand, that there is only one 
“correct” approach to the artwork, and, on the other, that this aesthetic approach is only 
proper to the artwork, that the writer as writer cannot immerse himself in or attend to the 
uniqueness of, for instance, natural objects—from which follows either the effacement of 
the distinction between the sphere of reading and that of writing or the affirmation of the 
latter as infinitely superior to the former, all the while begging the question of how 
exactly literary works can be written at all. Therefore, the object doesn’t dictate the 
approach any more than the “subject.” It is, rather, the given praxis—the approach 
itself—that imposes itself. In plain, philological knowledge doesn’t have the option to 
distance itself from the object and “congeal into mere knowledge of the facts,”777 since it 
names precisely the praxis that resists such congealment. 
                                                 
775 Ibid. 
776 Ibid., 14. 
777 Ibid., 6. 
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Notwithstanding Szondi’s ultimate inability to arrive at second reading, his description of 
philological knowledge puts forth several characteristics that strongly intimate the 
former’s nature. Foremost among these is its orientation toward the singular. Though he 
limits the latter’s meaning to the single occurrence of a particular metaphor in Hölderlin’s 
poetry, and therefore spatializes it, its origin in the rejection of the “once is never” 
principle betrays its temporal applicability. That the transient singular event bears an 
essential link to second reading can be discerned not only from the fact that solely with 
an ear bent to the transient does a process as diaphanous as second reading manifest 
itself, nor just in that second reading is itself a reading of transience, a reading wherein 
each word juts out momentarily like a dagger threatening an end, but also through second 
reading’s inundation of the writer with one crisis, then another, whereby it draws his 
attention to the absolute freedom upon which he sails,778 the fact that none of his 
decisions are “once and for all,” that—to reverse the meaning of Szondi’s phrase—this 
“once” is n(ot for)ever.779 
                                                 
778 “All thought, even when skeptical, negative. dark, and disabused, if it is thought, frees the 
existing of existence—because in fact thought proceeds from it. But hope, as the virtus of 
thought, absolutely does not deny that today more than ever, at the heart of a world overwhelmed 
by harshness and violence, thought is confronted with its own powerlessness. Thought cannot 
think of itself as an ‘acting’ (as Heidegger asks it to be and as we cannot not require it to be, 
unless we give up thinking) unless it understands this ‘acting’ as at the same time a ‘suffering.’ 
Free thought thinking freedom must know itself to be astray, lost, and, from the point of view of 
‘action,’ undone by the obstinacy of intolerable evil. It must know itself to be pushed in this way 
onto its limit, which is that of the unsparing material powerlessness of all discourse, but which is 
also the limit at which thinking, in order to be itself, divorces itself from all discourse and 
exposes itself as passion. In this passion and through it, already before all ‘action’—but also 
ready for any engagement—freedom acts.” Jean-Luc Nancy, The Experience of Freedom, trans. 
Bridget McDonald (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 18. 
779 It is significant that Hegel, in the “Sense Certainty” chapter of his Phenomenology of Spirit, 
uses precisely writing—and the writer’s reading of his own writing—as a test for the truth of the 
“now”: “To the question: ‘What is the Now?’, we answer, for example, ‘The ‘now’ is the night.’ 
In order to put the truth of this sensuous certainty to the test, a simple experiment will suffice. We 
write down this truth. A truth cannot be lost by being written down any more than it can be lost 
by our preserving it, and if now, this midday, we look at this truth which has been written down, 
we will have to say that it has become rather stale.” Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The 




The same cannot be said of first reading, for, while it may be equally transient, the fact 
that its transience is cursive prevents it from presenting itself. Put differently, first 
reading is oriented towards the end of its object, towards finishing its object: accordingly, 
the reader keeps himself aloof from the text he reads, disallowing himself any absorption 
that might jeopardize the realization of his telos and thus discounting every detail that 
would contradict his bourgeoning interpretation and give him pause. Additionally, while 
first reading can be repeated with respect to one and the same object such that the latter 
can have multiple first readings, the second reading of an object is entirely unique. This, 
namely, because second reading doesn’t have an object, or, better put, its object is 
double—both the source-text and the text the writer is writing about the source-text. At 
best, for the sake of simplicity, it can be said that second reading has not so much a 
Gegenstand as a Ding, an obiect as a lucru, an oggetto as a cosa780—namely, the 
unrepeatable event of writing. Second reading is itself a “once” and of a “once.” In this 
sense, no less is first reading a reading of that which is most forcefully before or in front 
of the reader,781 than second reading is a reading in and of seconds. 
VIII. 
The other feature that Szondi assigns to philological knowledge and that can contribute to 
a sketch of second reading is its derivative status with respect to its aesthetic object. He 
explains this in terms of a prohibition on, namely, the “commentary” or the “stylistic 
examination”782 from reproducing its object, from ever placing itself on the same level as 
its object and from feigning to be, as is every artwork, even once an end in itself. What he 
is referring to specifically is the difference between (i) a commentary that seeks to give 
                                                 
780 The root of the German Ding is the Proto-Germanic *þingą, meaning ”meeting, date” (but it is 
also a word which, used in English, means to evoke a ringing sound); the Romanian lucru means 
at once “thing” and “work” (where the verb “to work” is a lucra); finally the Italian cosa—like 
the French chose—comes from the Latin causa, which means, among other things, “case, 
situation.” 
781 “First” derives from the Proto-Germanic *furistaz, which is the superlative of *furai, meaning 
“before, in front of.” 
782 Szondi, “On Textual Understanding,” 5. 
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an exhaustive explanation of the source-text, therefore seemingly rendering any further 
reading of the latter pointless—as so many “Guides” and “Beginner’s Introductions” 
do—and (ii) a commentary whose “deciphering operation should allow the poem to be 
understood as written in cipher” insofar as the poem “is a lock that snaps shut again and 
again, and explanation should not try to break it open.”783 Szondi, then, favors the former 
and prohibits the latter. But it’s his intuition here that’s more correct than his formulation, 
for he confuses the commentary’s assay of replacing or reproducing the artwork with its 
assay of placing itself at its level and being an end in itself—a confusion that precludes 
the possibility that a commentary be a disclusive text and thus itself an artwork. 
If “[e]ven the most uncritical reader will wish to compare such a description [of the poem 
which takes itself as an end in itself] with the poem,”784 then this description is, in fact, 
no more than a means to the poem, which is its ends. That it thereafter considers itself an 
end-in-itself is beside the point. Put differently, the “guiding”-commentary appears to the 
reader only in his confusion vis-à-vis the source-text. It is read for the source-text. 
Certainly, reading a “clear” explanation of the source-text might persuade the reader to 
abandon the latter altogether and only re-read the “guiding”-commentary when need be. 
But no less is it a means on this account. For, soon enough, like an old photograph, it 
shows its age and comes to be replaced by yet another reproduction of the negative. Its 
logic is therefore that of replacement: it derives from the source-text only as does a copy 
from the original and therefore not at all—for, the copy doesn’t “derive” from the 
original, doesn’t spring immediately from it, but rather from the copier’s “interpretation” 
of the original, this being the precise context wherein “object-adequacy” plays a relevant 
role. What can, from the viewpoint of the source-text, be called a “guiding”-commentary, 
is, from that of second reading, called the occlusive text. 
It follows that, if there is a “philological”-commentary that can stand in contrast to the 
“guiding” type, and be identical to the discursive text, a commentary of this kind must be 
                                                 
783 Ibid., 6. 
784 Ibid., 5. 
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an end in itself. In this case, the reader is not impelled to read the “philological”-
commentary due to its source-text, in order to dispel the latter’s complexity, but may 
even be lured into reading the source-text on account of the “philological”-commentary. 
And, as is the case between itself and the source-text, a further such commentary on the 
same “source-text” will not “replace” it but extend it along with the source-text. Thus is 
its logic one of extension, deriving from its source-text as a child from its father, or a 
polaroid from an instant camera. Ultimately, the “philological”-commentary makes the 
source-text itself visible in its derivativeness, in its secondariness, therefore: as “lock” or 
“cipher.” Or: second reading fulfills the secondariness of the “philological”-commentary 
while simultaneously evincing the secondariness of the source-text as such, this being 
another reason for which it is second. 
The “philological”-commentary, however, always stops short of explaining this 
secondariness—namely, that whereto the source-text can be considered secondary. 
Literary-historical, socio-politico-historical, or biographical explanations are all ruled out 
by the “philological”-commentary, insofar as each of these, only obtainable from further 
source-texts, requires the detachment wherein operates comparison, and thus a writing 
“on.” Even if the source-text is itself a “philological”-commentary, such as Benjamin’s 
“Goethe’s Elective Affinities,” and therefore that whereto the source-text is secondary 
seems obvious, no less does the rule regarding comparison apply. Notwithstanding, a 
“philological”-commentary lays new ground for such explanations, ones thereafter 
profferable by a “guiding”-commentary that takes at its word the “philological”-
commentary’s presentation of the source-text. 
IX. 
That there are “philological”-commentaries dealing with more than one-source text—
even with only bits and pieces of source-texts, in a collage—reveals the source-text to be, 
in fact, essentially obscure. With them can finally be grouped the various other kinds of 
disclusive texts that appear to have no source-text whatsoever: philosophical treatises and 
literary artworks. Put differently, the source-text of a given “philological”-commentary 
can’t ever be empirically singular even where the title announces it to be. What it is 
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secondary to, and with it every artwork, is both more than just one source-text and a 
source-text that is more than just a source-text. Benjamin’s Goethe essay is therefore 
secondary not only to Goethe’s Elective Affinities, but also to the literary, philosophical, 
historical, and biographical contexts in which it (the essay) was written—and, at the limit, 
to everything that came before it(s completion), albeit not in the absolute sense.785 Just as 
a father does not father his child by himself and in a timeless, space-less realm786 so 
Elective Affinities did not engender Benjamin’s essay ex nihilo. To claim that Elective 
Affinities is the source-text of Benjamin’s essay is no more than to indicate the genuine 
source-text by means of a heuristic device. Which is to say that a “father” is equally only 
a symbol or a fragment of “the” father—that “the” father is never not lost, has never not 
left, and his child is never not a bastard. 
But second reading is not thereby—on account of lectorial reading being exclusively a 
reading of written, cited texts—nullified; it is instead precisely what makes possible the 
source-text’s obscurity. After all, it is not lectorial reading that is the essential part of 
second reading, but scriptorial reading. In other words, the source-text can be extended 
to include prior readings and interpretations, half-articulated thoughts and distinct 
concepts, vague metaphors and particular examples, the skeleton of a thesis and the 
apparent affinity between certain words. Nonetheless, when they enter the act of writing, 
they are articulated or disarticulated by second reading, that is, read and re-thought such 
that, what appeared evident to the writer before the act of writing, reveals itself, on 
second reading, as mere chimera. And so too it is second reading that extends the 
thought, making previously hidden aspects of the incipient insight evident for the first 
time, all the while—due to the resonance787 and style that writing generates—in-forming 
                                                 
785 “Not in the absolute sense” means herein that the essay is not secondary to everything equally. 
786 This “patriarchal” metaphor means to accomplish two things: 1) it is meant to refer to the 
common meaning of “bastard” in “bastard reasoning,” namely, as describing a child without a 
father; and 2) it is meant to ironically exhibit the limits of carrying on a “man”-centered 
discourse. 
787 “Speaking—speaking and listening, as Ponge makes clear, for speaking is already its own 
listening—is the echo of the text in which the text is made and written, opens up to its own sense 
as to the plurality of its possible senses. It is not, and in any case not only, what one can call in a 
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its expression in yet un-thought ways, ones which ultimately push it to yield further 
insights. 
Given that such thoughts-intepretations-concepts derive at least partially from written 
“source-texts” that he has left behind, however mediately or immediately, the writer 
might seem to commit the error of taking himself for a reader—that is, he might seem to 
carry himself vis-à-vis these “source-texts” as does a reader, by turning his back to them 
in favor of his own interpretation(s). Yet these “source-texts,” from which he’s partially 
drawn his insights, should not be confused with the source-text of his writing. In truth, 
with this insight, the logic of extension typical of disclusive texts finally rips at the seams 
and demands a redress. For the extension at stake is not a linear, continuous one, but 
rather more akin to an interrupted line. That is, insofar as the child emerges from “its-
father-at-a-particular-point-in-time-space-history-etc.,” it is an extension of this specific 
father and not of its father as such. Equally, the father is not an extension of the 
grandfather but of the grandfather-there-then. At stake, namely, are mediated, 
discontinuous extensions. 
Benjamin’s Goethe essay is then not an immediate extension of Elective Affinities, but 
merely a mediate extension of it, being an immediate extension only of a nodal point 
wherein Elective Affinities participated. This, while Cioran’s On the Heights of Despair, 
for instance, is an immediate extension of its source-text, but—given the absolute 
obscurity of this source-text, the text not aiding its clarification in the least, devoid even 
of one allusion to another work or writer—doesn’t seem a mediate extension of any other 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
superficial way the musicality of a text: it is more profoundly the music in it, or the arch-music of 
that resonance where it listens to itself [s’écoute], by listening to itself finds itself [se trouve], and 
by finding itself deviates [s’écarte] from itself in order to resound further away, listening to itself 
before hearing/understanding itself, and thus actually becoming its ‘subject,’ which is neither the 
same as nor other than the individual subject who writes the text.” Jean-Luc Nancy, Listening, 
trans. Charlotte Mandell (New York: Fordham University Press, 2007), 35. In fact, this resonance 
between the text and its writer does not properly speaking belong to second reading. “Listening” 
is, in fact, a praxis on its own. No less is it involved, however, in writing. The resonance at hand 
should therefore be called a second listening. 
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text.788 The texts—brought to light by way of historical fact—that Cioran must have 
read, interpreted, and assimilated, only to thereafter leave behind, can certainly be 
regarded as related to On the Heights. But that, even if the historical fact is to be 
confirmed absolutely—by way of discovering, for instance, a set of notes in Cioran’s 
hand on, say, the entirety of Nietzsche’s Gay Science, dated almost immediately prior to 
his writing of On the Heights—it would still fall short of permitting Nietzsche’s Gay 
Science to be read as a mediate source-text of On the Heights. At most, these notes would 
be On the Heights’ mediate source-text, or it is Gay Science that would be the mediate 
source-text of these notes. Therefore, only where a text more or less explicitly alludes to 
another text can the latter be considered a mediate source-text of the former. And yet, this 
is still no more than a mediate source-text, and can not in any way be considered a 
“retrievable” part of the source-text. Herein, the possibility of arriving at the work’s 
source-text as another text, and therefore of comparing the work to this other text, 
disappears entirely. For even if comparison were not a writing “on,” it would nonetheless 
be as absurd as comparing Oedipus Rex to the myth of Oedipus—a myth which is never 
given except in other writings, none of which are identical to it. 
Thus is the relation between works entirely mysterious. And the one holding between the 
works of different writers is no less active ‘twixt the works of one and the same writer. 
                                                 
788 Three years prior to the publication of On the Heights, in 1931, Cioran’s short article entitled 
“A Modern Monster: the Bibliographer” made its way into a periodical. It serves as an eloquent 
justification for his debut’s dearth of bookish allusions: “The true intellectual has been replaced 
by the bibliographer. […] The bibliographer is a man who has entangled himself in books and 
who can’t create anything. It’s quite the illusion to believe that the impressive number of books 
that appear day after day are the product of some restless soul. On the contrary. almost all of them 
are written on the basis of index cards, of notes retrieved from other books. […] Indeed: the 
culture of bibliographers is a culture of index cards. No one will contest that this culture of index 
cards results from the democratization of culture. But few are disposed toward thinking that this 
culture of index cards, of scholars with withered or putrefying brains, is indubitably sterile. This 
because we, moderns, tend to appreciate work much more than spontaneous and fragmentary 
creation; on the condition, of course, that the work be constant. In the realm of culture proper, 
work doesn’t have any special value; it is an altogether secondary element. Isn’t appreciation for 
the punctilious and archival work of the bibliographer an indication of a lack of ample 
perspective? Why so many concessions to and so much benevolence towards this exemplar of 
decadence?” Emil Cioran, “Un Monstru Modern: Bibliograful,” in Opere II: Volume, 
Publicistică, Manuscrise, Corespondență, ed. Marin Diaconu (Bucharest: Editura Fundației 
Naționale pentru Știință și Artă, 2012), 144. (My translation.) 
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Save that, in this latter case, no matter how devoid of allusions to any other text a 
particular work is, it can still be assumed to have the writer’s prior work(s) for its mediate 
source-text(s). Not on account of any stable subject-hood that he might have—since he 
himself is barred from complete access both to the source-text of his own past works and 
to the source-text of the very work he’s writing—but only insofar as, having written those 
prior works, he has necessarily also read them. To ever so slightly graze the source-text 
of a particular work, a “philological”-commentary must therefore deal with all relevant 
prior works by the same writer, including the work whose source-text is at issue. To 
avoid, in “dealing” with more than one work, becoming a writing “on,” it must 
(mediately) “extend” each relevant work either independently of the others, so that the 
resonance carried from one part to the next might sound a note from the source-text’s 
harmony, or “across” the others as if a contagion, without clearly delineating them from 
one another, yet nonetheless proceeding chronologically (or, at least in part, 
terminologically), so that their final conglomeration might bear the shadow of a likeness 
to its illimitable density. (Or else, where historical, biographical, socio-political, 
economic, cultural, and literary-historical “parts” of the source-text are no less 
immediately available than another text, the “philological”-commentary could equally 
juxtapose these “parts” without explaining any one of them or filling the gaps ‘twixt them 
with explanation. Herein, second reading would operate at a “higher” level, namely that 
of selection and organization—although it would perhaps be tied no longer to the act of 
writing proper. Yet this approach is more suitable where the source-text of a genre or an 
epoch is sought, insofar as having recourse to the writer becomes, in this case, an outright 
impossibility.)789 
Yet, at much as this may sound like an attempt at “being equal to the object,” the latter 
has in fact vanished completely. Neither the source-text of the “philological”-
commentary nor the source-text of this source-text can be objects to the commentary: 
                                                 
789 See Giorgio Agamben, “The Prince and the Frog: The Question of Method in Adorno and 
Benjamin,” in Infancy and History: On the Destruction of Experience, trans. Liz Heron (London: 
Verso, 1993), 119-137. This text most notably includes the exchange between its title thinkers on 
the question of “mediation” as it applies to method, as well as Agamben’s juxtaposition (and, 
unfortunately: explanation) of this issue with regards to Hegelian (and Marxian) dialectics. 
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they are events-nows-crises both, and never objects against which either the commentary 
or they themselves are to be measured. If the “philological”-commentary nonetheless 
writes about a particular empirical text, trying to reach ever so slightly this latter’s 
source-text, this is not in order to be adequate either to the text it writes about or to this 
text’s source-text, but only to its own source-text, which is naught but the event of 
writing. For both its attempt of extending concrete prior texts and that of nonetheless 
either keeping these prior texts separate or forcing them to cross-pollinate are operations 
of second reading, which is part and parcel of its act of writing. Which is to say that these 
are not “attempts” or intentions in the least, but merely the consequences of fidelity to 
second reading. The notion of the source-text as an object is one that finds its place in 
and emerges from the reader’s realm alone. It’s the reader who con-fronts an object the 
presence of which pre-exists him. And therefore only in the “guiding”-commentary can 
the concern for object-adequacy be found, one that—projected not only between the 
commentary and its “source-text(s)” but also between its “source-text(s)” and various 
other “source-texts”—leads ultimately to comparison and writing “on.” 
(The secondariness at stake is therefore not primarily the one that the work may be said 
to hold vis-à-vis a prior work but, rather, first and foremost, the one that it holds with 
respect to its own birth, and, with it, everything that precedes it, including the prior work. 
Consequently, the notion that a work is also secondary to what succeeds it790 relies on a 
misunderstanding. Such a notion would argue, for instance, that, with the appearance of 
Kafka’s The Trial, Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment is irreversibly changed, that it 
becomes secondary to The Trial: in short, interpretable only through the lens of the latter. 
This constitutes at least in part the ground upon which reading secondary literature is 
deemed necessary. For it is supposed that a piece of secondary literature has the potential 
to substantially change the piece of primary literature that serves as its object—such that 
works are considered to be secondary even to their secondary literature. In truth, The 
                                                 
790 See T.S. Eliot, “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” in The Sacred Wood: Essays on Poetry 
and Criticism (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1920), 42-53, and Jorge Luis Borges, “Kafka and 
His Precursors,” trans. Eliot Weinberger, in Selected Non-Fictions, ed. Eliot Weinberger (New 
York: Viking Penguin, 1999), 363-5. The notion at stake boils down to the claim that the present 
changes the past (in Eliot), that Kafka (re-)invents (or re-writes) his precursors (in Borges). 
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Trial is an extension of its source-text, of its event, and this means: a transformation of it. 
Nonetheless, never is Crime and Punishment as such transformed by The Trial, but only 
Crime and Punishment as it occurs in The Trial’s source-text: the “image” of Crime and 
Punishment particular to that “age.” Through its transformative action, The Trial 
manages to make Crime and Punishment secondary to it only with regard to the latter’s 
image. It’s not the previous images of Crime and Punishment that thereafter become 
secondary to The Trial, but the image of Crime and Punishment: that is, all subsequent 
images of Crime and Punishment—until another text may operate a further 
transformation. The “guiding”-commentary tends to repeat a particular image of a text 
while the “philological”-commentary tends to transform it. Insofar as the latter 
necessarily involves second reading, however, its transformation of the text’s image is 
dependent precisely on willfully disregarding the text’s secondary literature, the 
“occlusive” kind and the “disclusive” kind equally.—It should be clear that only in the 
realm of the reader, where “source-text” is left undifferentiated from “prior text” does 
such a misunderstanding emerge.) 
X. 
Thus does writing, on account of the second reading it involves, open up the space of 
secondariness. It continuously points to its own beginning, and by so doing immediately 
points to the beginning; the Beginning begins with every beginning, with every act of 
writing.—At the start of Dell’Inizio, Massimo Cacciari’s chef d’oeuvre, two 
interlocutors, named A and B, discuss the opening pages of Kant’s first Critique, 
specifically the difference or identity between those of the 1781 edition (commonly 
designated as A) and those of the 1787 edition (commonly designated as B), with A 
defending the first edition against the second, and thus the very difference ‘twixt them, 
and B defending the second with the first, that is, the identity of the two editions. Toward 
the end of their dialogue, just prior to them reaching an agreement, the difference 
between the two beginnings of the first Critique is summarized by A. The beginning of 
the 1781 edition, as he puts it, “lead[s] to the necessity of asserting that a Beginning gives 
itself, and that it consists of the productive power of the intellect” since “if experience is 
the beginning of all knowledge, but experience is in truth considered a product of the 
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intellect,” then “every knowledge begins with an elaborated-produced kind of 
experience” such that “its only source is the subject that elaborates-produces.”791 
Consequently, the Beginning, as the subject, is a “causa immanens […] [i]mmanent […] 
to every act of knowing” and “always caus[ing] the beginning of knowing”—a knowing 
that “knows only experience,” namely, “as factum,” as the fabrication, “of the 
intellect.”792 In other words, the 1781 text, by making the Beginning identical to the 
subject, puts forward a closed circle: the latter gives itself, entirely from within itself, its 
own experiences-knowings-beginnings. It is, as such, not just a causa immanens but a 
causa sui. 
On the other hand, in the second edition of Kant’s book, “a Beginning does not give itself 
[…] we always find ourselves away from the Beginning, when we begin,” any 
“beginning of ours” being “already a result.”793 Here, then, the Beginning is rather a 
causa transiens—a “subject” that is “‘other’ than the intellect” whose produced 
appearances emerge, “re-produc[ing] themselves in experience,” no less than 
“mysteriously.”794 Put differently, the 1787 text posits, against the one of 1781, that the 
Beginning is identical to a “subject” other than the one proper to the intellect, that the 
“intellect-subject” is always one step behind this “other-subject,” that it follows the 
“footprints, traces, imprints”795 of the “other-subject” as if across a sandy shore, 
“footprints” that are not produced by the intellect-subject and thus are absent of any 
explanation for their visibility. Where in 1781, the beginning, namely, of knowing gave 
itself, which is another way of saying: was self-evident, by 1787 the beginning of 
                                                 
791 “condu[ce] di necessità ad affermare che si dà un Inizio, e che questo consiste nella forza 
produttiva dell’intelletto”; “l’esperienza è l’inizio di ogni conoscenza, ma l’esperienza è 
veramente pensata come prodotto dell’intelletto”; “ogni conoscere inizia da un che di elaborato-
prodotto.” Massimo Cacciari, Dell’Inizio (Milan: Adelphi, 1990), 21. 
792 “causa immanens […] [i]mmanente […] in ogni atto del conoscere”; “sempre causa l’inizio 
del conoscere”; “conosce soltanto l’esperienza, in quanto factum dall’intelletto.” Ibid. 
793 “non si dà Inizio”; “qualsiasi nostro inizio è già un risultato.” Ibid. 
794 “‘altro’ dall’intelletto”; “nell’esperienza misteriosamente si ri-producono.” Ibid., 19. 
795 “orme, tracce, impronte.” Ibid. 
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knowing is entirely shrouded, aloof, not giving itself to being known but vanishing, as an 
external, transitive cause, into the knowing it effectuates.796 In Kant’s terms, the first 
beginning is the transcendental subject while the second is the thing-in-itself. 
Nonetheless, despite the apparent solace that 1787 offers by giving the beginning what 
it’s due, by setting it aside, “[i]n reality,” argues A on behalf of 1781, “we are coerced by 
the problem of the beginning […] as causa immanens” either “to pursue […] the path of 
thinking the beginning” or “to immediately bar it, demonstrating the paralyzing 
antinomies to which such an attempt would give rise.”797 Here, as throughout, A 
purposely doubles the alternative, creating an echoing double-entendre: what he is 
saying, in other words, is that “we,” as subjects, may not care much for the 1787 
beginning precisely because, as a causa transiens, it is entirely external to “us,” but the 
1781 beginning coerces “us,” surrounds or corners “us,” inasmuch as it is “us”—and 
what it, the transcendental subject, coerces “us” to do, namely, is either to “produce” a 
beginning, that is, to experience the beginning, to explain it through induction, or bar any 
such experience-based explanation of the beginning through deduction, which would 
itself explain the beginning, only logically and negatively instead. 
It’s only now that B jumps to defend 1787, serious as ever, wondering whether such 
pursuit after the beginning is possible “without presupposing […] the ‘gray matter’ of 
sensation, the material side of […] the phenomenon.”798 B thus pushes A into a corner: 
certainly one can attempt to think the transcendental subject through its products, be they 
experiences (therefore inductively) or “pure” knowings (therefore deductively), but this 
is, in fact, to think after the fact, to follow after the beginning, to interpret its traces, and 
                                                 
796 Given that Kant’s two Introductions don’t truly make a conceptual distinction between 
“experience is the beginning of all knowing” and “experience is the first product of the intellect,” 
Cacciari must be seen as referring to the very beginning of these texts, to which of the two 
phrases begins the text. Consequently, the clarity of the 1787 beginning and the obscurity of that 
from 1781 must be seen as referring to Kant’s texts themselves. 
797 “noi siamo costretti al problema dell’Inizio”; “perseguire […] la via del pensiero dell’Inizio”; 
“subito sbarrarla, dimostrando le paralizzanti antinomie cui un simile tentativo darebbe luogo.” 
Ibid., 21. 




thus to attempt thinking the thing-in-itself, as the proper beginning, instead. Finally, A 
formulates what he sees as “the circle” ‘twixt the two positions, where each threatens to 
turn into the other in an endless “oscillation,” and turns the circle back toward himself. 
Of course, he claims, since “an object [is] ‘given’” only “as appearance, […] no object 
can be presupposed”799—which is to say that, indeed, the beginning at stake, the one 
behind the experiences investigated, the one which is presupposed, is to be considered 
more than just an object, since objects are only objects within the sphere of appearances 
and not beyond it. On the other hand, however, “if the Erscheinung lost its ‘Materie’”—
if, that is, the footprints and traces are entirely devoid of their cause on account of it 
being posited as a causa transiens, as a thing-in-itself—“we would have to see it [the 
Erscheinung: the experience at stake] purely as a product yet again.”800 
Here the entire problem of reading-writing, reader-writer, and source-text is present, but 
in epistemological rather than literary terms. What it describes, namely, is the stage upon 
which the reader performs his two functions: as (i) the reader of a text outside the act of 
writing, and as (ii) the writer of an occlusive text or “guiding”-commentary. For, in 
reading a text, the reader is guilty of no less than figuring its source-text as the causa 
transiens of the text, as an external, entirely opaque thing-in-itself from which the text 
has emerged mysteriously and which can by no means be re-accessed. Before it, the 
reader is at his most emphatic, for he ultimately imagines it to be the work of a “genius.” 
And it’s precisely for this reason—namely, on account of the unbridgeable distance that 
he perceives between the text (the Erscheinung) and its source-text (the Materie), of his 
inability to reach the latter—that the reader can so easily transfigure from an awestruck 
admirer to an aggressive, appropriating interpreter who, imagining the text as no more 
than his representation, effaces its materiality, misinterprets it as he desires and imagines 
himself as its source-text. Now a writer, the reader merely enacts the notion of the 
writer’s role that he held vis-à-vis the “work of genius”: he takes himself to be a genius 
                                                 
799 “ci è ‘dato’ un oggetto”; “soltanto come apparenza […] nessun oggetto può venir 
presupposto.” Ibid. 




and is so confident in his originality and his ability to write that he overlooks his own 
writing—which is to say, he doesn’t read his writing while he writes, and therefore 
disregards the act of writing altogether. 
The realm of reading thus contains two source-texts or beginnings—that is, two poles 
‘twixt which the reader swings without respite. At one end, in his act of reading, lies the 
source-text of the text he’s reading, while, at the other, in his act of “writing,” lies the 
source-text of the “guiding”-commentary he’s writing. Such is precisely the situation that 
Michel Foucault describes in “What is an Author?”—especially where his concern is to 
critique “[t]he notion of [écriture] as currently employed.”801 According to Foucault, 
écriture has fallen short of its declared intention (to excise the author) insofar as it has 
assumed an “a priori status”802—that is, has become a transcendental: the ahistorical 
condition of possibility for written texts as such. The implicit target here is Derrida (but 
also Blanchot), for whom écriture is (or: was) entirely removed from the empirical, being 
rather an archi-écriture that makes empirical writings and traces possible in the first 
place, functioning as “the general condition of each text, the condition of both the space 
in which it is dispersed and the time in which it unfolds.”803 Thus, goes Foucault’s 
argument, écriture as archi-écriture “transpose[s] the empirical character(istic)s of the 
author into a transcendental anonymity”804: it renders both empirical writing (the letters 
of the author), and the empirical in writing (trace, mark, style) transcendental, 
“generalizing” them by “neutralizing” them.—In short, Foucault accuses écriture—at the 
hands of which the author has supposedly been put to death—of confusing the individual, 
empirical author of the text with the notion of the author. By so doing, écriture limits 
itself to disposing of the empirical author, namely by bringing to the fore his 
character(istic)s, but these only in a “neutral,” “transcendentalizing” key: as “archi-
                                                 
801 Michel Foucault, “What is an Author?,” trans. Josué V. Harari, in The Foucault Reader, ed. 
Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 104. 
802 Ibid., 105. 
803 Ibid., 104. 
804 Ibid. (Translation modified.) 
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writing,” “différance,” “archi-trace,” “proper name,” and so on. In truth, the author is 
only one name for the ahistorical-a priori-transcendental, such that the 
transcendentalization of other figures over it ultimately only succeeds in preserving it. 
And now, rather than the author being “the indefinite source of significations which fill 
the text,” that which “precedes the works,”805 that to which the text can be subsumed and 
of which the text is the “expression” and product, it is écriture. Thus the question of 
“who speaks?” is not done away with but merely given a new answer: “language.” 
The “source-text” as it functions in the reader’s realm is no more than a synonym for this 
notion of écriture, such that the double but non-coincidental status of the former—as 
thing in itself and transcendental subject—is not less characteristic of the latter. For, as 
Foucault argues, the effacement of “the more visible marks of the author’s empiricity” 
from which this a priori concept of écriture results is accomplished though a “playing 
off, one against the other” of “two ways of characterizing” the latter: “namely, the critical 
and religious approaches.”806 In the critical approach, écriture is deemed to have a 
“creative character”: it creates807 texts that inevitably subject it to “oblivion and 
repression” such that it only remains in the “implicit significations, silent determinations, 
and obscured contents”808 of these texts, elements that thereafter impel commentary. In 
other words, écriture “dies”—turns absent in the wake of its oblivion—no less than the 
author, while its text “surviv[es],” persists in “enigmatic excess”809 of it, which is to say: 
                                                 
805 Ibid., 118-19. 
806 Ibid. These two approaches, the critical and the religious, correspond to Derrida and Blanchot, 
respectively—both of whom had published scathing critiques of Foucault’s previous works: 
Derrida of The History of Madness (in the 1963 “Cogito and the History of Madness”) and 
Blanchot of The Order of Things (in the 1967 “Atheism and Writing. Humanism and the Cry”). 
This being 1969, Foucault’s response/critique is probably directed at Derrida’s 1967 Of 
Grammatology and Blanchot’s 1969 (albeit for the most part already published in periodicals) 
The Infinite Conversation. 
807 Foucault makes use of the word créateur in describing its character. Michel Foucault, “Qu’est-
ce qu’un auteur?,” in Dits et Écrits, 1954-1988: I, 1954-1969, ed. Daniel Defert, François 
Ewabel, and Jacques Lagrange (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1994), 795. 
808 Foucault, “What is an Author?,” 104. 
809 Ibid., 105. 
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persists only inasmuch as it becomes the symbol of its originator and thus helps it persist 
in turn. In the religious approach, on the other hand, écriture takes on a “sacred 
character,” functioning as the sacred text (the Book), “the inalterable and yet never 
fulfilled tradition,”810 the absolute totality of all texts. Like creative écriture, however, it 
too is pushed into oblivion and repression by the very texts from which it is made up, and 
as a result is accessible only as the “hidden meaning” of these texts, “requir[ing] [their] 
interpretation”811 so as to be remembered. 
Put in the terms proper to the reader’s realm, sacred écriture is the source-text of the 
reader’s object, of the text handed down to him or bequeathed on him by tradition—this 
being the quality of every text he reads. That the reader is aware of sacred écriture, that 
he initially construes the text he reads as “the work of a genius,” is not a function of some 
attribute belonging to the text. Nothing in the text or on the text announces to the reader 
that its origin is sacred. It’s instead the very “fact” of its existence that tips him off—
immediately implying, as it does, a productive capacity. Upon finally reading the text, the 
reader will also subject it to interpretation, intent on arriving at its ultimate, hidden 
meaning, that is, on disclosing its source-text: sacred écriture. But that, interpretation can 
only be directed at the form and contents of the text, while the hidden meaning pursued 
by the reader is itself present only at the “level” of the text’s existence.812 This meaning 
is therefore essentially impervious to all interpretation. Unwitting, the reader forges 
ahead without ever reaching his sought-after treasure, but unearthing, instead, more and 
more of the text’s mutually exclusive meanings. And precisely now, at the moment of his 
total failure, does he make the double realization that (i) the hidden meaning of the text is 
constitutively inaccessible813 and that (ii) the meanings he’s “unearthed” from the text 
are, in fact, his products, which means that he himself has a productive capacity of sorts, 
                                                 
810 Ibid., 104-5. 
811 Ibid. 
812 Differently put, interpretation attends only to the meaning of the text’s form and contents and 
never to their existence (or, the meaning of their existence). 
813 Better yet: it is un-predicable, or, only “it exists” can be predicated of it. 
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the potential to be a “source-text.” The reader finally actualizes himself as a source-text 
only upon deciding to exscribe these meanings—a source-text, namely, of the text or 
texts that emerge from this exscription. 
This second source-text is no more than the écriture associated, by Foucault, with the 
critical approach, namely, creative écriture. And what is valid for this écriture becomes 
valid for the reader at this stage: he is effaced. For, if he’s limited to being an empirical 
subject in employing his faculty of reception, then, conversely, he can’t be more than a 
transcendental subject in exercising his productive faculty. His effacement, the removal 
of his empiricity, is therefore the condition of his writing, of his textual production. It’s 
all the same whether this is understood as (i) the text effacing its writer, the reader, or as 
(ii) the reader effacing himself for the text that he writes, since the reader is erased in the 
same moment that his text materializes. Put differently, the fact that his production 
depends on non-empiricity and non-receptivity means that the reader is never truly 
writing, that his act of writing doesn’t occur, or, better yet, occurs all at once. 
Consequently, the trace of this act or of the reader lies not in the text but “in” the very 
existence of the text—it is the text entire. To speak of the reader’s death, of the text’s 
birth, and of their coincidence is the most accurate. Thus does creative écriture end 
where sacred écriture begins: as empirically present in no more than the text’s existence. 
Foucault’s loose mention of implicit significations, silent determinations, and obscured 
contents is mere irony—for where a meaning is implicit, a determination is silent, and a 
content is obscured, at stake is either the hallucination of a reader or the text’s very 
existence. 
This, in short, is the aut aut dialectic of the reader: either A or B—either creative écriture 
or sacred écriture—never both at once—only one when not the other. From it, 
singularity, event, act, and situation are all proscribed, this being no less true for the 
visible marks of the author’s empiricity. Proscribed, that is, on the author’s authority. It 
should come as no surprise that the only way out is the replacement of this either/or with 
both/and or neither/nor (or: both/and and/or neither/nor). Of, that is, replacing—or: 
supplementing—a relationship of opposition and mutual exclusion with one wherein the 
two terms can co-exist or coincide. Both Cacciari and Foucault suggest as much: Cacciari 
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through the very choice of writing a dialogue ‘twixt A and B—that is, both of writing a 
dialogue between A and B, and therefore arresting the oscillation ‘twixt them, and of 
writing a dialogue between A and B, rendering the first letter of his last name the symbol 
of his choice—and Foucault first and foremost by constructing a tight juxtaposition of 
creative écriture with sacred écriture and following it with that between the author’s 
disappearance and the death of God (and man).814 For it is no less than the 
transcendental’s doubling that “has managed” to unfailingly secure it from the 
vulnerability of the empirical; that has, in other words, perpetuated the myths of genius, 
of eternal-primordial-universal-unchanging truths, and of artworks’ and ideas’ 
immaculate conception and transmission. At stake is a mechanism wherein any one 
empirical appearance is assigned two transcendentals that are mutually exclusive such 
that it can’t, in turn, be attributed to either of them; consequently, they are left with clean 
records while it is forsaken to endless oscillation. As should be obvious, this problem is 
no other than that which starts Kant’s first Critique, namely, the duplicity or ambiguity of 
experience’s reference (or origo)—on the one hand, (to) the thing in itself, and on the 
other, (to) the transcendental subject. Accordingly, only where these two noumena 
coincide can the reader’s aut aut dialectic be arrested and pierced through. 
There is but one such moment of coincidence between thing in itself and transcendental 
subject: the text itself—which is to say, the very fact of its existence, the text as factum. 
This means, namely, that the now of writing, of the text’s being made, functions as the 
crisis of the reader’s dialectic. This (f)act, extended, provides the text with a single 
transcendental and therefore one tied to it at the hip. Thus does the (empirical) text enter 
a relationship of reciprocity with its transcendental (concept), becoming the latter’s 
condition of possibility in turn: without being identical to a particular empirical object, 
the transcendental can henceforth be gleaned only from the empirical, as a particular set 
of connections within it, for instance. Which is to say that any “author” spotted 
                                                 
814 “It is not enough, however, to repeat the empty affirmation that the author has disappeared. 
For the same reason, it is not enough to keep repeating (after Nietzsche) that God and man have 




henceforth is rather the effect or function of the particular set of elements a text possesses 
within a particular discursive-historical context. Put differently, any a priori is now 
historically contingent. It relies, for its production, on a particular set of acts and 
practices, and this holds no less for every other concept. Thus the coincidence between 
the Self and the Other brings with it yet other coincidences—between the empirical and 
the transcendent, receptivity and productivity—and upends, at the limit, the reader’s 
entire realm. Ecce: the act of writing in-formed by second reading. The realm that now 
emerges, that proper to the writer, consists entirely of act(ion)s, encounters, processes, 
productions, situations, events, roles, functions, singularities and multiplicities. And the 
“source-text,” the beginning, what the text is secondary to, is neither a transcendental 
method nor a transcendental object, but only the singular event of the text’s emergence, 
one of which its correlative singular text is the sole extension. It is a singular suspension 
of the reader’s dialectic, a singular coincidence of Self and Other. There is only ever one 
source-text for every text, and one text for every source-text. 
XI. 
The writing in-formed by second reading—the disclusive text—has its postulates: 
1. It is not a work of “criticism.” Which is to say: it does not aim to assess or evaluate 
another text. The disclusive text is only ever an “extension” or “transformation” of the 
latter. 
2. It writes neither “on” the other-text nor “on” itself, but only ever “in.” Strictly 
speaking, and from the point of view of its reader, the disclusive text’s commentary is 
implied. This holds also for its use of irony. 
3. The voice of its writer is not to be distinguished from the voice of the other-text’s 
writer. It is a constitutive impossibility for the other writer to have a voice in this text. 
4. Serious engagement is limited to one other-text at a time and the results of each 
disparate interpretation should be left un-synthesized. The disclusive text has no one 
principal thesis. It is made of a non-synthesizeable multiplicity of theses. Problems, not 
solutions, are its bread and butter. 
301 
 
5. Each writer, and ultimately each other-text, deserves serious engagement. Therefore, 
any introduction of a writer or other-text merely to illustrate a point, borrow a term, or 
create an analogy should be avoided. 
6. Matters of history or context—whether understood as biography, literary history, 
history of ideas, socio-economic history, and so on—are to be excluded. This because 
each such con-text can be understood only by interpreting a set of various other-texts. 
Seriously engaging with each, as second reading requires, would create an infinite task. 
For this same reason, the larger the quantity of secondary literature that the other-text 
possesses, the less pertinent this literature should be to the disclusive text 
7. Each engagement should make use of a different method—that is, a different “form” of 
writing, or a different organizational principle. 
8. The writer should reread the “finished” parts of his disclusive text as little as possible. 
In principle, he should forget his previous conceptual constructions and always start 
afresh. Conceptual consistency or coherence is not his priority. 
9. Every thought, argument, idea, concept, “introduced” by the disclusive text should be 
followed through to the end, to the point where it threatens to contradict itself. Although 
the disclusive writer’s ability to become-mad with his text is essential, it should never be 
taken for granted. 









Ailleurs, bien loin d’ici! trop tard! jamais peut-être! 
—Charles Baudelaire, “À une passante” 
This dissertation is the result of my attempt to extract Walter Benjamin’s theory of ideas 
from his early writings—particularly from his (i) 1916-1917 epistemologico-linguistic 
fragments, (ii) dissertation, (iii) “Goethe’s Elective Affinities” essay, and (iv) “Epistemo-
Critical Prologue.” The first chapter functioned, by way of augmenting Benjamin’s 1916 
“Letter to Martin Buber” and positioning his remarks therefrom with the existentialist 
current, as a stylistic justification of and guide to the rest of my dissertation. In the second 
chapter, I turned to interpreting and supplementing Benjamin’s essay “On Language” in a 
systematic key, drawing from it two main postulates: (i) that paradisiacal language 
implies a necessary hierarchy or differentiation between three types of language (of 
things, of man, of God) and (ii) that translation and art, especially in the form of the 
Trauerspiel, function as modes wherein this hierarchy can be re-established and fallen 
language can be escaped. The third chapter analyzed Benjamin’s 1916-1917 
epistemologico-linguistic fragments, conceptualized his notion of a “new transcendental 
logic”—posited in the “Coming Philosophy” essay—as a theory of language and 
translation, and argued that the concept of “non-synthesis” from the same essay should be 
understood as Benjamin’s concept of the idea. In the fourth chapter, I further developed 
this concept of “non-synthesis” by investigating its appearance within Benjamin’s 
dissertation on Romanticism and his essay on “Goethe’s Elective Affinities”: namely, as 
that which underlies the tension both between form and content and between the 
Romantics and Goethe. 
In the fifth and central chapter, I brought the entirety of my previous insights to bear on 
the “Epistemo-Critical Prologue.” I therein posited and applied (i) the Platonic concept of 
“bastard reasoning” as a mediator between the Romantics and Goethe as much as 
between the methods of deduction and induction that I saw them embody, and (ii) the 
concept of “virtual translation” as an instance of Benjamin’s “new transcendental logic.” 
Most prominently, I offered distinguos between concept, phenomenon, idea, and truth 
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along the lines of the hierarchy I had already extracted from the essay “On Language”: 
truth corresponding to the divine word, phenomenon—to the language of things, 
concept—to fallen language, and idea—to paradisiacal language. I ended the chapter by 
elaborating, in an apocalyptic key, on translation, critique, art, and philosophy as various 
forms of escape from conceptualizing, fallen language. Finally, in the sixth chapter, I 
presented the methodology used by the dissertation while both (i) applying Benjamin’s 
theory of ideas to the praxes of reading and writing, and (ii) engaging with while further 
contextualizing Benjamin within post-war literary theory. 
What I dare to see this dissertation as having most notably achieved, established, or 
presented are: (i) a retrieval not so much of the system as of the metaphysics present in 
Benjamin’s early writings (especially in Chapters 2 and 5); (ii) a sketch of Benjamin’s 
ethics (spread across Chapters 1, 2, 5, and 6); (iii) the elaboration of a particular post-
history in which Benjamin participates, namely, an undercurrent of existentialism that 
extends into literary theory (in Chapters 1 and 6); and (iv) the inextricability of the theory 
of ideas from a theory of language, and therefore the re-placement of language at the 
forefront of philosophy (in Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5).815 
* 
As the reader will note, this dissertation has abstained from interpreting most of 
Benjamin’s early fragments on aesthetics, as well as, and corresponding to them, the 
“Philosophical Beauty” section of the “Epistemo-Critical Prologue.” In short, despite my 
best efforts and many pages written but ultimately excised, I was not able to properly 
conceptualize Benjamin’s aesthetics—specifically his theory regarding “beauty,” 
“semblance,” and “symbol.” I regard this as the greatest limitation of my project. As a 
                                                 
815 I’m referring, of course, to the philosophical movement of speculative realism, which, as far as 
I can tell, has no theory of language. I cannot claim complete originality herein, however. I would 
say, rather, that my writing inscribes itself within a contemporary “return” to the question of 
language, which I see as undergirding Giorgio Agamben’s publication of Che cos’è la filosofia 
(2016) and the recent English translations of (i) Werner Hamacher’s Minima Philologica (2015), 
(ii) Paolo Virno’s When the Word Becomes Flesh (2015) and Essay on Negation (2018), and (iii) 
Vilém Flusser’s early writings on the philosophy of language (2014-2018). 
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result, I would like, in a future project, to investigate the meaning of these three terms as 
they appear in the aesthetics of Weimar Classicism and German Idealism/Romanticism, 
so as to be able to establish the manner in which Benjamin modifies or re-interprets them. 
I thereby see myself as following in the footsteps of Gianni Carchia, who, subsequent to 
writing his thesis on truth and language in early Benjamin, roamed the field(s) of 
aesthetics. But that, while his starting point was the Ancient Greeks, mine would be the 
Germans. 
Another project that I regard as a possible extension of this dissertation is one that I 
began during my writing of Chapter 6 but had to put aside: namely, a theory of linguistic 
praxes. Such a theory would interrogate the manner in which the praxes of speaking, 
listening, conversing, and so on, operate and differ from those of reading and writing. 
This second project would take as its starting points (i) the tension between hermeneutics 
and deconstruction as it emerged Jacques Derrida’s 1981 debate with Hans-Georg 
Gadamer and was worked through by Werner Hamacher in his analysis of 
Schleiermacher’s lectures, and (ii) Jean-Luc Nancy’s theory of listening. Furthermore, it 
would attempt to figure the difference between praxes along the lines of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s language-games and thus interrogate the extent to which the latter 
intersects with Benjamin’s theory of ideas. 
Lastly, I realize that I’ve left many thoughts open and threads loose through this 
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